Coercive Persuasion
Coercive Persuasion
A Socio-psychological Analysis of the
“ Brainwashing ” of American Civilian
Prisoners by the Chinese Communists
EDGAR H. SCHEIN with
INGE SGHNEIER and CURTIS H. BARKER
Center for International Studies
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
W. W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC.
New York
Sms, 8 -73
K1
13867
COPYRIGHT © 1961 THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
FIRST EDITION
Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 61-7483
PRINTED K THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE PUBLISHERS BY THE VAIL- BALLOU PRESS, INC.
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CONTENTS
' Preface and Methodology 7
Introduction jg
TART I The Context of Coercive Persuasion
1 The Persuasion Theme in the Development of the Chi*
nese Communist Party 25
2 Thought Reform After the Take-over 43
3 The Passion for Unanimity 02
TART II Coercive Persuasion: Its Structure, Effects, and
Determinants
4 A Socio-psychological Model for the Analysis of Coer-
cive Persuasion 117
5 The Special Role of Cuilt in Coercive Persuasion 140
0 The Effects of Coercive Persuasion 157
7 The Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 167
PART HI Theories of Coercive Persuasion
8 Theories I: Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 199
9 Theories II: Socio-psychological Theories 221
PART IV Implications for a Theory of Influence
10 The Realization of Belief 259
11 Coercive Persuasion in Non-Communist Settings: Some
Parallels 269
CONCLUSIONS 283
Appendixes 256
Bibliography '
Index
314
PREFACE AND METHODOLOGY
The study to be reported below was an outgrowth of research which
began in 1953. At the time I was serving as an Army research psychol-
ogist at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Washington,
D.C. With the settling of the terms of the armistice in Korea came
the problem of how to handle the prisoners of war who were to be
exchanged; specifically, how to determine what experiences they had
undergone and how to assess the effects of such experiences on the
men. As is well known by now, the decision was made to give an
extensive battery of interviews and psychological tests to all the
repatriates, and, to accomplish this, a large group of intelligence
officers, psychiatrists, and psychologists were gathered together to
work in Tokyo, Inchon, and on board ship carrying the repatriates
home (Segal, 1954; Lifton, 1954).
Underlying this decision was the concern which we had that the
Chinese had been able to sway many of our soldiers to their way of
thinking, as evidenced by reports of extensive collaboration, by
propaganda broadcasts made by some of the prisoners, and by letters
and other documentary evidence of collaboration. The publication
of Edward Hunters bock, Brainwashing in Bed China (1951), pro-
vided further evidence of the Chinese Communists’ intentions to
wage a total ideological war and provided information concerning
some of the techniques used on the Chinese mainland to secure the
allegiance of politically neutral or hostile Chinese to the Communist
cause. We were all concerned to find out whether the Chinese had
"brainwashed” our troops, and if so, what this meant and by what
means it had been accomplished. The possibility that the repatriates
would need psychiatric care upon their return was seriously faced
and provisions were therefore made to have a psychiatrist interview
each repatriate prior to his arrival in the States.
I was one of a number of psychologists who were sent to the Far
East to participate in this program, specifically, to support the
psychiatrists by being available to give tests where such were called
for. As it turned out, the exigencies of the local situation did not al-
low much time for psychological testing. Consequently, a number
g Preface and Methodology
of us turned our attention to the research program which had also
been built into the processing of the men, and, as part of this re-
search program, I began to devote time to a soeio-psychological
analysis of the situation which had existed in the Chinese prison
camps (Schein, 1956). The opportunity to conduct these interviews
met my needs very well because of long-standing interests which I
had in group psychology and the social psychology of influence and
attitude change.
One of the major conclusions which came out of these interviews
was that the much-feared Communist program of “brainwashing”
was really more of an intensive indoctrination program in combina-
tion with very sophisticated techniques of undermining the social
structure of the prisoner group, thereby eliciting collaboration which
in most cases was not based on ideological change of any sort. In
other words, the indoctrination was not very effective but the social
control exercised by the Chinese Communists was (Schein, 1956).
Clearly the Chinese Communists had a novel approach to dealing
with a large captive group, but the low rate of ideological influence
in this group left unanswered the question of whether the Chinese
had discovered or were using some new techniques of changing the
political beliefs of captives. There appeared to be ample evidence
of the success of their indoctrination techniques with segments of
their own population, but not until some time after the repatriation
had been completed was there any further available evidence con-
cerning the effectiveness of these techniques with Westerners who
were known to have been initially hostile to the Communist regime.
A group of American and European students, doctors, business-
men, and missionaries began to be repatriated into Hong Kong in
1953, and among these were a goodly number, including some
Americans who had been studying in Peking, who were arrested
after the outbreak of the Korean War and imprisoned for periods of
tlircc to five years. Within this group were some individuals who
stated to the press when first interviewed in Hong Kong that they
had been spies for the United States, that they had been justly
arrested, tliat they had deserved the punishment which they had
received, and that, in fact, they had been treated very leniently by
the Chinese Communist government These statements seemed
fantastic inasmuch as there was absolutely no evidence tliat any of
Preface and Methodology 9
the repatriates had committed any of the crimes to which they had
confessed, and because of evidence from other repatriates and de-
fectors (as well as from the subjects' own later admissions) that
their imprisonment had been anything but lenient, and had, in fact,
been quite brutal by Western standards. It seemed then, that these
cases represented more truly instances of what Hunter had called
brainwashing”; that is, cases of genuine ideological conversion
seemingly accomplished by coercive means.
The present study was then undertaken in an attempt to find out
what had happened to this small group of Americans, what these
events meant to the prisoners, what attitude changes had actually
taken place and why, what long-run effects could be observed in
them following their return home, and, finally, the meaning of all
these events for the social psychology of influence and attitude
change.
The study was sponsored by the Center for International Studies
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was carried out in
collaboration with Inge Schneier and Curtis H. Barker from 1937
to 1959,
Our original plan was based on the assumption that if we were to
understand “brainwashing,” or coercive persuasion as we came to
call the process, we should have to understand a great deal more
about the context in which it operated (Le. the cultural, social, and
political situation in China and the history of the Communist take-
over) and about the histories of the people who were arrested and
coercively persuaded. It was apparent that what had happened to
these Americans was part of an extensive program which the Chinese
Communists themselves call “thought reform” or 'ideological re-
molding.” °
Since we were not China experts, it seemed that the way to gather
this kind of background contextual information was to set up a
proj'ect which would provide for the editing of a volume, the con-
tributors to be Cliina experts who would write articles on the various
phases of the thought reform program and its effects. Oar intention
• The first rood reports of thought reform were published In 1950 and 1957
by Robert Luton, \s ho also wo r led at the Walter Reed Institute of Research
and who based his conclusions on Interviews conducted in Hong Kong with
defected Chinese and expelled Westerners (Lifton, 1956b).
10
Preface and Methodology
was not only to treat thought reform in the context of Chinese de-
velopments and Chinese Communist history, but also to relate it
to other lands of contexts such as Soviet types of indoctrination and
totalitarianism in general, as well as to other kinds of mass persuasion
attempts in history such as the Papal Inquisition. The analysis was
also to include chapters on theory by representatives of the fields of
psychology, psychiatry, sociology, political science, and anthropol-
ogy, who would give a theoretical analysis of the process based on
their particular disciplinary point of view.
The first step in carrying out our plan involved a series of inter-
views with experts in the field. 0 The purpose of the interviews with
these experts in Chinese affairs, Russian affairs, history, psychology,
sociology, and anthropology was to try to answer the following
questions:
1. Was the project feasible, and if so, what suggestions did they
have for organizing it?
2. Could they suggest reading material?
3. Could they suggest names of people who might be contributors
to the project, who would have the kind of knowledge that would
• Among the persons interviewed were:
Allport, Gordon
Bauer, Raymond
DuBols, Cora
Jduddiohn, Clyde
Schwartz, Benjamin
Korol, Alexander
Lctwin, William
Milliken, Max
Morfson, Elting
Pool, Ithicl
Pye, Ludan
Borton, Hugh
Dallin, Alexander
Roberts, Henry
Robinson, Ceroid
Berle, Adolf
Krader, Lawrence
Monroe, James
Moseley, Philip
Borjlczky, Sandor
Fisher, George
Krcdcrmeti. Paul
Harvard University
MIT
Columbia University
New York
Brandeis University
RAND Corporation
American University
Sodcty for the Investigation of Human
Ecology, New York
Coundl on Fordgn Relations, New York
Preface and Methodology , jj
allow them to write a chapter for us without having to do extensive
original research?
In general, the persons interviewed expressed the opinion that the
project was very worth while and important, but somewhat too
ambitious and too broad. Most important, however, was the finding
that the number of candidates who were suggested for chapters was
quite inadequate in terms of how we visualized our end product It
was evident that the kinds of questions we were asking were im-
portant, but could not be answered without extensive original re-
search. We were seeking (1) ways of bridging the gaps between
areas of knowledge and (2) broad sets of relationships between
different events that occur in totalitarian societies. But such ques-
tions in particular were ones which we found most political scien-
tists or historians unwilling to get involved with. Hence, the major
conclusion of our interviewing was that it would be quite unlikely
that we should be able to find contributors for the bulk of tho areas
which we had chosen to investigate.
Since it was not possible to get contributors who would answer
the questions we had originally posed, we decided that it might be
best to reorient our work outline toward questions that perhaps we
ourselves could answer, not by investigating primary sources (most
of which would, of course, be in Chinese), but by pulling together
material from various secondary sources and analyses. In terms of
the literature which we felt might be available to us, wo asked our-
selves what kind of a research outline we could reasonably set up
for ourselves, i.e. what kinds of questions we might be able to
answer. Through a series of discussions we arrived at the following
outline:
1. A discussion of the political-social-cultural context in which
coercive persuasion operates, stated as a set of hypotheses. This
discussion would include analyses of any historical, social, and
cultural factors which we could identify in totalitarian society in
general and in the Chinese situation in particular which bore on die
development of the thought reform program and its operation in
the 1950s.
2. An an alp is of the institutional devices for carrying out the
process of coercive persuasion, i.e., pena! institutions, revolutionary
universities, organized group discussions, and so on.
12
Freface and Methodology
3. A consideration of the individuals or groups which serve as the
agents of the institutions discussed above, i.e., the sorts of people
who are the change agents in the day-to-day business of producing
ideological change.
4. A consideration of the victims or target individuals and groups,
i.e., who became involved in the program and why. The considera-
tion here of why Westerners, why prisoners of war, and why Ameri-
cans became involved is obviously a crucial one.
5. A consideration of the interpersonal process between the agent
and the target What goes on, for example, in the political prison
which leads to a change process in the target individual?
6. A consideration of what might be called the intrapsychic proc-
ess within the target individual. What kinds of changes were pro-
duced and by what kinds of psychological mechanisms are these
changes to be understood?
7. A consideration of various kinds of psychological, psychiatric,
sociological, and other theories which pertain to the change process
or the influence process, with an attempt to evaluate what kinds of
theoretical models are best suited to explaining what happened to
the target individuals.
8. A consideration of parallel phenomena either at other periods
in history or in our own contemporary society, in which we should
attempt to spell out what sources of influence in our own society
resemble the coercive persuasion that one witnesses in China. By
making the comparison, we hoped it would be possible to illuminate
both the process as it occurs in China and the process as it occurs
in our own society.
We realized that we could not cover each of the above points with
equal intensity or sophistication, particularly on the contextual side.
We hoped, rather, to draw together what information oilier people
had gathered and to summarize and integrate rather than produce
original research. Our original contribution is primarily in the
analysis of the interpersonal process that occurred in coercive per-
suasion between the change agent and the target individual, and
the internal effects of this process on the target individual.
Having determined an outline for organizing our study, the ques-
tion next arose of how best to gather the information relevant to the
13
Preface and Methodology
various topics. We chose to look at four kinds of data, or, rather, we
chose four different approaches to the gathering of data in these
areas.
1. Reading existing analyses of Communist China, the Soviet
Union, and totalitarian society in general.
2. 'Reading autobiographical accounts of victims of coercive per-
suasion, both victims of Soviet imprisonment, forced labor, and in-
doctrination, and victims of Chinese Communist thought reform.
3. Discussions with various China experts as particular questions
arose and as we needed dues to new sources or answers to specific
questions.
4. Interviews with Americans who actually experienced thought
reform and who allegedly were successfully “brainwashed.” Such in-
terviews were of interest not only from the point of view of getting
information about the methods of thought reform, but also from the
point of view of gathering follow-up data some three to five years
after the experience. In choosing the subjects for interviewing we
were not attempting to obtain a representative sample of civilian
repatriates. Rather we were seeking people who had experienced the
full force of thought reform in a prison setting and either had been
influenced or had resisted influence successfully. Our final sample
therefore consists of only fifteen people, but the accounts of these
individuals have been supplemented by material from published
reports, government documents, first-hand observations by others
not imprisoned, and consultations with others who are studying
modem Chinese affairs.
The report which follows is the result of amalgamating the data
gathered through these four approaches. As will be seen, the report
does not follow our original outline at many points and there is far
more emphasis on some of the points in the outline than on others.
It is our hope that many of the assertions we make tliroughout the
report will be treated primarily as hypotheses contributing to the
understanding of events which have been little understood thus far,
and that the reader wffl approach our study with a spirit of inquiry
rather than with a hope of finding final answers. It is also our hope
that we have been able to convey the complexity of the coercive per-
suasion phenomenon and to avoid the kind of oversimplification
14 Preface and Methodology
which has characterized some of the early efforts to understand it.
A few words are in order concerning our own division of labor. All
three of us worked on all phases of the project. We divided our
reading responsibilities and concentrated on different questions but
basically hammered our conclusions out jointly. We each did some
of the interviewing and each worked up portions of the material. It
is therefore difficult to give credit for any particular set of ideas to
any one of us. They were always a joint product. The only exceptions
are the historical outline in Chapter 1 (developed by Curt Barker),
the categories which underlie Chapter 5 on types of guilt (developed
by Inge Schneier), and the theoretical model of coercive persuasion
which underlies Chapters 4, 8, 9, and 10 (which is my own). Specific
contributions by Curt Barker can also be found in Appendixes 2
and 3 (group methods and the agent). The final draft is my own
version of our joint conclusions.
The encouragement and support of many of our colleagues helped
us to sharpen our ideas, and their critical evaluation of our con-
clusions helped us to avoid premature or unwarranted generaliza-
tions. We would like to extend special thanks to James Monroe of
the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology for his consistent
support of this project and for his generous offering of his own
knowledge of psychological warfare to us.
The support which we received from the Center for International
Studies was immeasurable. Particularly helpful were the efforts of
Miss Alice Riedinger, the Center librarian, and Don Blackmcr,
Arthur Singer, and Richard W. Hatch whose encouragement and
support were unflagging. The tireless efforts of a number of secre-
taries, particularly Miss Jane Ishenvod, also deserve special mention.
Finally, I must give special thanks to my wife, who not only pro-
vided the moral support necessary to complete the study, but whose
editing of the entire manuscript improved its quality immeasurably.
Our thanks also to our subjects, whose interest in our study and
willingness to give freely of their time and thoughts made the inter-
views productive and rewarding experiences.
Edcah H. Scum*
Cambridge, Massachusetts
INTRODUCTION
The pubfose of this study is to analyze the experiences of a small
number of American civilians who were imprisoned by the Chinese
Communists between 1950 and 1956. These cases are of interest to
the psychologist because almost all of these individuals are alleged
to have made confessions of a politically damaging nature and a small
percentage of them appeared upon repatriation to have been con-
verted to Communism. Though there was no evidence at all of their
having worked for the United States Government, and though it
became known through others and from their own later accounts
that their imprisonment had been illegal and quite brutal by West-
ern standards, they made statements like the following upon their
repatriation:
“In China today a person who is not guilty of a crime could never be
arrested or convicted. . . . Before I was arrested in my heart I knew
that I was guilty of being a spy, but I wouldn’t have admitted it . . .
our conditions were so good! The People’s Government took care of us
so well! . . . We had no pressure put on us."
"When I was arTested I was absolutely guilty of the crime of espionage
... I knew in the first place that I was guilty. ... In order to gam
self-respect one has to confess. ... We are grateful for such light sen-
tences. One has to be penitent to be released."
Because the beliefs, attitudes, and values of these persons had
apparently been drastically altered by coercive means, the label
"brainwashing" came to be applied to the experiences they had
undergone, and it was widely assumed that the Communists had
developed a new and powerful weapon to use against the mind of
man. . .
The dramatic confessions of Communist Party members in die
Soviet purge trials of the 1930 s, the confessions extracted by the
Soviet and satellite secret police from Cardinal Mindszcnty, William
Oatis, and Robert Vogcler bad given ample forewarning of Com-
munist willingness and ability (^obtain confessions, b at not until
Introduction
16
the publication of Edward Hunters book Brainwashing in Red
China (1951) did it become widely apparent that the Chinese Com-
munists were waging a far more extensive battle for the mind of
man, which included confession extraction as only a small, though
key, part of a more elaborate process of re-education. And not only
was such political-ideological re-education limited to political prison-
ers, but it was widely applied to all segments of Chinese society. The
attempts to indoctrinate United Nations prisoners of war in Korea
and the successful extraction of germ warfare confessions from some
of them was but one segment of this total program of ideological
re-education.
The term “brainwashing,” introduced into the English language
by Hunter, derives from the Chinese phrase Hsi Nao, which is used
to refer to the idea of washing away the vestiges of the old system
(literally “cleansing the mind”) in the process of being re-educated
to assume one's place in the new Communist society. The concept
is alleged to have been used in reference to re-education by Mao
Tse-tung in his early speeches on Chinese Communism, but is not
commonly in use witliin China today. The more common way to
refer to the program of re-education is the phrase Szu Hsing Kai
Tsao, which translates into “thought reform” or “ideological remold-
ing” (Lifton, 1956b).
The term "brainwashing” quickly became associated with all
Communist efforts to extract confessions and indoctrinate captive
audiences, as well as with their internal educational and propaganda
efforts. Analyses of the psychological processes underlying such a
widespread program of mental coercion have sought general prin-
ciples like Pavlovian conditioning which could account for the
seemingly involuntary compliance that the behavior of prisoners
suggested. In fhe attempt to find the common core of methodology
in brainwashing, the actual events and the experiences of prisoners
were often lost, however. This led to some quite erroneous concep-
tions of what the Cliinese approach to re-education actually is, and
what sort of psychological theory is appropriate to the explanation
of its outcomes.
On the other hand, those studies which have attempted to analyze
a limited set of events like the Soviet purge trials (Leites and
Bcmaut, 1934), the Soviet approach to education and propaganda
Introduction yj
(Infceles, 19o0), the Chinese “revolutionary university” (Lifton,
1957), or the Korean prisoner of war (POW) episode (Schein!
1956) have typically revealed that situational factors or unique as-
pects of the total experience are crucial for an understanding of the
outcome. And as carefully conceptualized studies of different aspects
of Communist control operations have been published, the image
of the master plot based on Pavlov has begun to fade. Important
differences have been turned up between the practices of the Soviet
secret police and the Chinese Communist secret police (in spite of
common origins and some overlap in methods). Where the Soviets
have put emphasis on confession extraction to justify public trials
(prior to eliminating the victim), the Chinese have from the begin-
ning emphasized the role of confession as a step in rehabilitation
and reform, and have relied more heavily on persuasion than co-
ercion. Where the Soviets have traditionally isolated the prisoner
and undermined his resistance by depriving him of any social con-
tact, the crux of the Chinese approach has been to immerse the
prisoner in a small group of others who are more advanced in their
reform than he and who operate as the key agents of influence.
Where the Soviet methods have supported an image of “scientific”
interrogation and confession extraction, the Chinese have stimulated
the image of a zealous, enthusiastic, almost evangelical mass move-
ment sweeping converts into its ranks by virtue of the intrinsic merit
of its message. In neither the Chinese nor the Soviet case has any
evidence been turned up of any connection with Pavlovian psychol-
ogy or any systematic use of his findings.
It is in the spirit of adding detailed analysis of a limited phe-
nomenon that we have built the present study around the ex-
periences of the rather small number of Americans who were im-
prisoned on the Chinese mainland and were subjected to unusual
and intensive pressures designed to change their beliefs, attitudes,
and values. We shall not attempt to encompass any of the many
other Communist efforts to indoctrinate, nor shall we be seeking
theoretical explanations which will account for the confessions and
conversions of captives in the Soviet Union or the satellites. We
shall not even extend our analysis to the experiences of the Ameri-
can POWs during the Korean War; partly because such analyses
have already been made (c.g, Lifton, 195-1; Segal, 195-1; Santucd
18
Introduction
and Winokur, 1955; U.S. Department of Defense, 1955; Strassman,
Thaler, and Scliein, 1956; Biderman, 1956, 1957; Scliein, Hill, Wil-
liams, and Lubin, 1957; Segal, 1957; Singer and Schcin, 19o8);
and partly because a detailed explanation of why some men col-
laborated, why some twenty-one of them refused repatriation, and
why some allegedly came home brainwashed would require a study
at least as long as the present one. Of course if one conceives of
brainwashing as a process of producing genuine, extensive, and
lasting belief, attitude, and value change in a person resisting such
change, then only the small number of American civilians im-
prisoned on the Chinese mainland are true cases of brainwashing.
Since its introduction into the English language, the term brain-
washing has acquired a whole range of usages. Most commonly,
when the word is used in a semi-technical sense, it refers to Com-
munist efforts to break an individual prisoner by a prolonged and
scientific program of mental destruction, and then to empty him of
his old beliefs and attitudes and pour in new Communist beliefs and
attitudes. This image of brainwashing as an esoteric technique of
systematically destroying the mind of an individual has been strongly
supported by the frequent claims of psychologists, psychiatrists,
and neurophysiologists that their researches on conditioning, sensory
deprivation, implantation of electrodes into the brain, and psycho-
pharmacology have direct relevance to the understanding of brain-
washing (Lilly, 1956, 1957; Miller, 1957; Huxley, 1958).
The experiences of the prisoners do not fit such a model, how-
ever; hence we have abandoned the term brainwashing and prefer
to use the term coercive persuasion. Coercive persuasion is a more
accurate descriptive concept because basically what happened to
the prisoners was that they were subjected to unusually intense
and prolonged persuasion in a situation from which they could not
escape; that is, they were coerced into allowing themselves to be
persuaded.
We are not implying by the choice of this term that the ex-
perience for the victim was not painful. What we are trying strongly
to underline at the outset is that the phenomenon with which we
are dealing here is a completely understandable one, and that it
occurred in people who were not broken or psychotic during or after
Introduction
19
their imprisonment. By inserting the concept of persuasion we are
further asserting that a genuine clash of beliefs and points of view
was involved in many phases of the process; it was not merely a
case of a Machiavellian Communist inserting into a docile prisoner
ideas or beliefs which would make good propaganda for the Com-
munist
From the outset the purpose of this study has been to analyze
these cases of attitude change from a sodo-psychological point of
view. We are not concerned with providing a detailed description
of the experiences of the prisoners, nor are we concerned with the
political implications of the whole thought reform movement. This
is not a study of China or its methods of education. Bather, it is a
study of a particular approach to the problem of influencing beliefs,
attitudes, and values and our main purpose is to contribute to the
social psychology of influence and attitude change. This is not to
say that we shall ignore the fact that the events of coercive persua-
sion took place in Communist China and that they have obvious
political relevance. Nor is it irrelevant to consider some of the im-
plications of these events for a totalitarian society. What we are
trying to delineate is our central focus or orientation, which is
basically psychological.
A preliminary survey of literature and a set of interviews with
experts on China and on Communism led to the conclusion that
the process of coercive persuasion and its outcomes in the American
prisoners could not be understood without a careful consideration
of the context in which it occurred. The coercive persuasion of the
prisoners took place as part of the general thought reform program
which was sweeping China, and this program had qualities which
derived partly from the history of the Chinese Communist move-
ment and partly from the fact that it was a particular manifesta-
tion of the passion for unanimity which has characterized a num-
ber of totalitarian systems. Consequently we have devoted Part 1
of this study to a consideration of these historical and political-
social factors. Our purpose in presenting this contextual material
is not to provide a definitive piece of history or political analysis;
rather, it is to trace the theme of coercive persuasion back to
some of its roots in totalitarianism in general and Chinese Com-
20
Introduction
munism in particular. As part of this analysis we shall also present
what appear to have been some of tire major aspects of the thought
reform movement of the 1950's, its explicit and implicit aims, and
the manner in which it led to the arrest and coercive persuasion of
our American cases.
In Part II we shall suggest a conceptual scheme for organizing
sequentially the many facets of the coercive persuasion experience;
discuss the special role which guilt played in accounting for some
of the changes observed in the prisoners; describe the kinds of
belief, attitude, and value change which occurred in the prisoners;
and state some hypotheses about personal predispositions and cer-
tain categories of experience which, 0 they were present, tended to
increase the likelihood that the prisoner would undergo extensive
belief, attitude, and value change.
Part III concerns itself primarily with the relevance of various
psychological, physiological, psychiatric, and sociological theories
to the understanding of the events and outcomes of coercive persua-
sion. We shall examine theories and conceptual schemes which
have been suggested to account for its effects, and attempt through
a critical analysis of these suggested theories to move toward a
synthesis and integration of them. The kind of theoretical model
which begins to emerge in rough outline from this attempt is not
only intended to encompass the coercive persuasion experience of
our cases in Communist China but is also generalizable to other
kinds of social influence situations, some of which occur in our own
society.
In Part IV we examine some of the implications of the points
developed in Part III for the analysis of influence situations which
exist within our own society and for a general theory of influence.
A word is in order about our methodology. We do not pretend
that our conclusions are based on an exhaustive analysis of all
Americans who were imprisoned by the Communists; indeed, we
do not even have a representative sample of them. Rather, we are
building a theoretical analysis around a very small number of cases
of individuals who demonstrated extensive and lasting belief, at-
titude, and value change. We obtained as much material as was
available on these cases, including reports of interviews with them
introduction
21
prior to, during, and alter their imprisonment; observations of them
at repatriation and at various times thereafter; follow-up interviews
with them some three to five years after their repatriation which
we conducted ourselves; autobiographical accounts which were in
some cases published, in other cases available only for our own use.
The reader will note that we have not, however, included very
much case material in our analysis. The basic reason for this is that
the persons concerned are so few in number as to make it almost
impossible to disguise their identity sufficiently to protect their
anonymity. Our subjects were more than willing to explore ex-
tensively their experiences and their feelings about them, but much
of this material was obviously private. There is, however, an ad-
ditional reason for the minimal amount of first-hand material — we
found in analyzing the experiences of our cases that adequate
documentation of our points would require virtually complete
biographical accounts. Since it was not our intention to be descrip-
tive, but rather to be analytical, we decided that detailed descriptive
material could better be obtained by the reader if he consulted
one of a number of excellent autobiographical accounts (Bull,
1955; Bonnichon, 1955; Rigney, 1956; Ford, 1957; Rickett and
Rickett, 1957; Becker, 1958) or more descriptive accounts like those
of Lifton (1956b) or Barnett (1953, 1956).
Wherever possible we checked our hypotheses with those of
others, like Robert Lifton and Doak Barnett, who were thoroughly
familiar with the events of thought reform and who had conducted
careful studies of samples of American and European repatriates
from Communist China. We cannot ignore, however, the real danger
that a post hoc analysis of events as complex as those surrounding
the coercive persuasion of a few Westerners contains within it.
Though we often state our points as conclusions, the reader should
always remind himself that basically they are hypotheses to be
checked against further data wherever and whenever such may be-
come available. And ultimately the test of our theoretical model will
have to come not from further analysis of cases but from empirical
investigations of comparable phenomena within our own society
where we have die opportunity to repeat observations and check
conclusions constantly against new data.
PART ONE The Context of
Coercive Persuasion
The phenomenon of coercive persuasion occurred * in the context
of the thought reform movement which the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) launched to deal with their problems of social control
and reconstruction. This movement permeated all segments of
Chinese society after the take-over, including the prisons and the
prisoner of war camps. It involved a number of Americans who were
arrested on suspicion of espionage or on other charges designed to
discredit the West, to assert Asian superiority at home and abroad,
or to serve as a bargaining point in international negotiations.
It is very doubtful that any Westerners were imprisoned and sub-
jected to thought reform techniques for the primary purpose of
being reformed. Rather, their treatment subsequent to arrest was
typical of current Chinese Communist penal methods for “enemies
of the people,” whether Chinese or Western.
It is the attempt to reform "enemies of the people* which dis-
tinguishes the CCP from other Communist Parties. The Bolsheviks
may have been masters at eliciting confessions, hut such confessions
were designed to destroy their authors and remove them from
society, while the emphasis in the CCP was to "cure the discaso and
save the man” for a productive role in the society. To understand
better the institutions and processes which this emphasis has pro-
* We use the past tense here and fa other parts of the chapter because • db
not know whether die combination of events we have labeled "coercive per-
suasion" is now occurring or will fa the future occur again. We do not have any
evidence that current penal practices are fa fact different; rather, we are assert-
ing that we simply do not know whether they are or not.
24 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
duced, it is necessary to look at those aspects in the history of the
CCP which throw light on the development of the thought reform
approach. Following this we shall briefly describe the operation of
the thought reform movement in the early 1950s and then set forth
the manner in which Americans became exposed to it
1
The Persuasion Theme
in the Development of the
Chinese Communist Party
A knowledge of a number of historical factors is essential to an
understanding of the thought reform program as it operated in the
1950’s, particularly to the understanding of the treatment of the
Westerners in political prisons. Some of these historical factors
pertain specifically to the development of the Communist movement
within Cliina, which was in many ways different from classical
Marxist theory of revolution and from the Communist experience
in the Soviet Union; some pertain to cultural themes which lent
themselves very well to the themes that the Communists intro-
duced; and some pertain to the organizational know-how which the
Chinese Communists acquired from their Soviet counterparts, par-
ticularly in secret police work and prison management.
MAO'S PEASANT BASE
As a political party the CCP had considerable difficulty in its
early attempts to make a place for itself in Chinese politics
(Schwartz, 1951). Not the least of these difficulties was the lack
of a proper base of popular support— that is, the absence of a po-
2Q The Context of Coercive Persuasion
litically conscious, powerful urban proletariat. In 1925, instead of
seeking the support of the urban proletariat, Mao, who was then
still a fairly low-level party secretary, was organizing a peasant base
of support in the province of Hunan. This activity was not sanc-
tioned by the party elite or by Moscow and resulted in Mao’s po-
litical ostracism from the CCP for a number of years (he was
charged with “adventurism").
Although the possibility of relying on the peasants in a revolu-
tionary movement had been considered by Lenin, it is a major
premise of Marxist ideology that proper class consciousness can
only come from proper class origins, and these origins can be found
only in the urban proletariat. Peasant origin is considered to lead
to the antithesis of the desired Communist attitude because the
peasant would tend to be ultra-conservative in his preoccupation
with property, and classical ideological appeals would therefore
have little effect on him. In organizing the peasants, therefore, Mao
had to rely on specific ideological themes (i.e. the disaffection in the
peasant groups with their landlords and the government) and had
to build from these particular themes an adequate working ideology.
One can imagine Mao, always reputed to have been a highly
practical man, appealing to the peasants primarily in terms of their
grievances against the “corrupt landlords supported by a corrupt
government," and winning only the support of malcontents in the
younger generation of farm children. That such discontentment
within the family existed prior to the rise of Communism in China
has been well documented (e.g.. Fried, 1959). It only remained for
the Communists to find the sources of discontent, like the absolute
authority of the father and elders, the complete subjugation of
women, the lack of freedom to choose a marital partner, and so on.
Mao had faith that the movement could be built by this means on
a peasant base of support, and implicit in this faith was an assump-
tion which underlies the entire thought reform movement — namely,
that class origins do not irrevocably fix political attitudes, but, rather,
that political attitudes can be learned and unlearned. It has been
observed that it was already a Chinese tradition to assume a
tabula rasa at birth and that through reason and rote learning one
could engrave on it what one would. Hence Mao was working in
The Persuasion Theme 27
keeping with Chinese tradition and the then current trends when
he undertook to educate the peasantry to fulfill the traditional role
of the proletariat (Wright, 1959).
Of course it was not only the force of Chinese tradition, but
Maos own background and experience which must have underlain
this faith in education to class consciousness. Mao and other leaders
were aware that they themselves did not have appropriate pro-
letarian class origins and that they had, in fact, learned the ideology
and developed the appropriate attitude (class consciousness) in-
tellectually.
But beyond this faith there was the necessity of creating support
for the party. And Mao, the realist, could see that in a society whose
base was overwhelmingly agrarian, and whose major grieviinces
were those of the peasants, it was most practical to seek and or-
ganize peasant support. Since the Chinese Communists were not in
a position to win the peasant support with actual programs to al-
leviate their plight (although they attempted in the mid-twenties
various land reforms such as reduction in their rent and even
some confiscation of the landlords’ land [Wright, 1959] ), they had
to woo them with the tools of persuasion and agitation. Thus,
their position led them to "a total inversion of certain Marxist pre-
suppositions. Instead of deducing ideological tendencies from class
affiliations, they decided to deduce class affiliations from ideological
tendencies” (Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 1952). They had the
faith that they could teach such new ideological tendencies to any
"correct thinking* individual. It should be noted that this assump-
tion differs markedly from the early Soviet assumption that ele-
ments of society which were, from the viewpoint of class origin, un-
fit for a contribution to Communist society were useful at best as
slave labor ( though a more common course was simply to eliminate
them).
THE EXIGENCIES OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
The blockade strategy of the Kuomintang (KMT) in the early
1930’s and of the Japanese in the 1940 s forced the Red Army to
become primarily a guerrilla operation using hit-and-nm tactics
rather than a well-based and well-supplied series of military gar-
28 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
risons. The very nature of these operations required extensive de-
centralization of administrative authority, a wide scattering of
forces, and dependence for basic supplies oF food on the local
peasantry. Only if the local peasantry was willing to support the
Communists actively by supplying food could the movement sur-
vive, a condition which required reliance on persuasion (to insure
active support) and extensive local decision-making power both on
short-run operational policy and on ideological matters.
... the Communist areas of China have, with few exceptions, been
the scene of practically continuous guerilla warfare. Successful guerilla
warfare demands the active support of the great majority of the popula-
tion. The normal situation has been that the population of any area have
been in a position to ensure the defeat of the local Communist forces,
not by actively opposing them, but simply by ceasing to give them whole-
hearted support. This has made actual popular support a material fact
of supreme importance which could not be explained away or distorted
to fit into a system of Marx-Leninist dogma. If the masses in any area
disliked Communist policy enough to stop giving active support to the
local Communist army, that army would be defeated. The Communists
might believe that the masses did not understand what was good for
them, that they were the victims of superstition, feudal traditions or re-
actionary propaganda, but this was all irrelevant to the practical problem-
However mistaken the masses might be, the Communists faced the choice
between winning their support and being defeated by the Kuomintang
or Japanese. [Lindsay, 1950, pp. 24-25]
Whatever the merits or demerits of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist
ideology, it had to be used operationally on a day-to-day basis as
a tool of persuasion. Furthermore, because guerrilla contact with
the local people of an area was likely to be on a diffuse person-
to-person basis, it was necessary that all members of the guerrilla
movement have the ideological tools with which to cany out such
persuasion. Clearly, it was not enough for a few leaders to be the
custodians of the ideology when it was the rank and file who were
in the day-to-day business of persuasion, nor was it sufficient to limit
ideological training to the teaching of orthodox theory. The rank
The Persuasion Theme 2g
and file had to learn it as a working ideology. Lindsay describes
very well the results of such experience:
_ Tl* 0 c ^ cct °f *his sort of experience could be seen very clearly in indi-
viduals as well as in the party as a whole. Cadres whose career in the
party liad been passed entirely in headquarters organizations, in the most
stable base areas or in underground work in enemy areas, were very
often similar to the typical cadres of other Communist parties. There was
seldom any doubt about their genuine desire to serve the people or about
their unselfish devotion to the party and (he cause they believed in. But
often their minds were completely closed to any experiences or ideas that
could not bo fitted into a dogmatic system determined by Marx-Leninist
theories and the Party Line. The one sacrifice they were not prepared to
make in the service of the people was to jeopardize their quasi-religious
faith in Communist doctrines by the exercise of crib' cal scientific reason-
ing and observation of the material world. Cadres whose careers in the
part)' had been mainly in the front-fine areas and especially in the guerilla
areas were a noticeable contrast to this. They believed the same Commu-
nist doctrines but, in most cases, believed in them as scienUfie theories and
not as religious dogmas. Their minds were usually much more open to
new experiences and new ideas and they would make room for observed
/acts by adjustments in their system of Communist beliefs in the sray
that a scientific theory is adjusted to new observations. This contrast can
be explained by a process of natural sclccbon. The work of a Communist
official or mass-movement organizer in the guerilla areas was extremely
dangerous (Central Hopei lost one-third of its hsicn magistrates in one
year), and he could only survive if the local populadon was prepared to
make considerable sacrifices and take very great risks in order to protect
him. He had to win the confidence and loyalty of a large number of
individual peasant families. Someone who refused to consider the real
individual Chinese peasant as he actually was, who refused to take ac-
count of differences with the ideal Chinese peasant as he should have
been according to Communist theory, was unlikely to survive. Work in
the guerilla areas was, therefore, a very effective education in modifying
Communist theory to fit the facts, with a high probability of sudden death
for those who failed to benefit from tin's education.
AU this has made the Chinese Communist Party unique in the high
30 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
proportion of its leaders and cadres who are prepared to use practical
common sense and who are prepared to make a scientific and objective
estimate of the facts of a situation and, if necessary, to modify their
Communist doctrines to take account of these facts. Jt is this unique ob-
jectivity and consistent materialism that have made the Chinese Commu-
nist Party develop Communist principles in ways which differ very
considerably from developments in the West. [Lindsay, 1950, pp. 24—25]
EXPERIENCES IN “LIBERATED AREAS”
This factor is closely related to the previous one in that the CCP
found itself in a position of having to administer areas which came
under its control fairly early in its history, and saw the necessity for
a program of “cultural” education emphasizing basic literacy train-
ing for the masses of illiterate peasants. This program provided an
ideal opportunity for political tutelage, insofar as it made evident
the Communists’ “genuine concern” for the ultimate welfare of the
peasant; at the same time, it could be used as a vehicle for political
propaganda, e.g., first teaching those few characters which were
essentially political slogans and generally teaching only those char-
acters which would make it possible for the peasants to read CCP
literature and propaganda. The general function of political tute-
lage, teaching the peasants the rudiments of the Communist ideol-
ogy, was, of course, to insure that if the areas were democratized
the vote would still be strongly for the CCP.
It was, however, inevitable because of the decentralized ad-
ministration that different ideological as well as practical solutions
to problems would be developed in different areas, and some of
these were in clear conflict with central party policy. Just as proper
class consciousness could be learned, so it could be unlearned or
learned wrong. And without tight centralized control the leader-
ship operating from Yenan could do little to prevent personal ambi-
tion, inadequate training, excessive fanaticism, and other situational
factors from threatening the security of the CCP. It was no doubt
factors like these which led eventually (in the 1940s) to the Cheng
/eng (Party Reform) movement for “the correction of unorthodox
tendencies, which wall be discussed in greater detail below.
The Persuasion Theme
31
RECRUITING MANPOWER IN THE CIVIL WAR
The CCP relied on two basic sources of manpower — young people
from the rural areas and villages through which the Red Armies
moved, and defectors from KMT forces or prisoners captured dur-
ing military engagements. We have not been able to determine how
many former KMT troops and officials actually became integrated
into the Red Armies or the exact reasons for the alleged large-scale
KMT defections, but in almost every account one reads, it is stated
that such personnel were a key source not only of manpower but
also of weapons for the Red Armies. The problem of making reliable
soldiers and Communist Party workers out of uneducated youtlis,
defectors, or prisoners was no doubt a considerable one. The
feature which stands out in the CCP approach to this problem, is
the great emphasis on political indoctrination for all troops as a
primary technique of insuring loyalty and high performance.
. . every Red Army man is fighting for the same purpose, so the
command is followed as one man and discipline is perfect ... the Red
Army is not only militarily but politically well disciplined and conscious."
[Chu Teh, quoted in Wales, 1939, pp. 259-60]
In a more general vein, Ch’en Yun wrote in How to he a Com-
munist Party Member:
"Revolution is a stupendous and trying undertaking and the conditions
of the Chinese revolution and the revolutionary movement are particularly
complex and kaleidoscopic; the reason why the CP is able to control,
under changing and complex circumstances, the great revolutionary
movement and guide it towards victory is because it possesses a revolu-
tionary ideology. Accordingly, a CP member must understand this revolu-
tionary ideology; then he can find a way out of highly complex situations;
he can work out his course in the ever-ch3nging (revolutionary) move-
ment, and can carry out his revolutionary assignments successfully. Unless
he does so, he will lose his way and direction in the midst of his compli-
cated and ever-changing revolutionary environment. He wall bo unable to
work independently and will fail to carry out correctly the assignments
32
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and resolutions of the Party. Thus, every CP member must learn through
work whenever and wherever possible, elevate his political and cultural
level, increase his revolutionary knowledge, and deepen his political vi-
sion." [Quoted in Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, pp. 334-35]
The political education of the troops occurred in a context in
which the shared experiences of hardship, stress, and success dur-
ing, for example, the Long March from 1934 to 1936 must have
already created strong emotional bonds and loyalty based on com-
mitment to the cause. But such solidarity was apparently not left
at a purely emotional level; instead it was continually rationalized
and placed into a political context through extensive education and
propaganda.
The approach which was used with captured or defected enemy
so Iers who might have been expected to represent an ideologically
hostile group was to rely once again on re-cducation, that is, to
real .the prisoner or defector as one who was misguided and could
be shown the true path (Wang Tsun-ming, 1954). His bourgeois
or even anti-Communist background was not held against him un-
less he showed himself unco-operative in his re-education.*
enemy prisoners would be treated with unexpected leniency and
fTT* e *P ress ah of their grievances against their officers and
landlords-, vomit bitter waters” as it was called; the Communist "fn-
f wou ^ help the prisoners ascribe the causes of their misfortune
e ormer regime dig up the roots”; and the prisoners would be
encourage ^to become part of the forces of the revolution — the "one heart
mo\ ement Communist soldiers stressed morality and dedication through
personal example. [Lifton, 1956b, p. 193]
The important point is that this approach was the result of
it. 3 .A, r™ ‘k 1156 was ^ le result of the many successes
OTib had When appIyfag il to initiaIl y neutral or hostile re-
the Ameriwn^pnw reco S n i 2 ® in this approach the "lenient policy” which took
a lerif uSrJSl * “■ Koroan const? t ot a decade and
pe* f 1 19S6 >- A S°°d description of this policy is giv.ro in Ap-
The Persuasion Theme
COALITION GOVERNMENT AND “UNITED FRONT’ STRATEGY
Another factor in the history of the CCP was the commitment
on the part of the leaders of the party to a “united front” with
other parties, particularly with the KMT, and their tolerance for
or actual encouragement of coalition government. Having com-
mitted himself to coalition government, Mao could not very well
rely on outright coercion to insure that his party would remain in
control.
Administrative and bureaucratic authority tended to be weak in
most of the rural Chinese areas; hence a reliance on military force
as a way of maintaining control of an area and establishing ad-
ministration had a long tradition (Pye, 1956). Many of the villages
had local mih'tias which were of considerable strength. Mao chose
to try to persuade such village militias to work with him, to be-
come part of his military force, rather than to waste his own man-
power by trying to subjugate them and risk losing the support of
the people in the process. Everything would go more smoothly from
his point of view if he were able by persuasion to win over what-
ever pockets of armed resistance he might meet.
Coalition government also meant the sharing of power with other
parties in parliamentary activities, which gave the CCP a fajade of
legality but also forced Mao to rely more on public opinion than
he probably wished. Of course, the political tutelage given to die
people, in combination with extensive use of activists and Party
workers in the liberated areas, usually insured that they would
“voluntarily and spontaneously” vote for the CCP candidates.
THE CIIENG FENG MOVEMENT
The Chen * feng movement of the early 19I0's was an attempt by
the CCP leadership to “purify ideologically” its administrative and
military organization. Because it was similar in many respects to
the post-takeover thought reform movement and foreshadowed
many of the techniques of coercive persuasion, we shall look at the
Cheng feng movement in some detail.
The movement for the “Correction of f unorthodox] tendencies" was
probably launched with the aim of rallying and rcconsolidating the forces
34 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
of Chinese Communism in order to overcome the blurring and unsettling
effects of the united front strategy. It may also have been launched with
a view to preparing the Communist movement for the contingency of a
possible disintegration of the united front at some time in the future.
Essentially it involved a reclarification of basic Chinese Communist posi-
tions on all matters of doctrine and organization. It re-emphasized certain
perennial core elements of the Communist tradition, and also clarified
the New Democracy line in various spheres of activity. By thus clarifying
Party positions on all issues, the CCP leadership could more easily separate
the sheep from the goats — i.e., separate "right and left opportunists"
from faithful followers of the Party line.
The movement concerned itself with three types of tendencies: (1) in
learning, (2) in the Party, and (3) in art and literature. But at the heart
of the whole movement there lay the question of proper Party organiza-
tion and Party discipline. For so long as the basic Leninist principles of
Party organization are not accepted, incorrect tendencies in other spheres
of Communist activity are an ever-present possibility. Thus Mao Tse-tung
constantly insists on “objectivity” in applying Mancist-Lcninist doctrine
to concrete Chinese realities. But the norm of what is objective and what
not, must be fixed by the Party leadership, just as in many churches the
correct interpretation of the Scriptures is always fixed by ecclesiastic au-
thority. The proper understanding of the Leninist concept of the Party
lies at the very heart of the whole Cheng-feng movement [Brandt,
Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, pp. 353-54]
Going into more detail Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank give the
following reasons for the Cheng feng movement:
(1) The problem of unorthodox thought. Ever since the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese war on July 7, 1937, the CCP had suffered from an
increasing shortage of trained (especially ideologically trained) personnel.
This was a result both of expanding personnel in the enlarged guerilla
areas and of losses through war-time casualties. A few hundred trained
cadres turned out at Yenan each year were quickly swallowed up in the
vastness of the country. The sudden influx of new Party members bad
created tension between the old and new comrades and made for an
increase in careerism and unorthodoxy. Evidently some Party members,
especially among the new recruits, had interpreted the spectacular shifts
The Persuasion Theme q-
°f the united front period to mean that the concepts of Western hberalism
could be imported into the CCP itself. On the other hand, other more
doctrinaire Party members were disturbed by the shift from the ideology
of the Soviet period and by what seemed to them to be discrepancies be-
tween the Marxist texts and the actual practices of the CCP, particularly
with regard to the relations between proletariat and peasantry and be-
tween Communism and the growing nationalism of the period. Liu Shao-
ch’i had expressed the uneasiness of the Party leadership in his speech
On the Intra-Party Struggle . . . when he said, “Recently a great num-
ber of intellectual elements and new Party members have entered the
Party, bringing with them to the Party strong bourgeois, liberal ideas.
Ideologically, politically, and organizationally they have not been temp-
ered by the iron discipline of the proletariat . . .**
(2) The problem of the sinification of Marxism. The accumulated effect
of war-time nationalism was also clearly manifest in the Cheng-feng move-
ment. Mao Tse-tung . . . say's, “II we have only read this theory [of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin] but have not used it as a basis to study
the historical reality and the revolutionary reality and have not created
our own specific theory in accordance with China“s practical needs, then
it would be irresponsible to call ourselves Marxist theorists.” A similar
remark was made by Mao in his speech. Reform Our Learning, in May
1041, that "Youths of seventeen or eighteen are taught fin the cadres*
school at Yenan] to digest Das Kapital and the Anti-Duhring. As a result,
an abnormal psychology is created among the students, who lose interest
in Chinese problems and neglect the directives of the Party. They only
worship the words passed on to them by the teachers, holding them to
be dogma that will remain forever valid." In short, it bad become evident
that Marxist theory could not be effective in China unless applied very
practically to Chinese conditions.
(3) Problems of intra-Party morale. The Cheng-feng movement also
served to cany out intra-Party reforms and tighten Party discipline. The
Decision on the CC’s resolutions and Comrade Mao Tse-tung s report
concerning the correction of three unorthodox tendencies, adopted by the
Propaganda Bureau of the CC cm April 3, 1942. calls the movement a
"spiritual revolution” and states that "All the organizations and schools
should thoroughly study and vigorously discuss the above [ Cheng-feng J
documents . . . everyone should think hard and pcnctratingly about his
am, >voik and thought and life. Tlic same applica to tic eumioation of
34 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
of Chinese Communism in order to overcome the blurring and unsettling
effects of the united front strategy. It may also have been launched with
a view to preparing the Communist movement for the contingency of a
possible disintegration of the united front at some time in the future.
Essentially it involved a reclarification of basic Chinese Communist posi-
tions on all matters of doctrine and organization. It re-emphasized certain
perennial core elements of the Communist tradition, and also clarified
the New Democracy line in various spheres of activity. By thus clarifying
Party positions on all issues, the CCP leadership could more easily separate
the sheep from the goats — i.e., separate “right and left opportunists*’
from faithful followers of the Party line.
The movement concerned itself with three types of tendencies: (I) in
learning, (2) in the Party, and (3) in art and literature. But at the heart
of the whole movement there lay the question of proper Party organiza-
tion and Party discipline. For so long as the basic Leninist principles of
Party organization are not accepted, incorrect tendencies in other spheres
of Communist activity are an ever-present possibility. Thus Mao Tse-tung
constantly insists on “objectivity” in applying Mardst-Leninist doctrine
to concrete Chinese realities. But the norm of what is objective and what
not, must be fixed by the Party leadership, just as in many churches the
correct interpretation of the Scriptures is always fixed by ecclesiastic au-
thority. The proper understanding of the Leninist concept of the Party
lies at the very heart of the whole Cheng-feng movement [Brandt
Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, pp. 353-54]
Going into more detail Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank give the
following reasons for the Cheng feng movement:
(1) The problem of unorthodox thought. Ever since the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese war on July 7, 1937, the CCP had suffered from an
increasing shortage of trained (especially ideologically trained) personnel-
This was a result both of expanding personnel in the enlarged guerilla
areas and of losses through war-time casualties. A few hundred trained
cadres turned out at Yenan each year were quickly swallowed up in the
vastness of the country. The sudden influx of new Party members had
created tension between the old and new comrades and made for an
increase in careerism and unorthodoxy. Evidently some Party members,
especially among the new recruits, had interpreted the spectacular shifts
The Persuasion Theme gg
of the united front period to mean that the concepts of Western liberalism
could be imported into the CCP itself. On the other hand, other more
doctrinaire Party members were disturbed by the shift from the ideology
of the Soviet period and by what seemed to them to be discrepancies be-
tween the Marxist texts and the actual practices of the CCP, particularly
with regard to the relations between proletariat and peasantry and be-
tween Communism and the growing nationalism of the period. Liu Shao-
chi had expressed the uneasiness of the Party leadership in his speech
On the Intra-Party Struggle . . . when he said, “Recently a great num-
ber of intellectual elements and new Party members have entered the
Party, bringing with them to the Party strong bourgeois, liberal ideas.
Ideologically, politically, and organizationally they have not been temp-
ered by the iron discipline of the proletariat . . ."
(2) The problem of the sinification of Marxism. The accumulated effect
of war-time nationalism was also clearly manifest in the Cheng-feng move-
ment. Mao Tse-tung . . . says, "If we have only read this theory [of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin] but have not used it as a basis to study
the historical reality and the revolutionary reality and have not created
our own specific theory in accordance with China's practical needs, then
it would be irresponsible to call ourselves Marxist theorists." A similar
remark was made by Mao in his speech. Reform Our Learining, in May
1941, that "Youths of seventeen or eighteen are taught [in the cadres’
school at Yenan] to digest Das Kapital and the Anti-Duhring. As n result,
an abnormal psychology £s created among the students, who lose interest
in Chinese problems and neglect the directives of the Party. They only
worship the words passed on to them by the teachers, holding them to
be dogma that will remain forever valid." In short, it had become evident
that Marxist theory could not be effective in China unless applied very
practically to Chinese conditions.
(3) Problems of Intra-Party morale. The Cheng-feng movement also
served to cany out intra-Party reforms and tighten Party discipline. The
Decision on the CC’s resolutions and Comrade Mao Tse-tung s report
concerning the correction of three unorthodox tendencies, adopted by the
Propaganda Bureau of the CC on April 3, 19-12, calls the movement a
"spiritual revolution" and states that "All the organizations and schools
should thoroughly study and vigorously discuss the above [ Cheng-feng ]
documents . . - everyone should think hard and penetrating!/ about his
own work and thought and life. The same apphes to the examination of
36
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
other people. . . . The responsible heads of various departments (both
Party and administration) should, after studying and discussing these
documents, think about the work of the department and its personnel.
Also they should exchange views with others, map out plans to check
departmental work, proceed to do so according to plan, and then draw
conclusions as to how the work could be improved. . . . Thus the Cheng-
feng movement was developed as a catalytic procedure to invigorate
Part)' and organizational activities. . . . [Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank,
1952, pp. 373-75J
The attitude toward this reform which we have pointed to
previously is best summarized by Mao himself in a speech on
“Correcting Unorthodox Tendencies in Learning, the Party, and
Literature and Art”:
Lastly, in opposing subjectivism, sectarianism, and Party formalism,
two principles must be observed. The first is, ‘Punish the past to warn the
future, and the second, ‘Save men by curing their ills.’ Past errors must
he exposed with no thought of personal feelings of face. We must use a
scientific attitude to analyse and criticize what has been undesirable in
the past so that more care will be taken in later work, and so this work
will be better performed. This is the meaning of ‘Punish the past to warn
the future. But our object in exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings
is like that of a doctor in curing a disease. The entire purpose is to save
the person, not to cure him to death. If a man has appendicitis, the doctor
performs an operation and the man is saved. If a person who commits an
error, no matter how great, does not bring his disease to an incurable
state by concealing it and persisting in his error, and if in addition he is
genuinely and honestly willing to be cured, willing to make corrections,
we will welcome him so that his disease may be cured, and he can be-
come a good comrade.** [Quoted in Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952,
p. 392]
And again, in his Opposing Party Formalism , Mao points out:
“The task of destroying and sweeping away these conditions is not an
easy one. It must be properly done, which means that a reasonable ex-
The Persuasion Theme g 7
pknatfon must be given. If tbe reasoning is good, if it is to the point, it
can be effective. The first method in reasoning is to give the patients a
powerful stimulus, yell at them, ‘you're sick!’, so the patients will have
a fright and break out in an over-all sweat; then, they can be carefully
treated." [Quoted in Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, pp. 395-96]
It should be noted that the preoccupation with ideological puri-
fication reflects the assumption that political attitudes can bo learned
and unlearned. Even the very favorably placed person in the
party hierarchy may become disaffected. The potential enemy is al-
ways present, even within the innermost party circles; hence con-
tinual purification, ideological purging, and mutual surveillance
are necessary and justified.
. . . Heresies are thus likely to emerge in any quarter. The only ulti-
mate criterion of Party loyalty is the disciplined acceptance of the Party
line at any given moment, no matter how that line may shift. It can be
seen that the tasks of intra-Party struggle are unending. [Brandt, Schwartz,
& Fairbank, 1952, p. 355]
The struggle is, of course, as unending in Chinese as in Soviet
Communism. There is, however, a fundamental difference in the ap-
proach wliich the Chinese have taken to dealing with the problem.
. . . We should note and ponder the fact that within the ranks of
Chinese Communism in the New Democracy period — as opposed to Rus-
sian Communism in the same years — there is almost no record of the
destruction of certain comrades by the Party or by other comrades,
through the means of official purges leading to execution or by mysterious
assassinations or disappearances. Moral suasion or rcindoctrination appear
to have taken precedence oocr violence as the means of settling intra-
Party disputes. In this and many other respects tbe experience of Europe
or of Russia may be an inadequate guide to the future of China's ancient
society. Traditional traits and ways may persevere among the Chinese
people with extraordinary tenacity. Today the esteem given die scholar
is still such a trait; and tills no doubt accounts in part for the CCF effort
to win over and work «ilh Ute intellectuals, even though Mao Tse-tung
38 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
has evidenced little but contempt for the traditionally bookish scholars
of the past [Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, p. 470; italics added]
The kinds of techniques used in this purification effort again
reflected leniency ° and involved: (1) encouragement of grievances
against non-Communist groups or ideas combined with the presenta-
tion of highly acceptable positive goals (to reconstruct China, fight
Japan, and later fight American aggression in Korea, or, in the
case of dealing with American row’s, to fight for world peace);
(2) heavy reliance on group discussion, creating an atmosphere in
which each student had to commit himself and subject himself
to detailed scrutiny and analysis; (3) the use of criticism and self-
criticism to stimulate self-examination and to permit group members
to compete with each other in self-exposure and mutual exposure
with the aim of denigrating and thus destroying all emotional ties
with the past; (4) systematic rewarding by group members and
authorities of self-exposure, confession, and self-criticism, thus
setting the tone that any man was redeemable provided he was
willing to allow his “reactionary tendencies” to be exorcised; (5)
learning Communist doctrine and its practical meaning in a group
setting in which each member had publicly to think through and
apply to his own case whatever the theoretical point was.
To conclude:
In the years from 1930 to 1946, while these Chinese Communists were
busy expanding and recruiting new members from the general Chinese
population, they gradually developed a highly organized and vigorous
indoctrination program. It was aimed at all potential recruits who hap-
pened to fall into their ranks. Uneducated peasants, city workers, and
captured KMT troops, as well as interested students from the universities,
were subjects for this indoctrination.
In order to create in this heterogeneous group a feeling of comradeship
comrades In the Party who have committed errors should not
fro ? 1 instead they should be persuaded, edu-
nhsoWW / rien %. sympathetic attitude, and only when
Shao-ch’i^ “rv, *bould be publicly attacked and expellecf.” ILia
.Syj 0 — rarty to
The Persuasion Theme 39
and identification with the peasant Communists, it was necessary to make
them cut their ties to the past." Therefore, the training program included
a deliberate assault upon all of the traditional “bourgeois," “reactionary,"
upper-class attitudes, beliefs, and practices the recruits brought with
them.
Trainees were forced to abandon their refinements of speech, manner,
and behavior, their reverence for family ties and worldly goods, and tD
adopt the crude and earthy attitudes and behavior of the new “people’s
army. This questioning and discussion of behavior and value systems was
accompanied by the inculcation of a fanatical enthusiasm for the Com-
munist movement, built around the ideal of the rejuvenation of China
and its re-establishment of a dynamic, modem society (an ideal which
had been shared by the majority of Chinese intellectuals and reformers
since the days of Sun Yat Sen). The combination of Communist practices,
such as public confession and self-criticism, with traditional Chinese
methods of learning by rote and repetition resulted in a highly effective
method of persuasion. [Hinkle & Wolff, 1956, pp. 35-36]
CULTURAL THEMES IN CHINA AND SOVIET CONNECTION’S
The Chinese Communists’ approach to thought reform has many
elements which are, in a sense, their own invention, or at least were
bom out of their own experience. They have not, however, failed to
take advantage of cultural traditions and specific institutions which
worked in their favor. Both China and the Soviet Union had a long
tradition of autocracy which created a readiness in the popula-
tion to accept still another authority, albeit one which purported
to rely more on ideology than raw power. Many of the institutions
which might have been expected to be most hostile to the intrusion
of Communism (e.g., the tightly knit family) had been weaken-
ing since the turn of the century from the impact of Western ideas,
war, and general social upheaval. There was a strong predisposi-
tion to accept Western approaches, of which democracy, socialism,
and communism were seen as some of the more interesting which
might be tried in China.
At the same time, the strong nationalism of the Cluncsc, winch
the Communists certainly fanned, and the hostility toward the
West, which was an outgrowth of a long history of exploitation by
38 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
has evidenced little but contempt for the traditionally bookish scholars
of the past. [Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1952, p. 476; italics added]
The kinds of techniques used in this purification effort again
reflected leniency * and involved; (1) encouragement of grievances
against non-Communist groups or ideas combined with the presenta-
tion of highly acceptable positive goals (to reconstruct China, fight
Japan, and later fight American aggression in Korea, or, in the
case of dealing with American POW’s, to fight for world peace);
(2) heavy reliance on group discussion, creating an atmosphere in
which each student had to commit himself and subject himself
to detailed scrutiny and analysis; (3) the use of criticism and self-
criticism to stimulate self-examination and to permit group members
to compete with each other in self-exposure and mutual exposure
with the aim of denigrating and thus destroying all emotional ties
with the past; (4) systematic rewarding by group members and
authorities of self-exposure, confession, and self-criticism, thus
setting the tone that any man was redeemable provided he was
willing to allow his “reactionary tendencies” to be exorcised; (5)
learning Communist doctrine and its practical meaning in a group
setting in which each member had publicly to think through and
apply to his own case whatever the theoretical point was.
To conclude:
In the years from 1936 to 1946, while these Chinese Communists were
busy expanding and recruiting new members from the general Chinese
population, they gradually developed a highly organized and vigorous
indoctrination program. It was aimed at all potential recruits who hap-
pened to fall Into their ranks. Uneducated peasants, city workers, and
captured KMT troops, as well as interested students from the universities,
were subjects for this indoctrination.
In order to create in this heterogeneous group a feeling of comradeship
. * * i’ com f a ^ e4 the Party who have committed errors should not
i , enotmcc ^ fr0 7» the start; instead they should be persuaded, cdu-
. l', . ^pered with a friendly, sympathetic attitude, and only when
“A/ should thev be publicly attacked and expelled.” !Li«
The Persuasion Theme Q9
and identification with the peasant Communists, it was necessary to make
them cut their ties to the past" Therefore, the training program included
a deliberate assault upon all of the traditional “bourgeois,” “reactionary,”
upper-class attitudes, beliefs, and practices the recruits brought with
them.
Trainees were forced to abandon their refinements of speech, manner,
and behavior, their reverence for family ties and worldly goods, and to
adopt the crude and earthy attitudes and behavior of the new “people’s
army.” This questioning and discussion of behavior and value systems was
accompanied by the inculcation of a fanatical enthusiasm for the Com-
munist movement, built around the ideal of the rejuvenation of China
and its re-establishment of a dynamic, modem society (an ideal which
had been shared by the majority of Chinese intellectuals and reformers
since the days of Sun Yat Sen). The combination of Communist practices,
such as public confession and self-criticism, with traditional Chinese
methods of learning by rote and repetition resulted in a highly effective
method of persuasion. [Hinkle & Wolff, 1956, pp. 35-36)
CULTURAL THEMES IN CHINA AND SOVIET CONNECTIONS
The Chinese Communists’ approach to thought reform has many
elements which are, in a sense, their own invention, or at least were
born out of their own experience. They have not, however, failed to
take advantage of cultural traditions and specific institutions which
worked in their favor. Both China and the Soviet Union had a long
tradition of autocracy which created a readiness in the popula-
tion to accept still another authority, albeit one which purported
to rely more on ideology than raw power. Many of the institutions
which might have been expected to be most hostile to the intrusion
of Communism (e.g., the tightly knit family) had been weaken-
ing since the turn of the century from the impact of \\ es tern ideas,
ww, and general social upheaval. There was a strong prechpo*
tion to accept Western approaches, of which democracy, socialism,
and communism were seen a s some of the more interesting which
s»on g — ™ or
the Communists certainly tanned, and the hostility jo"™* '*
West, which was an outgrowth of a long history of raptautoo by
40 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
the West, led most Chinese to be somewhat ambivalent toward
Western ideas. They wanted to become westernized, but at the
same time they wanted to reject Western ideas and do things their
own way. It may have been such ambivalence which stimulated
concern with converting Westerners such as in the POW camp
or the political prison. Perhaps the Chinese felt that they needed to
prove to the Westerner that the Oriental was in fact superior and
that they could do this best by forcing him to accept a new ideology,
though the irony of it was that this “new” ideology was itself
Western.
As far as more specific cultural themes are concerned, a number
of them are relevant. For example, the traditional emphases on learn-
ing by rote and on learning by systematic self-examination have
been exploited in the methods of thought reform; the belief that
man can be re-educated has been previously mentioned as an im-
portant underlying assumption; the practicality of Chinese culture
and the tendency of the Chinese to treat things expediently would
suggest an easy acceptance of a movement like thought reform but
a withholding of deep involvement in it; the contemplative em-
phasis which stems from Buddhism and Taoism would facilitate
tendencies toward self-analysis but would obviously make difficult
the active involvement sought by the Communists; Chinese sensi-
tivity to interpersonal relations, the ability correctly to diagnose
what is happening emotionally in another person, would, of course,
become one of the most potent weapons in the service of thought
reform jf sufficient involvement was obtained to get individuals to
use it destructively (in the sense of destroying bourgeois rem-
nants) in their mutual criticism and other group discussion activities.
Litton (195Gb) also points out that those aspects of thought re-
form which run strongly counter to traditional values (denouncing
c osc members of the family, willingness to be publicly humiliated
jpS public confessions, renouncing ancestor worship and
other religions, etc.) still proved to work in favor of the acceptance
ot thought reform because of their appeal to the rebellious and
the young.
Specific techniques such as the use of group discussion for in-
octrinahon and the extensive use of self-criticism were certainly
The Persuasion Theme
well known and highly developed long before the advent of the
Chinese Communist movement. Many of them go back to early
Marxist experiences and were learned in the process of developin'*
stable and reliable cells. Many of them were products of Lcnin‘s
organizational genius.* There is no evidence that they were ex-
trapolations from scientific principles of psychology, psychiatry, or
sociology.
The extraction of public confession and public self-analysis may
be techniques taken over from the Soviets; certainly there is more
precedent for this kind of institution in Russian culture and religion
than in the Chinese. For example, Berle (1957), in discussing the
legal origins of Communist techniques of interrogation and in-
doctrination observes:
... in the Slavic Balkans and in South Russia the Creek-Orthodox
Catholic practice of confession differed somewhat from our more familiar
Roman Catholic practice. The penitent made his confession to the “pope"
or priest, in a sort of running conversation. The priest felt quite justified
in questioning him to discover whether he had told all the truth, and
frequently sent him home admonishing him to search hi s conscience and
memory, and to return to make fuller accounting. When the priest was
satisfied that he had a fair or adequate disclosure, he imposed penance
and gave absolution. [Berle, 1957, pp. &16— 17]
The important point here is that the priest, operating os an
audience and judge, could, in effect, interrogate the subject and ex-
hort him to continue self-analysis j'ust as fellow group members
do in thought reform. The use of public confession as a political
device was, of course, extensively exploited in the Soviet Union dur-
ing the purge trials.
Many of the speciGc techniques of confession extraction and in-
doctrination in a political prison derive from (he long experience
of the Soviet secret police, which in turn had antecedents in
* This statement is not intended to imply that the Marxists invented these
techniques. Rather, tliey used methods which have been used in reli^otw,
fraternal, and other orders throughout history. It Is pofiiMe, however, that the
Communists are the Erst to use group methods specifically in the service cl
political Indoctrination.
42
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
Czarist secret police experience (Hinkle & Wolff, 1956). The
Chinese did introduce some major variants in their treatment of the
prisoner, specifically the use of group pressure as a central tech-
nique both of confession extraction and indoctrination. It is im-
portant to remember, however, that the basic plan of prisoner
handling was typical of Communist police procedures everywhere.
2
Thought Reform
After the Take-over
The rosT-YcNAN period (19-15-49) was a period of moving back
info the cities, of further civil war, and of the gradual take-over of
the mainland. For our study, the events of this take-over have their
main significance in terms of the image which the Communists
created in the minds of those Westerners who were later to be-
come prisoners. For some of these Westerners the predominant
image was one of a highly moral, puritanical, well-disciplined,
ideologically zealous Bed Army “liberating” cities and villages from
the oppression of a government supported by "Western imperial-
ism,’* thus making possible for the first time in Chinese history a
united China based on ostensibly genuine concern for the people.
Such an image appeared to predominate either among those who
had witnessed only the early phases of the Communist take-over or
those who had spent most of their time in cities like Peiping where
a special effort was made by the Communists to conduct their
operations in an exemplary fashion and where unfavorable informa-
tion coming from other parts of China could be suppressed by the
control of the mass media. If stories of brutality and terror filtered
through to the intellectuals in Peiping, it was second-hand knowl-
edge which could easily be discounted by anyone exposed only to
the exemplary conduct of the troops within the city; and even if
43
44 The Context of Coercive Ter suasion
those in Peiping became intellectually aware of the fact that Com-
munist take-overs have typically been brutal affairs, they could
hardly have felt the impact in the same sense in which it must
have been felt by the missionaries in the villages where most of this
brutality manifested itself in the Land Reform program.
These missionaries and other civilians who found themselves in
the path of the Red Army also reacted initially with surprise and
with admiration for the behavior of Communist troops. Typically,
the missionaries were reassured that the regime was not hostile to
religion per se, and that the)' had nothing to fear if they did not
actually interfere with or harm the new People's Government How-
ever, as many accounts have documented (Bauer, 1934; Becker,
195S; Report of Three Canadian Jesuits, 1953; Dejaegher & Kuhn,
1952; Tcnnicn, 1952), after a honeymoon period of reassurance and
co-operation, there inevitably followed increasing pressure on the
missionary to give up all of his local influence, property, and status,
eventually leading either to voluntary abandonment of the mission
or to confiscation, imprisonment, and often thought reform.
The image of the Communists which these groups had at the
time of their imprisonment was therefore quite different from
that of the intellectual or the unexposed resident of the big cities.
They had usually seen the brutal totalitarian side of the Com-
munists; and, by seeing tire Communist operation over a period of
time, had had an opportunity to see that behind the exemplary
Rea Army lay the party with its willingness to use any means to
achieve given ends.
How did the CCP organize Chinese society once its own power
position was secured, i.c., how did it approach the broad problem of
^ a ;,~ nlro1 an(1 how does thought reform fit into it? Basically
ic approach to the control problem W'as to use a complex
mixture of coercion and persuasion.
On the one hand, there is ample evidence that Mao and liis
icu cnants were and still arc completely walling to use any amount
o force necessary to achieve their goals. The brutality of Land
itetorm and the extensive physical liquidation * of the landowner
ut ? d*® <cnn ‘liquidation’* has meant the psy-
chological wiping out of certain das, attitudes. 1 Thus, following adequate ri
Thought Reform After the Take-over
class is but one example of their following the traditional totalitarian
pattern. At the same time, they have instituted extensive measures
of coercive control by reviving the old pao chia system of mutual
surveillance (in which every citizen is made responsible for some
other group of citizens to report any counter-revolutionary ac-
tivity •), by encouraging children to spy on and, if necessary, de-
nounce their parents, and by the liberal use of secret police terror,
forced labor, and political imprisonment (Wei, 1955; Chen, 1955).
Secret police organizations exist in Communist China under both the
Ministry of Public Security of the government and the Bureau of Social
Affairs of the party’s Central Committee, but not a great deal is known of
their operations. They do not appear to be as omnipresent as their counter-
parts in the Soviet Union. One important public manifestation of police
state controls, however, is a system of so-called Public Security Commit-
tees, established on a nationwide basis in 1932. These committees, com-
posed of three to eleven members each, are to be organized in every vil-
lage, factory, institution, and organization in the country "to organize and
lead the masses to help the government and public security organs to
denounce, supervise, and control counter-revolutionary dements" and
"to protect the slate and public order.” In short, it is an organized, nation-
wide system of police informers. Anonymous denunciations have also
been legalized and systematized by such devices as "peoples opinion
boxes" run by the local representatives of the Committee of People’s
Control. These and similar measures have contributed to a general atmos-
phere of mutual suspicion which effectively inhibits the expression of any
opinions in conflict with the official line. fBamctt, 1933, p. 48]
On the other hand, the Communists have made extensive use
of persuasion and reform, as outlined in our previous historical
section. The use of these techniques in all echelons of Chinese
society has been one of the most drama b'c departures from cx-
edueation and reform ed landowners, they might say that the landowner c!a«
ha -Nt^ualSc£ce is a powerful weapon of control. If •
failed to report person B, and some other
A would be guilty of failing to report and would therefore be Just ts aspect
as B himself.
40 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
pected totalitarian rule. But their extensive use also creates a paradox
in that they are so heavily supported by the coercive police ap-
paratus. As Barnett puts it:
The efficiency of instruments of coercion which the police state ap-
paratus in China possesses should not obscure the fact that the Chinese
Communists rely to a great extent upon persuasion in dealing with the
Chinese population. A tremendous amount of energy is devoted to propa-
gandizing, educating, indoctrinating, and in effect trying to convert the
Chinese people. The Ection is consistently maintained that virtually every-
thing that people are forced to do is done "voluntarily,” and the spectacle
of people enthusiastically” doing things which arc obviously in conflict
with their own personal interests is one of the most remarkable phenomena
o servable in China. Actually the line between coercion and persuasion
is so blurred as to have little meaning in China today. The populus is
persuaded to take “voluntary” action, but the Communists' persuasiveness
rests to a considerable degree on the instruments of coercion they possess,
the periodic campaigns of controlled terror they have conducted, and
the under-current of fear which permeates Chinese society under Com-
munist rule. Nonetheless the Chinese Communists’ efforts at mass per-
suasion are impressive. [Barnett, 1956, p. 125]
The approach tlirough persuasion rests on several kinds of in-
L_i U ° r P ro S rams ’ O ne °f its basic supports is the complete con-
ol of the mass media. The mass media are in effect made an ex-
ITTaV P art y propaganda apparatus (which, by the way,
C explicitly admit and of which they are apparently
un?rthn?l Ud * 7 ^ information fr °m the West is censored and all
, ° °c * j? 5 , are ^^ded from the carefully co-ordinated
K °- me uv e "?’’ tke news P a pers, the movies, the radio, loud-
marn 7 ^n*» 1I \? ,U i ° P ac f s * dramatic productions, cartoons, comics,
oner-is % °-u ’ P am P^ ets > painting, poster art, dances and songs,
to all of ^ stor ytellers). All the media are used to present
current nfT 6 ft, SJn ^ e P art y point of view propagating the
current officml hne (Barnett, 1956).
aEitadon' nph' n l t i k audio-visual propaganda network is an oral-
5 neUv0rk designed to reach the high number of illiterates.
Thought Reform After the Take-over 47
Oral propagandists, operating at a village level, “deliver propaganda
to the door”; they are even advised, without a trace of humor, to get
ordinary people to “replace family gossip with talk on current events.”
The organized propaganda apparatus is so extensive that the Chinese
Communists claim that during special campaigns they can mobilize fifteen
per cent of the total population actively to propagandize the remaining
eighty-five per cent. [Barnett, 1956, p. 126]
Such campaigns seem to play a major role in communicating the
party lice, mobilizing the population for certain particular programs,
and serving as a further vehicle of indoctrination. For example,
during the summer of 1950 the Land Reform movement began
involving large numbers of the rural population in “peoples tri-
bunals” to help get rid of "oppressive” landlords. The Korean War
late in the summer of 1950 served as the basis for the Resist
America, Aid Korea” drive in which citizens were expected to con-
tribute heavily both material resources and manpower (Chen,
1955). In early 1951 a "Hate America” campaign was organized in-
volving extensive propaganda posters, cartoon books, and movies.
In 1952 the famous “3-Anti" (anti-corruption, anti-wasteland anti-
bureaucratism in government and party) and the "5-Anti (against
bribery, tax evasion, fraud, stealing state property, and theft of
state economic secrets) drives were launched. Also during 19a-
the “ideological remolding” or "thought reform” movement for in-
tellectuals was officially launched as well as further judicial reform
and agrarian reform movements. In 1953 there was ic oo-
Many” drive in recognition of the fact that there had been so many
campaigns and drives that people did not have enough tone to do
constructive work. -
In 1954 the party’s decision to doom the nch peasant y
and strengthen the agricultural producers’ cooperatives Jed to
“high tide of socialization in the Chinese countryside, S
the establishment in early 1936 of the cooperatives and die vol
tary- transformation of private industry andcommer^byded^
viei of -joint- state-private operation. In 1937 tb*e » "«
taenlar drive to 'Let Flowers of Many Kinds Bloom and Dncrsc
Schools of Thought Contend." Mao highlighted this
46
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
pected totalitarian rule. But their extensive use also creates a paradox
in that they are so heavily supported by the coercive police ap-
paratus. As Barnett puts it:
The efficiency of instruments of coercion which the police state ap-
paratus in China possesses should not obscure the fact that the Chinese
Communists rely to a great extent upon persuasion in dealing with tire
Chinese population. A tremendous amount of energy is devoted to propa-
gandizing, educating, indoctrinating, and in effect trying to convert the
Chinese people. The Sction is consistently maintained that virtually cvcry-
thing that people arc forced to do is done “voluntarily,'’ and the spectacle
of people “enthusiastically" doing things which are obviously in conflict
with their own personal interests is one of the most remarkable phenomena
observable in China. Actually the line between coercion and persuasion
is so blurred as to have little meaning in China today. The populus is
persuaded to take voluntary” action, but the Communists’ persuasiveness
rests to a considerable degree on the instruments of coercion they possess,
the periodic campaigns of controlled terror they have conducted, and
t e un er-current of fear which permeates Chinese society under Com-
munist rule. Nonetheless the Chinese Communists’ efforts at mass per-
suasion are impressive. [Barnett, 1956, p. 125]
a PP roach through persuasion rests on several kinds of in-
. l ° r P 10 !? 31113 ' ^ ne °f its basic supports is the complete con-
t ° f !? aSS met * ,a ' Th e mass media are in effect made an ex-
party propaganda apparatus (which, by the way,
C j\ ne !« e ! C *r* C * t ^ r ac k n ‘ t an d which they are apparently
nmTTi? r ^ U " i information from the West is censored and all
- 0 1 oas are excluded from the carefully co-ordinated
snmkprc °* mC i!v C '?'’ newspapers, the movies, the radio, loud-
_ . m J 5U , ° P aces ’ dmmatic productions, cartoons, comics,
r£r^’l b °ih FampWets ’ P a inting, poster art, dances and songs,
to alTnf ^ V, aSf ; fellers). All the media are used to present
currmt n fR C - pe °P e a sin gle party point of view propagating the
current official line (Barnett, 1956)
aEitarioiTnpK till ^ t ^ iS - aU ^ i0 ' VisUa ^ P ro P a g an( la network is an oral-
g tabon network designed to reach the high number of illiterates.
Thought Reform After the Take-over 47
Oral propagandists, operating at a village level, “deliver propaganda
to the door"; they are even advised, without a trace o£ humor, to get
ordinary people to “replace family gossip with talk on current events."
The organized propaganda apparatus is so extensive that the Chinese
Communists claim that during special campaigns they can mobilize fifteen
per cent of the total population actively to propagandize the remaining
eighty-five per cent. [Barnett, 1956, p. 126]
Such campaigns seem to play a major role in communicating the
party line, mobilizing the population for certain particular programs,
and serving as a further vehicle of indoctrination. For example,
during the summer of 1950 the Land Reform movement began
involving large numbers of the rural population in “people’s tri-
bunals” to help get rid of “oppressive” landlords. The Korean War
late in the summer of 1950 served as the basis for the “Resist
America, Aid Korea” drive in which citizens were expected to con-
tribute heavily both material resources and manpower (Chen,
1955). In early 1951 a “Hate America” campaign was organized in*
volving extensive propaganda posters, cartoon books, and movies.
In 1952 the famous “3*Anti” (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti*
bureaucratism in government and party) and the “5-Anti" (against
bribery, tax evasion, fraud, stealing state property, and theft of
state economic secrets) drives were launched. Also during 1932
the "ideological remolding” or “thought reform* movement for In-
tellectuals was officially launched as well as further judicial reform
and agrarian reform movements. In 1953 there was the “5-Too-
Many” drive in recognition of the fact that there had been so many
campaigns and drives that people did not have enough time to do
constructive work.
In 1954 the party’s decision to doom the “rich peasant economy
and strengthen the agricultural producers’ co-operatives led to the
“high tide of socialization in the Clunesc countryside ” resulting in
the establishment in early 1930 of the co-operativcs and the "volun-
tary” transformation of private industry and commerce by the de-
vice of “joint” state-private operation. In 1957 there was the spec-
tacular drive to “Let Flowers of Many Kinds Rfoom and Dircree
Schools of Thought Contend." Mao highlighted this new line on
48
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
ideological remolding and stressed an alleged ideological freedom
in his speech on “The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among
the People in February, 1957. Very quickly this drive was followed
by a new ideological rectification movement (1957-58) which was
directed against the “bourgeois rightists” who had shown their true
colors during the "Flower” period. This was followed by a series
of Socialist solidarity and "re-construction” drives which cul-
minated in the 1958 drive directing that the collectives be con-
solidated into communes. The widespread participation of the
people in these communes, "the best form of organization” and the
“basic social units in Communist society ” has been the object of this
latest drive.
For our purposes the drives that are of greatest importance are,
of course, the ideological remolding movements of 1952, 1957, and
19o8. These dnves were implemented through widespread group
indoctrination which extended from the most remote rural areas to
the most urbanized centers. The essential technique was again the
group discussion:
One of the unique features of Chinese Communist rule is group indoc-
tnnati°n on a very large scale. Contrary to some opinion, the techniques
abel ed "brainwashing” by Westerners are not restricted in their use to
inmates of Communist jails or labor camps. Although prisoners of the
regime arc su jected to indoctrination in its most intensive forms, similar
ec mques, w ic s ovv great psychological insight into means of manipu-
. . f an .„. C ° ntr ° mens minds, are used in small study groups to
. * I™™ ° or inar y citizens belong. These study groups, averaging
ten or twelve members, meet regularly in places of work or residence,
nrnvVlpT k" t0 rea<k listen to talks, and discuss materials
is i i u e i° , Cia * P ro P a 8 an da agencies of the regime. Each group
y ,l lea l er Wh ° makes reports to higher authorities,
cussion within the group is often prolonged and intense. Members
view on ™ aC e *P ectet * to ra k e doubts about the official "correct”
nected in ^ a SU - ^r’ Ut W * ien happens all other members are ex-
atrreempnt °® cia l hne. The final objective is mutual
~^ d Un f n T )U * SUPP ° rt ° f Ae official line - Eve *y mem ber of
g up must take an active part; one cannot be passive or silent.
Thought Reform After the Take-over 49
The result is described by some Chinese as a situab'on in which there is
neither freedom of speech nor freedom of silence." [Barnett. 1956 n,
127] 0 *
Because of the regime’s extensive oral-agitation network it was
possible to bring such group discussion techniques into even the
more remote rural areas of China, but, of course, they were effective
only to the extent that the cadres who made up this network were
themselves properly trained for and committed to their job.
We noted in our historical section the importance of creating
cadres who could work more or less independently and without
close party supervision. The necessity for cadres to work alone ex-
isted even after the take-over because of Cliina’s great size and
population. Facilities were therefore needed for training cadres
and imbuing them with a sufficient sense of commitment and
dedication to make them reliable party workers who would resist
the personal aggrandizement which their power position often made
possible. Tliis job of training has been undertaken by a number of
educational centers modeled after the training centers of the Ycnan
period, which in turn were designed by graduates of Moscow train-
ing schools for Chinese Communists (Courlay, 1952). Such educa-
tional centers, usually labeled “Revolutionary Colleges or Univer-
sities, 1 * taught courses lasting from a few months to several yean
(Walker, 1955); the essence of their training was a very intensive
program of persuasion aimed at the severance of the students
emotional ties with his past and the adoption of a new identity
(Lifton, 1957; Liu Shaw-tong, 1953; Yen, 195-1). These Revolu-
tionary Universities were also places where intellectuals and others
whom the regime wished to “reform" were sent if their crimes w ere
not so serious as to warrant imprisonment. Since similar programs
of ideological reform were instituted within the regular universities,
virtually no one in the society could escape exposure to them
(GuiUain, 1957). , , .
For students who proved to be recalcitrant or who needed a more
-fundamental" land of rc-cdueation, and for professionals, Intelleo
• A more detailed description of the use of poops in thoosht rr/onn i. S<'<”
fa Appendix 2.
50 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
tuals, and party members whose occupations might make their class
consciousness too parochial (and thus not proletarian), there was
“reform through labor.” Prisons sometimes sent their political prison-
ers through “reform through productive labor” programs. Revolu-
tionary Universities also carried "productive labor” as part of their
regular program, and more recently everyone has had to spend a day
or so per week working in the fields or factories. The regime
justified “reform through labor” in terms of the assumption that
there is no better way to acquire and maintain the proper pro-
letarian outlook and correct class consciousness than by actual
manual labor. Judging by the reaction of many Chinese to the
prospect of such reform, this program was often little more than a
somewhat dressed-up version of Soviet slave labor. It was per-
ceived by the Chinese as punishment similar to Soviet slave labor,
in spite of its manifest reform image and its accompaniment of fan-
fare and jubilation.
For those individuals (whether Chinese or foreign) who were
accused of or suspected of counter-revolutionary activity, i.e., whose
actions were dangerous above and beyond their incorrect attitudes,
there were many kinds of prisons. However, it is noteworthy
that the Chinese political prisons, too, operated on the assumption
that the inmates should and could be reformed. Thus they were
unlike their Soviet counterpart where the major goal was confession
extraction prior to liquidation, or penal servitude in forced labor
camps. The whole Chinese penal reform scheme emphasized that
prisoners were to be treated leniently in order to be rehabilitated;
leniency, of course, meant that good treatment would come only
to those who co-operated with the government in changing their
attitudes (Lifton, 1956b, 1957).
The implementation of a program of confession extraction, in-
doctrination, and reform was far from perfect in many prisons, and
one should not make the mistake of assuming that the prison’s only
role was to reform. Rather, the reform and indoctrination emphasis
often entered prison management in the same way that the other pro-
grams entered it. The Communist leaders would emphasize the
importance of reform, and soon thereafter everyone in the society
was expected to intensify his participation in it. The drives would
Thought Reform After the Take-over 51
extend into the prison’s routine and intensify its reform aspects.
As one reads the accounts, one must conclude that sometimes the
reform empliasis entered the prison structure primarily in response
to external pressures, and that the sophistication with which it was
then administered as a program varied sharply with the quality
and training of the prison personnel and with their geographic dis-
tance from the political center (Peiping). It varied also with what
seemed most effective in each prisoner's case.
Although prison procedures were apparently in accordance with
an over-all plan formulated by the central ministry and handed
down to all sub-committees (Lifton, 1956b), the elaboration of the
plan was left to the individual bureaucrats. The manuals used by all
prisons were general in nature (of the kind that Liu Shao-chi pro-
vided in How to Be a Good Communist, 1951), not psychologically
technical or specific. Thus the actual reform techniques used in a
prison varied with the sophistication, facilities, and motivation of
each prison official. If the guards, administrators, and interrogators
had assimilated some of the dynamic qualities of the re ^°™ rn ° ve "
ment, understood its premises, and believed in its validity, they
could implement it effectively. But in some prisons the authorities
did not really understand it, did not have adequate ideological
training to implement it effectively, and did not have the support o
their own superiors (e.g., the pressure to get a quick confession
may have been sufficient to make some prison authorities fall back
on “illegal’’ coercive methods). In some cases the prison personne
had no more than a three-months' indoctrination course jo
that given to prisoners) before they became interrogators (Tcnmcn,
19 The geographic distance from Peiping had an Impart on i the
i *j> facMhoMt
52 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and superior physical facilities thus made the Pciping prisons the
most eEective centers of reform.
In summary, from an ad hoc technique, designed to meet prag-
matically the problems of the emergent revolutionary movement,
persuasion became an institution in name and function; “thought
reform. While thought reform thrived primarily on the assump-
tion that people could be re-educated if they were given a chance
and that their desire for re-education could be “brought out” in
them, and while it was, in intention, basically a program of educa-
tion and persuasion, it should not be overlooked that it was strongly
supported by a monolithic coercive apparatus in which the person
who became the target of thought reform really had no choice but
to reform himself if he wished to keep peace with the regime. This
mixing of coercion and persuasion was most dramatically exem-
plified in the treatment of apolitical civilians (many of them West-
erners ) in political prisons.
THE AVOWED AIMS OF THOUGHT REFORM
Creation of a “ New Man”
u ultimate avowed aim of thought reform is, of course, the
new man^who will be ideally fitted for the Communist society of
e u ure. The new man” has the following characteristics. He
snouid be completely concerned about “others,” “The People,” and
e i eo ogy. He should not look at things subjectively, from a self-
cen ere or selfish point of view, but “objectively,” recognizing that
e greatest good for himself is that which is the greatest good for
ie group as a whole. He should be an active enthusiastic sup-
^ |.. C . r °. cause (apathy and indifference are tantamount to op-
^ * °, 1 ’ , e s h° u ld be enthusiastic about physical labor and
» .. a ° r , l as essential means to the glorious “ends” of the
thphV Gr ?. an concerned with intellectual and aes-
spIvpc- in^u &xe often pursued selfishly as ends in them-
c ec al and aesthetic activities should be pursued only
reform sLrtJy^ter^iT'^r 11611 / 3 ! ^ aVe S^^ted pressures for this kind of
h " a* K"o°” d ‘ n m “ y 01 ftCm
Thought Reform After the Take-over 53
for the purpose of effectively communicating the Communist con-
ception of society and rallying others’ support of it. He should be
enthusiastic about the simple, unembellished life rather than being
concerned with material possessions and the luxuries of life; he
should adopt the simple values and standards of the working people
and peasants, including their language, manners, and morals. In
short, the "new man” should be truly collectivized . 0
The image of the “new man” was continually held up by the
authorities and by the propaganda organs as the ideal to strive for,
and any tendency of a citizen or a prisoner to behave in a manner
not consistent with this idealized image could and did lead to his
being severely criticized.
Teaching Communist Point of View on
Specific Issues
The creation of a "new man” is the long-range goal, but the
more immediate task was to reveal the "incorrect" attitudes of the
prisoner or citizen and to encourage him to change these by adopt-
ing the Communist point of view, “the people’s standpoint,” toward
certain issues which had to be dealt with on a day-to-day basis.
For the American POW this might have meant the adoption of
“correct attitudes” about the question of who started the Korean
war, who were the aggressors in the world picture, who stood for
peace, whose policies should be supported, and so on. For the
peasant the issue might have been the adoption of "correct at-
titudes” toward having his land collectivized, paying high taxes to
the government, having some of his hard-won crop shipped to the
Soviet Union even though Ills family was starving, and so on. For
some citizens whose social origin had allegedly predisposed them
to "reactionary” tendencies, the adoption of "correct attitudes” might
have meant that the)' should denounce members of their family or
loved ones, that they should divorce husbands or wives who were
political liabilities to their own career, that they should give up
personally profitable businesses to the government, and so on. For
the political prisoner the adoption of a "correct attitude might
* This term was suggest us by Malcolm Bcrsoba.
52 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and superior physical facilities thus made the Peiping prisons the
most effective centers of reform.
In summary, from an ad hoc technique, designed to meet prag-
matically the problems of the emergent revolutionary movement,
persuasion became an institution in name and function: “thought
reform. While thought reform thrived primarily on the assump-
tion that people could be re-educated if they were given a chance
and that their desire for re-education could be "brought out” in
them, and while it was, in intention, basically a program of educa-
tion and persuasion, it should not be overlooked that it was strongly
supported by a monolithic coercive apparatus in which the person
who became the target of thought reform really had no choice but
to reform himself if he wished to keep peace with the regime. This
m ^ n 8 °f coercion and persuasion was most dramatically cxem-
pliGed in the treatment of apolitical civilians (many of them West-
erners) in political prisons.
THE AVOWED AIMS OF THOUGHT REFORM
Creation of a " New Man ”
„ ^ lc ultimate avowed aim of thought reform is, of course, the
new man^who will be ideally fitted for the Communist society of
ie uturc. The new man” has the following characteristics. He
should be completely concerned about "others,” “The People,” and
ie co ogy. He should not look at things subjectively, from a sclf-
cen cr or selfish point of view, but “objectively," recognizing that
ie greatest good for himself is that which is the greatest good for
ie group as a whole. lie should be an active enthusiastic sup-
°\ VI cau t sc ( a pathy and indifference arc tantamount to op-
i C be enthusiastic about physical labor and
I* »• 3 >or ^ *be essential means to the glorious "ends” of the
ft,-./ 1 * 0 " *?! lcr *J ian being concerned with intellectual and acs-
s » L'n' 0 !’ 1110 often pursued selfishly as ends in them-
e cc ual and aesthetic activities should be pursued only
for this kind of
53
Thought Reform After the Take-over
for the purpose of effectively communicating the Communist con-
ception of society and rallying others’ support of it. He should be
enthusiastic about the simple, unembellislied life rather than being
concerned with material possessions and the luxuries of life; he
should adopt the simple values and standards of the working people
and peasants, including tlieir language, manners, and morals. In
short, the “new man” should be truly collectivized .*
The image of the “new man” was continually held up by the
authorities and by the propaganda organs as the ideal to strive for,
and any tendency of a citizen or a prisoner to behave in a manner
not consistent with this idealized image could and did lead to his
being severely criticized.
Teaching Communist Point of View on
Specific Issues
The creation of a “new man” is the long-range goal, but the
more immediate task was to reveal the “incorrect" attitudes of the
prisoner or citizen and to encourage liim to change these by adopt-
ing the Communist point of view, "the peoples standpoint,” toward
certain issues which had to be dealt with on a day-to-day basis.
For the American POW this might have meant the adoption of
"correct attitudes” about the question of who started the Korean
war, who were the aggressors in the world picture, who stood for
peace, whose policies should be supported, and so on. For the
peasant the issue might have been the adoption of “ correct at-
titudes” toward having his land collectivized, paying high taxes to
the government, having some of lu's hard-won crop shipped to the
Soviet Union even though his family was starving, and so on. For
some citizens whose social origin had allegedly predisposed them
to "reactionary* tendencies, the adoption of "correct attitudes" might
have meant that they should denounce members of their family or
loved ones, that they should divorce husbands or wives who were
political liabilities to tlieir own career, tliat they should give up
personally profitable businesses to the government, and so on. For
the political prisoner the adoption of a “correct attitude might
• Tills term was suggested to us by Malcolm Bcrsoha.
54 The Context o/ Coercive Persuasion
have meant that he should recognize how various of his past ac-
tivities actually or potentially hurt “the people’s” cause, that he
should confess to crimes by this standard, and should help to locate
other actual or potential criminals by denouncing them. In other
words, the adoption of a “correct attitude often meant accepting
highly desirable ethical principles which would make the person
fed morally uplifted, and at the same time accepting tremendous
personal sacrifices for the sake of a government which promised a
future utopia.
THE IMPLICIT AIMS OF THOUGHT P.EFORM
Creation of Obedient Citizens and Cadres
If we extrapolate only slightly from the avowed aim of teaching
people to adopt the “correct attitude,'* we come to what is prob-
ably a major implicit aim of thought reform, namely the creation of
a well-motivated worker for the regime, one who will be com-
pletely obedient to the party, yet be able to apply the party line in-
dependently and creatively in new and unanticipated situations.
Whether he is an ordinary citizen, low-level cadre, or party member,
he must be willing to accept and justify the party line, be able to
derive from it the relevant consequences for his own behavior, and
be able to subordinate himself so completely to the system as to
be willing to sacrifice himself physically or socially for its sake.
That is, if and when a program fails he must be willing to accept
responsibility for its failure by confessing that it was his implementa-
tion, not the basic theory, which was at fault; at the same time he
must be creative in applying party policies and avoid the sin of
"formalism** (being too theoretical and unable to apply theory to
local situation) or “bureaucratism** (being too slavishly obedient
to the party line and hence failing to take into account the exigencies
of the local situation). Also he must be willing to employ any
means prescribed by the party in the achievement of prescribed
ends, no matter how immoral they might seem or how distasteful
they might be to him, and he must be willing and able to justify
them enthusiastically in terms of the higher morality which is de-
fined by the utopian goals of the Communist ideology.
Thought Reform After the Take-over
55
Conversion of an Entrenched Bureaucracy into
an Arm of the Communist State
Because the regime had so few trained administrators it had to
work through the existing bureaucracy which had traditionally been
independent of specific political ideologies. The political conver-
sion of members of this bureaucracy to bring them into reliable
service for the Communists, and their initiation into Communist
society were thus important implicit goals of thought reform. Ob-
viously, the more entrenched they were, the more severe this initia-
tion had to be to stand any chance of success. A similar attitude
had to be taken by the regime toward the intelligentsia and any
other groups whose services were required by the Communists, yet
whose initial attitudes might be anti-Communist or neutral.
Creation of Ideological Unanimity
The high degree of obsession with unanimity which totalitarian
regimes seem to develop is well illustrated in the case of Communist
China. Tremendous effort was expended to bring the ideological
message to every member of the society, and tremendous effort
was expended to insure that all citizens overtly express their
ideological unanimity whenever possible. Thought reform provided
the mechanism and the energy for converting anyone and everyone,
whether he was initially friend or foe, native or foreigner.
In the next chapter we shall discuss in detail some hypotheses
concerning the reasons for such preoccupation with unanimity in
a totalitarian state. For present purposes we need only to emphasize
that the thought reform program touched every person with whom
the Communists came in contact. Tire involvement of our Western
subjects could in no way be construed to be the result of a specific
policy of reform aimed at them in particular. Bather, they un-
wittingly became involved in something wlifch was sweeping all of
Chinese society.
VISIBLE EFFECTS OF THOUGHT REFORM
We do not have data which would permit n detailed evaluation
of the effects of drought reform on the Chinese citizen, but there
5 q The Context of Coercive Persuasion
is sufficient consistency in the reports of Westerners and Chinese
defectors to warrant certain tentative conclusions. The first of
these conclusions is that behavioral conformity and verbal unanimity
seem to have been achieved on a wide scale. Almost everyone who
has had contact with Communist China in recent years has been
struck by the degree to which all the citizens look alike, speak alike,
and act alike (e.g., Guillain, 1957). In fact, many observers feel
somewhat terrified by tins massive conformity because it implies a
tremendous power potential and has a strong appeal for anyone
seeking to lose himself in a powerful cause.
It has also been observed that the disciplined efforts of masses
of the population have led to a number of tangible accomplish-
ments, ranging from increasing productivity in some sectors of the
economy to the stamping out of certain vices. The fact that there
are apparently no more beggars on the streets of Peiping recurs in
the accounts of our subjects with dreary regularity, suggesting that
this sort of accomplishment has almost become a symbol of the
success of the new regime. Clearly there is in a number of these
accomplishments a strong basis for great pride and great hope for
the future.
The ascetic moralistic tone of the message of thought reform
lends itself well to acceptance by a serious young generation bent
upon bringing the “New China” into the front ranks of world
powers. There is no doubt that among many of the young and
rebellious the “correct attitude” has been accepted and internalized,
leading to zealous and sincere proselytization of others. Our PO\Vs
and our civilian subjects encountered many completely converted
cadres and Red soldiers in the prison camps and prisons, and it was
often their sincerity which caused our subjects to be swayed by
them.
On the other hand, evidence that thought reform has not gone
deep in many segments of society was provided by the flood of
criticism that followed Mao’s “Let 100 Flowers Bloom” speech, and
from the frequent reports by our subjects that the prisons were filled
with unreconstructed critics of the regime, as were many of the
cities and rural areas. The presence both of outspoken supporters
and outspoken critics was important because the group with which
Thought Reform After the Take-over 57
our subjects came into contact created much of their initial attitude
toward thought reform.
By way of summarizing:
There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist regime, despite its
totalitarian character, does have a solid basis of support which is by no
means small. There are millions of people in China who work for the
regime and its myriad organizations and who have a vested interest in it
Although their financial rewards are small, they acquire power, status,
and prestige in return for their support. In China, also, there arc clearly
many people who, although undoubtedly objecting to some Communist
policies, apparently accept the proposition that China requires violent
social surgery to change and develop the country and that totalitarian
methods are therefore justified. There are certainly other Chinese whose
intense nationalism has led them to accept totalitarianism and justify its
necessity because they want to see China acquire national power and
international prestige. In addition, the Chinese Communist regime appears
to be attracting positive support from a sizeable proportion of the youth
of the country; it is convincing many of them that the Communists'
policies are inevitable and right, historically unavoidable, and desirable.
. . . nctivv supporters of the regime constitute only a relatively small
minority of the total population and ... a large majority of Chinese dis-
like Communist rule and have been alienated by Communist policies
during the past seven years. The Communists’ performance lias been far
different from the slogans and promises before 1949. Their rutUessness,
totalitarian control, and use of violence have disillusioned millions who
were once hopeful about what a change of regime might bring. The
Communists have undermined the position and attacked the interests of
groups making up a great majority of the population. They have un-
doubtedly alienated most of the peasantry by collects tan, the majority of
businessmen by socialization, and many Intellectuals by campaigns of
"thought reform." In die past seven years the Communists base clearly
come to rely increasingly on repression and control and decreasing!/ on
voluntary support. It is a reasonable guess, therefore, that the majority
of Chinese, if they were now offered a choice of regimes . . . would
reject the Communists, and that if there were some practical political
alternatives which they believed achievable . . . they would probabty
53 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
choose to be ruled by another group of leaders. [Barnett, 1956, pp. 127-
29]
REASONS FOR THE IMPRISONMENT OF WESTERNERS
One of the major reasons for the arrest and imprisonment of
Westerners was the belief on the part of tire regime that there were
spies and enemies among this group (particularly among the ones
who stayed in China after the outbreak of Korean hostilities). The
intensive attempts to force them to confess were probably straight-
forward attempts to break “spy rings” by learning the names of
others involved. It must be noted that from the CCP point of view
it was considered preferable to arrest many innocent ones rather
than to let one guilty one escape; clearly the safest procedure
was to arrest all Westerners against whom any degree of evidence
was available. It must also be noted, however, that by no means all
the Westerners were arrested; rather, the regime seemed to build
up its case against particular individuals before proceeding with
the arrest
A second reason for imprisoning Westerners was to provide an
adequate basis for propaganda. As some of the CCP programs
failed, and as certain Western ideas had to be discredited to facili-
tate CCP consolidation of power, it became convenient to arrest
Westerners and pin the blame on them directly if possible, or at
the minimum discredit them. To this end it was obviously desirable
to obtain confessions which could be publicized as evidence of
the regime’s claims. For example, one suspects that many of the
priests and medical missionaries were arrested to discredit the
work which the missions and their hospitals had done, and thereby
to discredit the notion that the West had ever done anything good
for China. During the Korean conflict, when most of the arrests
occurred, it was obviously not possible to fan suitable hatred for
the enemy if, in the midst of China, American missions were doing
basically good work for the Chinese people. Some of the more
fantastic propaganda, lflce charges of infanticide against nuns
running primary schools, probably served the functions of fanning
hatred in support of the war effort.
A third and closely related reason was that the Chinese un-
Thought Reform After the Take-over 59
doubted ty wan ted the properties and facilities of the missions and
their hospitals. Since they maintained an avowed policy of free-
dom of religion and promised not to persecute priests, they could
not very well make such expropriations without first discrediting
the work of the missions. Hence, charges of sabotage or counter-
revolutionary activities had to be developed to justify arrest and
expropriation. The lengths to which the Communists went to justify
the premise that the priests and doctors had exploited the Chinese
people is reflected in some astonishing incidents. For example,
ono story tells of the charge that some ten years or more ago some-
one from a mission had stolen an egg from a fanner. This egg’s
theoretical productive capacity over the ten-year interval proved
to be roughly equivalent to the value of the mission; hence to repay
the "people” for the theft of the egg, the missionary was now ex-
pected to give up the mission. It was probably not difficult in any
of the mission areas to find someone with sufficient personal griev-
ances against tire Western priests, doctors, nurses, and teachers to
denounce and accuse them. In a way the surprising thing is that
the CCP had as much trouble as it did. In most places die local
populace supported the missions very strongly and only after real
threat to the people in the area was it possible to get them to
participate in the discrediting of the missionaries.
A fourth reason for imprisoning Westerners was undoubtedly
the need to collect hostages to be used in bargaining with the West
for political advantages. Some of the more unpredictable adventures
of our subjects are probably related to this purely political factor.
For example, some of the cases wound up with unusual rapidity
after international argeements had been reached on the release of
Americans held in Ciiina. ^Vhether these individuals had confessed
or changed their attitudes became irrelevant once the decision was
made to release them on political grounds. Nevertheless, while in
prison they were subjected to the standard prison regimen includ-
ing thought reform.
A fifth reason was perhaps one which the Chinese themselves
would not explicitly recognize but which no doubt played a part
in their manner of handling the Western prisoners, namely the op-
portunity to revenge themselves on the exploiting West and at the
CO
The Context of Coercice Persuasion
same time prove their own superiority by humiliating the prisoner
and in the end converting him. The pride which Chinese guards
showed in exhibiting POWs to native populations, for example,
suggests strongly that there were deep emotional factors involved,
at least for those Chinese who had the opportunity to have direct
contact with the Western prisoners. The rapidity with which re-
formed prisoners were expelled from China after their cases had
been settled also makes one wonder whether this was in part moti-
vated by a desire to show off the power of the Chinese Communist
methods of re-education. Another factor which makes one think that
desire to prove Asian superiority entered strongly into the picture
was the tremendous sincerity and zealousness of many of the au-
thorities who dealt with Westerners, their pride in Chinese accom-
plishments, their sensitivity to any kind of criticism, their desperate
attempts to emulate the more “civilized” ways of the West (for
example, not using torture on prisoners), and their desire to have it
be clearly understood on the outside that they felt that Communism
was doing something constructive for the prisoners.
As can be seen, there were many overlapping reasons for the ar-
rest of Westerners and their subsequent exposure to the thought
reform program. As we have previously pointed out, there is little
evidence to suggest that thought reform was specifically designed
to convert Westerners; there was no Machiavellian program of
brainwashing designed for the treatment of certain groups of cap-
tives. Rather, they became involved with thought reform by virtue
of being held in prisons in which it was a normal part of the prison
regimen. Thus it was only a fortuitous set of circumstances which
made the combination of imprisonment, traditional emphases on
confession extraction, and an atmosphere of reform the powerful
blend of forces which we have labeled “coercive persuasion.**
CONCLUSIONS
1. Thought reform as an approach to a prisoner was but a mani-
festation of a wide program of social and psychological control
which permeated all segments of Chinese society in the 1950’s.
2. Thought reform as an approach to the problem of social con-
MLSU - CENTRAL LIBRARY
mmnniiii
Thought Reform After the Take-over GI
trol had a fairly long history in the development of the CCP and had
its roots in both Soviet Communism and Chinese culture.
3. The avowed and implicit aims of thought reform are, respec-
tively, to create a new man, to change attitudes, to produce an
obedient and energetic party worker, to initiate into Communist
society individuals who are not yet committed ideologically, and to
produce ideological unanimity.
4. The effects of thought reform on the Chinese population were
seen by some of our subjects as being very deep, by others as being
very' superficial. Probably by objective evaluation one would find
certain segments of society more deeply influenced than others. The
perceptions and the kinds of contacts which our subjects had, of
course, influenced their later reactions to their own imprisonment
and the effects of the reform program on them.
5. Westerners were arrested in order to expose spies and other
enemies, in order to discredit Western ideas and programs, in order
to expropriate Western properties, in order to have hostages for
international bargaining, and in order to assert Asian superiority.
6. One should not confuse the reasons for arrest with the rc “° nS
for being subjected to thought reform. The reasons for in S
“thought-reformed” are probably fortuitous, in the sense that it was
not planned to have prisons engage in reform of Westerners, rat icr,
this was part of the regular prison routine in which Westerners ap-
pened to get involved. . , j
7. While the emphasis on thought reform is verj “P
throughout China, it would be a mistake to assume that ie
programs and techniques are employed cw^vhcrc. 1 M
significant variations in the practices found w differ en
and at different times.
3
The Passion for Unanimity °
Chinese Communist thought reform is a dramatic instance of the
totalitarian passion for unanimity, both in the intensity with which
it lias been pursued and in the wide range of participation which it
has demanded. Is this purely a Chinese phenomenon, or are there
forces in any totalitarian society, particularly in a revolutionary
period, which can account for the elaborate unanimity rituals like
parades, elections with predetermined outcomes, “spontaneous” mass
demonstrations, and society-wide campaigns; the extensive proselyt-
izing among the “heretics” or the “infidels”; the purges, programs of
re-education, and other repressive measures aimed at deviants; the
deep infringement on the part of the government into areas of life
ordinarily considered to be private; and the extensive efforts by the
leaders to legitimize whatever coercion of overt behavior is present?
We propose to examine this general question by considering what
functions ideological unanimity serves for the system as a whole, for
the leaders, and for the followers. Most of our examples will deal
with Communist society but will highlight those aspects which it
shares with other totalitarian societies. Our basic purpose is to show
that unanimity pressures can be deduced from many different forces
acting in a totalitarian society and that achieved unanimity serves
many different functions. In particular we wish to demonstrate the
fallacy of assuming that any single level of analysis — the political,
•We are indebted to Ruth Ohlin (1954) for this concept and for a number
of the ideas in this chapter.
62
The Passion for Unanimity gg
sociological, or psychological — is any more valid than any other level
fa providing an adequate explanation. Therefore our approach will
be to discuss each of the forces which act at these various levels one
at a time and as if it were the only one acting. The interaction be-
tween the forces, their relative strength, and their degree of inter-
dependence are, of course, important determinants of the final out-
come. Wc have set as our goal, however, only the identification and
discussion of the separate forces, considering them to be some of
the basic variables of any final theory of the passion for unanimity:
The forces wc shall consider can be categorized in the following
manner:
Forces deriving from the movement’s ideology.
Forces deriving from the goals of the leaders of the movement
or state.
1. The necessity of projecting an image of unanimity for ex-
ternal consumption.
2. The necessity of projecting an image of unanimity for in-
ternal consumption.
3. Keeping control over any ideas which could become the
basis of resistance.
4. Creating or eliciting motivation for social and economic
change (rapid industrialization or other pressing goals
which the movement or state may wish to attain).
Forces deriving from the definition of the movement or state as
being in a state of "combat."
Forces deriving from psychological factors in the leaders of the
movement or state.
1. Basic personality traits of the leaders.
2. The psychological consequences of success.
3. The effects of coercing unanimity.
Forces driving from psychological factors in the followers or
citizens of the state. 4
1. Dependency, alienation from self, need to merge self with
larger movement.
2. Effects of crisis or disillusionment
3. National character factors.
4. Missionary zeaL
64 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
A system organized explicitly around an ideology probably shows
the effects of the ideology in all areas of its functioning, yet it is
usually quite difficult to specify precisely the nature of these effects.
In the case of Communist society the difficulty lies partly in our in-
ability to determine precisely the role of classical Marxist ideology
in the psychological organization of the leaders; partly in our in-
ability to determine precisely in what manner the ideology enters
into the education of the young and integrates itself with existing
cultural themes; and partly in the nature of the Communist ideology
itself insofar as it is a dynamic philosophical system with a large
number of components, many of which are loosely tied together,
many of which are susceptible of redefinition as suits the needs of
the leaders, and many of which are ethical generalities and platitudes
which do not clearly distinguish it from many other ideologies. In
the section on ideology we shall present those aspects of classical
Marxism-Leninism which bear directly on the question of unanimity,
recognizing that the existence of this ideology does not necessarily
imply its use by the leaders in actually seeking unanimity; in sub-
sequent sections we shall discuss some of the specific effects of the
ideology on the psychology of the leaders and followers in the
society.
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY
Communist ideology, as a philosophical system, contains a number
of features pertaining to unanimity. First, because it is a deter-
ministic, all-encompassing set of beliefs based on psuedo-scientific
laws, it cannot, as a religion cannot, admit the possibility of any
other truth. Any idea or piece of behavior not in line with Com-
munist principles is ipso facto blasphemy, sacrilege, or heresy de-
pending on the nature of the deviance. As Talmon puts it:
The totalitarian democratic school ... is based upon the assumption
of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It may be called political Messian-
lsm in the sense that it postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect
scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven and at which they
are bound to arrive. [Talmon, 1952, p. 2]
The Passion for Unanimity e ~
Second though the ideology is supposedly based on a scientific
analysis of history, it contains in its assumptions the refutation of
any competing theory. It is thus completely untestable, while main-
taining the appearance of rational truth. For example, the plea on
the part of a prisoner to subject an assertion by the interrogator to
scientific” test is immediately refutable on the grounds that the
scientific method as conceived of by the Western prisoner is a
capitalist invention and therefore, ipso facto, not valid. On the
other hand, it is asserted that the validity of the Communist point
of view can be perceived only by adopting the correct cognitive
frame of reference, which means, in effect, die a priori acceptance
of its basic premises.
Third, the basic goals, i.e., die Communist vision of utopia, are
higldy acceptable generalities concerning the brotherhood of man,
complete harmony of outlook, and a world of freedom and plenty
for all. The reiteration of such broad ethical generalities as the
justification for the operation of the Communist state not only in-
creases the possibilities of easily obtaining unanimity on a very
general level but also sharply decreases the likelihood of successful
ideological deviance or resistance. The ideology is too general and
broadly acceptable to be vulnerable.* However, the acceptability of
a broad ethic by no means guarantees that it will be easy to obtain
unanimity concerning the means used to achieve the utopia. From
the point of view of the leaders of the movement, outspoken unanim-
ity on basic utopian goals is probably important to serve as a set of
rationalizations or Justifications for a concrete program which, it is
anticipated, may lead to strong resistance on the part of the followers
or citizens. Whatever resistance arises can be neutralized by affirm-
ing the proposed means as the only way to achieve the ends that
everyone has agreed to already, or can be eliminated by being
branded as standing in the way of the achievement of the ultimate
goals. .
It has been pointed out by Talmon that all utopian ideologies.
• Erikson (1958) has pointed out that the ideological utterances of sucews-
fill leaders of mass movements .re often distinguished : more by ^vainer-
ability to attack than by their intrinsic apptah Part of the success of the
ideological program lies in the nentralieaUon of potential opposition.
GG The Context of Coercive Persuasion
even those eighteenth-century philosophies which underlie the de-
velopment of the Western democratic state (e.g., Rousseau s idea of
“the general will" as a rational way of integrating separate individual
wills), contain the assumptions that make a totalitarian system
possible.
It is of great importance to realize that what is today considered as an
essential concomitant of democracy, namely, diversity of views and in-
terests, was far from being regarded as essential by the eighteenth century
fathers of democracy. Their original postulates were unity and unanimity.
The affirmation of the principle of diversity came later, when the totali-
tarian implications of the principle of homogeneity had been demonstrated
by Jacobin leadership. [Talmon, 1952, p. 44]
The very idea of a self-contained system from which all evil and un-
happiness have been exorcised is totalitarian. The assumption that such a
scheme of things is feasible and indeed inevitable is an invitation to a
regime to proclaim that it embodies this perfection, to exact from its
citizens recognition and submission and to brand opposition as vice or
perversion.
The greatest danger is in the fact that far from denying freedom and
rights to man, far from demanding sacrifice and surrender, this system
solemnly reaffirms liberty, man’s self interest and rights. It claims to have
no other aims than their realization. Such a system is likely to become
the more totalitarian, precisely because it grants everything in advance,
because it accepts all liberal premises a priori. For it claims to be able by
definition to satisfy them by a positive enactment as it were, not by leav-
ing them alone and watching over them from the distance. When a regime
is by definition regarded as realizing rights and freedoms, the citizen be-
comes deprived of any right to complain that he is being deprived of his
rights and liberties. The earliest practical demonstration of this was given
by Jacobinism. [Talmon, 1952, p. 35]
The impact of this circumstance on the citizen is described well
by Ferreus.
. . . the adoption of the artificial communist creed must produce guilt
complexes, as does, within a communist-controlled nation or within the
67
The Passion for Unanimity
part)-, the negation of the "accepter code. Many of these guilt complexes
are essentially soeial and political in nature-1 have sinned against my
class “I am a saboteur and exploiter"— and they expose the person to
e dangers of nonconformism. Whenever the communists succeed in con-
vincing people that they are a sort of incarnation of humanity’s social
conscience and that they are history’s anointed arbiters of any action
undertaken by non-communists, a person will tend to be apologetic about
any doubts he may be harboring concerning communism. Opposition to
or deviation from communism is tantamount to a negation of mankind’s
loftiest ideals and of mankind’s inevitable future. [Ferrous, 1957, p. 1021
Fourth, in its basic assumptions (and supported by its own se-
mantic rules ) the ideology tends to dichotomize the world, reflecting
an almost complete lack of tolerance for ambiguity. Thus statements
axe either absolutely true or totally false; people are either friends
or enemies; the world can only be capitalistic or communistic; future
developments are either inevitable or impossible; given actions are
either prescribed or forbidden; there is in any given situation just
one “correct line” of policy, all others tend to lead to ruin; and so on.
The philosophical assumption behind this aspect of the ideology is
that objective truth is attainable:
When ... a Party member is given instruction in Marxist ideology,
the first thing that is impressed upon him is that there exist, and can
exist, only two possible philosophical positions, idealism and materialism.
. . . He is told that there are many forms of idealism, but that all assert
that mind is primary, and that matter, if it has any reality at all, is second-
ary. Idealism contends that we can have no final knowledge of the world
of phenomena, because such knowledge is conditioned by our senses. A
knowledge of "things in themselves” is thus impossible. To men boro in
green or red spectacles the snow will appear green or red, and they have
no means of discovering that it is, in fact, neither. On the other hand,
materialism insists that reality is not mind but matter; that the existence
of matter precedes that of mind; that the material world, so far from exist-
ing only in our minds, possesses an objective existence apart from our
perception of it; and that we can therefore obtain a knowledge of the
world which, though incomplete, like a jigsaw puzzle from which certain
€8
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
parts are missing, contains an indestructible core of absolute truth which
is continually growing as our knowledge increases. [Hunt, 1957, p. 301
Undoubtedly this land of position creates forces toward unanim-
ity in that any degree of deviation or lack of support can be defined
as total rejection should the regime choose to apply the definition.
Only by complete outspoken acceptance can the citizen guarantee
for himself some measure of safety (though, as we shall see later,
even this may not be an iron-clad guarantee).
Fifth, the ideology states that it derives its main dynamism from
the thought and needs of the proletariat. In fact, it claims to be an
expression of the will of the proletariat. It is therefore implied that
any member who fits the definition of proletarian ought to think in
a Communist manner and support the movement. If he does not, he
has been contaminated or infected by incorrect ideas and must be
taught the truth. Because it would damage the image of the ideology
to have its a priori faithful actually be heretics, it is clearly justifiable
to expend considerable effort to prevent them from becoming or
continuing to be unfaithful. 0 For this same reason, perhaps, great
emphasis was given by Lenin and others to the Communist Party
as the leader and embodiment of the will of the masses (the prole-
tariat). If the masses do not express their own will, the leadership
must “make them conscious of it” and express it for them.
For the Chinese Communist Party this ideological problem was
exacerbated by the fact that the masses supporting the revolution
were primarily drawn from the peasantry instead of the urban
proletariat. This circumstance forced Mao to reconsider the cor-
rectness of the basic Marxist premise that only the urban proletariat
could provide a proper mass base for the revolution. His successful
peasant movement validated the concept that people with improper
class origins could be re-educated and, in so doing, he laid the
foundation for thought reform.
• Other groups in the society are judged by the ideology to be a priori
unenlightened and in varying degrees to be incapable of rc-cducation (e.g.,
capitalists, landowners, small shopkeepers, intellectuals, soldiers, etc.). With
respect to these groups the government has the alternatives of liquidating them,
stripping them of power and status and tolerating them, imprisoning them, or
re-educating them.
The Passion for Unanimity • 6 g
Sixth, the ideology stresses the unity of theory’ and action. Among
other tilings this concept implies that intellectual knowledge alone
is useless and that apathy or lack of support is as evil and intolerable
as outright opposition. Hence there results continuous pressure for
outspoken, active support.
Marx teaches that . . , sensations, which were held to give us faithful
images of tho external world, did not proride immediate knowledge but
only stimuli to knowledge which completed itself in action; for if sensa-
tions were purely passive, it was impossible to explain why they should
result in conscious activity; and if men were unable to react on their
environment and change it, revolutions could no longer be regarded as a
form of human activity and were simply incidents in a mechanical process.
Hence, he insisted that we only prcccive a thing as a part of the process
of acting upon it, just os a cat when it sees a mouse Immediately pounces
on it. , . . Marxists have always insisted tint theory and action are one.
A theory of wliich the truth is not confirmed by action Is sterile, while
action which is divorced from theory is purposeless. The two stand in
much the same relation to one another os do faith and works in Christian
theology. [Hunt, 1057, pp. 34-35]
In the same vein, Mao said in 1&12:
"How con half-intellectuals be transformed into intellectuals with *
title corresponding to reality? There is only one way: to see dial those
with only book knowledge become practical workers engaged in practical
tasks, and sec that those doing theoretical work turn to practical re-
search. In tills way we can reach our goal." [Quoted in Brandt. Schwartz.
& Fairbank, 1952, p. 331]
The need for activity as proof of loyalty follows:
70 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
comes insufficient ns proof of devotion to it. Positive action is demanded,
and men compete in loyalty. It is no aeeident that seeret pohee files in
the USSR stress, first of all, whether a given individual is passive or
active. Needless to add, one can be active in a totalitarian society only on
behalf of the regime. [Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1950, pp. 135-36]
In China, the pressure for active support has reached even greater
intensity:
The regime desires unanimous approval even in the prison camps.
\Vo must not imagine that the pariahs can fulminate against the system
within their cell walls or under the sun of the Gobi desert. The pressure
on them is so great, as wc have learned from those who have manage
to return from the Chinese prisons to the free world, that the prisoners
are zealous to bow to the warders, accusing themselves of all manner o
crimes and thanking the People's Republic which has reformed their way
of thinking. Unanimity must nowhere be in default, and even Hell itse
must echo with approval and praise. [Guillain, 1957, pp. 288-89]
The society, led by the party, must actively work to achieve the
utopia, not merely wait for its arrival, and must be willing to use any
means to achieve the utopian goals. The dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, excessive terror and coercion, and the combat atmosphere to
be described below are all consistent with and justified by this
ideological premise.
A seventh and final point which should be made about the Com-
munist ideology is that it is an all-inclusive philosophy of life.
It recognizes ultimately only one plane of existence, the political. It
widens the thought and action as having social significance, and there-
fore as falling within the orbit of political action. Its political ideas are
not a set of pragmatic precepts or a body of devices applicable to a
special branch of human endeavour. They are an integral part of an all
embracing and coherent philosophy. Politics is defined as the art of ap-
plying this philosophy to die organization of society, and the final purpose
of politics is only achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all
fields of life. [Talmon, 1952, p. 21
The Passion for Unanimity 71
All aspects of life become related to the political, hence all areas
of life become the target of political scrutiny, and the demands for
unanimity, though they may originate in a purely political sphere,
often spill over into the most minute details of daily living. This same
alhinclusiveness also operates as one of the powerful appeals of the
ideology. In a revolutionary period when traditional values are
strongly undermined, or at a time when such values no longer serve
to mediate between an individual and the problems he faces in the
world, a new ideology which can serve to orient him to all aspects
of his external world has more appeal than one which orients him
to only a portion of it.
Comment. Having mentioned some general points about the
Communist ideology, we should now consider the question of the
level at which unanimity is actually demanded in a totalitarian
society. We have already made the distinction between behavioral
conformity and ideological unanimity, but must further refine the
latter concept because the ideology consists of a number of com-
ponents, not all of which are equally important at all times. These
components range from very fundamental premises, philosophical
assumptions, and basic goals (the vision of the utopia) to very
operational principles which apply to specific situations and may
change from day to day. The distinction made by Smith, Bruner, and
White ( 1956) in reference to political attitudes between a person's
basic orientation, or attitude toward something, and his policy stand,
or concrete proposals for action in regard to it, can be useful here
in considering the components of ideology.
As we have implied before and shall see again, unanimity on basic
orientation is often easier to achieve than unanimity on policy stand.
From the basic philosophies of most ideologies it is possible to de-
rive several alternative policy stands, each designed to achieve die
ultimate goals at which one is aiming. In principle this flexibility
also exists in the Communist ideology, but in practice it must often
be denied because of the party’s position as the only valid formulator
of policy stands. If one allowed the possibility of alternatives, then
the position of the party as the sole legitimate power would be
brought into question. To avoid this possibility the system arrives
at a paradoxical conclusion: that unanimity must be shown not only
72 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
on basic premises but also on any given policy stand (the regime
must at all times be publicly upheld as correct); yet that the popu-
lace must be prepared to change its mind overnight and become
unanimous about new policy stands whenever the party line changes,
at the same time pretending that this change has not occurred or
that there is no inconsistency at all between the previous and the
current position.
In other words, in Communist society certain basic premises and
goals must be genuinely accepted by all members of society (in-
cluding the premise that the party and its leaders are the legitimate
leaders of the society), while other principles concerning the day-
to-day means of operation must appear to be accepted by all mem-
bers of the society, regardless of how often they change. It can be
seen that for the individual citizen or party member this set of cir-
cumstances leads to a difficult psychological situation. He must be
committed sincerely to an ideology, but he must not think through
the consequences of this ideology for himself; instead he must be
prepared ritually to affirm what his leaders dictate and must be able
to rationalize his leaders’ conclusions in terms of the ideology." The
citizen must be prepared to do extensive rationalizing of his leaders
policy in any public situation where he is under the scrutiny of
others who have some degree of control over his fate. This kind of
pressure to think through and discuss the ideology in various kinds
of peer-group situations is, of course, one of the main features of
the Chinese Communist approach to producing unanimity.
The components of the ideology also differ in the degree to which
their content is relevant for given segments of the population. Cer-
tain basic premises must be accepted throughout the society by the
masses, the rank and file, the cadres, and the top elite alike. Beyond
tliis, the content of the ideology, and the degree of acceptance re-
* It k probably for this reason that the intellectual communist, the man who
believes in all portions of the ideology and thinks It through for himself, is often
considered to be tlie real enemy ot the system. His "formalism,” to use the
phrase Mao used in condemning certain factions in the Chinese Communist
movement (Brandt, Schwartz, & Fairbank, 1932), makes him unreliable as an
obedient citizen and makes 1dm ineffective if he has to adapt the ideology to a
situation for which no formal soluUon has as yet been worked out or promul-
gated, a situation which arose often In tlie Chinese case.
The Passion for Unanimity 73
quoted, are tailored to the concerns and needs of each tareet croup
and the goals which the leaders have in mind for tliis group. To the
peasants the party brings theories, promises, and programs for land
reform; to the workers it brings the theory of the proletariat as the
true base of the revolution and promises of labor owning the means
of production; to the cadres and party members the leaders bring
promises of power and glory for aiding the advancement of the
revolution; to the political prisoner or prisoner of war they bring the
opportunity of redemption, re-education, and identification with a
glorious cause; and so on. Within each group unanimity must be
expressed concerning the specific content and program proposed;
across groups there must be unanimity about the wisdom of the
Ieadersliip which has brought these programs into existence, and
about the amount of energy, devotion, and loyalty which should be
exhibited in their implementation.
From the point of view of the Ieadersliip this process not only
consists of properly extrapolating from the basic premises of the
ideology to a concrete situation but also, more importantly, involves
careful diagnosis of the actual demands of a given situation and
careful choice of a program (including such details as the language
in which to make the ideological appeal). 0
In summary, it is evident that the Communist ideology has in it
many themes which suggest the need for unanimity, but that it is a
complex enough philosophical system to preclude the prediction
that from its characteristics alone one could specify how the society
in which it operates will handle the unanimity problem. The role
which ideology plays in the society at a given time, the stage in
• Mao, for example, said the following in a speech on “Opposing Party For-
malism”: "As soon as a man talks with another man he Is engaged In propa-
ganda work. If he Is not mute, he always will have a few wordr to say.
Therefore, our comrades must all study languages. In studying various languages
[they must] pay special attention to the language of the workers, peatanf*. and
soldiers and Sc masses. If we do no! study the language of dm «
canno! lead the masses." <Druidt, Sch.™ti, S Falrbanl 10s. £•«»>. In
soother contest he says, "Ihc people s language Is very rich to espm.tonjt ts
lively and vigorous and presents Me as it is. Many of in hive not mastered It,
and 'as a eo^erpence, in svritmg articles and rivrng
lively, vigorous, really effective language, we only have a few varicose veins
(Brandt, Schwartz, & Falrbank, 1952, p. 399)
74 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
which a revolution finds itself, and the psychological commitment
which the leaders actually feel to it (as contrasted with public
commitment which may serve purely political or social functions) all
enter into a consideration of how an actual program of creating
unanimity may come about and its specific character.
THE GOALS OF THE LEADERS
Maintenance of Power by Presenting a Correct
External Image
It is a tenable assumption that the leaders of Soviet and Chinese
societies, regardless of their degree of commitment to the ideology,
have as their primary goal the securing of their own position and
the securing of the power position of their nation. Insofar as the
leaders see themselves as being in a struggle for survival with other
nations in the world, one may expect that they will utilize whatever
means are available to give the appearance of being powerful. There-
fore the leaders are committed to creating and projecting a certain
image of themselves and their society — an image of solidarity, una-
nimity, and legitimacy.* They must show that the society accepts
them and their program unanimously and with enthusiasm, and that
their citizens will fight to defend the new system. If they can suc-
cessfully project such an image, two very important functions are
served: the solid front which is offered as a proof of strength ac-
tually reduces the likelihood of threat from other nations; unanimous
popular acceptance as proof of the legitimacy of the regime is a
powerful weapon in international bargaining and in proselytizing
among neutral national groups.
Comment. A regime’s need to prove its legitimacy and exhibit its
• The following news release Is a good example:
"London, April 20, 1658 (Reuters) — Following is from the text of President
Tito’s speech today to the Yugoslav Communist party congress at Ljubljana, as
issued by the official Yugoslav news agency Tanyug:
“The seventh congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia today
finishes its fruitful work.
"We can indeed be pleased and proud of the extraordinary ideological politi-
cal unity and unanimity which has found full expression during tne work of
the congress. Whoever nas been present at or otherwise followed the work of
this congress can no longer have any doubts as to the force which moves and
guides the entire process of development of our Socialist society/ "
The Passion for Unanimity ^
power m the form of unanimity is probably greatest when tbe society
ana its leaders are in reality most insecure and least powerful. If the
Chinese Communists were in fact at their weakest during the civil
war and in the immediate post-takeover days, one would expect to
see the greatest pressures toward unanimity at those times. The
Chinese Communist leadership relied more from the very beginning
on ideological re-education for anyone who came into contact with
the movement and did intensify their efforts during the civil war in
the Cheng feng movement and after the take-over in the thought
reform movement
The importance of unanimity as a means of presenting an image
of power to the external world can be seen daily in the impact which
Chinese Communist society has on the foreign visitor. Time and
again what impresses him is the solidarity and uniformity and the
huge numbers of people involved in any public demonstrations.
Maintenance of Power by Presenting Correct
Internal Image
The regime’s power position is also supported by an image of
unanimity and solidarity projected within Communist society. Such
an image serves at least three functions: it isolates the actual or
potential dissenter psychologically and thus prevents the organiza-
tion of dissent or resistance; it diverts attention from actual disagree-
ment among members of the ruling groups; and it provides the
psychological basis for increased dedication and loyalty to the re-
gime by reassuring the followers that they arc indeed part of a
powerful and rightful social movement.* Many kinds of rituals such
as parades, demonstrations, campaigns, and elections seem to have
as one of their primary functions the production and dissemination
of such an image.
The importance of the first of the above functions can be seen by
an examination of the consequences of lifting totalitarian pressure;
as in Hungary in 1956, or in the “Let Onc-Hundred Flowers Bloom
speech of Mao Tse-tung. As soon as a few disaffected individuals
begin to speak their mind, others discover that they have not been
• The reassurance »Mch such unanimity provides to the l«dcn themselves
will be discussed below.
76 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
alone in harboring grievances against the regime, leading to a rapid
build-up of resistance. In the Hungarian rebellion, once a small
group had impulsively initiated resistance action, other disaffected
Hungarians risked going into the streets to fight, only to discover
that all their neighbors whom they had mistrusted for years were
also joining in the fight. The sudden recognition of solidarity and the
destruction of the image of a nation solidly standing behind Com-
munism opened the floodgates of rebellion. Of greatest significance
is the fact that the image of unanimity, though invalid, had kept
hundreds of potential dissenters from ever broaching their dissension
to any but their closest friends or family members. Most had believed
that their neighbors were Communists and informers.
The regime can prevent the growth of rebellion only by enforcing
complete conformity in public utterances, thus insuring that no one
wall know to whom to turn to seek social support for an anti-regime
opinion. Continuing mutual surveillance such as was described in
the discussion of social controls in Communist China (Chapter 2) is
also necessary in order to undermine private interpersonal relation-
ships and, in fact, to destroy the concept of a legitimate private
world. As close friends and members of the family are seduced into
becoming agents of the totalitarian system (e.g., children informing
on parents), it becomes increasingly difficult for the citizen to inter-
act with others in anything but a “public” frame of reference. Noth-
ing remains safe from government scrutiny.
. . . perhaps more important than what totalitarianism does to mass
communication is what it does to private communication. Mass com-
munication receives a new' content, but remains mass, whereas private
communication is transformed and ceases to be private. No matter what
the context, on the street talking to a stranger or in the intimacy of
one's home, one must say only the right thing. And one must say it as
publicly as possible. Private communication becomes suspect, for to
speak privately implies the desire to speak without being overheard by
others. And the wish not to be overheard suggests that one Is saying
forbidden things — for if they were not forbidden, blasphemous things,
would you not be proud to say them aloud for all to hear? In the end,
even silence becomes suspect, for it may mean an unwillingness to
77
The Passion for Unanimity
reiterate the catechism which the mystique requires all to intone, and
hence mark one out as an alien, a non-believer, and a potential source of
contamination. Thus, private communication becomes public communica-
tion, and along with mass communication is subverted to fulfilling the
imperatives of the mystique. Communication is communalized. [Inkelcs,
1954, p. 102]
As this process takes hold, one may expect that individuals in-
creasingly lose their ability to identify what others really believe,
because it becomes increasingly difficult to check the accuracy of
their perception. To the extent that the government succeeds in
creating an image of the world as a place in which what a person
says publicly is taken to be equivalent to what he believes privately,
it undermines the individuals confidence in the belief that he and
others have a private world or makes him forget how to go about
looking for it* . , , ,
It is an interesting fact that such social isolation can be produced
merely by coercing public utterances. It docs not matter hon ■dis-
affected the citizen is privately. As long as he does no ; pteak M»
mind to others, Iris disaffection is, in effect, irrelevant to the security
of the system.! The point is well summarized by Fncdnch and
Brzezinski:
• Intcles also points out that it Is , dMjKtj^ fah « * “SlSiSSJ
to subordinate the individual by first ” ® individual. For example:
through which he obtains his status without
“Clearly, if the subordination of J follows further that absolute sub-
the subordination of his associations, subordination of nil the human
ordination of the individual req . _ Dut it ls not on these grounds alone
associations which form the web . & r ro _ being measured against hi*
that the totalitarian exempts no an of thV gwd sodety. I{ P n>v 1 K,es
Procrustean rule. The mystique imp P |M [)on °^i totalitarian rejects
a single metric for all ioms 'render unto Caesar the
outright the principle which lnh««l distinction between the sacred and
LTSf equally subject to review" id'L, 10,.
p ' f& — 132S&.
tive consequences for the regime suen
fectlon, etc.
76 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
alone in harboring grievances against the regime, leading to a rapid
build-up of resistance. In the Hungarian rebellion, once a small
group had impulsively initiated resistance action, other disaffected
Hungarians risked going into the streets to fight, only to discover
that all their neighbors whom they had mistrusted for years were
also joining in the fight The sudden recognition of solidarity and the
destruction of the image of a nation solidly standing behind Com-
munism opened the floodgates of rebellion. Of greatest significance
is the fact that the image of unanimity, though invalid, had kept
hundreds of potential dissenters from ever broaching their dissension
to any but their closest friends or family members. Most had believed
that their neighbors were Communists and informers.
The regime can prevent the growth of rebellion only by enforcing
complete conformity in public utterances, thus insuring that no one
will know to whom to turn to seek social support for an anti-regime
opinion. Continuing mutual surveillance such as was described in
the discussion of social controls in Communist China (Chapter 2) is
also necessary in order to undermine private interpersonal relation-
ships and, in fact, to destroy the concept of a legitimate private
world. As close friends and members of the family are seduced into
becoming agents of the totalitarian system (e.g., children informing
on parents), it becomes increasingly difficult for the citizen to inter-
act with others in anything but a “public” frame of reference. Noth-
ing remains safe from government scrutiny.
. . . perhaps more important than what totalitarianism does to mass
communication is what it does to private communication. Mass com-
munication receives a new content, but remains mass, whereas private
communication is transformed and ceases to be private. No matter what
the context, on the street talking to a stranger or in the intimacy of
one's home, one must say only the right thing. And one must say it as
publicly as possible. Private communication becomes suspect, for to
speak privately implies the desire to speak without being overheard by
Olliers. And the wish not to be overheard suggests that one is saying
forbidden things — for if they were not forbidden, blasphemous things,
would >ou not be proud to say them aloud for all to hear? In the end,
men silence becomes suspect, for it may mean an unwillingness to
77
The Passion for Unanimity
reiterate the catechism which the mystique requires all to intone, and
hence mark one out ns an alien, a non-believer, and a potential source of
contamination. Thus, private communication becomes public communica-
tion, and along with mass communication is subverted to fulfilling the
imperatives of the mystique. Communication is communalized. [Inkeles,
1954, p. 102]
As this process takes hold, one may expect that individuals in-
creasingly lose their ability to identify what others really believe,
because it becomes increasingly difficult to check the accuracy of
their perception. To the extent that the government succeeds in
creating an Image of the world as a place in which what a person
says publicly is taken to be equivalent to what he believes privately,
it undermines the individuals confidence in the belief that he and
o tliers have a private world or makes him forget how to go about
looking for it* , , ,
It is an interesting fact that such social isolation can be produced
merely by coercing public utterances. It does not matter how dis-
affected the citizen is privately. As long as he does not speak jus
mind to others, his disaffection is, in effect, irrelevant to the security
of the system.] The point is well summarized by Fnednch and
Brzezinski:
••Clearly, if the subordination of the that absolute sub-
the subordination of his associations, then, subordination of all the human
ordination of the individual requires these grounds alone
associations which form the web of soaety. But it Is not on„^^ ^
that the totalitarian exempts no organization S sode ^_ It provides
Procrustean rule. The mystique unphes a plant* th g ^f tarian rejects
a single metric for all r unto Caesar the
outright the principle which wlieiw ™ distinction between the sacred and
tilings which are Caesars. te ^ soc jal fcfe The demands of the
the profane, the public and *5 L P ^ kf ti£in regard to anv partumto
’ (,i ' k
p - $ -rsrittZS&fZ S3***
Uve consequences for the regime such as u
fection, etc.
78 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
. . . The atmosphere of fear it creates easily exaggerates the strength
of the regime and helps it achieve and maintain its facade of unanimity.
Scattered opponents of the regime, if still undetected, become isolated
and feel themselves cast out of society. This sense of loneliness, which is
the fate of all, but more specially of an opponent of the totalitarian
regime, tends to paralyze resistance and makes it much less appealing. It
generates a universal longing to “escape” into the anonymity of the col-
lective whole. Unanimity, even if coerced, is a source of strength for the
regime. [Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956, p. 137]
The second function of an internal image of unanimity is to ob-
scure actual diversity.
. . . Behind the totalitarian fa 5 adc, the struggle of the elite forma-
tions of Soviet society for power and influence continues to find expres-
sion. The Party apparatus, the police, the army, and the administrative
bureaucracy vie with one another for preferment, and the local and de-
partmental interests of different sections of the bureaucracy exercise
their counterinfluence on the Party. The public affirmations of unanimity
on which all totalitarian regimes insist serve to obscure the diversity of in-
terests which they can neither eliminate nor dare openly acknowledge.
[Fainsod, 1953, p. 328]
If the regime’s legitimacy rests solely on its claim of being the of-
ficial interpreter of an absolute ideology, it could hardly gain in
power by allowing to become public the disagreement among lead-
ers concerning the interpretation of doctrine. As Orwell so well
foresaw in his Nineteen Eighty~Four (1949), even outright falsifica-
tion of history, manipulation of statistics and public records, and the
faking of elections is justified in the pursuit of an image of unanim-
ity when diversity threatens to become evident.
The third function, that of providing the image of a powerful and
righteous social movement, will be discussed in greater detail when
we consider the psychology of the follower. Suffice it to say at this
point that, if the follower is a person who wishes to lose his sense of
self by identifying with a powerful social movement, he will be aided
in his quest if tire members of the movement are unanimous and
The Passion for Unanimity 79
outspoken about their unanimity. This result follow both for cogni-
tive and emotional reasons. On die cognitive side, it has been well
demonstrated that ease of identification with anodier person or
group is a function of the clarity of that person or group as a model.
On the emotional side, the perceived power of the movement, which
is again a function of its unanimity, will determine its attractiveness
to all those whose desire is to identify with a powerful cause upon
which they may become dependent (Hoffer, 1951; Mecrloo, 1956).
The compulsive concern with active participation in the thought
reform movement obviously aids in the maintenance of the image.
The “student” who does not commit himself actively mars the Image
just as much as if he uttered heresies, for silence can only mean
lack of acceptance or unspoken heresy. The student must think out
loud and thereby show the manner in which he recognizes the error
of bis past; he must publicly confess hi s sins to show to all others
who may yet be wavering how the regime is permitting him to be-
come a penitent and redeemable person. Thus he prorides a model
of how to become part of the movement at the same time as affirming
his solidarity with it, a device frequentiy used by religious mass
movements.
Maintenance of Power by Controlling Ideas
It is a stated assumption of the Communist leaders that correct
political behavior is based on correct political ideas. Such an as-
sumption is embodied in Communist ideology (unity of theory and
action ) and is clearly reflected in Communist law in the concept of
guilt for holding ideas which if logically carried out would lead to
crimes against the party (Leites & Bcmaut, 1951; Berfe, 1957). Such
an assumption is also reflected in the boundless optimism verbalized
by the leaders, especially the Chinese, concerning the malleability of
men, and in their energetic program to create “a new man.
Harsh repressive measures against incorrect ideas j»re justified be-
cause, if one can root out such ideas and create a “new man, one
can then dispense with coercive controls.
The Chinese Communists have always stressed the importance of
ideological homogeneity os a means of control. Believing that action
go The Context of Coercive Persuasion
springs from thought, they consider the control of thought even more
fundamental than the control of overt behavior. All errors in action, they
maintain, are traceable to errors in thinking, or, in other words, to
ideological deviations. Consequently, the history of the Communist
movement is in part a story of unceasing ideological struggle against
tendencies of deviation from the correct orthodoxy sanctioned by the
Party leaders. [Chen & Chiu, 1955, p. 177]
Furthermore, permitting incorrect ideas to exist, whether they
are in the political area or not, is likely to contaminate loyal citizens
and lead inevitably to rival centers of power which must grow from
such ideas (Inkcles, 1954).
To achieve ideological homogeneity, the regime controls com-
pletely the flow of incoming information, while saturating the mass
media of communication with those ideas considered to be correct,
and reinforces the correct ideas by thought reform wherever it is
considered necessary'. This technique was clearly seen in the POW
camps where all publications, news broadcasts, movies, mail, and
contact with outsiders was carefully filtered for its ideological purity.
Western literature and personal mail were permitted only if they'
supported the Communist ideology or could serve some other im-
portant function, c.g., mail was permitted to go through which con-
tained bad news in order to demoralize the prisoner and to under-
mine the support which he might be getting from identification with
reference groups (Schein, 1956). In the political prison the more
extreme measure of cutting the prisoner off from all information was
sometimes used (Litton, 1956a, b; Hinkle & Wolff, 1956).
Comment. Much of what the Chinese Communists do in re-
forming a prisoner or citizen is inconsistent with much of what
they say theoretically about such efforts, in that the outright coercion
of behavior is given at least as much emphasis as the initial control
of incoming ideas or persuasion. As we saw in the previous chapter,
tremendous overt and covert pressure is brought to bear on every-
one to conform publicly, to participate actively, and to work hard,
while a facade is maintained that such conformity and dedication is
entirely voluntary* or the product of successful ideological persua-
sion. It would appear, then, that the regime not only holds the as-
The Passion for Unanimity gj
sumption that correct behavior results from correct beliefs, but also
bolds the assumption that correct beliefs result from correct be-
havior. Actually this assumption is also stated explicitly and is
strongly supported by ideological underpinnings. The whole concept
of reform through labor (learning the attitude of the proletariat by
experiencing directly what the proletarian does), the notion of
identifying potential progressives or reactionaries by means of a
study of their class origins and what they haw done in their lifetime,
the rejection of the sophisticated intellectual Communist who has
never engaged in political action, all support tliis assumption.
These apparently inconsistent assumptions can be seen to be con-
sistent if we consider what kinds of ideas or beliefs the good Com-
munist is expected to learn. As we have previously noted, acceptance
of the basic utopian premises is one level of idea or belief that
everyone is expected to share and which C3n presumably be in-
culcated by information control, propaganda, and persuasion alone.
But to have correct political beliefs also involves the absolute ac-
ceptance of and belief in the party as the official interpreter and
implemcnter of the ideology. This latter class of ideas and attitudes
can be taught only by coercion, 9 but, once thoroughly learned, does
indeed lead ritually to “correct political behavior," i.c., obedience to
party directives and policies.
In neither case ore we dealing with a class of ideas, beliefs, or
attitudes which serve the person as a way of defining his own role
in relation to his environment, which express his own needs and
personality, which grow and change os his experience clunges, or
which guide a whole range of overt behavior because of their inner
logic. In Communist society, particularly under the impact of the
"passion for unanimity," beliefs and attitudes function only os a
way of appraising reality and relating to others, particularly to others
in positions of authority. To the extent that they cease to express
anything about the personality of their holder they become at once
coercible and determinative of overt behavior, lc., they become
ritualized. f The person who operates in terms of ritualized ideas
* Except Insofar as the person’s needs for complete dependency are roGctait’y
dominant to mAe him a W 4nmc8«^p!icr.
i See Chapter 10 for a more detailed discussion of rituahzatwn ©1 Leiirr.
82 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and beliefs guides his behavior by such ideas or beliefs but is com-
pletely dependent on external authority to define for him what his
ideas and beliefs should be in any given situation. Thus for the
budding Communist his practical training consists of learning how
to obey and rationalize party directives in concrete situations or how
best to attune himself to what these might be if he is in a situation
in which he is cut off from direct party authority.
Eliciting Motivation for Rapid Social and
Economic Change
In the period immediately after the take-over, one of the primary
goals of a regime is to build up the new society economically, in-
dustrially, and socially. In order to accomplish this goal according
to the rapid time scale which the regime usually sets for itself, a high
degree of motivation and dedication is needed on the part of the
• citizens. The regime does not have time nor is in a position to earn
this kind of loyalty and motivation because it neither has available,
nor is willing to produce, the material goods which would serve as
real incentives for hard work and loyalty. It must fall back, there-
fore, on ideological goals and symbolic incentives. However, per-
suading people of utopian conceptions when their standard of living
is only slowly improving is not likely to be successful. Furthermore,
with the consolidation of power by the new regime come aspects of
life which may be highly unattractive to the citizen: lack of freedom
of physical movement, lack of privacy, heavy taxation, longer work-
ing hours, and the like. The result may be that the ideology stands
in danger of being actually disconfirmed for the man in the street
in the immediate post-takeover period.
Under these conditions the regime has two alternatives: to cut
back its own programs or time schedules (as in Lenin's New Eco-
nomic Policy); to tighten discipline and coerce the acceptance of
the ideological goals, and the regime’s means to achieve them, as a
dogma rather than as empirically derived knowledge. The validity
of the means and ends is simply stated as a fact not to be ques-
tioned, and the unpleasant conditions of the post-takeover period
are explained and justified as being an essential stage in the achieve-
ment of the ultimate goals (the Dictatorship of the Proletariat),
The Passion for Unanimity gg
and/or the result of sabotage and counter-revolutionaiy activity. The
all-encompassing and absolutistic nature of Communist ideology
makes its conversion from a system of pseudo-scientific knowledge
into a dogma a relatively easy matter.
As we have seen at other times in history (e.g., the Papal In-
quisition of the Middle Ages, the French Revolution), when faith
or knowledge becomes converted into dogma, the passion for una-
nimity grows apace, for dogma is far more vulnerable than faith or
knowledge to the diversity of opinion which rationat examination
of means and ends entails. When the dogma is a justification for the
tremendous self-sacrifice demanded of the citizen in the industrial
reconstruction, one may anticipate great pressure against any ideo-
logical deviance which could even suggest the possibility of errors
in ideological premises or their implementation by the party. Thus
we see in totalitarian society the whole coercive apparatus of the
state brought to bear on any individual who questions the regime’s
policy or even advocates that it be subjected to rational discussion.
Comment. As the regime is able to build up its industrial base
and concentrate on consumer goods, the need for this artificial moti-
vation declines. One may hypothesize that the greatest pressure for
unanimity will therefore be present when the maximum rate of
industrial and social change is called for and when the fewest
alternative motivations sucii as nationalism or fear of attack are
readily available.
Converting ideology into dogma can build some measure of col-
lective motivation, but collective ideological goals do not meet the
citizens’ personal needs for status, and if such needs are not fulfilled
the collective motivation cannot be maintained. To fulfill the needs
for status, individual incentives must be provided in the form of re-
ward for and recognition of individual contributions to the collective
effort, as have in fact been provided in the Soviet Union and in
China in the form of medals, publicity, luxury vacations, extra
privileges, and so on.
While at work, the workers are constantly exhorted by their party orj
eanizatfons and by the trade unions to engage in "socialist competition
among themselves, and collectively with the workers of otlicr factories.
84 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
trusts or institutions. Special rewards are given to those who excel in
overfulfilling their norms, the so-called “shock-workers”; since the thirties
the successful shock-workers have been known as Stakhanovites, after
Stakhanov, a shock-coalminer. The Stakhanovites receive special medals,
and badges, as well as financial rewards. They are entitled to certain
privileges, such as free railroad travel, while in some cases their children
are entitled to free education. It was estimated that in 1948 some 87 per
cent of the labor force in the USSR was engaged in “socialist competi-
tion* [Friedrich & Brzczinski, 1956, p. 283]
It should be noted that the acceptance on the part of the popula-
tion of such incentives also tends to deflect attention from a rational
examination of the underlying goals of the regime.
By accepting the regime's policies as dogma, the citizen solves a
number of problems for himself. He is able to reduce the external
pressures impinging on him; he is able to rationalize and justify to
himself a course of action which he has reason to believe the regime
would impose by force anyway; he can gain some measure of status;
and he is able to maintain hope for a better future. It should not be
assumed therefore that the citizen’s clinging to the dogma is merely
an expression of fear. Its acceptance may fulfill a number of psy-
chological needs.
One important limitation of the above argument is that, by itself,
it docs not explain the tremendous encroachment of the government
apparatus on the private lives of the citizens. It docs not account for
the conformity demands in widespread areas of behavior such as the
arts and the manner of dress.
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT DEFINED AS
A “COMBAT* ORGANIZATION
We have alluded in a number of places to the fact that the Com-
munists perceive themselves to be in a struggle for survival with
many enemies both inside their movement and in other countries,
and to be organized therefore according to military combat stand-
ards rather than peacetime standards. The overt emphasis on these
conditions is, of course, greatest during and immediately after the
The Passion for Unanimity s -
take-over, when the actual number of enemies inside and outside
the movement may be expected to be greatest For example, the
1945 Constitution of the CCP states in its preamble:
“The CCP is a unified, combat organization, built on the principle
of democratic centralism, and held together by the discipline which all
Party members must observe conscientiously and voluntarily. The
strength of the CCP rests on its solidarity, unified will, and integral ac-
tion. The Party cannot tolerate any internal action which deviates from
its programme and Constitution or is detrimental to discipline; it cannot
tolerate any demand for autonomy wi thin the Party, factionalism, or
two-faced deeds which pretend to obey the Party while opposing it in
practice. The CCP must constantly purge from its ranks those who
violate the programme, Constitution, and discipline of Party membership,
and who are incorrigible in their mistakes.’* [Brandt, Schwartz, & Fair-
bank, 1952, p. 424]
Pye, in commenting on “People’s Liberation Movements" in Asia,
notes that their reliance on armed struggle is to o degree a reflection
of the general importance which armed power has traditionally had
in Asian politics. It also reflects the situational demands of a pro-
longed revolutionary struggle, consisting of the gradual “liberation"
of rural areas prior to gaining control of the urban centers.
. . . Conceiving of themselves as existing in an environment domi-
nated by violence and as struggling against enemies who seek to main-
tain their control by military means, the People's Liberation parties have
readily turned to the task of creating their own military forces. [Pye,
1956, p. 27]
“Confronted with such enemies, it is inevitable for the Chinese revolu-
tion to take on a *protracted’ and ‘ruthless’ nature. . . . Confronted
with such enemies, the method and principal form of the Chinese revolu-
tion must necessarily be militant and not peaceful. ... It is absolutely
correct for Stalin to say, ‘One characteristic peculiar to the Chinese
revolution is opposition against the armed counter-revolutionaries by the
armed revolutionaries.' Hence any tendency to make light of armed streg-
gG . The Context of Coercive Persuasion
gle, of revolutionary war, of guerrilla warfare, and of the work of the
armed forces, is altogether wrong " [Mao Tse-tung. quoted in P>'c, 1930,
p. 29]
Several general consequences follow from the system’s definition
of the situation as one of combat which can be found in most post-
revolutionary regimes or in non-revolutionary situations where re-
gimes feel themselves to be threatened (c.g., the Papal Inquisition).*
1. In a state of combat there is the need for highly centralized
authority to achieve efficiency in implementing the goals of the re-
gime and maintain adequate co-ordination among decentralized
forces.] Highly centralized authority makes possible a greater de-
gree of arbitrariness of decision and thus lays the groundwork for
inquisitions and persecutions of deviants.
2. Organizations or regimes which conceive of themselves as being
tinder threat or in combat tend to replace authority by legal process
with authority by administrative decision. The source of this trend
is probably to be found in the desire of the leaders to maintain as
much power in their own hands as possible, but it is also justified
as a means of reaching disciplinary decisions rapidly and efficiently,
and preserving a solid front by avoiding the full airing of issues
which accompanies the usual legal process.
Essentially, the Communist legal system in this respect approximates
the situation in other legal systems in States where Church and State are
combined, and where the law and procedures are assimilated to and
governed by ecclesiastical and religious practice. The difference lies in
the fact that the Communist system, being materialist, discards any ex-
ternal or transcendental criteria: doctrine is madp by the Communist
Party of which the State is an expression; there can be, therefore, no
principle, let alone law, superior to it Police, administrative officials and
Courts axe obliged to adapt the Taw” (meaning thereby decrees and
regulations, and so forth) to this doctrine, and to handle the accused
* In this section in particular, we are shifting onr level of analysis. Our pur-
pose is to show that some of the characteristics of totalitarian movements can be
tUp laine d without explicit considerations of their ideology.
1 High centralization may In fact be the product of the power drive of the
leaders, but it is likely to be rationalized ana justified in terms of its efficiency.
The Fassion for Unanimity . < ^
accordingly. Leaving out the transcendental element, the Communist
legal system is probably merely a new version of the practice prevailing
in trial of crimes against the State under the Byzantine Empire (in which
the Emperor was also dominant in the Church) and of the actual though
less rationalized practice in many political cases under the Czarist
Empire. [Berle, 1957, p. 649]
There appear to be several corollary effects, particularly as the
system operates in Communist China: the automatic assumption of
guilt if any member of the administrative apparatus makes an ac-
cusation; the inadmissibility of any defense by the accused because
such defense constitutes a questioning of the authority and is there-
fore a revolt against established power; the unavailability of any
legal text to which the accused can turn to discover the nature of
his crime (which has a striking counterpart in the Papal Inquisition
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the outlawing of the Bible
for popular consumption (Lea, 1887]; the person in authority de-
fines the law simply by his position); the definition of crime purely
in terms of evpediency and the demands of the moment, which in .
turn leads to rather vague categories like “counter-revolutionary ac-
tivity,'' “sabotage,” “reactionary tendencies,” and so on (Berle, 1957);
repressive measures which maximize the odds for the government
by inferring from a minimum of evidence the actual or probable
criminal intent of anyone who is in any way a threat to it.*
Given these circumstances, the actual or potential deviant has
little chance in the system. If he is accused by anyone, he can quickly
be arrested, tried, and convicted by virtually any administrative
authority. It is the recognition on the part of the prisoner that the
demands for confession and thought reform are backed by com-
pletely arbitrary authority which more than anything else creates a
hopeless situation for him. Just as the witch or heretic of the Middle
Ages could only defend himself or herself by accepting the frame
of reference of the inquisitors (which meant accepting at least the
• These factors have been noted by a number of students oflegaT practices to
post-revolutionary states. A particularly concise analysis of the Chinese Com-
munist legal system Is given by Boanicbon (undated), a jurist who was himself
imprisoned. A more detailed discussion can be found in Wei, 1955.
gg The Context of Coercive Persuasion
validity of the premise that devils and witches do exist), the prisoner
of the Communists can survive only by accepting the ideological
frame of reference of his captors and the validity of their premise
about "struggle” “combat,” “ceaseless vigilance against counter-
revolutionary activity,” and so on.' He soon learns that if his judge
or interrogator says he is guilty, he is in fact guilty. Bonnichon de-
scribes the situation this way:
“Therefore, two ways lie open to you: either you confess and implore
the clemency of the government, in which case the government will be
lenient, or you resist and subject yourself to the severest of punish-
ments." This speech has been repeated to every accused, both in the
field of political crimes and that of ordinary crimes; in each case, it has
been repeated many times; it was clear that judges and interpreters
alike knew these words by heart. It is understandable, therefore, that to
plead innocence is to offend the government; and moreover, you are
told so: “So you dare accuse the government of frivolity or injustice!”
That is another offence which makes your case worse. Thus, not only is
the accused presumed guilty, but he is forbidden to prove the contrary:
to try, is to revolt! Not only does the judge have nothing to prove, but
he is even dispensed from the necessity of pronouncing a precise ac-
cusation: You are guilty; we know It; accuse yourself. When I ask:
"Guilty of what?”, I am told that it is not for the accused to put ques-
tions; there is only one thing he can do: confess and ask the govern-
ment's pardon.
Thus it is the knowledge on the part of the prisoner that he has
absolutely no recourse which forces him ultimately to give in to the
* The generality of this phenomenon was recently demonstrated in the post-
takeover phase of the Cuban revolution in which Fidel Castro set aside the
legally am'ved-at acquittal of a number of pilots who had fought for Batista,
and by a dminis trative act condemned them to life imprisonment on the basis
of his personal conviction that they had murdered Innocent women and children
in their rtrafiag,
1 This presumption is irrefutable to such a degree that the "political ir^
P 1 **®?* to the judge in the "reform of our thoughts,
told me one day; “The very fact that you do not see what crimes you have
committed makes jour case even worse, because it proves sour obduracy.
I Bo nnicho n, undated, p. 8]
Thc Passion for Unanimity • gg
s)*stem. At the same time, the administrative official knows that his
own position depends entirely upon the adequate fulfillment of his
superiors orders and tills motivates him strongly to produce total
conformity in the prisoner at virtually any price (short of losing him
by death or psychosis). The combat atmosphere, strongly supported
by ideological premises, makes him particularly sensitive to anv
evidence of crime and deviance, no matter how tenuous or cir-
cumstantial; thc confessions he finally elicits, of course, confirm his
suspicions.
3. Conditions of threat or combat tend to produce a shift in the
frame of reference used to evaluate behavior. Behavior which under
peacetime conditions might be ignored or might result only in mild
censure can and does become, under combat conditions, a serious
offense punishable by imprisonment or even death. Such severe
penalties are applied both for behavior which constitutes failure to
achic\-c a stated goal (such as failing to stay awake on guard duty
or to clean one’s rifle) and for behavior which increases danger by
breaking security (such as telling of a troop ship departure to art
unreliable person).
Thc Chinese Communist definition of such offenses as espionage
and saljotagc is an excellent example of this kind of sliift in frame of
reference. As one reads the kinds of charges wlu'di have been
brought against Western prisoners, one is initially struck by their
utter incongruity — a student accused of espionage, a priest or nun
accused of sabotage or infanticide, and so on. However, many
prisoners in time come to be able to understand the frame of refer-
ence from which thc conclusion follows that crimes have been
committed. This frame of reference, usually called "the people’s
standpoint,” is characterized primarily by the degree to which it
attaches serious criminal intent or effect to any action which in any
conceivable way could hurt the Communist regime. The justification
for this extreme kind of interpretation is the notion of perpetual
combat with enemies n-ilhin and without. For example, a letter to
an American friend by a priest who had just traveled tlirough some
rural areas, in which he described the landscape and the land of
farming he observed, was espionage according to the judge because,
it was pointed out, from the Chinese "people’s point of view combat
90
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
was not restricted solely to military engagement but included also
political and ideological struggle. Hence “intelligence” is not limited
to matters of military significance but includes also matters of eco-
nomic, political, and social significance. If information about a farm
in China could conceivably be used as the basis for a psychological
warfare campaign against the peasant, for example, it is automati-
cally “intelligence” and its transmitter is deliberately or unwittingly
engaging in espionage. The fact that between 1950 and 1953 the
United States and Communist China were technically at war with
each other supported this logic. It is not at all unlikely that in a
situation of comparable threat any nation would adopt a course of
maximum security and treat many seemingly innocent actions with
suspicion, especially if those actions were committed by members
of an enemy nation.
We have belabored this point to establish clearly the distinction
between a set of Communist attitudes which derives from their
ideology and a set which derives primarily from their preoccupation
with struggle, threat, and survival. The point is crucial because many
victims of Communist Chinese imprisonment found it much easier to
understand and accept the fact that their own behavior was harmful
because it represented a threat in a situation which was defined as
one of combat than it was for them to accept the ideological prem-
ises and rationale that led to such a definition of the situation in
the first place. For example, Robert Ford, a British citizen working
as a radio operator for the Tibetan government when captured by
the Communists, recognized shortly after his arrest that from the
Communist point of view he was certainly guilty of espionage (in
terms of the circumstantial evidence against him), and that he
might as well confess it rather than deny something he could ap-
preciate intellectually. Only much later in his thought reform did
the Issue of the acceptance of Communist values arise (Ford, 1957).
To generalize the argument: it seems clear that if the Communist
regime or any other regime can convince its population that they
are under constant threat from enemies inside and outside the sys-
tem, it Is introducing a potent force toward unanimity and con-
formity because even slight deviance becomes highly suspicious and
is severely dealt with. Every person can then be told that his own
The Passion for Unanimity 9J
lack of conformity can be a severe threat to the system as a whole,
and that such behavior is therefore not only against his own long-
run interests but also gives justification to the harsh repressive
measures used by die regime.
4. Conditions of struggle and combat, particularly in the period
prior to take-over, require the recruitment and maintenance of ef-
fective fighting forces. If such forces are drawn from politically un-
educated masses, and if, as was the case in the take-over of China,
these forces have to wage scattered guerrilla warfare as well as to
administer “liberated areas,” the importance of ideology as a moti-
vating force and guideline for action becomes exceedingly great
Hence, the Communists have placed great emphasis on political
education and indoctrination within the armed forces, with the effect
of making them more disciplined and providing for their politically
untutored audience in the liberated areas an appealing model of the
"good life* under Communism.
The ideology operates not only as a unifying force and a guide-
line to action in ambiguous situations, but also as a language, a set
of semantic guides, which makes possible rapid and efficient com-
munication of the wishes of the central authorities.* For example, if
every soldier and cadre understands clearly what is meant by a term
like "bureaucratism” (i.e., the slavish obedience to orders without
consideration to the local political situation), then a campaign can
be launched by the regime against this type of behavior simply by
stating that bureaucratism is bad and must be avoided. Everyone
knows precisely what is expected of him, what he is to criticize in
others, and liovv to change his behavior in the future. Semantic
clarity can be achieved only if unanimity of knowledge and interpre-
tation is strenuously enforced. One function of intensive indoctrina-
tion, then, is to insure the widespread sharing of definitions of key
terms of the ideology. If tliis goal can be accomplished, the com-
munication process can to a degree be streamlined and wider active
participation can be insured.
• William Griffith, £n private conversation, has pointed out the importance of
Western studies of Communist ideology as a basis for understanding even what
their internal communications mean.
92
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE LEADERS
OF THE MOVEMENT OR STATE
In considering the psychological factors in the leaders we must
distinguish between the tlirce sets of such factors: basic psychologi-
cal traits or personality predispositions; the psychological conse-
quences of success — attitudes and psychological mechanisms wliich
result from the leader’s role as one who has successfully engineered
a revolution; and, feelings and attitudes which result from the lead-
er s launching of a purge or a program for coercing unanimity.
Basically, the problem is to keep separate those psychological
characteristics which motivate the individual to become a revolu-
tionary leader from those characteristics which may be assumed to
be the result of his experiences, as these are mediated by the posi-
tion in which he finds himself at different stages of the revolution.
Basic Psychological Traits
Among the basic traits which have been attributed to successful
leaders of revolutionary movements are fanaticism, intolerance for
am guity, extremism, megalomania, idealism, authoritarianism, ex-
cessive se -righteousness, vanity, paranoia, asceticism, excessive
sense of dedication or commitment, ruthlessness, cruelty, rebellious-
. GSS ’ °P a thy, opportunism, frustrated ambition, nonconform-
This bewildering diversity of traits, combined
vi a ac o goo biographical data, argues strongly for holding in
abeyance any hasty conclusion about a revolutionary type.
nS ff \ J mton srgues that revolutionary leaders represent the
fRnVur, SGCt i 0n °* sode ty 35 any other types of leaders
195 “i* In analyzin S the “character and disposition” of the
lutinm'c* >ri fiP ,, ‘ f ml °n finds among them (1) “the gentleman-revo-
™ ’ the 11 miSgUided su P eri « the man bom on top, but per-
the rulincr' n g to stay there” (p. 113); (2) from classes below
dinWif^f 00 ^ °°^ S ’ SCOundre ^’ idealists, professional agitators,
in th TnU ’ 1UnabCS ’ COwards ’ Md heroes” (p. 115); (3) “failures
their ambitioT^ ““T. 11 ? ,?¥ MtS ° £
of .'P' l 4 ) nien of very practical abilities, men
a even cautious and hard-headed conservatives must
The Passion for Unanimity 93
recognize as Worthy of respect” (p. 117); (5) “men of blood (the
terrorists) (p. 117); (6) “the crack-brained schemer, the fantastic
doctrinaire, the man who has a crazy gadget which will bring
Utopia” (p. 110); (7) “the disputatious, contrary-minded person
who loves to stand out from the crowd of conformists” (pp. 119-20);
and finally, (S) the type most nearly the “perfect revolutionist,”
namely “the idealist’ (p. 121),
The concept of “the idealist" who is devoted enough to his ideals
to pursue them relentlessly and who is realistic enough to find a way
to mold a revolutionary movement around them is well expounded
by Inltcles in his discussion of the “totalitarian mystique” (Inkeles,
1934). He points out that the assumption of cynical power-seeking
is not sufficient to account for the often seemingly irrational tamper-
ing with social institutions characteristic of totalitarian movements.
Rather, the leader is primarily characterized by his conviction that
he has directly perceived some immanent law of social development
and by liis “mystical” dedication to it.
This element of the totalitarian character is not conceived of as
replacing the power drive, but rather as distinguishing the totalitarian
from other individuals who also seek power, even absolute power,
flnkelcs, 1954, p. 8S)
Furthermore^
. , . this approach is assumed to manifest itself regardless of the
particular content of the totalitarian’s formal ideology— although it may
be that only certain kinds ot formal ideology trill appeal to him; [Ibid.]
and
... the totalitarian's knowledge of the law is seen by hta both as
dictating necessary action on his part, and as guaranteeing the correct-
ness” of that action. [Ibid.]
We are not prepared to judge the validity of any of the character
trait analyses. We can note, however, that certain of fhe traits which
94
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
have been mentioned above, or which can be inferred from those
mentioned, are highly relevant to our basic question — what func-
tions does unanimity serve? Looking at this question now from the
perspective of the personality of the leader, we can identify three
kinds of traits which are relevant: the predisposition to feel anxious
and insecure (which can be inferred from the preoccupation with
security operations such as dedication to pseudo-religions, power-
seeking, etc.); lack of flexibility' in thinking and perceiving (which
is either mentioned directly or can be inferred from a number of
other traits mentioned); and activity proneness.
The first of these predispositions leads the leader to seek constant
reassurance, which for one who sets out to be a leader can only be
the unanimity of his followers. He needs not only the reassurance
that his followers will remain loyal, but also the reassurance that
they accept his legitimacy, that they grant that his ideology and
course of action are correct. Furthermore, if his insecurity is rooted
in emotional conflicts of childhood rather than being based on a
realistic evaluation of his current situation, one may expect pre-
occupations with reassurance which are out of all proportion to the
objective situation.
The tendency to be inflexible in perceiving and thinking should
lead to genuine inability on the part of the leader to see the virtue
of any point of view other than his own. Other positions are likely
to e viewed, at the minimum, as understandable errors of the un-
enlightened (in which case re-education is called for), or, at the
maximum, as inherently evil and dangerous heresies to be excised as
quickly as possible. The latter position is more likely to be taken if,
with the inflexibility, there is present a strong commitment to an
ideology which is all-inclusive. Inkeles labels this phenomenon a
fear of contamination from within":
... It is a characteristic of totalitarian leaders that they see every
so™, movement as having within it 4e seeds of j(s own destru rtion, and
that they are ridden by fear that within their own movement and social
organization there is such a potentially destructive foreign body "lac! 1
must be wholly and violently expunged-it is not enough to build anti-
bodies against rt-lest it cripple its hosl society ham For Hitler
The Passion for Unanimity 95
it was the Jews and all other forms of “race mixture," whether of blood,
of physical contact, or of ideas, which he saw as opening up the pos-
sibility of the disintegration of his particular mystical structure. For
the Soviet Bolshevik it is the taint of capitalist thought remnants, or of
various forms of "deviation.” And 1 suppose that for Franco it is any
sign of "socialism” or “anti-clericalism." [Inkeles, 1954, pp. 97-98]
When heresies or “inner taints" axe discovered there is no choice but
to destroy the carrier as well as the germ, thus leading to the possi-
bility' of endless preoccupation with purges and thought reform.
Activity proneness in the service of an ideology derives its im-
portance from the fact that it leads the individual into an irreversible
series of commitments from which is forged an identity to which
the individual inevilably becomes strongly attached psychologically.
It is in such behavioral commitment that the main difference lies
between the intellectual Communist who may go so far as to discuss
his ideas and beliefs with congenial friends or willing listeners, and
the active revolutionary who is prepared to back up these ideas and
beliefs with actions which may result in exile, imprisonment, or
The ideology becomes a component of the persons W™ ll 'y Partl) r
through his behavioral commitments and partly through hn ‘ rater-
actions with others who may join him in forgrng
movement. This process of embedding a set of
sonal commitment and in lasting social relationship cm, i Itmd rfy
to increasing psychological commitment to them, wtah,
should lead to increased efforts to convince others , of then ■ val dffy.
One may expert this process to reach its f £.
point of greatest commitment, in the final struggle to take over tn
society aid in the period immediately afterward.
The Psychological Conse ? ocn«. of Succa*
The successful take-over of a
obviously a product of the intera on 1 P of this interaction
social, and psychological (ac, “f -Jem J’lection that no one
insures the conclusion discussed in P f tj c successful
personality type will likely end up m the position
9G The Context of Coercive Persuasion
leader. It is tenable to assume, however, that the psychological con-
sequences of being a successful leader will show considerable uni-
formity, regardless of the personality of the individual in whom
they manifest themselves. We shall hypothesize four kinds of psy-
chological consequences and try to show how they relate to the
passion for unanimity.
1. Successful take-over strongly confirms the ideology for the
leader himself, and confirms also the identification of the leader with
the ideology in the minds of the followers and bystanders. The
ideology thus becomes not only the most convenient but also the
only tenable basis of legitimacy for the new regime.
2. Successful take-over reinforces the leader's sense of confidence
in himself, his sense of rightness, and consequently his sense of
power. Gaining more and more power is supported not only by
whatever personal power needs may be present but also by the
newly reinforced sense of destiny which legitimizes these needs.
3. Successful take-over must involve a certain amount of guilt
concerning actions which have been taken in the take-over process,
though one might expect that this guilt would be fairly deeply
buried psychologically. The more guilt is present, however, the
more the successful leader must seek reassurance and legitimation,
on the one hand, and the more paranoid he may become, on the
other hand. The growth of paranoid feelings may result either be-
cause of fear of revenge or because of the leader’s projection onto
others of his own hostility toward established authority.
4. Successful take-over thrusts the leader into a position of having
to fulfill the utopian promises of the ideology on which he rose to
power, and to test his own ability as a person in a position of final
authority. It is much easier to criticize the existing order than to
create something better oneself. Therefore, under the leader’s fagade
of confidence must lie a layer of doubt and insecurity concerning his
own ability to bring to fruition many of the things he has talked
about so glibly. As actual programs fail, this insecurity may be ex-
pected to mount, because both the ideology and the leader’s own
ability are then in danger of being disconfirmed.
From any one of these factors one could predict that the leader
would initiate programs to liquidate those who are useless and un-
The Passion for Unanimity 97
edu cat able, to re-cducate those who are needed in the new society
and who are considered re-educatable, and to purge members of the
faithful as a way of purifying and reaffirming the faith as well as con-
sohdating his own power position. Tlie important point here is that
one can predict the occurrence of preoccupation with unanimity in
the post-takeover period without postulating any specific basic per-
sonality characteristics in the leader. Different personality types mav
be equally prone to preoccupations with legitimacy and may
equally share the need for reassurance because of the circumstances
in which they find themselves.
The type of expression of unanimity demanded by the leader may,
of course, be partially determined by the situation in the post-take-
over period. The leader during this period not only requires reas-
surance that he will receive support; he also must be elevated to
the great heights of a savior and be given a positive image and high
status to insure ready acceptance of his position among other nations
and to reward psychologically the masses who identify with him. To
tin's end one may find great importance given to the more overt ritual
expressions of unanimity — the demonstrations, elections, parades,
and so on. However forced such demonstrations may be, they prob-
ably operate to give the leader a sense of power and control which
enables liim to go ahead with the process of rebuilding society, and
which makes it possible for him to maintain face in his dealings with
representatives of other nations.
Overtly expressed unanimity also serves the important function of
absolving the leader of responsibility for irreversible courses of
action. If the leader can feel that actions which lead to feelings of
guilt or which threaten to have unpredicted consequences are in
fact demanded of liim by the ideology and the people (i.e., that he
is only the agent of destiny), he can relieve liimself of much psy-
chological discomfort. The "People’s Courts” in the take-over of
China may serve as a good example. A landlord is to be liquidated.
The party member launches into a harangue concerning the land-
lord’s crimes against the people and demands to know what the
people’s judgment is. Agitators in the crowd shout for liquidation of
the criminal. The malcontents pick up the theme and some of the
timid go along from fear. Soon the whole crowd is swept by a
gg The Context of Coercive Persuasion
frenzy of mob feeling and expressed hate, leading to the unanimous
decision to execute the victim. Such demonstrations no doubt serve
many functions. The one we wish to point to here is that the party
member, though he knows he staged the whole thing, is nevertheless
reassured and absolved by the final unanimous people's decision.
Self-fulfilling prophecies are no less reassuring than other kinds, and
in some sense perhaps more so.
An additional aspect to this need for legitimation which is often
mentioned in analyses of the totalitarian system is the leader’s need
to be judged favorably by history (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1958).
Not only does he feel a need to be reassured in the present but his
commitment to being an agent of destiny requires that ultimately
he be proved correct no matter what the actual outcome of his de-
cisions may be. To this end, then, are devoted the more fantastic
rituals like the falsification of history so well described by Orwell
in his Nineteen Eighty-four. One may expect this process to take
hold in totalitarian society to the extent that the leader or leaders
can imbue the members of the party and the citizenry with the same
sense of destiny which they themselves have.
The points discussed thus far refer primarily to the problem of
dealing with power needs, legitimacy, and absolution from guilt. It
remains to discuss the fourth factor mentioned in our list of con-
sequences, the threat of personal or ideological disconfirmation. It
is quite likely, the complexities of social systems being what they
are, that the leader will make some predictions or put into operation
some programs which will fail to materialize in the manner ex-
pected. Statistics can be falsified to preserve the public image of the
leader’s omniscience, but what of the effect on the leader himself?
There is relatively good evidence that if an individual or group com-
mitted to a certain ideology makes concrete predictions about future
events on the basis of the ideology, and such events fail to occur as
predicted, the degree of commitment to the ideology will psycho-
logically increase, and will manifest itself in sharply increasing
proselytization (Festinger et al, 1956). In other words, when a set
of ideas to which one is committed is about to be proved false, the
best way to preserve psychological balance is to reassure oneself that
they are not false, and this can best be accomplished by convincing
The Passion for Unanimity g9
others of their validity. Thus, in the group which Festinger et al.
studied first hand, a prediction was made, based on revelation from
God, that tlie earth would be destroyed on a certain day at a certain
time, but that the faithful would be picked up by a flying saucer and
saved. When the original prediction and several revisions (based
upon further revelations) failed to materialize, the group for the
first time in its history actively began to seek publicity, to tell others
of their religion, and to reaffirm it more than ever among themselves.
The explanation of the earths being saved was revealed also: the
devotion of the group itself had led Cod to relentl
Because the leader of totalitarian society, particularly the first-
generation leader, rises to his position by virtue of his commitment
to an ideology around which a revolutionary movement was forged,
it is highly unlikely that he would find it psychologically possible to
become less committed even if the ideology proved to be quite use-
less in coping with concrete reality. It should be noted, by the way,
that in a broad sense it is impossible to disconfirm an ideology like
Marxism-Leninism. Apart from the unassailability of a humanitarian
ethic and a utopian goal, the clear separation of means from ends
and the concept that any means are justified to achieve the ends
always make possible the explanation of short-run failure as the
result of such things as incorrect choice of means, sabotage or
counter-revolutionary activity, or poor administration at lower eche-
lons. The same kind of semantic ambiguity which is introduced into
a religion by successive revelations is present in Communist ideology
because of its failure to define denotatively (except insofar as the
definitions are provided by the leaders to suit the needs of the mo-
ment) what its basic terms mean. It is well and good to be against
the "rich farmer" in a given campaign, but there remains the prob-
lem of defining precisely what constitutes a farmer and what con-
stitutes rich. 0 Given such ambiguity, it is not difficult for the leader
to convince either himself or others that his false predictions were
actually not fake, and that no one need lose faith.
• An excellent discussion of the .
group of prisoners who were attem
Communist prison is presented in
periences in prison (Huang, 1954
problems ibis kind of ambiguity posed for a
pting to re-educate themselves in a Chinese
Bishop Quentin Huang’s account of his ex-
93 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
frenzy of mob feeling and expressed hate, leading to the unanimous
decision to execute the victim. Such demonstrations no doubt serve
many functions. The one we wish to point to here is that the party
member, though he knows he staged the whole thing, is nevertheless
reassured and absolved by the final unanimous people’s decision.
Self-fulfilling prophecies are no less reassuring than other kinds, and
in some sense perhaps more so.
An additional aspect to this need for legitimation which is often
mentioned in analyses of the totalitarian system is the leader's need
to be judged favorably by history (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956).
Not only does he feel a need to be reassured in the present but his
commitment to being an agent of destiny requires that ultimately
he be proved correct no matter what the actual outcome of his de-
cisions may be. To this end, then, are devoted the more fantastic
rituals like the falsification of history so well described by Orwell
in his Nineteen Eighty-Four. One may expect this process to take
hold in totalitarian society to the extent that the leader or leaders
can imbue the members of the party and the citizenry with the same
sense of destiny which they themselves have.
The points discussed thus far refer primarily to the problem of
dealing with power needs, legitimacy, and absolution from guilt. It
remains to discuss the fourth factor mentioned in our list of con-
sequences, the threat of personal or ideological disconfirmation. It
is quite likely, the complexities of social systems being what they
are, that the leader will make some predictions or put into operation
some programs which will fail to materialize in the manner ex-
pected. Statistics can be falsified to preserve the public image of the
leader’s omniscience, but what of the effect on the leader himself?
There is relatively good evidence that if an individual or group com-
mitted to a certain ideology makes concrete predictions about future
events on the basis of the ideology, and such events fail to occur as
predicted, the degree of commitment to the ideology will psycho-
logically increase, and will manifest itself in sharply increasing
proselytization (Festinger et al., 1956). In other words, when a set
of ideas to which one is committed is about to be proved false, the
best way to preserve psychological balance is to reassure oneself that
they are not false, and this can best be accomplished by convincing
The Passion far Unanimity S9
others of their validity, llius, in tie group which Festinger et al
studjed first hand, a prediction was made, based on revelation from
God, that the earth would he destroyed on a certain day at a certain
time, but that the faitfiful would be picked up by a flying saucer and
saved. When the original prediction and several revisions (based
upon further revelations) failed to materialize, the group for the
first time in its history actively began to seek publicity, to tell others
of their religion, and to reaffirm it more than ever among themselves.
The explanation of the earth’s being saved was Tevealed also: the
devotion of the group itself had led God to relent!
Because the leader of totalitarian society, particularly the first-
generation leader, rises to liis position by virtue of his commitment
to an ideology around which a revolutionary movement was forged,
it is highly unlikely that he would find it psychologically possible to
become less committed even if the ideology proved to he quite use-
less in coping with concrete reality. It should be noted, by the way,
that in a broad sense it is impossible to disconfirm an ideology like
Marxism-Leninism. Apart from the unassailability of a humanitarian
etliic and n utopian goal, the clear separation of means from ends
and the concept that any means are justified to achieve the ends
always make possible the explanation of short-run failure as the
result of such things as incorrect choice of means, sabotage or
counter-revolutionary activity, or poor administration at lower eche-
lons. The same kind of semantic ambiguity which is introduce d into
a religion by successive revelations is present in Communist ideology
because of its failure to define denotatively (except insofar as the
definitions are provided by the leaders to suit the needs of the mo-
ment) what its basic terms mean. It is well and good to be against
the "rich farmer" in a given campaign, but there remains the prob-
lem of defining precisely what constitutes a farmer and what con-
stitutes rich.® Given such ambiguity, it is not difficult for the leader
to convince either himself or others that h is fake predictions were
actually not false, and that no one need lose faith.
iscusston of the problems this hind of ambiguity posed for a
who were attempting to re-educate themselves in a Chinese
is presented in Bishop Quentin Huang's account of ins «-
i (Huang, 1954).
• An excellent d
group of prisoners
Communist prison
periences in prisor
gg The Context of Coercive Persuasion
frenzy of mob feeling and expressed hate, leading to the unanimous
decision to execute the victim. Such demonstrations no doubt serve
many functions. The one we wish to point to here is that the party
member, though he knows he staged the whole thing, is nevertheless
reassured and absolved by the final unanimous people’s decision.
Self-fulfilling prophecies are no less reassuring than other kinds, and
in some sense perhaps more so.
An additional aspect to this need for legitimation which is often
mentioned in analyses of the totalitarian system is the leader’s need
to be judged favorably by history (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956).
Not only does he feel a need to be reassured in the present but his
commitment to being an agent of destiny requires that ultimately
he be proved correct no matter what the actual outcome of his de-
cisions may be. To this end, then, are devoted the more fantastic
rituals like the falsification of history so well described by Orwell
in his Nineteen Eighty-Four. One may expect this process to take
hold in totalitarian society to the extent that the leader or leaders
can imbue the members of the party and the citizenry with the same
sense of destiny which they themselves have.
The points discussed thus far refer primarily to the problem of
dealing with power needs, legitimacy, and absolution from guilt. It
remains to discuss the fourth factor mentioned in our list of con-
sequences, the threat of personal or ideological disconfirmation. It
is quite likely, the complexities of social systems being what they
are, that the leader will make some predictions or put into operation
some programs which will fail to materialize in the manner ex-
pected. Statistics can be falsified to preserve the public image of the
leader’s omniscience, but what of the eflect on the leader himself?
There is relatively good evidence that if an individual or group com-
mitted to a certain ideology makes concrete predictions about future
events on the basis of the ideology, and such events fail to occur as
predicted, the degree of commitment to the ideology will psycho-
logically increase, and will manifest itself in sharply increasing
prosclytization (Festinger cf al., 1956). In other words, when a set
of ideas to which one is committed is about to be proved false, the
best way to preserve psychological balance is to reassure oneself that
they are not false, and this can best be accomplished by convincing
The Passion for Unanimity 99
others of their validity. Thus, in the group which Festinger ct al
studied first hand, a prediction was made, based on revelation from
God, that the earth would be destroyed on a certain day at a certain
time, but that the faithful would be picked up by a flying saucer and
saved. When the original prediction and several revisions (based
upon further revelations) failed to materialize, the group for the
first time in its history actively began to seek publicity, to tell others
of their religion, and to reaffirm it more than ever among themselves.
The explanation of the earths being saved was revealed also: the
devotion of the group itself had led God to relentl
Because the leader of totalitarian society, particularly the first*
generation leader, rises to his position by virtue of his commitment
to an ideology around which a revolutionary movement was forged,
it is highly unlikely that he would find it psychologically possible to
become less committed even if the ideology proved to be guite use-
less in coping with concrete reality. It should be noted, by the way,
that in a broad sense it is impossible to disconfirtn an ideology like
Marxism-Leninism. Apart from the unassailability of a humanitarian
ethic and a utopian goal, the clear separation of means from ends
and the concept that any means are justified to achieve the ends
always make possible the explanation of short-run failure as the
result of such things as incorrect choice of means, sabotage or
counter-revolutionary activity, or poor administration at lower eche-
lons. The same kind of semantic ambiguity which is introduced into
a religion by successive revelations is present in Communist ideology
because of its failure to define denotatively (except insofar as the
definitions are provided by the leaders to suit the needs of the mo-
ment) what its basic terms mean. It is well and good to be against
the "rich farmer" in a given campaign, but there remains the prob-
lem of defining precisely what constitutes a farmer and what con-
stitutes rich.* Given such ambiguity, it is not difficult for the leader
to convince either himself or others that his false predictions were
actually not false, and that no one need lose faith.
• An excellent discussion of the problems this kind of axnbfpiUy P 05 *^ ( or *
croup of prisoners who were attempting to reeducate themselves In a Chinese
Communist prison is presented in Bishop Quentin Huang* account of his ex-
periences fn prison (Huang, 1054).
100 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
Cynicism and an apparent lack of devotion to ideology are often
cited as a characteristic of totalitarian leaders, however. Is the
observation wrong, or should one assume that such feelings are the
end result of repeated disconfirmation and/or the hard experience of
dealing with the realities of power politics? We prefer a third ex-
planation, suggested by Inkeles, that the totalitarian treats his
ideology in a mystical pseudo-religious sense which permits cyni-
cism, indeed encourages it, about existing worldly institutions. The
argument is well stated in the following passage:
... I do not minimize the cynicism and the manipulativeness of
totalitarians. Indeed I suspect the world has never seen cynicism and
manipulation to surpass theirs. The questions are what makes them
cynical and what are they cynical about? The mystique dictates their
morality, indeed it stands above ordinary human morality and places its
adherent outside the demands normally to be made of a man and leader.
Hence the totalitarian may be cynical about and manipulate "law,”
"loyalty,” "truth,” “honesty,” and so on. For as long as he manipulates
these in the service of the mystique, his action is beyond question — it is
law, honesty, loyalty, unto itself. [Inkeles, 1954, p. 92]
The callous disregard for the human suffering caused by the
establishment of the totalitarian regime and the expensive human
sacrifice which the leader is explicitly willing to make for the sake
of the ideology can only be understood in terms of fanatic devotion
to a higher morality and a mystical sense of omnipotence.*
An additional point, though one concerning which we have not
* Parenthetically, the degree to which leaders of the revolutionary movement
®° me to be identified with the ideology of the movement was well demonstrated
by Leites and Bcmaut in The liitual of Liquidation (1954), in which they
showed convincingly how the public false confessions of prominent Communists
b® understood best as a final act In the service of the party and the
symbolic reidentificatlon which this act then signified. Smith (1954), in com-
paring the Soviet purge trials of the 1930 s with the English treason trials under
Henry VIII, finds convincing parallel evidence that individuals accused of
nunes&ey probably never committed nevertheless confessed when facing the
S scalfold as a final act of reaffirming their solidarity with the system. After all, to
e the government to which one has devoted one’s whole life as wrong
es a mockery out of one’s own past It is easier to see oneself as wrong and
to reaffirm the system.
The Passion for Unanimity 101
located data, is that the role of the ideology in the total personality
probably shifts as the career of the member of a movement, organi-
zation, or society progresses. It appears to be generally true that the
person is overtly most committed and most fanatical when he first
enters the movement or organization. In the early stage of his career
he must prove his worth, and part of his initiation is the total emo-
tional acceptance of the ideology. As the person enters higher posi-
tions of authority he finds himself increasingly in a managerial role,
and the managerial attitude must be maintained alongside the
ideological conviction. If the ideological commitment remains as
emotionally consuming as it was in earlier years, it becomes im-
possible for the person to function effectively in a managerial ca-
pacity, and thus effectively blocks his rise to power. To be an
effective leader he must develop perspective, that is, he must be
able increasingly to see the ideology in relation to other considera-
tions. This implies no diminution in commitment to the ideology,
but it does imply an increasing concern with other aspects of life.
A useful parallel can be drawn here with religious orders. To
become a high official of the order generally requires administrative
ability and a high degree of worldliness, yet one does not get the
feeling that the high official is therefore any Jess devout. Rather,
with rising rank the person learns more and more how to fulfill his
religious goals in a complex environment. Similarly, when a totali-
tarian leader rises to a position of high authority he takes on a
managerial role without, however, being any Jess influenced by the
ideology. If anything, his increasing administrative ability may teach
him better how to accomplish ideological goals; where the fanatic
might fail at the helm of a society, the managerially competent leader
might succeed.
The conclusion for our purposes is that one may expect in any
program of coercive persuasion a mixture of rational and irrational
elements. The leader of the regime may see the rational functions
outlined in earlier sections of this chapter, but also may be emo-
tionally swayed by needs either which he has always had or which
have resulted from his accession to power.
102
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
The Effects of Coercing Unanimity
Partly for the psychological reasons described above, partly to
facilitate rapid reconstruction of society, partly to build an image of
legitimacy, and partly to consolidate his power by isolating the po-
tential dissenter, the leader initially commits himself to a program
of coercing agreement or unanimous acceptance of the ideology.
However, the more the regime coerces unanimity in the political
area, the fewer criteria it has for determining whether there is genu-
ine acceptance or not The more fear there is created in the citizenry
and in the bureaucracy, the more of a communication vacuum is
created around the top leadership because of the fear of passing up-
ward any information which could in any way be used against
anyone below.
This failure to communicate effectively, both within the hierarchy
and with the rest of the people and the world, we have called the
phenomenon of the vacuum. There develops within the regimes a kind
of empty space around the rulers, which becomes more and more difficult
to penetrate. A slow disintegration affecting all human relations sets
people against each other and causes mutual distrust so that ordinary
people are alienated from one another, all the bonds of confidence in
social relaUonships are corroded by the terror and propaganda, the spy-
ing, and the denouncing and betraying, until the social fabric threatens
to fall apart. The confidence which ordinarily binds the manager of a
plant to his subordinates, members of a university faculty to each other
and to their students, lawyer to client, doctor to patient, and even parents
to children, as well as brothers to sisters is disrupted. The core of this
process of disintegration is, it seems, the breakdown of the possibility of
communication — the spread, that is, of the vacuum. Isolation and anxiety
are the universal result. And the only answer the totalitarian dictatorship
has for coping with this disintegration of human relationships is more
organized coercion, more propaganda, more terror. [Friedrich & Brzezin-
ski, 1956, p. 166]
At the same time, the more uniform everyone’s behavior becomes,
the more difficult it becomes to distinguish the active enthusiastic
The Passion for Unanimity 103
supporter from the mere conformist. Thus the very mechanism
initially designed to reassure the leadership actually leads to greater
insecurity, which in turn leads to greater demands for reassurance
and, therefore, to more widespread coercion. One result of tliis
cycle is the broadening of the sphere of the citizen’s activities which
the regime begins to take an interest in. That is, behavior in initially
non-political areas comes to be considered indicative of what the
person might say or do in public on potdical issues. Such broadening
of surveillance is justified, as we have previously indicated, by the
demands of the totalitarian ideology for total active participation
on the part of the citizen. It is easy to show, in terms of the prem-
ises of the ideology, that the “new man” in the society should have
no private life, or any need of it, and that all activities are basically
political anyway.
As the regime’s demands and areas of surveillance increase, the
citizen, to protect himself, begins to conform in more and more
areas of his life, thus making those areas once again useless as cri-
teria for loyalty and resulting in still further searching by the regime
into his private life. The only way this cycle can be slowed down is
by the citizen’s total acceptance of the regime’s paranoia, in effect
giving up all claims to a private life separated from a public one,
and a wholehearted co-operation with the regime in “hunting out its
enemies." When mutual surveillance in the service of the regime
completely replaces surveillance by the authorities the process is
complete.*
As we have previously suggested, the main effect of this social
process is that political-ideological beliefs do get confirmed for the
leaders and are learned by the citizenry, but at the same time these
• Inkeles in his discussion of the totalitarian mystique argues that the de-
liberate destruction of certain social institutions (e-g., primary group relation-
ships) as a way of destroying the very basis of individuality is inherent in the
system. While this may be true, it implies a high degree of sociological sophisti-
cation on the part of the leaders. Our explanation suggests that whether he
deliberately set out to do so initially or not. the totalitarian leader soon turns
himself forced to attack institutions like the family and friendship ti« anyway.
It is quite possible that he then discovers empirically what the good and fad
consequences are of destroying primary group relations and the private Me.
often leading to a deliberate reversal of pohcy (eg., reaffirming the solidarity
of the family).
102
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
The Effects of Coercing Unanimity
Partly for the psychological reasons described above, partly to
facilitate rapid reconstruction of society, partly to build an image of
legitimacy, and partly to consolidate his power by isolating the po-
tential dissenter, the leader initially commits himself to a program
of coercing agreement or unanimous acceptance of the ideology.
However, the more the regime coerces unanimity in the political
area, the fewer criteria it has for determining whether there is genu-
ine acceptance or not. The more fear there is created in the citizenry
and in the bureaucracy, the more of a communication vacuum is
created around the top leadership because of the fear of passing up-
ward any information which could in any way be used against
anyone below.
This failure to communicate effectively, both within the hierarchy
and with the rest of the people and the world, we have called the
phenomenon of the vacuum. There develops within the regimes a kind
of empty space around the rulers, which becomes more and more difficult
to penetrate. A slow disintegration affecting all human relations sets
people against each other and causes mutual distrust so that ordinary
people are alienated from one another, all the bonds of confidence m
social relationships are corroded by the terror and propaganda, the spy-
ing, and the denouncing and betraying, until the social fabric threatens
to fall apart. The confidence which ordinarily binds the manager of a
plant to his subordinates, members of a university faculty to each other
and to their students, lawyer to client, doctor to patient, and even parents
to children, as well as brothers to sisters is disrupted. The core of this
process of disintegration is, it seems, the breakdown of the possibility of
communication — the spread, that is, of the vacuum. Isolation and anxiety
are the universal result. And the only answer the totalitarian dictatorship
has for coping with this disintegration of human relationships is more
organized coercion, more propaganda, more terror. [Friedrich & Brzezin-
ski, 1030, p. 166]
At the same time, the more uniform everyone's behavior becomes,
the more difficult it becomes to distinguish the active enthusiastic
The Passion for Unanimity J0g
supporter from the mere conformist. Thus the very mechanism
initially designed to reassure the leadership actually leads to greater
insecurity, which in turn leads to greater demands for reassurance
and, therefore, to more widespread coercion. One result of this
cycle is the broadening of the sphere of the citizens activities which
the regime begins to take an interest in. That is, behavior in initially
non-political areas comes to be considered indicative of what the
person might say or do in public on potilical issues. Such broadening
of surveillance is justified, as we have previously indicated, by the
demands of the totalitarian ideology for total active participation
on the part of the citizen. It is easy to show, in terms of the prem-
ises of the ideology, that the “new man" in the society should have
no private life, or any need of it, and that all activities are basically
political anyway.
As the regime’s demands and areas of surveillance increase, the
citizen, to protect himself, begins to conform in more and more
areas of his life, thus making those areas once again useless as cri-
teria for loyalty and resulting in still further searching by the regime
info his private life. The only way this cycle can be slowed down is
by the citizens total acceptance of the regime’s paranoia, in effect
giving up all claims to a private life separated from a public one,
and a wholehearted co-operation with the regime in “hunting out its
enemies." When mutual surveillance in the service of the regime
completely replaces surveillance by the authorities the process is
complete.*
As we have previously suggested, the main effect of this social
process is that political-ideological beliefs do get confirmed for the
leaders and are learned by the citizenry, but at the same time these
• Inkeles to his discussion of the totalitarian mystique argues that the de-
liberate destruction of certain social institutions (eg, primary group relation-
ships) as a way of destroying (he very basis of individuality ismhezent in the
system. While this may be true, it implies a high degree of sociological sophisti-
cation on the part ol the leaders. Our explanation suggests that whether he
deliberately set out to do so initially or not. the totalitarian leader soon finds
himself forced to attack institutions like the family and friendship ties anyway.
ble that he then discovers empirically what the jgJOci end bad
e of destroying primary group relations and the private Ure,
a deliberate reversal of policy (eg, reaffirming the solidarity
It is quite pos;
consequences a
often leading t
of the family).
104 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
beliefs increasingly assume tbe form of a ritual rather than remain-
ing or becoming viable, growing, expressive cognitive responses. The
form, the time of expression, and the content all become so rigidly
prescribed that the belief ceases to serve any function other than
reassuring the regime and maldng life safe for the citizen. That is,
the citizen learns not to invest too much of himself in the political
belief and learns not to take its content too seriously, although he
does accept the importance of the principle that "one must have the
correct political belief and must express it appropriately.”
From the point of view of the regime, the fate of the coercion-
insecurity-more coercion cycle will probably depend on the follow-
ing considerations: whether the leader’s insecurity is based on stable
personality dispositions or on a realistic evaluation of the likelihood
of disaffection in the citizenry (especially under the pressures of
forced industrialization) and the actual degree of success of the
social system in reconstruction, industrialization, war, providing
consumer benefits, scientific or cultural accomplishment, etc. If the
leaders insecurity is strongly rooted in his personality one may ex-
pect no diminution of coercion through his lifetime. If on the other
hand it is based on a realistic assessment of the state of feeling of the
citizenry, one may expect coercion to decline as success is achieved
by the system; that is, as the basis of consent and legitimacy begins
to shift from purely ideological grounds to rational grounds in terms
of the successful performance of the leaders.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN THE FOLLOWERS
Thus far we have concentrated on the functions of unanimity for
the system as a whole and for the leaders of the system. It remains
to discuss what may be a most significant additional dimension of
the problem — the functions which una nim ity serves for the follow-
ers, functions which may be of sufficient importance to lead the
masses not to resist the regime’s demands for unanim ity and at given
times even to demand it
A number of authors writing about modem man have cited psy-
chological characteristics such as alienation from selfhood (Fromm,
1941; Hotter, 1951), latent dependency wishes (Meerloo, 1956), the
The Passion for Unanimity 10 g
need to submit to a strong authority (Adomo et al, 1950), all of
which lead, they feel, to longings to achieve harmony or a mystical
union with a powerful group, great cause, or mass movement Be-
cause the individual fails to find a personal identic or is dissatisfied
with what he sees himself to be, he seeks a new identity by identify-
ing with a mass movement. The stronger and more unanimous this
movement, the stronger the sense of self which the individual gains
by identifying with it
Fromm, in his Escape from Freedom (1941), argues that modem
man has a “feeling of insignificance in comparison with the over-
whelming power of the world outside himself” (p. 185) and selects
a “mechanism of escape” which meshes well with the totalitarian
passion for unanimity:
This particular mechanism is the solution that the majority of norma!
individuals find in modem society. To put it briefly, the individual ceases
to be himself; he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him
by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes exactly as all others are
and as they expect him to be. The discrepancy between “I" and the
world disappears and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and power-
lessness. This mechanism can be compared with the protective color-
ing some animals assume. They look so similar to their surroundings that
they are hardly distinguishable from them. The person who gives up
his individual self and becomes an automaton, identical with millions of
other automatons around him, need not feel alone and anxious any
more. But the price he pays, however, is high; it is the loss of his self.
[Fromm, 19-11, pp. 185-86]
Hoffer, in his analysis of mass movements, develops this theme
by noting that people do not want freedom but faith and unity
(unanimity):
. . They do not want freedom of conscience, hut faith blind
authoritarian faith. They sweep away the old order not to create a society
of free and independent men, but to establish uniformity, individual
anonymity and a new structure of perfect unity. It is not the wickedness
100 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
of the old regime they rise against but its weakness; not its oppression,
but its failure to hammer them together into one solid, mighty whole.
The persuasiveness of the intellectual demagogue consists not so much
in convincing people of the vileness of the established order as in
demonstrating its helpless incompetence. The immediate result of a
mass movement usually corresponds to what the people want They arc
not cheated in the process. [Hoffcr, 1951, p. 141; italics added]
Hoffcr, too, feels that the needs of the follower mesh well with
the needs of totalitarian society.
The vigor of a mass movement stems from the propensity of its fol-
lowers for united action and self-sacriBce. When we ascribe the success
of a movement to its faith, doctrine, propaganda, leadership, ruthless-
ness and so on, we are but referring to instruments of unification and to
means used to inculcate a readiness for sclf-sacrificc. [Holler, 1951, p.
571
. . . The same is true of religious and revolutionary organizations:
whether or not they develop into mass movements depends less on the
doctrine they preach and the program they project than on the degree of
their preoccupation with unity and the readiness for self-sacrifice. [Ibid.
p. 581
The total surrender of a distinct self is a prerequisite for the attain-
ment of both unity and self-sacrifice; and there is probably no more
direct way of realizing this surrender than by inculcating and extolling
the habit of blind obedience. When Stalin forces scientists, writers and
artists to crawl on their bellies and deny their individual intelligence,
sense of beauty, and moral sense, he is not indulging a sadistic impulse
but is solemnizing, in a most impressive way, the supreme virtue of blind
obedience. All mass movements rank obedience with the highest virtues
and put it on a level with faith: "union of minds requires not only a
perfect accord in the One Faith, but complete submission and obedience
of will to the Church and the Roman Pontiff as to God Himself."
Obedience is not only the first law of God, but also the first tenet of a
revolutionary party and of fervent nationalism. “Not to reason why” is
considered by all mass movements the marie of a strong and generous
spirit. [ Ibid , p. 115]
The Passion for Unanimity . J07
. Some members of society probably have needs to lose themselves
in a movement no matter what the circumstances. More importantly,
all of us have such needs latently within us, but they become pre-
potent only under certain conditions such as disillusionment with
existing values or at the time of some kind of crisis. Hoffer (p. 138)
feels that in the early stages of a revolution it is up to the “men of
words to stimulate such needs into prepotency by denigrating the
existing social order and “creating a hunger for faith.” A crisis situ-
ation can have similar effects:
The unavoidable conclusion seems to be that when the individual
faces torture or annihilation, he cannot rely on the resources of his own
individuality. His only source of strength is in not being himself but
part of something mighty, glorious, and indestructible. Faith here is
primarily a process of identification: the process by which the in-
dividual ceases to be himself and becomes part of something eternal.
Faith in humanity, in posterity, in the destiny of one’s religion, nation,
race, part)’ or family-- what is it but the visualization of that eternal
something to which we attach the self that is about to be annihilated?
[Hoffer, 1951, p. 63]
It has also been observed that under the stress of crisis the indi-
vidual tends increasingly to perceive and judge in terms of blacks
and whites and to be increasingly unable to see the nuances of gray,
a condition which, of coarse, makes black and white kinds of ideolo-
gies like Marxism-Leninism particularly effective. We need not docu-
ment here the specific appeals of this ideology. Suffice it to say that
it offers to remove the frustrations of most of those members of
society who have visible external frustrations. The Communists add
another dimension to the problem by providing both the disease and
the cure, as Lifton has remarked in discussing the leniency phase of
thought reform (Lifton, 1956b). If things arc bad at home it is
because of the American aggressors. How doe 5 one deal with the
American aggressors? By reaffirming the faith and supporting Com-
munism and, parenthetically, sacrificing a little bit more for the
regime! . .
In addition to personality factors which are to a degree universal.
108 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and factors which relate to the nature of crisis or disillusionment,
we must add, of course, the personal features deriving from national
character or particular cultural themes. Such cultural themes have
been noted both for China and Russia — the striving for complete
harmony in Chinese culture, the yearning of the individual to be-
come mystically merged with the group in the old Russia as painted
by Dostoievsld and a number of students of national character. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to give a detailed analysis of such
themes as they apply to Russia and China. Suffice it to say that some
observers are struck by the continuity between prc- and post-take-
over Chinese culture. For example, Guillain writes:
The Communist system found one of its luckiest breaks in the very
good will of the Chinese. It was able to transform their great enthusiasm
for the public good into an immense submission. It is an absurd illusion
to think that the great majority of the Chinese have secretly and obsti-
nately renounced the system and, in their hearts, are in perpetual revolt
against the regime. It would be far nearer the truth to say that by and
large the system has been accepted by the masses. They have allowed
themselves to be guided from the paths of rebellion to those of obe-
dience. . . .
. . . The man of the people in China has never known political or
economic liberty. He has always been passive. If at times he has violently
rebelled against tyranny he has, above all, grown used to constant op-
pression and from time immemorial has tended to rally to established
authority. . . .
. - . We must not forget that to copy and act as the next man is a
fovr-thouscnd-ycars-old tradition in China. If you were a potter you
plied your trade as your father and your grandfather did before you. If,
on occasion, a genius produced something novel, this creator was im-
mediately followed by a line of imitators. China is still under the weight
of tikis tradition when the generation of great revolutionaries is followed
by millions of small conformists. [Cuillain, 1937, pp. 273-741
. . . past centuries have endowed the Chinese with infinite flexibility
and great opportunism. Ideology has too long been overshadowed in his
case by the need to tlunk of his bowl of rice. To obtain this, he lias
too often had to profess the ideas of his master, and to change his ideas
109
The Passion for Unanimity
when he changed masters. He is not the only man in Asia to follow
this pattern of behavior. I have witnessed within a few years two in-
credible, truly historic reversals in Asian countries: the change of Japan
toward the Americans after the capitulation of 1945, and that of^China
toward the Communists after the liberation of 1949. [Ibid., p. 27o]
A final point which should be noted about the followers in the
movement is that the Communists have instilled in many members
of the “New China” a true missionary zeal based on a mixture ot
nationalism, youthful exuberance, and genuine hostility toward
Western exploitation. The recognition among the populace that
China is becoming an important world power and that, to a degree,
this status Is a Communist accomplishment is one
in building nationalism, no doubt strongly reinforced V
ful stalemating of the Korean War. The regimes strong reliance on
youth who can bo counted on to light against oU
Hons with the enthusiasm of adolescent revolt >s taportmr ^“Tof
an example for the entire nation. FinaUy fte “
anti-Western feeling is no doubt strongly stimulating the desne o
4 e pS?f*e Chinese to prove that the Asian way can also prove
^'unanimity can serve important functions
well os for the system as a whole or the leade , M y ndilions
as difficult to achieve complete unanimity under cert
as some aspects of our discussion have
detailed knowledge of the system comes from ^ „
not been able to make then- peace with. IV « “ f e „f
strongly biased sample, and ns ' "^ s S H * s sense) who
cheerful and enthusiastic -true belsev rs (»«“““ fajfedge
take their place in the total.tanan system secum^ .
that tliey are part of something bigge
• studies ot the motivation
108 The Context of Coercive Persuasion
and factors which relate to the nature of crisis or disillusionment,
we must add, of course, the personal features deriving from national
character or particular cultural themes. Such cultural themes have
been noted both for China and Russia — die striving for complete
harmony in Chinese culture, the yearning of the individual to be-
come mystically merged with the group in the old Russia as painted
by Dostoievsky and a number of students of national character. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to give a detailed analysis of such
themes as they apply to Russia and China. Suffice it to say that some
observers are struck by the continuity between pre- and post-take-
over Chinese culture. For example, Guillain writes:
The Communist system found one of its luckiest breaks in the very
good will of the Chinese. It was able to transform their great enthusiasm
for the public good into an immense submission. It is an absurd illusion
to think that the great majority of the Chinese have secretly and obsti-
nately renounced the system and, in their hearts, are in perpetual revolt
against the regime. It would be far nearer the truth to say that by and
large the system has been accepted by the masses. They have allowed
themselves to be guided from the paths of rebellion to those of obe-
dience. . . .
. . . The man of the people in China has never known political or
economic liberty. He has always been passive. If at times he has violently
rebelled against tyranny be has, above all, grown used to constant op-
pression and from time immemorial has tended to rally to established
authority. ...
. . . We must not forget that to copy and act as the next man is a
four- thousand-years-old tradition in China. If you were a potter you
plied your trade as your father and your grandfather did before you. If,
on occasion, a genius produced something novel, this creator was im-
mediately followed by a line of imitators. China is still under the weight
of this tradition when the generation of great revolutionaries is followed
by millions of small conformists. [Guillain, 1957, pp. 273-74]
* - . past centuries have endowed the Chinese with infinite flexibility
and great opportunism. Ideology has too long been overshadowed in his
case by the need to think of his bowl of rice. To obtain this, he has
PART TWO Coercive Persuasion:
Its Structure, Effects, and
Determinants
The actual experiences of prisoners arrested by the Chinese Com-
munists varied widely. They varied according to the purposes of
the arrest, according to the general political climate at tile time of
arrest, according to the available facilities and personnel in the
particular area of China where the arTest took place, and according
to the attitude of the prisoner. In describing these experiences, it is
tempting to ignore the variations and seek the common themes on
the assumption that the CCP was able to exert effective and cen-
tralized control over all of its -operations. Indeed, many of the
analyses of coercive persuasion or thought reform which have
previously been published (e.g. Hunter, 1951; Liflon, 1956a, b;
Hinkle and Wolff, 1956) have organized their material in terms of
the explicit assumption of a common core of prison methodology.
Our own early efforts were also oriented in this direction, but a close
analysis of the cases forced us increasingly to the recognition that
the variations in prison experiences and in pre-prison circumstances
were as important for understanding the ultimate outcome (in
terms of influence accomplished) as the common themes. Further-
more, one could not limit a description of experiences to those events
which occurred in prison. A number of pre- and post- imprisonment
experiences were crucial. To avoid theoretical prcjudgment of which
were the important experiences we constructed the folfoning gen-
eral outline:
111
no
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
Hungary: (1) real or convinced Communists; (2) opportunists; (3) those who
joined in order to keep their jobs and status; (4) those who joined because they
were threatened with arrest, withdrawal of ration card, or some other penalty
if they did not; and (5) disillusioned Communists who started out as idealists,
became disaffected, but then could not get out of the party.
PART TWO Coercive Persuasion:
Its Structure, Effects, and
Determinants
The actual experiences of prisoners arrested by tie Chinese Com-
munists varied widely. They varied according to the purposes of
the anest, according to the genera] political climate at the time of
arrest, according to the available facilities and personnel in the
particular area of China where the arrest took place, and according
to the attitude of the prisoner. In describing these experiences, it is
tempting to ignore the variations and seek the common themes on
the assumption that the CCP was able to exert effective and cen-
tralized control over all of its -operations. Indeed, many of the
analyses of coercive persuasion or thought reform which have
previously been published (e.g. Hunter, 1951; Lifton, 1956a, b;
Hinkle and Wolff, 1950) have organized their material in teims of
tire explicit assumption of a common core of prison methodology.
Our own early efforts were also oriented in this direction, but a close
analysis of the cases forced us increasingly to the recognition that
the variations in prison experiences and in pre-prison circumstances
were as important for understanding the ultimate outcome (in
terms of influence accomplished) as the common themes. Further-
more, one could not limit a description of experiences to those events
which occurred in prison. A number of pre- and post-imprisonment
experiences were crucial. To avoid theoretical pre/udgment of which
were the important experiences we constructed the following gen-
eral outline:
110
The Context of Coercive Persuasion
Hungary: (1) real or convinced Communists; (2) opportunists; (3) those who
joined in order to keep their jobs and status; (4) those who joined because they
were threatened with arrest, withdrawal of ration card, or some other penalty
if they did not; and (5) disillusioned Communists who started out as idealists,
became disaffected, but then could not get out of the party.
113
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
B. Experience of Imprisonment
1. Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest
2. Type of Imprisonment
a. House arrest.
b. Detention prison,
e. Regular civil prison.
3. Nature of Prison Facilities and Prison Personnel
4. Initial Contact with Judge or Interrogator
a. Type and intensity of feeling stimulated in S.
b. Manner of presentation of S’ s situation.
(1 ) Description of Anient policy.”
(2) Nature of accusation, if any.
(3) Sincerity and skill of judge or interrogator.
(4) Types of threats and physical pressures.
5. Type of Cell
a. Physical properties.
b. Number of cellmates.
c. Type of cellmates and their attitudes toward S.
(1) Type of crime committed by them.
(2) Degree to which they are reformed and committed to
reforming S.
(3) Similarity of cellmates to S in terms of occupation,
“cultural” level, experiences with CCP, aspirations for
future, etc.
(4) Chinese vs. Westerner.
6. Daily Regimen or Routine
a. Bodily need management.
(1) Food and drink.
(2) Sleep.
(3) Elimination.
(4) Exercise.
(5) Heat, cold, and light.
(6) Washing and hygiene.
(7) Medical care.
(8) Sex.
(9) Tobacco and other habits.
(10) Pain.
H2 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
A. Pre-imprisonment Experiences.
1. S’s General Situation in China.
a. Motives for being in China and circumstances surrounding
the decision to remain there.
b. Occupation and activities in China.
c. Length of time in China prior to imprisonment
d. Identification with the Chinese, degree of integration into
China.
e. Political sophistication of S, attitudes toward KMT and
Communism.
2. Perception of the Take-over
a. Type of information to which S became exposed.
(1) Reading and listening to reports of others.
(2) Witnessing the liberation in a rural or urban area.
(3) Length of exposure, e.g., exposure only to initial vic-
tory parades, demonstrations, etc., vs. exposure to
gradual process of establishment of CCP policies and
practices.
b. Attitudes of others around S, both Chinese and Westerners.
c. Perception of own situation vis-l-vis the CCP: does S see
himself as being a friend, enemy, or neutral party and how
does he think the CCP will view him?
d. Type of CCP activity witnessed.
(1) Honeymoon period activities.
(2) Land reform.
(3) Aspects of the terror: People’s Courts, accusation meet-
ings, expropriation of mission properties, etc.
3. Situational Factors
a. Geographical location in China.
b. Nature of political situation in general and in that area in
particular.
c - Type and quality of CCP personnel operating in that area.
d. Facilities available for imprisonment and reform.
e. Attitudes of local populace toward S and toward the CCP.
f- Ss personal feelings: e.g., fear of arrest, confidence in
self, etc.
4. S s Personality: Specific Vulnerabilities or Strengths
113
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
E. Experience of Imprisonment
1. Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest
2. Type of Imprisonment
a. House arxest.
b. Detention prison.
c. Regular civil prison.
3. Nature of Prison Facilities and Prison Personnel
4. Initial Contact with Judge or Interrogator
a. Type and intensity of feeling stimulated in S.
b. Manner of presentation of S’s situation.
(1 ) Description of "lenient policy.’*
(2) Nature of accusation, if any.
(3) Sincerity and skill of judge or interrogator.
(4 ) Types of threats and physical pressures.
5. Type of Cell
o. Physical properties.
b. Number of cellmates.
c. Type of cellmates and their attitudes toward S.
(1) Type of crime committed by them.
(2) Degree to which they are reformed and committed to
reforming S.
(3) Similarity of cellmates to S in terms of occupation,
“cultural” level, experiences with CCP, aspirations for
future, etc.
(4) Chinese vs. Westerner.
6. Daily Regime a or Routine
a. Bodily need management
(1) Food and drink.
(2) Sleep.
(3) Elimination.
(4) Exercise.
(5) Heat, cold, and light.
(6) Washing and hygiene.
(7) Medical care.
(8) Sex.
(9) Tobacco and other habits.
(10) Pain.
■Q2 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
A. Pre-imprisonment Experiences.
1. S’s General Situation in China.
a. Motives for being in China and circumstances surrounding
the decision to remain there.
b. Occupation and activities in China.
c. Length of time in China prior to imprisonment
d. Identification with the Chinese, degree of integration into
China.
c. Political sophistication of S, attitudes toward KMT and
Communism.
2. Perception of the Take-over
a. Type of information to which S became exposed.
(1) Reading and listening to reports of others.
(2) Witnessing the liberation in a rural or urban area.
(3) Length of exposure, e.g., exposure only to initial vic-
tory parades, demonstrations, etc., vs. exposure to
gradual process of establishment of CCP policies and
practices.
b. Attitudes of others around S, both Chinese and Westerners.
c. Perception of own situation vis-h-vis the CCP: does S see
himself as being a friend, enemy, or neutral party and how
does he think the CCP will view him?
d. Type of CCP activity witnessed.
(1) Honeymoon period activities.
(2) Land reform.
(3) Aspects of the terror: People’s Courts, accusation meet-
ings, expropriation of mission properties, etc.
3. Situational Factors
a. Geographical location in China.
b. Nature of political situation in general and in that area in
particular.
c. Type and quality of CCP personnel operating in that area.
d. Facilities available for imprisonment and reform.
c. Attitudes of local populace toward S and toward the CCP.
f. Ss personal feelings: e.g., fear of arrest, confidence in
self, etc.
4. S s Personality: Specific Vulnerabilities or Strengths
113
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
B. Experience of Imprisonment
1. Circumstances Surrounding the Arrest
2. Type of Imprisonment
a. House arrest.
b. Detention prison.
c. Regular civil prison.
3. Nature of Prison Facilities and Prison Personnel
4. Initial Contact with Judge or Interrogator
a. Type and intensity of feeling stimulated in S.
b. Manner of presentation of S’s situation.
( 1 ) Description of Henient policy.”
(2) Nature of accusation, if any.
(3) Sincerity and skill of judge or interrogator.
(4) Types of threats and physical pressures.
5. Type of Cell
a. Physical properties.
b. Number of cellmates.
c. Type of cellmates and their attitudes toward S.
(1) Type of crime committed by them.
(2) Degree to which they are reformed and committed to
reforming S.
(3) Similarity of cellmates to S in terms of occupation,
“cultural” level, experiences with CCP, aspirations for
future, etc.
(4) Chinese vs. Westerner.
6. Daily Regimen or Routine
a. Bodily need management.
(1) Food and drink.
(2) Sleep.
(3) Elimination.
(4) Exercise.
(5) Heat, cold, and light
(6) Washing and hygiene.
(7) Medical care.
(8) Sex.
(9) Tobacco and other habits.
(10) Pain.
114
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
(11) Clothing and possessions.
(12) Level and type of sensory input
b. Daily routine.
(1) Distribution and timing of activities.
(2) Prescriptions and proscriptions about use of time and
space.
(3) Degree of organization and integration of activities
around stated prison objectives.
(4) Type of work expected and demanded of prisoner.
c. Degree and type of contact with others and with com-
munication channels.
(1) Prison authorities
(a) Amount of contact.
(b) Rules concerning contacts: degree of deference
and type of demeanor required.
(c) Ease or difficulty of communication.
(2) Fellow prisoners.
(a) Number of other prisoners with whom contact is
allowed.
(b) Type of contact allowed or demanded.
(c) Ease or difficulty of communication.
(3) Outsiders.
(a) Formal channels of communication with outside.
1 — newspapers, radio, bulletin boards, loud-
speakers, movies.
2 — mail.
3 — word of mouth.
(b) Clandestine communication with outside.
(c) Type of information contained.
7. Discipline — Rewards and Punishments Utilized.
8. Activities Pertaining to Goals of the Prison: Confession and
Reform.
a. Interrogation — confession extraction.
b. Struggle — tou cheng in the cell.
c. Study.
(1) Autobiography: repeated writing.
115
Structure, Effects, end Determinants
(2) Diary writing.
(3) Group activity; tou cheng, study groups.
(4) Mutual and self criticism.
(5) Mutual survetliance and reporting to authorities.
(6) Emulation campaigns — competing among prisoners.
(7) Reading and discussion of Communist materials—
rationalizing conclusions .
(8) Airing of grievances.
(9) Behavioral commitment through forced self-degrada-
tion, denunciation of others.
{ 10) Politicizing of all activities no matter how trivial.
(11) Reform through labor.
(12) Observation of other activities — People's Courts, etc.
(13) Promulgation of certain norms of conduct and cer-
tain points of view— the People’s standpoint, aban-
donment of self-concems, etc.
C. Post-imprisonment Experiences.
1. Nature of Initial Contacts with Non-Communist World.
2. Degree to Which Predictions Made by Communists Come
True, or Degree of Confirmation of Wbat Was Learned in
Prison about Self and Others.
3. Type and Intensity of Emotional Relationships Which De-
velop in the New Environment.
4. Degree of Social Support Available for Point of View Learned
in Prison.
5. Activities of U.S. and Communist China in the World Arena.
This outline is intended to include all possible variables which
might be important for an understanding of coercive persuasion and
to serve as a frame of reference for our subsequent analysis. In
Chapter 4 a socio-psychologieal model of the process of coercive
persuasion is presented. This model emphasizes the stages in the
process of being influenced and attempts to show the relevance of
the prisoners' experiences to these different stages. Chapter 5 ex-
plores one particular facet of the coercive persuasion process—
tlie role of guilt— in somewhat greater detail because of its central
114
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
(11) Clothing and possessions.
(12) Level and type of sensory input
b. Daily routine.
(1) Distribution and timing of activities.
(2) Prescriptions and proscriptions about use of time and
space.
(3) Degree of organization and integration of activities
around stated prison objectives.
(4) Type of work expected and demanded of prisoner.
c. Degree and type of contact with others and with com-
munication channels.
(1) Prison authorities
(a) Amount of contact.
(b) Rules concerning contacts: degree of deference
and type of demeanor required.
(c) Ease or difficulty of communication.
(2) Fellow prisoners.
(a) Number of other prisoners with whom contact is
allowed.
(b) Type of contact allowed or demanded.
(c) Ease or difficulty of communication.
(3) Outsiders.
(a) Formal channels of communication with outside.
1 — newspapers, radio, bulletin boards, loud-
speakers, movies.
2 — mail.
3 — word of mouth.
(b) Clandestine communication with outside.
(c) Type of information contained.
7. Discipline — Rewards and Punishments Utilized.
8. Activities Pertaining to Coals of the Prison: Confession and
Reform.
a. Interrogation — confession extraction.
b. Struggle— tou cheng in the cell.
c. Study.
(1) Autobiography: repeated writing.
115
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
(2) Diary writing.
(3) Group activity: fou cheng, study groups.
(4) Mutual and self criticism.
(5) Mutual surveillance and reporting to authorities.
(6) Emulation campaigns — competing among prisoners.
(7) Reading and discussion of Communist materials —
rationalizing conclusions.
(8) Airing of grievances.
(9) Behavioral commitment through forced self-degrada-
tion, denunciation of others.
( 10) Politicizing of all activities no matter how trivial,
(11) Reform through labor.
(12) Observation of other activities — People's Courts, etc.
(13) Promulgation of certain norms of conduct and cer-
tain points of view— the People's standpoint, aban-
donment of self-concerns, etc.
C. Post-imprisonment Experiences.
1. Nature of Initial Contacts with Non-Communist World.
2. Degree to Which Predictions Made by Communists Come
True, or Degree of Confirmation of What Was Learned in
Prison about Self and Others.
3. Type and Intensity of Emotional Relationships Which De-
velop in the New Environment.
4. Degree of Social Support Available for Point of View Learned
in Prison.
5. Activities of U.S. and Communist China in the World Arena.
Tin's outline is intended to include all possible variables which
might be important for an understanding of coercive persuasion and
to serve as a frame of reference for our subsequent analysis. In
Chapter 4 a socio-psychological model of the process of coercive
persuasion is presented. This model emphasizes the stages in
process of being influenced and attempts to show the relevance of
the prisoners' experiences to these different stages. Chapter 5 ex-
plores one particular facet of the coercive persuasion P roccs *“7
the role of guilt— in somewhat greater detail because of its centra:
116
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
importance. Chapter 6 describes the outcomes of coercive persua-
sion in terms of the degree and type of influence accomplished by
the process, and Chapter 7 attempts to select and illustrate from
the broad outline of prisoner experiences those which can be
thought of as determinants of influence or resistance to influence.
4
A Socw-psychological Model for
the Analysis of Coercive Persuasion
The construction of a model for the analysis of coercive persua-
sion has three basic purposes: to provide a theoretical structure
■ which will permit the organization of the many and varied prisoner
experiences into meaningful categories ; to provide theoretical cate-
gories which will make it possible to understand the coercive persua-
sion process and its effects psychologically; and to provide some
basic categories for a more general theory of social influence, which
will permit a systematic comparison of coercive persuasion with
other kinds of influence processes.
The model we have chosen to fulfill these purposes derives from
Kurt Lewin (1947) and was originally designed to analyze change
processes in groups or organizations. It is particularly applicable
to the analysis of influence because the kinds of resistances to
change which Lewin and his collaborators observed in groups and
organizations have their counterparts in the individual if an at-
tempt is made to influence his beliefs, attitudes, or values. In
fact, it is a basic assumption of the model that the beliefs, at-
titudes, values, and behavior patterns of an individual tend to be
integrated with each other and tend to be organized around the
person's self-image or sclf-conccpti This integration, even if im-
perfect, gives continuity and stability to tlic person and hence
118
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
operates as a force against being influenced, unless the change
which the influence implies is seen to be a change in the direction
of greater integration.
A second assumption of the model is that the integration de-
scribed above is not a static but a dynamic equilibrium which re-
sults from the interaction of a great many forces that are con-
tinuously acting on the individual. What we mean by “forces is
all those external or internal events which the person perceives
at a conscious or semi-conscious level as pulling or pushing him
in some direction: needs, motives, desires, impulses, restraints, de-
mands, questions, orders, temptations, goals, etc. For present pur-
poses it is not important to distinguish carefully between different
classes of forces, though in principle one should distinguish, for
example, between internal forces (needs and motives) and external
forces (requests, etc., coming from others).
Individually the forces acting on a person change constantly,
but in the usual situation of everyday life the variations are either
too small to affect the equilibrium or the person uses compensatory
mechanisms to preserve his stability. The need to maintain a con-
sistent self-image and the need to reduce uncertainty in one’s
environment are, of course, additional forces toward stability which
operate once any equilibrium level has been reached.
We can illustrate what we have said thus far by taking as a
hypothetical example a person holding the belief that “in order to
survive in this world one must always think first of oneself.” Our
model would hold that this belief can be thought of as a dynamic
equilibrium between one set of forces which push toward holding
it and another set of forces which push against holding it. Ex-
amples of the former might be: desire to be like one’s father who
held this belief, desire to identify with a group in which such a
belief is the norm, pressure from a boss to be more self-seeking,
past successes with selfishness and failures with generosity, desire
to see oneself as tough, fear of being taken advantage of by others,
and so on. Examples of the latter might be: fear of retaliation by
others for one’s selfishness, desire to be loved more, desires not to
have to fight all the time, pressure from friends to be more generous,
A Model for Analysis jjq
successes with generosity and failures with selfishness, guilt for hurt-
ing others, and so on.
As was stated above, the individual forces vary all the time, but
the integration of the belief into the self-image, the general desire
not to change and thereby increase uncertainty, and the individuals
capacity to compensate (hr example by rationalizing that the
success of others who are generous really is luck, or the related
belief that people will love one more if one is really tough and self-
seeking) can and do operate to preserve the equilibrium where it is.
If one conceives of beliefs, attitudes, values, and behavior patterns
as dynamic equilibria which tend to remain stable, it follows that
one cannot influence the person unless one alters the balance of
forces sufficiently to prevent compensation and thus forces a change
in the equilibrium (a change in intensity of a belief, or its aban-
donment, or reinterpretation, etc.). If one flunks of the persons
stability (his resistance to influence) as the result of an inter-
action of many forces, it follows that the strategy of influencing
him can be manifold — altering the strength or direction of various
forces on either side of the equilibrium. The utility' of this model
derives in part from tills point — it focuses attention on the many
forces which underlie beliefs, eta, and therefore on the manifold
strategies which the agent of influence can and usually docs ap-
ply. It thus serves to steer us away from oversimplified explanations
of the influence process.
A second important featuro of the model is that it suggests that
the process of change or influence occurs over time and consists
of several successive stages or steps. These stages can be labeled
unfreezing, changing, and refreezing, and can be defined as follows;
Unfueezinc. An alteration by the agent of influence of the fortes
acting on the person such that the existing equilibrium is no
longer stable. Subjectively one can think of this as the Induction of
a need or a motive to change; i.c, the person who lias been un-
frozen with respect to some belief desires to change or abandon that
CtiANCiNC. The provision by the agent of influence of Informa-
tion, arguments, models to be imitated or identified with, etc.
120 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
which provide a direction of change toward a new equilibrium,
usually by allowing the person to learn something new, redefine
something old, re-evaluate or reintegrate other parts of his per-
sonality or belief system, etc. Subjectively this would be experiences
as “seeing the fight,” having insight, seeing that the other fellow’s
viewpoint has a lot of merit, beginning to understand how some-
one else thinks about things, and so on.
Refeeezixg. The facilitation by the agent of influence of the
reintegration of the new equilibrium into the rest of the personality
and into ongoing interpersonal relationships by the provision of
reward and social support for any changes made by the person.
Sometimes, however, it is not within the agent’s power to determine
whether the new belief will in fact fit into the rest of the per-
sonality or will be accepted by the person’s significant others.®
Subjectively this would be experienced as discovering that others
shared one’s new point of view, that they were pleased with the
change, that the new belief was quite congenial with other parts
of the self-image and other beliefs, etc.
Given that the goal of coercive persuasion is to produce a change
in the prisoner’s beliefs and attitudes about himself and the Com-
munists, and that a key step toward this outcome is the making of
a sincere confession based on a feeling of guilt, we can now con-
sider the experiences of the prisoner in the context of the modeL
UNFREEZING
Before a prisoner could confess in the manner desired of him by
the Communists and before he could change his beliefs and at-
titudes about himself and the Communists, several sets of stable
equilibria had to be unfrozen. One of the central ones was simply
the unwillingness on the part of the prisoner to confess to something
which was not true. The kinds of forces which were acting on the
prisoner with respect to this unwillingness in a well-run reform
prison are exemplified in Table 1. We are not implying that each
By significant others we mean all those individuals with whom a person has
* “ ose enou g Jj _ emotional relationship to care deeply what they think of him,
hv hv °P* n *°ns about himself he will therefore respect and attempt to
121
A Model for Analysis
prisoner had acting on him all the forces listed or that this force
field exhausts all the varieties of forces which might have played a
role. What we are implying is that the act of confessing was a
function of the relative strengths of those forces which were in
effect and of the manner in which the prison experiences tended to
strengthen or weaken them.
TABLE 1
Forces Acme o.v m Prisoner in Regard to His Unwillingness
to Confess
Toward Confessing
Fear for self or others
Desire to comply to another
Desire to relieve pressure from
cellmates
Desire to relieve pain
Desire to aelueve relationslu'p
with cellmates
Need to rationalize anxiety
resulting from unconscious
guilt
Desire to adapt, to achieve a
sense of reality
Desire to “settle case" and be
released
Need to attach felt guilt to
concrete behavior
Others
Against Confessing
Fear of violating one’s own
values
Fear of behaving inconsist-
ently with self-image
Fear ofloss of integrity
(giving in)
Inability to be intellectually
dishonest
Fear of violating reference
Fear of being punfshed for
untruth by authorities and
cellmates
Unwillingness to be coerced
Others
Unfreezing in .his contest 0» : “.5
rent which tended to < . <an ,„l c . If the cellmates,
•cakcn forces «£><■“*' eon ^ ,„n u ence) increased their
itcrrogators, or judges ( » h likelihood of confession seas
rcssure on the prisoner to h „j , counter forte,
i creased unless this r^fear of loss of Integrity,
id. ns unwillingness to he coereeu
122 Structure, Efiecls, and Determinants
Or if the cellmates offered the prisoner a convincing argument os
to why confession would not be intellectually dishonest nor involve
a loss of integrity they would also increase the likelihood of confes-
sion, unless they at the same time weakened one of the forces toward
confession. . . ,
It should be noted that the more forces there arc on each side ana
the more intensely these forces are brought to bear in the strugg c
between the prisoner and the agents, the greater will be the likeli-
hood of confession. This is the case simply because of the exhaustion
resulting from the continuing inner conflict in the prisoner (this
exhaustion encourages confession by increasing the desire to relieve
pain). In other words, the continuing inner conflict operates along
with sleep deprivation and other physically exhausting devices to
motivate the prisoner to accept the only solution permitted— con-
fession. Psychologically the only other solution possible is to
the situation into one permitting an "escape from the field. The
prisoner may become psychotic or develop psychotic-like defenses;
i.c., he may imagine that his impulse to confess is tclcpathically hi-
troduced into him by the authorities and therefore must be doubly
intensively resisted, or he may become impervious to the accusations
and humiliations imposed by the cellmates by psychologically not
hearing them.
Confession was a behavioral commitment which was initially out
of line with the prisoner’s values or his image of himself, but the
attitude change of the type which was demanded in thought reform
was tantamount to a change in this very image of self. Such attitude
change involved a more fundamental kind of unfreezing in that the
person’s perceptions of and attitudes toward himself are typically
more stably organized and more widely integrated into the per-
sonality than other kinds of attitudes. One would expect even more
resistance on the part of the prisoner, therefore, with respect to
changing such attitudes than with respect to confessing. The kinds
of forces which were acting on the prisoner with respect to this un-
willingness are exemplified in Table 2.
Both those forces which preceded confession and those which
succeeded confession are included because attitude change often be-
A Model for Analysis 12 3
gan before confession and continued after it. In principle the psy-
chological processes leading to a confession and the ones leading to
attitude change are independent and can occur together or apart.
In most of the actual cases known to us, the two processes were
closely tied together, however; confession facilitated attitude change
and vice versa; successful resistance to one often meant successful
resistance to the other (though by no means always),
TABLE 2
Forces Acting on the Prisoner in Regard to His Unwillingness
to Chance His Attitudes
Toward Change
Need to rationalize behavior
(if confession or some other
concession has been made)
Need to find justification for
confessing (if confession has
not been made but force
toward it is great)
Need to establish communica-
tion with cellmates and to
relieve pressure from them
Need to handle anxiety and
guilt
Desire not to appear different
Need to have a viable self-
image (identity)
Desire to adapt to inputs —
achieve a sense of reality
Others
Against Change
Need to maintain integration
of attitudes into total per-
sonality
Need to maintain integration
of attitudes into interper-
sonal relationships
Unacceptability of new atti-
tudes to values or principles
held by the person
Unacceptabili ty of new atti-
tudes to other parts of per-
son, or to significant others
in the environment
Need to assert self by resisting
intrusion attempts by others
Fear of loss of identity
Others
Again it can be seen that the induction of a motive to change
could involve a strengthening of forces toward change (e.g, getting
the prisoner to denounce a close friend which set up strong needs
to rationalize his behavior; humiliating the prisoner in public lo
destroy his image of himself, thus heightening his need for a nesv
m Structure, Effects, and Determinants
Or if the cellmates offered the prisoner a convincing argument as
to why confession would not be intellectually dishonest nor involve
a loss of integrity they would also increase the likelihood of conles-
sion, unless they at the same time weakened one of the forces toward
concession.
It should be noted that the more forces there are on each side ana
the more intensely these forces are brought to bear in the strugg e
between the prisoner and the agents, the greater will be the likeU-
hood of confession. This is the case simply because of the exhaustion
resulting from the continuing inner conflict in the prisoner ( is
exhaustion encourages confession by increasing the desire to relieve
pain). In other words, the continuing inner conflict operates along
with sleep deprivation and other physically exhausting devices to
motivate the prisoner to accept the only solution permitted con-
fession. Psychologically the only other solution possible is to
the situation into one permitting an “escape from the field. The
prisoner may become psychotic or develop psychotic-like defenses,
i.e., he may imagine that his impulse to confess is telepathically in-
troduced into him by the authorities and therefore must be doubly
intensively resisted, or he may become impervious to the accusations
and humiliations imposed by the cellmates by psychologically not
hearing them.
Confession was a behavioral commitment which was initially out
of line with the prisoner’s values or his image of himself, but the
attitude change of the type which was demanded in thought reform
was tantamount to a change in this very image of self. Such attitude
change involved a more fundamental kind of unfreezing in that the
person’s perceptions of and attitudes toward himself are typically
more stably organized and more widely integrated into the per-
sonality than other kinds of attitudes. One would expect even more
resistance on the part of the prisoner, therefore, with respect to
changing such attitudes than with respect to confessing. The lands
of forces which were acting on the prisoner with respect to this un-
willingness are exemplified in Table 2.
Both those forces which preceded confession and those which
succeeded confession are included because attitude change often be-
A Model for Analysis
125
Aspects of Imprisonment Which Tended to
Unfreeze the Prisoner
Type of Support Undermined
or Type of Resistance Force
Imprisonment Experiences
Operating as Unfreezing Forces
Communist control of information,
prevention of unfavorable infor-
mation about the CCP from
reaching S
Exposure to other Chinese or West-
erners who were pro- Communist
Exemplary behavior of Red Army
and the appeal of their sincere,
enthusiastic, positive solidarity
Convincingness of interrogators
threats and statements of “lenient
policy"
Strangeness and general inade-
quacy of diet in prison
Loss of sleep due to intermittent
and continuous interrogation or
cellmate pressure
Diseases Idee dysentery resulting
from diet
Lack of exercise
Excessive cold in combination witn
inadequate clothing
Physical pain induced by prolonged
standing or squatting in cell or
during interrogation
Physical pain and injury due to
wearing of manacles and chams
Physical pain due to prevention by
authorities of defecation except
at h\o 2-minute intervals during
n^oirement that prisoner notrinit
position in coll except by pcnnis-
sion of guard
Cuffing and beating by cellmates,
occasionally by interrogator
1. Desire to Resist Communists; in-
itial attitude of non-co-operation
2. Physical strength
124 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
identity, etc.), or a weakening of forces against change (e.g., making
certain significant emotional relationships inoperative by cutting or
manipulating communication channels with the outside; showing
the prisoner that the new attitudes are not, in fact, incompatible win
his values or other parts of the personality by intensive discussion
and the encouragement of self-analysis on his part, etc.), or both.
The personal characteristics of the prisoner enter into this model
in determining which forces will be present and their size or
strength. For example, the poorly integrated individual did not have
as much initial resistance to redefining the self as the well-integrated
one; the individual who was strongly integrated into a cause (i-e.,
had strong emotional attachments to others, actual or symbolic) was
more resistant to attempts to undermine such relationships; the per-
son who was prone to anxiety and guilt was more susceptible be-
cause of his need to justify such feelings to himself once they were
stimulated; and so on. The actual experiences in prison tended not
only to create new forces but also to strengthen or to weaken forces
which were already present in the prisoner.
Tables 1 and 2 are intended to exemplify the nature of the un-
freezing process to which the prisoner was exposed. They are not
systematic or exhaustive, however, with respect to the actual forces
which were present in the total prison milieu, nor do they cover the
various levels of resistance which the prisoner exhibited. Table 3
attempts to provide a more exhaustive survey, listing in the leit
column the key forces which operated as resistance to change
(cither confession or attitude change), and in the right column the
various experiences which operated as forces toward change. To the
extent that the forces or experiences on the right hand side were too
powerful to be compensated for, the prisoner was unfrozen, i-c.,
developed a need to confess and/or change his attitudes. The table
does not list those personal factors in a prisoner which would lead
to the interpretation that lie was already unfrozen at tire time of his
imprisonment; rather, the table applies to those prisoners who en-
tered prison with an attitude of resistance.
The predominant emphasis in the well-run prison was on those
techniques which tended to undermine the individual's social and
emotional supports (Sections 3, 4 , and 5 of Table 3). Those parts
A Model for Analysis
123
Aspects of Imprisonment Which Tended to
Unfreeze the Prisoner
Type of Support Undermined
or Type of Resistance Force
Imprisonment Experiences
Operating as Unfreezing Forces
1. Desire to Resist Communists; in-
itial attitude of non-co-operation
2. Physical strength
Communist control of information,
prevention of unfavorable infor-
mation about the CCP from
reaching S
Exposure to other Chinese or West-
erners who were pro-Communist
Exemplary behavior of Red Army
and the appeal of their sincere,
enthusiastic, positive solidarity
Convincingness of interrogators
threats and statements of ^enient
policy"
Strangeness and general inade-
quacy of diet in prison
Loss of sleep due to intermittent
and continuous interrogation or
cellmate pressure
Diseases like dysentery resulting
from diet
Lack of exercise
Excessive cold in combination warn
inadequate clothing
Physical pain induced by prolonged
standing or squatting in cell or
during interrogation
Physical pain and injury due to
wearing of manacles and chains
Physical pain due to prevention by
iulho/tics of defecation crcept
at two 2-minute intervals during
BcquiiScnt tint prisoner notshift
position in cell creep! by pe™b-
sion of guard _
and beating by cellmates.
occasionally by interrogator
126
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
TABLE 3 ( continued )
Type of Support Undermined Imprisonment Experiences
or Type of Resistance Force Operating as Unfreezing Forces
3. Social-emotional and cognitive Control of information, only pro-
support; validation of beliefs, at- Communist mass media allowed
titudes, and values by appropri- Continuous repetition of one
ate information input recaraing line, one type of information in-
tbe feelings and beliefs of signifi- put
cant others, reference groups. Control of mail, either withheld
prestige sources, etc. completely or unfavorable mail
only passed on
No personal contact whatever with
outsiders
No close relationships permitted
with anyone except in the con-
text of reform; even clandestine
communication with cellmates
prohibited in some circumstances
Introduction of testimonials by
others in the form of confessions,
etc., lauding the virtues of reform
and the CCP
Continuous and unanimous con-
demnation of groups with which
S identifies or of values to which
he adheres
Creation of mutual distrust among
cellmates by presence of inform-
ers
Solitary confinement
4. Self-image, sense of identity. Humiliation, rcvilcmcnt, and bru-
sense of integrity and inviola- talization by cellmates as part of
ba *V “struggle"
Complete prescription of use of
time ana space in prison in the
direction ot mating prisoner feel
completely dependent on author-
ities
Identification of prisoner by num-
ber only
Prohibition of any decision -mating;
every act no matter how trivial
must be preceded by obtaining
guard's permission
127
A Model for Analysis
Type of Support Undermined
or Type of Resistance Force
Imprisonment Experiences
Operating as Unfreezing Forces
Unanimous perception of S ns re-
actionary and criminal, denial of
professional or other roles
Manacling and chaining S, making
him dependent on cellmates for
basic bodily need management
or making him manage at a sub-
human level — enforced self-
derogation
Seducing or forcing S into making
concessions which arouse guilt,
e.g., false confessions, denuncia-
tions, etc.
Social-emotional rejection of S by
cellmates
Prevention of personal hygiene, de-
meaning punishments, insults
and taunts
Denial of even a moment of privacy
* — continuous scrutiny by cell-
mates or guards
5. Basic personality integration. Threats of death, of non-repatria-
intra-psychic defense mecha- tion, of endless isolation and In*
nisms, basic values, super-ego tenogation, of torture and physi-
cal injury, of injury to family and
loved ones — induction of anxiety
and despair
Rewards and Indulgences used to
tantalize and contuse (not typi-
cal, see Ch. 7)
Failure by cellmates and authorities
to accept as valid S's own values
and morals, or failure to accept
S's behavior as being consistent
with his professed values and
morals — induction of guilt
Continual criticism and rejection of
S by cellmates
Continual projection of image that
Communists are operating ac-
cording to higher moral and ethi-
cal principles than S
128
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
TABLE 3 ( continued )
Type of Support Undermined Imprisonment Experiences
or Type of Resistance Force Operating as Unfreezing F orces
Induced and enforced self-analysis
by requirements to write autobi-
ography, engage in self-criticism,
write diary, reflect and meditate,
etc.
Recognition by S that some cell-
mates are good people who are
sincerely trying to reform them-
selves— guilt tor feeling hostile
toward them
Recognition by S of his own class
attitudes and prejudices — guilt
for feeling superior or for sense
of failing in accepted role in
China
Stimulation of unconscious guilt by
enforced state of dependency, re-
creation of childhood conflicts
Chronic failure on the part of S to
be able to live up to the avowed
norms of the cell pertaining espe-
cially to basic bodily need man-
agement; e.g., taking up too
much room while sleeping is
given political significance and
considered a symptom of a bad
attitude on the part of S — guilt
Constant accusation and exhorta-
tion to confess
Self-analysis induced by need to
find solution
of the prison regimen which tended to be physically debilitating were
not as crucial to the unfreezing of existing attitudes as one might
suppose and were not emphasized by the authorities. The aim of the
authorities was not to reduce the prisoner physically to a nonentity.
The aim was rather to reduce him psychologically to a nonentity, a
procedure which was justified by the assumption that his existing
identity was a reactionary and useless one from the Communist point
A Model for Analysis 2„g
of view. However, the identity components of the personality are
not the whole personality; hence, the destruction of identity is not
equivalent to making a person psychotic. In fact, the authorities
were generally very careful to ease the pressures on anyone who
seemed to be in danger of becoming psychotic, because they seemed
to want genuine reform. Both cellmates and authorities were always
careful to justify their harsh psychological approach by saying ex-
plicitly, or at least implying, that they were only attacking the
prisoner s reactionary self” not his whole person; they were exorcis-
ing the devils within him and expected him to co-operate in this
process. The irony of it was, of course, that the prisoner could not
co-operate initially because lie could not recognize in himself what
the others saw as the devils in him.
CHANCING
Once the prisoner was unfrozen with respect to some of his beliefs,
attitudes, values, and behavior patterns, he was ready to change in
order to re-establish an equilibrium, but he did not necessarily know
in what direction to change. If the influence agent did not provide
any guidance, the prisoner had to search for a solution by himself;
if the agent provided information or models to be imitated, the
prisoner could use these as guides for altering bis beliefs. The mental
process which was involved in locating a direction of change and
actually making a change in the unfrozen athtude is what we have
labeled in our model the step of changing.
Unfreezing can be thought of as being primarily a matter of what
happened to the needs and motives of the prisoner as a result of the
agent's interventions. The process of changing was concerned more
with cognitive processes in the prisoner. Once he was willing to con-
fess, he had to have information which told him what confession
meant and what he was to confess to; once he was ready to re-
examine his beliefs and attitudes he bad to have information con-
cerning alternative beliefs and attitudes which were available.
The kind of information source to which the prisoner began to
pay attention of course varied with the nature of his unfreezing
experiences and the kind of motive to change which had been
stimulated. For example, the prisoner who became motivated to
128
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
TABLE 3 ( continued )
Tuve of Support Undermined Imprisonment Experiences
or Type of Resistance Forc e Operating as Unfreezing Forces
Induced and enforced self-analysis
by requirements to write autobi-
ography, engage in self-criticism,
write diary, reflect and meditate,
etc.
Recognition by S that some cell-
mates are good people who are
sincerely trying to reform them-
selves — guilt for feeling hostile
toward them
Recognition by S of his own class
attitudes and prejudices — guilt
for feeling superior or for sense
of failing in accepted role in
China
Stimulation of unconscious guilt by
enforced state of dependency, re-
creation of childhood conflicts
Chronic failure on the part of S to
be able to live up to the avowed
norms of the cell pertaining espe-
cially to basic bodily need man-
agement; c.g., taking up too
much room while sleeping is
given political significance and
considered a symptom of a bad
attitude on the part of S — guilt
Constant accusation and exhorta-
tion to confess
Self-analysis induced by need to
find solution
of the prison regimen which tended to be physically debilitating were
not as crucial to the unfreezing of existing attitudes as one might
suppose and were not emphasized by the authorities. The aim of the
authorities was not to reduce the prisoner physically to a nonentity.
The aim was rather to reduce him psychologically to a nonentity, a
procedure which was justified by the assumption tint his existing
identity was a reactionary and useless one from the Communist point
A Model for Analysis 131
the way to successful reform. These cellmates had the mission of
convincing the Western prisoner of his guilt and the progress of the
entire cell was contingent on their success. In Table 3 we indicated
the many hinds of pressure they brought to bear on the recalcitrant
prisoner. We wish to focus now on the relationship which developed
between one or more of them and the Western prisoner once the
unfreezing process was well under way.
The cellmates as sources of information assumed especial im-
portance because the prisoner had usually been deprived of all
other personal sources who could confirm his basic sense of identity.
If the unfreezing experiences had undermined or destroyed the
prisoner’s self-image and basic sense of identity (as was often the
case), he found himself with a fundamental psychological problem
to solve — namely the re-establishment of a viable self.* In other
words, the unfreezing process could precipitate or exacerbate an
“identity crisis" (Erikson, 1956). The establishment of an identity
then involved finding new beliefs and attitudes about the self which
would be reinforced and confirmed by others. If the prisoner was
in an environment in which the only reinforcements available were
contingent upon his accepting a particular set of beliefs and attitudes
about himself, it was likely that he would eventually accept such
beliefs and attitudes.
By what cognitive mechanism does such acceptance come about?
The descriptions given by the prisoners suggest that the process is
best characterized as one of a growing identification with cellmates
(and/or interrogators, or judges). This process psychologically
transforms these individuals into highly credible information sources.
Sequentially the process can be described in terms of the following
steps; _
1. Precipitation or exacerbation of an “identity crisis" as a result
of an intensive unfreezing process.
2. The induction of a motive to find acceptable beliefs about the
self in an environment in which the number of such acceptable be-
• We are assuming that any person reeds a viable social self and
tally deprived of a given social self will be strongly motivated to
one (Sehdn. 1960).
If svstemaU-
£n d another
130
Structure, Ejjedts, and Determinants
confess because he no longer feared future consequenc
coming convinced that a false confession could later he
and could not hurt the United States anyway) would
himself primarily to his interrogator and attempt to learn from him
just what he was to confess to. On the other hand, the prisoner who
became motivated to confess because he saw confession as the only
way to re-establish a sense of identity and a relationship with his
cellmates would attempt to re-examine his own past in a manner
seen to be acceptable by the cellmates and adopt their point of view.
In the well-run reform prison the prisoner was usually in a severe
dilemma because he was pressured and exhorted to confess and
change his attitudes without however being able to discover in-
formation which led reliably to a diminution of this pressure. Usually
a false confession was condemned by cellmates and interrogators
alike; attempts to use the ubiquitous Communist propaganda were
likely to fail because mostly it did not make sense or was seen as
patently false by the prisoner. His basic problem then was to find
some credible information source which, if used as a guide, would
lead to an acceptable confession and attitude changes in line with
the agents demands.
The information sources available were the controlled mass media,
the interrogator and/or judge, the cellmates, and the prisoner him-
self. With respect to the mass media we have already indicated that
the prisoner usually could not see them as credible, though some
prisoners attempted to obtain disable information by “reading be-
tween the lines” or learning some of the Communist jargon. If the
prisoner was strongly motivated to make an acceptable yet false
confession, he would attempt to use such information to determine
what he could safely confess to, and would use jargon to make the
confession sound more convincing. Only if there had already been
some attitude change could the prisoner see the Communist mass
media as reliable and understand them sufficiently to help himself
in further analyzing his own case.
The most significant source of information, by contrast, was the
prisoner’s set of cellmates, usually a group of Chinese prisoners who
had already made acceptable confessions and were themselves on
:es (by be-
repudiated
then orient
A Model for Analysis
133
mates.' He received extensive "help" in this redefining process by
the examples of his ceilmaf es, by their criticism of him, and by their
continued espousal of the “correct attitude*
Thus far we have been analyzing the rather extensive changes
occurring in prisoners in whom identity crises were created. For
others, whose identity remained more intact, the cellmates or au-
thorities also assumed importance as sources of information, par-
ticularly if they represented a completely unanimous social environ-
ment. Unanimity of outlook in terms of premises completely differ-
ent from the prisoner’s led inevitably to some shifting of the prison-
er’s own standards of judgment and frame of reference.! Such shifts
would occur especially in entirely new situations in which it was
completely unclear to the prisoner what standards of evaluation or
judgment should apply. The main difference between this type of
shift in frame of reference and the type described in connection with
identity crisis lies in the object of evaluation. In the case of prob-
lems of identity, the object of evaluation was the self; if the prisoner
re-evaluated the self this would produce a wide range of behavioral
changes. In the present instance, the object of evaluation would
more likely be an isolated event, item of behavior, or specific situ-
ation, and a re-evaluation of it would probably not be generalized
very widely. For example, a prisoner might become convinced, be-
cause of the unanimity of his social environment, that die Communist
approach to penal problems was very progressive (in comparison to
what China had before), yet this might in no way influence his
general attitude toward the CCP or his attitudes toward himself.
The only way in which a prisoner could protect himself against the
effects of unanimity was to discount completely all information
sources, but this was difficult to do (short of relying on a psychotic
defense mechanism) if the cellmates really were intent on getting
the prisoner to confess and to change.
Those aspects of tire imprisonment experience which pertained
most directly to the process of changing are described in Table 4.
•Lifton (1956b) aptly terms this transition a “psychological unplugging of
*1 gSUSSTwo* by Helson, 1948. Schein. 1949, Asch 1952 and often
fos demonstrated this type of influence effect particularly in situations in which
there is ambiguity about the task or the standards of judgment.
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
"t lt?ch“nnaaon relevant ,o finding acceptable beliefs
of an “other” whose identity is acceptable (whose
beliefs about himself are accepted as correct by other prisoners,
“'abfenttoaon'with this “other” even if he was initially defined
as an enemy. _ ,
6. The acceptance of things this “other says and does as credible
information about the prisoner’s own self.
This process of coming to identify with another prisoner or one of
the authorities was often aided by the “discovery” that the other*
was in many respects similar to the prisoner. He may have pursued
the same occupation prior to imprisonment, or may have had similar
experiences with the Communists, or may have been intellectually
and culturally similar to the prisoner, or may have represented a
social type about which the prisoner had always been ambivalent
(e.g., a lower-class person vis-^-vis a prisoner whose own middle-
class status rested on situational factors about which be had fe t
unconsciously guilty).
Once an identification process was begun and the behavior of the
“other” began to be treated as credible information, the foundation
was laid for extensive cognitive re-definition in the prisoner. The
basic process in such redefinition was the learning of new standards
for judging behavior and a new set of semantic rules , i.e., the adop-
tion of a new frame of reference, commonly called “the peoples
standpoint”
Once the prisoner began to listen to his cellmates or to the au-
thorities, in die sense of genuinely trying to understand their view-
point, he began to see how his own past behavior and his past and
present attitudes were “wrong.” And once he began to understand
this, he could suddenly see and understand what it was he was
expected to confess to, and what attitudes he was expected to
change. From merely having a strong motive to find a solution to all
his problems he moved to a stage of actually seeing a solution, one
which was apparently acceptable to the authorities and the cell-
A Model for Analysts
133
mates.* He received extensive “help- in this redefining process by
the examples of his cellmates, by (heir criticism of him, and by their
continued espousal of the ‘'correct attitude *
Thus far we have been analyzing the rather extensive changes
occurring in prisoners in whom identity crises were created. For
others, whose identity remained more intact, the cellmates or au-
thorities also assumed importance as sources of information, par-
ticularly if they represented a completely unanimous social environ-
ment. Unanimity of outlook in terms of premises completely differ-
ent from the prisoner s led inevitably to some shifting of the prison-
ers own standards of judgment and frame of reference, f Such shifts
would occur especially in entirely new situations in which it was
completely unclear to the prisoner what standards of evaluation or
judgment should apply. The main difference between this type of
shift in frame of reference and the type described in connection with
identity crisis lies in the object of evaluation. In the case of prob-
lems of identity, the object of evaluation was the self; if the prisoner
re-evaluated the self this would produce a wide range of behavioral
changes. In the present instance, the object of evaluation would
more likely be an isolated event, item of behavior, or specific situ-
ation, and a re-evaluation of it would probably not be generalized
very widely. For example, a prisoner might become convinced, be-
cause of the unanimity of his social environment, that the Communist
approach to penal problems was very progressive (in comparison to
what China had before), yet this might in no way influence his
general attitude toward the CCP or his attitudes toward himself.
The only way in which a prisoner could protect himself against the
effects of unanimity was to discount completely all information
sources, but this was difficult to do (short of relying on a psychotic
defense mechanism) if the cellmates really were intent on getting
the prisoner to confess and to change.
Those aspects of die imprisonment experience which pertained
most directly to the process of changing are described in Table 4.
• Lffton (1956b) aptly terms this transition a “psychological unplugging of
th f SX3 w „l by Helson, 1948, Schem. 1919, Asti, 1952 and olhm
has demonstrated this tj^ of influence elect,
there is ambiguity about the task or the standards of judgment
132
Structure, Effect!, end Determinants
llC a A search for : infoimalion relevant to finding acceptable beliefs
aboutdic mU. ^ ^ « othe r" whose identity is acceptable (whose
belief s about himself are accepted as correct by other prisoners,
interrogators, etc.).
5. Identification with this "other," even if he was
initially defined
35 ^TheTcceptance 0 f things this “other" says and does as credible
information about the prisoner’s own self.
This process of coming to identify with another prisoner orone of
the authorities was often aided by the “discovery" that the other
was in many respects similar to the prisoner. He may have pursued
the same occupation prior to imprisonment, or may have had similar
experiences with the Communists, or may have been intellectually
and culturally similar to the prisoner, or may have represented a
social type about which the prisoner had always been ambiyalen
(e.g., a lower-class person vis-i-vis a prisoner whose own midd e-
class status rested on situational factors about which he had fe t
unconsciously guilty).
Once an identification process was begun and the behavior of t le
“other" began to be treated as credible information, the foundation
was laid for extensive cognitive re-definition in the prisoner. The
basic process in such redefinition was the learning of new standards
for judging behavior and a new set of semantic rules, i.e., the adop-
tion of a new frame of reference, commonly called “the peoples
standpoint”
Once the prisoner began to listen to his cellmates or to the au-
thorities, in the sense of genuinely trying to understand their view-
point he began to see how his own past behavior and his past and
present attitudes were “wrong " And once he began to understand
this, he could suddenly see and understand what it was he was
expected to confess to, and what attitudes he was expected to
change. From merely having a strong motive to find a solution to all
his problems he moved to a stage of actually seeing a solution, one
which was apparently acceptable to the authorities and the cell-
A Model for Analysis jgj
Living In enforced close contact with others made it htay that strong
feelings (anxiety, guilt, dependency, and hostility) would be stimulated
which would heighten the likelihood of an identification occurring,
either defensively to avoid deeper conflict or as an aspect of growth
and the solution of identity problems.
The presence of several cellmates increased the likelihood of there being
among them at least one who would be able to "see through” and
consequently expose any defensive maneuvers on the part of S to avoid
taking them seriously.
Aspects pertaining to information provided by interrogator and/or fudge
The interrogator was often the only person in the prison with whom S
could identify because of his being the only one capable of fulfilling
S’s intellectual needs (i.e., to discuss his case rationally and unemo-
tionally — this would pertain to S's who dealt with emotional problems
by intellectualizing them).
The interrogator was often the only person with whom S could identify
because he was the only one who was similar to S culturally and intel-
lectually.
The interrogator was usually the person who was seen as responsible for
many of the events which made S dependent and afraid, and hence the
only one who could produce changes in S’s condition; this circumstance
heightened the probability of "identification with the aggressor” as a
defense.
For some prisoners the amount of contact with the interrogator was far
greater than with anyone else, including cellmates (e.g., the prisoner
kept in isolation or in a prison in which cellmate contact was prohib-
ited) .
The interrogator, by virtue of being an official member of the govern-
ment and by virtue of being in charge of S’s case, was the primary
audience for S’s behavior and hence the one mose closely attended to
for cues as to what was expected of S.
Aspects pertaining to information discovered by prisoner from his men
' seif-analysis
Discovery by S of beliefs, attitudes, values, or past behaviorw hich, evra
b^hKlrf standards of evaluation justified his treatmcnt-gu.lt regard-
ing own past.
134
Structure, Elects, and Determinants
TABLE 4
AsrEcrs or the Imprisonment Experience Relating to Chancing
Aspects pertaining to Information provided by tire mass media
Ss=iSLVS^ns^«'
not, etc.
Content of mass media in terms of ST, perception of it « credible or not;
e.g., internal consistency and logic, manifestness of propaganda a
etc.
Sources to which content was attributed in terms of S's perception 10
them as credible or not, e.g., use of testimonials or confessions by mem
hers of S’s reference groups (germ warfare confes! i*. .for MM
reprinted in entirety, or movies of the confessors), use of _ ””f >
observers like the International Commission which mvestigated tnc
germ warfare charges, statements by Western observers, etc.
(We cannot draw definite conclusions about any of the above points be-
cause we have no clear evidence of any prison policy other thap
ously mentioned restrictions on non-Communist media. Whether ay
of the mass media affected the prisoner positively or negatively in
of the above points seemed to depend more on the prisoner on
orientation toward mass media than on specific events which occun
within prison.)
Aspects pertaining to information provided by cellmates
Among a number of cellmates it was likely that S could find someone with
whom he could identify.
The presence of several cellmates made possible the observation of their
interaction and their relationships as a model of how S was expec
to behave in reference to others.
The presence of several others who were all unanimous provided informa
tion of high potency by virtue of its unanimity.
The presence of others with whom S was living in very close contact
made possible a coaching or tutoring relationship in which rapid
back could be obtained by S concerning any provisional behavior
might engage in.
A Model Jot Analysis jgj.
If the beliefs and attitudes which are involved in the change
process concern the persons self and his sense of identity, it is par-
ticularly important to consider the role which interpersonal con-
firmation plays as a refreezing force. We know our self primarily
through others, hence attitudes toward self must be shared by at
least those others who are most important to us. If these others do
not support or confirm new attitudes, they are in effect forcing the
person to change them once again by motivating him to find attitudes
which they will confirm or support.
Many of the experiences in prison tended to refreeze whatever
changes in the direction of Communist attitudes had occurred in the
prisoner. At the emotional level the prisoner received the support
and encouragement of his cellmates; at the intellectual level he had
ample opportunity to study the Communist point of view and thus
to rationalize thoroughly any changes he bad undergone. But once
he left prison he was deprived of this support Whether the new
attitudes then persisted or not depended on how well integrated
they were with the rest of the repatriates personality and on the
likelihood that the repatriate would receive emotional support for
the changes from others he regarded as important These and other
aspects of the total experience which relate most clearly to tills
process of refreezing are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Aspects op the Imprjsoment Experience Relatxnc to Retreezinc
Experiences within prison
Communist propaganda as reinforcement of and justification for confes-
sion and attitude change.
Study of Communist materials within cell, by small group discussion tech-
nique involving the following elements:
Reading of nu terials.
Analysis of materials in tlie presence of otlets.
Implicit and raplicit competition among prisonen in analysis tie-
ory and deriving practical implications.
136
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
TABLE 4 ( continued )
Discovery by S of identity components within himself which he wished
to strengthen and which fitted in broadly with the eth.cal generaliza-
tions depicted in the "peoples standpoint -, increased motivation to
reform self further, might then result from S s recognition that cellmate
pressure had allowed this "therapeutic'’ discovery to occur.
To summarize, the process of changing can be thought of as the
mental operations which the prisoner went through in arriving at
new beliefs, attitudes, values, and behavior patterns. These mental
operations can be thought of as the adoption of a new frame of
reference, of new standards for evaluating behavior, and of new
semantic rules. The whole process was given its direction by the
information which the influence agent provided to the prisoner. Be-
fore acceptable changes could occur, however, the prisoner had to
learn to pay attention to the information. He usually learned to pay
attention when he began to identify with his cellmates in the process
of trying to re-establish a sense of identity in the hostile prison
environment
REFREEZING '
If changes in beliefs are to remain stable, the new equilibrium of
forces must be refrozen. This process implies that the new belief
must be integrated into other parts of the person and must be sup-
ported and reinforced by the behavior of significant others. If it is
not so integrated or supported, it will change once again when the
original forces toward change have been removed. For example, if a
prisoner has been physically coerced into making a confession, he
will repudiate that confession once the physical pressure is lifted;
or, if he has adopted pro- Communist attitudes only because of a
desire to please a particular cellmate, he will drop these attitudes
when his relationship with the cellmate is terminated. On the other
hand, the repatriate will not repudiate the confession or drop the
new attitude if in retrospect either response seems rational and logi-
cal from the standpoint of new premises which he now accepts.
Similarly, if important others treat the confession as a laudable re-
sponse and agree with the new attitudes, they will thereby give them
stability, i.e., help to refreeze them.
A Model for Analysis 139
wilL”
Our model of the influence process suggests that any influence is
to a degree against the persons will because it involves the dis-
comfort of giving up some stable equilibrium and finding something
new. The person who comes to a situation ready to change has al-
ready been unfrozen and has therefore sufFered this discomfort at
some time in the past, but it logically should be included as part of
the total influence process.
What distinguishes coercive persuasion from other lands of in-
fluence processes is the degree to which the person who is to be
influenced is physically or psychologically confined to a situation in
which he must continue to expose himself to unfreezing pressures.
Not only did the prison confine him physically, hut the round-the-
clock vigilance and pressure from cellmates confined the person
psychologically to an environment in which unusually intense un-
freezing pressures were present at all times. The success of coercive
persuasion in those few cases where it was successful in producing
lasting belief and attitude change can be related primarily to the
intensity of this unfreezing.
138
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
TABLE 5 ( continued )
Mutual criticism for incorrect analysis or incorrect attitude toward
material.
Requirement to analyze material in reference to own case, show how
theory applied to S's own daily behavior.
Rationalization and justification of conclusions presented in materials;
generally the conclusions could not be questioned, only justihed,
c.g., “Why are the Americans imperialistic and warmongeringr
Showing how all activities, no matter how trivial, have political
implications.
Further public self-analysis in reference to materials, often as part
of elaborating and deepening the confession; referred to some-
times as "thought conclusions."
Rewarding aspects of having re-established comfortable emotional rela-
tionships with cellmates and interrogator.
Rewarding aspects of having found a frame of reference and semantic
rules which made communication with others possible.
Lessening or complete removal of all those pressures described in refer-
ence to unfreezing.
Experiences offer release from prison and after repatriation
Cognitive confirmation of predictions made by cellmates and authorities
regarding events which would occur after repatriation.
Location of significant others who support changes made in prison.
Sense of personal integration, in the absence of prison supports and pres-
sures.
By way of conclusion, we should like to point out that among the
influenced repatriates wc saw some individuals whose change did
not persist very long after repatriation and some individuals who
were able to find social, emotional, and informational support for
their new* beliefs and attitudes, and whose beliefs and attitudes
therefore have persisted. It is this latter group which emphasizes the
need to analyze coercive persuasion in terms of a general theory of
influence rather tlian to see it as a peculiar, uncommon, or bizarre
set of procedures designed to make man do something "against his
The Special Role of Guilt 141
him; his first task is to understand the nature of his crime, and in
this task the government will do its best to help him. Analysis of
his past will show him how he has been guilty, how the ultimate
consequences of his acts have been harmful to the Chinese people.
If he is honest with himself he will discover his guilt more rapidly
and proceed easily to what is expected of the criminal: admission of
guilt by confession, subsequent repentance, and reform of the un-
desirable thoughts, attitudes, feelings, and actions.
From the moment of his arrival in prison the prisoner has urged
upon him the rationale of the Chinese authorities by his interrogator,
judge, and, most important, his cellmates. He may attempt to defend
himself against the accusations of guilt by denying criminal acts or
intents, by laugliing at their absurdity, or simply by failing to tale
them seriously, but the total prison regimen as outb'ned in the
previous chapters may convince him that his own concepts of gui t
and innocence are incorrect or at least are not shared by the o cr
prisoners or the authorities.
The bases for being judged guilty which he must come to appreci-
ate are the following: , „ . . ,
1. Guilt by Association. The prisoner is guilty if he has associ-
ated with any others who are themselves guilty, evra if he has not
committed any acts -harmful to the Chinese people.' ted
any intent to do so, or been aware of his association with other gu.Ity
F Tcot.t by Intention. The prisoner is guilty c5 ““
motives which could and probably eventually woul Mod
which would harm the Chinese people; thus the
potential criminal who must be made to feel his gu.it and he
punished as social prophylaxis. . . if fj C
P 3. Guilt roa iNtWcr Attitudes. The pn»»ci '"gSc* or
takes a negative attitude toward the P art y°f ^ attitude under-
questions any of their decisions, ^ ausc . .j vcs - j n Uicir pro-
mines the effectiveness of the "peoples rep > ^ averting his
grams to help the people; questioning J^f a negative
innocence c£i be, of course, a further instance of sue *
■ — ia thoif oiieuneu
• Since the guilt of the “others" tsV^LJe.
it can be seen that the attribution of guiit to anj-on 1
5
The Special Role of Guilt
in Coercive Persuasion
Onx of the primary motives which leads the prisoner to begin a
process of change (to begin to allow himself to be influenced) is
guilt, which he comes to experience in various forms in the prison
environment. This experience of guilt results from a combination of
external pressures and internal predispositions. From the point of
view of the interrogator or judge, criminal guilt is assumed once the
prisoner has been arrested, but there are several different bases for
such guilt From the point of view of the prisoner there are a number
of predispositions which lead to psychologically distinct types of
guilt, though they may not be experienced as different. The purpose
of this chapter is to explore these distinctions and thereby to show
how the captor’s presentation of the nature of guilt begins to un-
freeze the prisoner by stimulating in him a sense of guilt, and how
the type of guilt which he feels is related to the final outcome of the
influence process.
TIIE CAPTOR’S VIEW OF GUILT
Once arrested, the prisoner must come to understand the following
version of his predicament: he is in prison because the government
considers him a criminal; his crime is obvious to everyone but to
140
The Special Role of Cuilt 143
lack of concern for others, class and/or racial prejudice, personal
weakness, failure to live up to his own stated ideals, and so on;
because the idealized "new man” is morally "perfect” from both a
Communist and non-Communist point of view, it is likely that the
kinds of faults for which the prisoner is criticized will be perceived
by him as faults also.
9. Guilt for Havznc Dancerous Social Oricins. The prisoner
is guilty if he was bom into a bourgeois family, if his friends and/or
relatives are capitalists, if he was educated under a capitalist system,
or if he associated with others of dangerous social origins; it is as-
sumed that various of the consequences described above — incorrect
attitudes and thoughts, failure to support the Communist cause,
characteristic personal faults, are all due to such social origins; hence
incorrect social origins are a primary and incontestable basis for
guilt. What makes matters worse for the prisoner is that he cannot
deny these origins, they are a matter of fact; he can only deny their
effects which is not likely to be convincing.
As one reviews these bases of guilt, one sees that they overlap to a
considerable extent and are linked by the underlying assumption t at
all situations must he fudged by their " objective " results, by their
ultimate consequences. Thoughts, attitudes, intentions, personal
characteristics, and even accidents of birth and status must
judged by what they could lead to, not by the actual actions Uiey
have led to in the past Thus the person may be guilty
knowing it, and it is the prison’s primary task to i ™ ake , e
conscious of his guilt as the prelude to reform. 'Hus ogic
its extreme makes the primary basis of guilt simp y e J
fact of having been arrerted; arrert is the just consequence of grnlt
^^n'gemti^the'a^nbtinrifluenc: (fudge, intartgator. cdlnwt^)
presume the guilt of their subjects). They belie. e 1
never have been arrested if he were not centered a to* ‘
-people ” They may not know the P'^/^ on ,„ fo 4f n c Sy
guilt nor which grounds are justiBably applicable t
• It Is « Interesting psynholngle^ fact
they were arrested unjustly, who saw thems
of the guilt of everyone else in the prison.
142
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
attitude, thereby proving the government’s correctness in the first
instance. # . ,
4. Guri-T for Incorrect Thoughts. The prisoner is guilty if he
exhibits thought patterns which reflect bourgeois premises and if he
fails to appreciate the validity of Communist premises, even if he
does not exhibit intentions or attitudes which could be harmful to
the people; it is assumed that wrong thoughts would eventually lead
to harmful acts.
5. Guilt for Havb?c Knowledge. The prisoner is guilty if he
has knowledge about China which could in any conceivable way be
used against the Chinese, no matter how vague or seemingly non-
political it might be; if the prisoner is a foreigner such knowledge is
particularly suspect because of the presumption that the only pos-
sible reason for his remaining in China after the take-over could be
the gathering of “intelligence information”; thus activities such as
research, casual questioning, and reading all become espionage.
6. Guilt for Harmful Action. The prisoner is guilty if he has
committed acts which are harmful to the Chinese people, even if he
does not recognize having committed them or does not recognize that
they were harmful; seemingly innocuous acts can be defined as
seriously harmful by the authorities, e.g., going to a party at a
Western embassy is “establishing contact with spies” or actually
“passing on information to Western agents”; looking something up
in easily available volumes in the library for an attache at a Western
embassy ( something he could easily have done him self ) is “aiding in
espionage activities,” and so on.
7. Guilt for Failure to Act. The prisoner is guilty if he has
not been active in his support of the party and the government, if he
has failed to show his own desire for the welfare of the people, if
he has failed to give willingly his own possessions, time, and efforts
in behalf of the Communist cause; to stand aside is to condone and
support the old status quo.
8. Guilt for Having a Characteristic Personal Fault or
Faults. The prisoner is judged guilty if he shows in his behavior
in prison some fault, shortcoming, or character defect from the point
of view of the idealized image of the “new man”; for example, the
prisoner is constantly being shown evidence of his own selfishness,
145
The Special Role of Cullt
Feelings of guilt are stimulated in the prison situation, both in-
tentionally and inadvertently, by the exacerbation of old conflicts or
the creation of new ones. For example, the prison regimen, whether
handcuffs and ankle chains are used or not, makes the adult as de-
pendent as a child and arouses some of the cliildhood conflicts,
particularly around problems of authority. Or weakly held values are
strengthened by continual emphasis until they begin to conflict with
other values, as in the case of the priest for whom the value of un-
selfishness was sharpened to such a degree that it began to conflict
with all efforts on his part to express any self-interest in the service
of survival.
The prisoner can come to accept guilt on any one or more of the
bases argued “logically” by the agents because he does begin to
experience guilt in some form. This guilt may be felt primarily as
guilt-anxiety (Lifton, 1956a) in which case the feeling is present but
no psychological basis for it is perceived by the prisoner; or it may
be consciously perceived to be related to one or more of the follow-
ing areas of psychological functioning:
1. Social Guilt. A recognition on the part of the prisoner that
much of what he has had in life has not been earned but has been
given to him by accident of birth; thus for a middle-class person o
have prejudices against the members of the lower class arouses gun
when he discovers that, in a sense, he has not earned but merely been
given his middle-class status. , .* '
2. Eco on Identity Guilt. A recognition on the part oi
prisoner that he has failed to live up to his image o _
3 Persona Guilt He feeling of guilt which i comes f »
tag a mask, from the discovery or recognition of haym S dehberat < y
or involuntarily deceived another person about one: P
by playing the role of a guilty person ' v, “ lc ho "S ' risoner
4. Loyalty Guilt. A recognition on the Pf. ? . Lonely
tfiat he has failed in his service to a ™ its'image by behaving
identified or has violated its norms or d members of that
in a manner not consistent with what is espected of members
^Srn— Guilt Guilt which is
lion on the part of others of minor infractions or petty
!44 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
not even be convinced that the grounds on which they are arguing
are justified. Nonetheless they are able to be persuasive because of
their “obvious” sincerity in working for the welfare of the people
and in their belief that if the subject had not been guilty of some-
tiling he would not have been arrested. Mistakes are considered
unlikely, and, in any case, must be made in favor of the system since
it defines itself to be in a state of combat.
The frequent allegation that the interrogators, judges, and cell-
mates are Machiavellian in their tactics is probably based on the
prisoner’s perception that the agent is willing to manipulate the
nature of the accusation to suit the subject’s particular vulnerability.
Tlius the judge may sincerely believe that in some general fashion
the prisoner is guilty of harming the people but may not believe the
specific charges that he is making against the prisoner. Under the
pressure of his job he may end up trying to convince the subject of
his guilt rather than trying to ascertain whether he is guilty; and he
may be willing in this process to make accusation after accusation
until some are found which the subject seems to find difficult to
refute. In the end the judge will most likely accept any honest con-
fession drawn from the subject’s general sense of guilt, and he will
no longer attempt to ascertain facts relevant to the matters con-
fessed to even if some of the confessed facts are incongruous or
absurd. If the judge senses, however, that the confession is dishonest,
in the sense of being merely an attempt by the prisoner to please
him, he will probably be genuinely outraged and continue his efforts
to find some basis for guilt which will elicit from the prisoner a
genuine confession.
THE PRISONER’S EXPERIENCE OF GUILT
We shall assume at the outset that all socialized people experience
a substantial amount of guilt when their behavior, desires, or feelings
conflict with the dictates of the moral code or value system they have
adopted or when they have not fulfilled some of the expectations
held by themselves or by others. Because of their personal history
and/or culture some people have stronger drives or make stronger
moral demands on themselves than others; they therefore experience
sliarpcr conflicts and arc consequently more guilt-prone than others.
145
The Special Role of Guilt
Feelings of guilt are stimulated in the prison situation, both in-
tentionally and inadvertently, by the exacerbation of old conflicts or
the creation of new ones. For example, the prison regimen, whether
handcuffs and ankle chains are used or not, makes the adult as de-
pendent as a child and arouses some of the cliildhood conflicts,
particularly around problems of authority. Or weakly held values are
strengthened by continual emphasis until they begin to conflict with
other values, as in the case of the priest for whom the value of un-
selfishness was sharpened to such a degree that it began to conflict
with all efforts on his part to express any self-interest in the service
of survival.
The prisoner can come to accept guilt on any one or more of the
bases argued “logically" by the agents because he does begin to
experience guilt in some form. This guilt may be felt primarily as
guilt-aaxiety (Lifton, 1956a) in which case the feeling is present but
no psychological basis for it is perceived by the prisoner; or it may
be consciously perceived to be related to one or more of the follow-
ing areas of psychological functioning:
1. Social Guilt. A recognition on the part of the prisoner th
much of what he has had in life has not been earned but has been
given to him by accident of birth; thus for a middle-ciass person to
have prejudices against the members of tbe lower class : arouses gudt
when he discovers that, in a sense, be has not earned but merely been
given his middle-class status. , .
2. ECO on Identity Cun.T. A recognition on thep rt of to
prisoner th at he has failed to live up to his image
3. Tcsom CtoLT. The feeling of gud whidi “bemtely
ing a mask,
r involuntarily deceived another person ““ “Stations.
Wf* * C G^Tre^to°on' V ou to part® of to prisoner
gr0up - r-mr Guilt which is aroused by the magniSea-
tion o”To^Xs of minor infractions or pe«y acts which
144 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
not even be convinced that the grounds on which they are arguing
are justified. Nonetheless they are able to be persuasive because of
their “obvious” sincerity in working for the welfare of the people
and in their belief that if the subject had not been guilty of some-
thing he would not have been arrested. Mistakes are considered
unlikely, and, in any case, must be made in favor of the system since
it defines itself to be in a state of combat
The frequent allegation that the interrogators, judges, and cell-
mates are Machiavellian in their tactics is probably based on the
prisoner’s perception that the agent is willing to manipulate the
nature of the accusation to suit the subject’s particular vulnerability.
Thus the judge may sincerely believe that in some general fashion
the prisoner is guilty of harming the people but may not believe the
specific charges that he is making against the prisoner. Under the
pressure of his job he may end up trying to convince the subject of
his guilt rather than trying to ascertain whether he is guilty; and he
may be willing in this process to make accusation after accusation
until some are found which the subject seems to find difficult to
refute. In the end the judge will most likely accept any honest con-
fession drawn from the subject’s general sense of guilt, and he will
no longer attempt to ascertain facts relevant to the matters con-
fessed to even if some of the confessed facts are incongruous or
absurd. If the judge senses, however, that the confession is dishonest,
in the sense of being merely an attempt by the prisoner to please
him, he will probably be genuinely outraged and continue his efforts
to find some basis for guilt which will elicit from the prisoner a
genuine confession.
THE PRISONER’S EXPERIENCE OF GUILT
We shall assume at the outset that all socialized people experience
a substantial amount of guilt when their behavior, desires, or feelings
conflict with the dictates of the moral code or value system they have
adopted or when they have not fulfilled some of the expectations
held by themselves or by others. Because of their personal history
and/or culture some people have stronger drives or make stronger
moral demands on themselves than others; they therefore experience
sharper conflicts and are consequently more guilt-prone than others.
The Special Role of Guilt 147
pretentious missionary family from which he came felt itself superior
and, despite its low standard of living (lower than that of other
foreigners ), exploited the Chinese. Today he describes with pleasure,
but also with considerable guilt, the gay, luxurious life of the foreign
students, the parties, the hobnobbing with the intellectual, social,
and political elite of the city.
Even one of the least guilt-prone of our subjects eventually became
vulnerable to a sense of social guilt. For two years he had been in
prison resisting influence, although making certain behavioral con-
cessions. He recounts how, no matter what the agents tried, he
continued to feel no guilt until a general personality crisis was pre-
cipitated which led him to ''recognize’* and accept social guilt
As I continued my analysis I realized even more how my egotism
had slowly developed to where 1 was incapable of seeing anything which
was not to my advantage and where 1 was oblivious to the plight of
others. I remembered how ... I had looked with revulsion on the
poverty around us when I arrived in China. One morning in November,
1018, we had stepped out of the gate of a friend’s house where we
had spent the night to find a man stretched out dead on the doorstep,
obviously starved to death. It was a shock to both of us and bad brought
an ugly note into a bright morning. Reflecting on my attitu e t lat y,
realized now that the little sympathy I had felt for the man had been
more overshadowed by annoyance over my day being spo' m ™ ,
way. My attitude toward the Korean War had shown e same
disregard for the lives of others on a much larger scale.
This subject did not accept "sodaT guilt before this crisis,
because be was not particularly guilt-prone but 0 . d pres .
come from on underdog family, whose suffenn^gAedcp^
sion had made a deep impression on him- A v „ter, and
turned, he was led to see the -selfishness” flaw m bs character, an
thus became ready to accept “sodaT guilt.
Though never a spy in our terras, he sai .
. a j] sfnee a person
Not wanting to harm others was no .**“*£, . Q r thinking of others,
totally blinded by his own self-interest is incapable of Uunxm b
140 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
normally do not run counter to the prisoner’s basic values or self-
image, particularly when they are perceived to have been stimulated
by great stress; feelings of guilt in reference to such acts imply that
the prisoner has already accepted some of the norms and standards
of evaluation of the cellmates and authorities.
These types of guilt are not logically discrete but are important to
distinguish if one is to understand some of the psychological proc-
esses which characterized the influence process in our subjects. In
the remainder of this chapter we shall attempt to illustrate each of
these types of guilt by quoting or paraphrasing some of the state-
ments made by our subjects concerning their prison experience.
Social Guilt
"Basically, I guess I always felt superior to the Negro. I didn’t realize
it before, but when I looked back on it from the prison-situation, I could
see it clearly."
"I realized that I had never done anything for society."
"What I came for [to China! was not so much to study, but to have
a good time with the embassy set To go to parties, and to make my dollar
count in a country where help and housing was cheap."
"About ten years ago I was full of ideas of social climbing. I wanted
to do some outstanding work so that I might acquire a distinguished
social position. I wished to be above other people."
"We've always lived entirely for ourselves — not for others."
These paraphrased statements, taken from recent interviews, il-
lustrate most directly what we mean by social guilt. The Com-
munists tried to convince their prisoners that they had actually
"harmed the people," or intended harm to them, or had at some
time in their lives, as members of a more privileged class, inten-
tionally or unconsciously taken advantage of others, because of in-
ferior "class" status. The struggle meetings, both group criticism
and self-criticism sessions, were designed to recall instances of such
guilty behavior.
In his recollections, one American repatriate mentions how all
foreigners living in China had at least subconscious feelings of
superiority to the Oriental. He cites instances where even the un-
147
The Special Role of CuiU
pretentious missionary family from which he came felt itself superior
and, despite its low standard of living (lower than that of other
foreigners ), exploited the Chinese. Today he describes with pleasure,
but also with considerable guilt, the gay, luxurious life of the foreign
students, the parties, the hobnobbing with the intellectual, social,
and political elite of the city.
Even one of the least guilt-prone of our subjects eventually became
vulnerable to a sense of social guilt. For two years he had been in
prison resisting influence, although maldng certain behavioral con-
cessions. He recounts how, no matter what the agents tried, he
continued to feel no guilt until a general personality crisis was pre-
cipitated which led him to "recognize" and accept social guilt
As I continued my analysis I realized even more how my egotism
had slowly developed to where I was incapable of seeing anything which
was not to my advantage and where I was oblivious to the p 'g t o
others. I remembered how ... I had looked with revulsion on the
poverty around m when I arrived in China. One morning in November,
1018, we had stepped out of the gate of a friends house wle"
had spent the night, to find a man stretched ont dead “ d ” rs '^'
obviously starved to death. It was a shock to both of ns sard ^ bmug
an ugly note into a bright morning. Reflecting on my at e ‘ '
realized now that the litde sympathy I had felt for the man tadteen
more overshadowed by annoyance over my day bemg ^
way. My attitude toward the Korean War had she™ the same brutal
disregard for the lives of others on a much larger scale.
This subject did no, accept -*d>r S
thus became ready to accept social
Though never a spy in our terms, he said.
Not wanting to harm ot ^ l ^ t “ i ^b!eof
totally blinded by his own self-mterest is
148 Structure, E feds, and Determinants
to begin with. If I had not been so blind, I would have been able to
see long ago the fallacy in my supposition that my espionage activities
had been of service to my country.
Having one’s innermost self brought out and dissected under the
glaring light of self-criticism was a shattering experience, but the result-
ing recognition of myself made me determined to overcome the weak-
nesses in my character which had been the cause of those former mis-
takes. Thus began the struggle with myself which was to last through-
out the rest of my stay in prison, and, indeed, goes on even today.
The creation and exploitation of social guilt were possible with
almost every prisoner who had already been successfully weakened
by other means, even if he was not initially guilt-prone. One reason,
among others, is that some evidence of having felt superior can
always be dug out and turned into such guilt The intellectual is
vulnerable to accusations such as “you don’t mix with the common
man, you don’t even speak his language.” The missionaries who went
to China to bring Christianity to the people sometimes lived better
than the masses “for whom they were supposed to be an example.
If this argument was not convincing, it was pointed out to the mis-
sionary that he undoubtedly felt some superiority over the un-
Christianized heathens.
Thus to have had a feeling of social guilt and to have acknowl-
edged it was to accept some version of this argument: if I have
shown a lack of social awareness and have taken no global social
responsibility; if I have been prejudiced toward a minority group;
if I have felt superior toward anyone because of class origin, in fact
felt superior at all; if I have been so concerned with my own life as
to be unaware of the interests of others or have been too concerned
with my own status and ambitions to do things for others, I have
been guilty of “a crime against the people.”
Ego or Identity Guilt
• . . Once you have made a false confession you lose heart and sclf-
confidencc. If they get you to make another confession then that lowers
resistance even more.’’
The Spedd Role of Cuilt 149
The interviewer asked him, "Why did you make a false confession?” ’
He said, "Because I thought I would get out if I gave them what they
wanted, I thought I would try it.” (Apparently the first time he actually
tried this was about four months after his imprisonment.)
The Interviewer asked what he had confessed to and he didn’t want to
tell but later in the conversation it came up. His lie was that he named
some sort of organization, which he had made up, for which he had
worked. Then he discovered that they had lied to him by telling him
that if he made a confession he would get out; and then they didn’t re-
lease him once they had gotten It. From that time on he decided he
was not going to make a false confession. But because he had once made
a false confession he began to lose faith in himself. "Why had I given in,
why had I lied?" he asked himself. . . . "There is something degrading
about lying about yourself."
Because this confession undermined this man s self-image of being
special, different, even heroic, it drastically lowered Us self-esteem.
It undermined lus self-esteem not only because he had lied but also
because he had been unable to resist. Each time he was forced to give
in again (ho confessed and retracted three or font times) lus guilt
increased. As his guilt increased, ids self-esteem was lowered and lus
ability to resist making false confessions and believing them became
izing it, the theme: If only I had been what ' <*s I woidd
have been able to resist. After having fought so hard and I long Jo
resist, and then having given in bemuse he just mnbl
to stop, he could not face the idea that he was so weak as_to_gv e in,
that lfe could be willing to lie "just to reh eve
haps he began '“^‘^j^mTfcvc that hf really was a spy
of^hettger^Itvnu'tUsiran who said on release in Hong Kong:
I knew in the Erst place to. I was guilty. U ^
one has to confess-
150
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
Ego or identity guilt is thus produced by eliciting from the
prisoner behavior which is inconsistent with his self-image, by de-
grading him and/or provoking him into degrading behavior. One
priests attempt to resist such pressure is indicated in the following
statement:
“As soon as the door opens we file off quickly to the washing-room
at the end of the corridor. With only six or seven places there, we have
to wait for our turn. Soap may not be used. You just dip your towel in
the trough and pass it over your face and hands. There's a time allowance
of two minutes and no more for all the fifteen of us, since twenty-eight
other cells on this floor have to get through their ablutions in the course
of the hour. We come and go back to our cell with the bowed heads of
sentenced criminals, though no one has been condemned. The Com-
munist technique sets much store on the outward sign. By subjecting
the body to the posture of guilt, the spirit is moulded and brought into
a responsiveness indistinguishable from that of domestic animals. That’s
whats wanted of everyone in the Communist regime. But why does my
good friend, Number 1052, bend down lower than the rest, and outdo all
by the exaggerated abjection of Iris posture? It hurts me every time I
see this. The line I have adopted is ‘submissively nonconformist' I keep
my eyes cast down like a nun, so that it’s impossible to accuse me of
breaking the rules by looking about But I simply won’t bow my head.
Yet apart from an occasional 'telling-off,' I have been left alone in my
obstinacy.” [Bonnichon, 1955, p. 4]
The use of handcuffs and ankle chains as punishment for refusal
to confess of course insures degradation and dependency and thereby
strongly heightens the probability of ego guilt. The provocation of
ehavior inconsistent with a man's image of himself is also made
easier by the fact that in the intimacy of cell life it is not difficult for
ce lmates to discover those points on which a fellow prisoner is
vulnerable.
One^ of our subjects after a long period of resistance started to
in e concessions in the form of confessions but he did not believe
m any of the behavior he had confessed to, Le., did not feel he had
committed any crimes by his own standards. The close relationships
151
The Special Role of Cuilt
which developed in the group cell and the constant argument and
harangue from the interrogator led gradually to an intellectual ac-
ceptance of the Chinese Communist semantics and to some identifi-
cation with cellmates, expressed most clearly in Iiis calling his cell "a
sort of home.* The cellmates were the first Chinese that the subject
felt he had ever known intimately.
Identification with his cellmates made it easier for this man to
accept the validity of their definitions of crime. Gradually the ac-
ceptance of their definitions led to a habit of conceptualizing his
activities and thoughts in terms of them. Finally he came to accept
the point of view that he had been guilty of espionage, but then
discovered in a newspaper article that repatriated POWs from
Korea who had allegedly been brainwashed had been sent to Valley
Forge "mental hospital,” and concluded that if he stuck to his con-
fession of espionage he would spend the rest of his days following
release in an American mental hospital. To avoid this future possi-
bility he decided to rewrite his confession in such a way as to make
it seem harmless from an American point of view, and then settled
down to await its acceptance by the authorities. After he ha wrn e
two months he was called before the investigating judge, at which
time he offered to rewrite the confession again in the hope of find g
a compromise version which would both be
Chinese and get him off the hook with the United met
with "cold hostility” and an order to get back to to
most upset by the loathing and disgust * the ™ce , « the judge ,11*
his devdoptogAyvayte 1^ ^ ^ prcdpilatadby his
this section to svhom me
X52 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
different The subject was guilty because his motives for rewriting
his confession were selfish, regardless of the truth or falsity of its
contents, and because he was acting selfishly he was failing to live
up to a self-image of helping “the people." 1 This conflict at the
surface must have made contact with a deeper conflict and must
have elicited guilt which was attached to impulses and deeds
stemming from his earlier life. We cannot guess what these were,
but it is clear that the prisoner was able to use the crisis provoked
in the prison situation to re-examine more fundamental aspects of
his character and to “reform” some of them.
In conclusion, ego or identity guilt, if it was elicited by the im-
prisonment experience, could range from being relatively superficial
to being quite deep and could be the basis for other guilt feelings
such as social guilt. To the extent that basic identity components in
the prisoner became involved in the intrapsychic conflict the experi-
ence of thought reform could lead to fundamental personality or
character change.
Persona or Face-to-Face Cuilt
“Isolation would have been heaven in that prison. ... I dreaded it
when the others would come [back to the cell] . . . because I knew I
would have no peace. . . . Don’t mention the word 'help’ to me. I
never want to hear that again. I had to watch myself, because they
would jump on everything I said. But I couldn’t avoid saying something,
because I just couldn t sit back and withdraw. I’m just that way.”
Id prepare some answer hours in advance so that I could use [it]
if they asked me what I was thinking ... and I’d feel guilty when I
didnt reveal my true opinion, but used a phoney one to make them
stop. ...Id feel miserable when, after really having made a sincere
effort, they didn t believe me. ... Of course everyone else was ■playing
a game of accusation and self-criticism. ... It was just because every-
one was forced to do it . . . I knew people were forced to play roles.
. . . Still Td feel guilty about playing my roles."
"You could never tell who was play-acting and who wasn’t and you
couldn t make any kind of a judgment You didn't have any kind of a
re tionship with anyone . . . They were not speaking to you, they
were speaking to the confessed you [the masked "you"]. . . . There was
153
The Special Hole of Guilt
no one we could trust. And you always thought someone was going to
inform. But there was one person — a cell mate — with whom I once
talked ... we spoke one night when everyone was asleep and he said
to me. This is the first time I felt that someone didn’t speak to me in a
role.* He said, 'I am innocent, should I try to make up a crime, do you
think it would he a good strategy if I confessed to something, then they
wall think I have confessed and they will let me go?" Then I answered
him frankly and I said, *Vou must not make any kind of false confes-
sion. You must stick to the truth, otherwise you are going to get con
fused.’” This was the only honest conversation and the only private con-
versation he ever had with anyone in his three and one half years in
prison.
Persona or face-to-face guilt is tie feeing « f g " 31 " Mc , h .
from wearing a mask, or from deliberately playing u c
is aware is not congruent with the self; in short, w c c0 “ ,
deceiving others about oneself. In prison persona guil t most ofte
resulted when the prisoner, to order to reduce the contnmed pres
sure to reform, deliberately began .0 act as if he were mcone he
was not, or pretended to opinions which were not ^ ^
model reform prison specializing in S 1011 ? ,
prisoners were forced some than .0
This facc-to-face deception was mo re u even wt h
others. One subject to whom saw ^ ttis type of guilt one of
the resented cellmates, were Another subject refers merely to
the major stresses Xufacture beliefs he did not
the embarrassment of having , ^ we „f decepUon
have. A third subject was har^y affccted.by W ^ ^ ^
because he approached rea ]ly individuals but personi-
P^i'iCrX- uieugh ide f (words, I.
lectual plane.
Bed abstractions with whom "r , '^” anions hidden behind masks,
tire prison situation, Xn |beir verbal masks obliterated
he was doubly removed f™ m “^ vcre oot IM 1 people with whom
any clue to their true se lves, fey dcE „i,; 0 n of the s.to-
one could have ““X^ svas quite impervious to the
ation and relationship . ^ P cdJmale pressures since the scream
group struggle meeting
154 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
ing, lacking, spitting, and verbal assault came from “ciphers” not
real people.
Thus susceptibility to persona or face-to-face guilt depended on
the meaning which deception had for the person, how significant
others were for him as persons to be concerned about, and how im-
portant it was for the person to obtain confirmation of his “real” self
from the others in the prison environment
Loyalty Cuilt
For an instant as he stood there, looking out over the street from a
window high in Loukawei Prison, there came to him without warning so
great a desire to get out of prison that he almost cried out. It would be
simple, really. All he had to do was say the word. One single word in
answer to one single question and this whole dreadful nightmare ex-
istence would come to an end, so that he could walk down a street and
be able to turn whichever way he wanted at the comer.
And then there arose in his mind the faces and names of people
whom he knew and loved: priests and laymen who bad calmly put their
lives and freedom on the line, students who had with wide open eyes
taken the deliberate step of depriving themselves of a career and the
possibility of a decent livelihood, women who had stood dry-eyed and
proud as their men, their sons, their brothers, had been inarched off to
jail, to slave labor camps, to the firing squad. He saw his Chinese fellow
Jesuits boldly speaking out against the Red tyranny, knowing that when
they went, they would not come back without breaking. "If I do come
out, and say anything different from what I have said before and am
saying now, have nothing to do with me. . . ”
Shaken and almost sick at the thought of how dose he had come to
betraying himself and his friends. Father Phillips turned away from the
window and moved back toward the door, f Becker, 1958]
Loyalty guilt resulted from behavior, thoughts, or feelings which
the prisoner felt to be a violation of the norms of important refer-
ence or membership groups or which would sully the image which
others held of that group. Thus a priest felt guilty if he committed
any actions which were unpriestlike. Marine POWs in Korea felt
guilty if they committed un-Marinelike acts, imprisoned Communist
The Special Role of Guilt 155
sympathizers felt guilty if they were accused of harming rather than
helping the people, cell members felt guilty if they violated the
norms of the prison cell (assuming they had become identified with
it) by refusing to reform themselves. Just as the prison situation
could provoke behavior inconsistent with the persons image of
himself, so it could provoke behavior inconsistent with his group
membership (for example, provoking a priest into a fist fight over
some cell privileges). Clearly loyalty guilt and ego guilt overlap to
the extent that the person's image of himself to a large extent re-
flects his perceptions of group membership and identification. A
distinction between the two is useful, however, because e su jec
themselves distinguished quite sharply between the i Feelings which
resulted from violation of self-image and those which rw ^*d torn
letting down important others. Perhaps loyalty gui can
of as ego guilt plus something mor*-a sense of failure in someone
else’s eyes as well as one’s own.
Situational Guilt . . _ n t
All our subjects made some referc ?5® 1 1 ^aggeratc into
“petty" acts which their ccUtnato wouH catch and
an indication of a great ^, m m-SonaI slightly
stories of great crunes oy > r ctealintr or cheating,
uneven distribution of food or n c , . P j^ncss, and so on.
accidental use of another s soap, 0 f 0 jj bourgeois im-
This behavior was identified as sharp attack of the
morality which warranted ‘® , a j itt j e too far out of Tils
entire ccU group. A mac i w ^ ^ ^ n0 , do accidentally but
space” during sleep w* 5 - nrmT - even if it did not remotely in-
because he was selfish- ] ucs „-as not overlooked. It ww
volve a serious breach of major' ^ ^ m||et muci. he
caught, dwelt on, and «?SS c ' a ^ Cod himself being «o
Wed to get along, the primer nigh , The entire
X “"'^“^Vsot^oflum 3d 1 bc°s toubS «“
150
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
CONCLUSIONS
Regardless of its psychological basis, once guilt was felt the sub-
ject became more prone to accepting one or more of the many argu-
ments of the agent concerning his objective guilt The prisoner’s
subsequent willingness to confess then resulted from his need to
attach his feelings of guilt to behavior or thoughts which the au-
thorities sanctioned as crimes, not from having been “broken." In
the case of social, persona, or situational guilt his subjectively felt
shortcomings coincided with the objectively defined crimes; in the
case of ego or loyalty guilt the subject may have been influenced
because it was easier for him to accept psychologically the ob-
jective crimes he was accused of and the belief system which defined
these as crimes than to face the weakness in himself which allowed
the guilt-provoking behavior to occur in the first place. In the case
of guilt-anxiety where the psychological conflict itself was un-
conscious, the same mechanism may of course have applied, in that
the prisoner may have accepted objectively defined crimes and at-
tached his guilt to them to prevent bis unconscious conflicts from
becoming conscious (Meerloo, 1950).
We have treated the topic of guilt as an unfreezing force in some
detail because it was undoubtedly one of the central forces motivat-
ing the prisoner to change. We wish to reiterate, however, that guilt
was not the only force acting on the prisoner tending to unfreeze
, ^ orces cou ^ a ho start an influence process. On the other
and, e degree of susceptibility to guilt varied sharply from pris-
oner to prisoner and many prisoners bad effective defenses against
gu which tended to prevent guilt feelings from precipitating major
avior an /or belief changes. Not all prisoners who experienced
gui w»e unfrozen by it and subsequently influenced. Many of
1 6 Phillips, quoted at the beginning of the section on
aya ty guilt, used the small quantity of guilt which the thought of
stimulated as a defense against actually giving in. Others
cn ems elves by the usual mechanisms of repression, denial,
m ° n ^tion, etc., at the psychological level, and by logical argu-
a gents 07 Slm ^ 6 re ^ us ®l to listen at the level of interaction with the
6
The Effects of Coercive Persuasion
Vzut 3S22VD of influence was actually accomplished by the prison
regimen and how was this related to Communist objectives? In
looking at our cases we found that a simple categorization in terms
of complete resistance, confession, or confession plus attitude change
is quite inadequate. Prisoners made confessions which were in vary-
ing degrees useful to the Communists, in varying degrees damaging
to the United States, and in varying degrees accurate in terms of the
behavior the prisoner had actually engaged in prior to imprisonment.
Similarly, attitude changes varied in the dcgTec to wluch the change
was toward unequivocal acceptance of Chinese Communism, toward
tlie acceptance of broad ethical generalities which Communism
shares with other ideologies, or merely toward a greater appreciation
of what the Communists arc allegedly trying to do for the C/ifncso
people. Attitude changes also varied in their degree of permanence,
in their degree of internal consistency, and in their significance for
tho repatriate’s later adjustment to our society. Finally, there were
changes produced in some prisoners which were quite irrelevant to
Communist objectives yet which were dearly the result of the im-
prisonment and coercive persuasion experiences.
In order to describe and evaluate the patterns of influence (n our
subjects we base chosen as an appropriate frame of refrrenre
changes in the prisoner’s behavior and attitudes which had meaning
far jjs own long-run adjustment, disregarding the political effects of
these changes in aiding or hindering the Communist came or in fuU
I5S
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
filling their immediate political objectives. For example, hvo subjects
who made identical confessions and therefore fulfilled some Com-
munist objectives in identical ways might represent instances of two
very different kinds of influence. In one subject the confession might
be the product of sheer opportunism, while in the other it might
represent a far-reaching change in self-percept and the acceptance
subjectively of the guilt which the confessed behavior implied.
Similarly, two subjects who changed their attitude toward Com-
munism and the CCP in identical fashion ( in terms of their manifest
behavior at the time of repatriation) might represent instances of
very different influence processes. In one of them the new attitudes
might represent a new integration of previously conflicting tend-
encies; in the other they might be new cognitive responses which
produce new and chronic conflicts within him. In the latter case we
might expect the new' attitudes to drop away rather quickly, in the
former case they might persist indefinitely. The main point is that
these two cases would not represent merely differing degrees of
influence, but also different types of influence as a result of seem-
ingly similar coercive persuasion attempts.
We shall present prototypes of the different types and degrees of
influence accomplished, recognizing that we are thereby implying a
degree of generality which is hardly warranted by our small sample.
The reader should once again remind himself that our stated con-
clusions are actually hypotheses to be tested against further ob-
servations.
TYPES AND DEGREES OF INFLUENCE
No Discernible Influence
No change perceived in self (except possibly in physical condi-
on), no aid given to the Communists, witting or unwitting; com-
p e e r usal to make or sign any confession; and no attitude change
except possibly increased hostility toward the Communists.
epatnates fitting into this category presented nothing in their
post-repatriation behavior that would be considered unusual or
U0U ° ^. n ^ or them any special publicity except the fact of their
unusua resistance. They would discuss in a calm, mature fashion
orror of the experience and the mann er in which they had
159
Effects of Coercive Persuasion
resisted Communist pressures, and would likely confirm for tlieir
audience the conviction that Communism in any form or guise has
to be fought to the limit of anyone’s ability. They would strike those
who knew them well before their imprisonment as having under-
gone no significant change in their attitudes, though one might note
an increased determination to combat Communism and would sense
that the coercive persuasion experience had taken a great toll physi-
cally and emotionally. The number of cases falling into this category
is extremely small since almost everyone who was released from the
mainland made some sort of a confession. Among published ac-
counts, the case of Father Phillips is the most enlightening and best
presented (Becker, 1958).
Altered Psychological Functioning
Diffuse change perceived in self, but not in direction of Com-
munist values; some compliance with Communist demands, but on y
minimal in willingness to confess to tilings actually done, sucoessfu
avoidance of atdfude change or more extensive *7 do-
velopment of defense mechanisms which psycM 'U 1
prisoner and made it possible for him to dneount incommg mforma
tion, but at some cost to Ids total psychology
Repatriates fitting into tins category appeared .upon rcpahlalio
to be somewhat confused, perhaps sick or TS ^fittri tat
seem to have accepted by^mespericncc. Sue!,
the image of the person who certain deeds and accept
a subject might admitJ ha Jg M that be had
his own guilt for them, b ^ wc n treated. The ex-
deserved his punishment or t;on ; nJ T had been influenced
tent to which his psycho og , „ .imp but he would seem to have
might not be asscssab c for a long infiocnccd toward
been influenced somel^ very tense.
Communism. For cramp ^ Jc( ; njt= period of lime following
restless, and nervous for an j ta „ t Communism, see-
repatriation; some became al most^ , ano ^ ^ ^
ing various fortuitous ^ 0 , U|Cm . som e reported a lengthy
rated "indifference to tragedy," berng unable
post-repatriation pen
1G0
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
to feel strongly about nearby emotional events (one subject re-
ported being almost unmoved when told of the death of his brother);
and so on. Of course, the psychological effects attendant upon the
tremendous physical incapacitation which resulted in some subjects
cannot be discounted either. Some subjects returned with TB, some
had the after-effects of vitamin deficiencies, some suffered con-
siderably from the after-effects of having worn manacles and chains,
and so on; but they all felt the psychological tension and other
psychological concomitants to be the more salient post-repatriation
Behavioral Compliance Without Attitude
Change
Minimal. Behavioral Compliance. Willingness to make and
sign con ession provided it was seen by prisoner not to be technically
e (even slightly exaggerated) and not to be compromising to
umse or is important reference groups; no subjective sense of
P .., n ° r degree of sympathy for Communist position; increased
! . ^ ? owing repatriation, toward the Communist regime but
not toward the individual influence agents who were likely to be
seen merely as having fulfilled their job.
nr „^ atriateS into this category are distinguished from the
weatWf 0n ^ in . a PP eare d upon repatriation to have
anre nf! f 6 some what better. They gave the appear-
j mn • 2 a nd objectivity and clearly did not appear as if
havimr JTT a< ^ m wa y “broken” them. They usually admitted
first nLTi 6 TS COnfessions «nder duress but pointed out that,
confessing e J avo *ded seriously compromising anyone by their
a,eir bial had been * "*~r 01 k « aI
had 3 m f aCt were n °t the criminals the Communists
reference t ^ e ‘ ^ e y did not seem to experience any guilt in
thev vinla/d ♦V* 1 - COD ^^ s ^ on > largely because they did not feel that
* It is 6 ^ se ^' ima S e by the kind of confession they made.
repatriated from Korean POW^J^ 3 {. oUc ^- u P stud Y of American PO\Vs
percentage of the n-ww “ w , ca 1 in P, s a similar pattern emerged. A very high
frostbite, torture et? tn ^ tes physical difficulties from wounds, diseases,
debilitating to them » a prevalent complaint which seemed much more
S to them was tension, nervousness, jwnpmess, etc.
Effects of Coercive Persuasion T _,
161
“ reSiSt f the pressures of ^omnent with great
St” proud o£ ,helr ra4er ftan “ *
“™P fe , ° f tte kind of resistance winch sustained
mL d j Va i d by Bonni! *°“ (1955). Though the prison
eves lh f Pn'oneee had at all times to lower their
ll ‘f ds fa a " alHtude of submission when in the
to b<Jhi f i?" “/‘“‘I*'' Boimicl10 " reported that he simply refused
that ! £ frt WSS , n f‘ P “ nishKi for lhis defian “. He states
for rn • ? • S . fu s feelm g of dignity intact in this fashion was crucial
tor maintaining his general strength to resist."
pected Sin U ' e feeUnS a a° Ut SubjeC,S ,his “'W *h»‘ Ihey «-
£ iTr m " ent r der 1116 Cou^uuists to be no more or less
evrtb e „ ,^7 '&*'*»** Mi it to be an in-
thev tliprpf T- j ° * a system like Communism; and that
at ,Lt r “ no | • specificaUy resent the treatment they received
be merelv to of the “““«>• so agents since most of these were seen to
mates Wert* W 6Ve worIcers doin g the job demanded of them. Celi-
as poor n i°f S H an , im P ortant reference group but more often
Kuidanrv £* fo ^ who needed above all else pity and proper
case thpr'p V 1Ch ? ccasionalI y prisoners tried to provide; in any
diem or trMt- S VU ? u ? U > r no probability of coming to identify with
hill of trrwi . 1 °? , 611 own reform 35 being anything other than a
to have bp 'ui aut ^ orities ^ a d sold tliem. These subjects seem
speed -in ^ ? f t0 l 00 ^ at ex P enence from a very broad per-
simnlv rli/l * S V ch a stron g rooer sense of identity that they
social pm-i D ° nce ° confirmation from anyone in their immediate
rational j\ roa Tn c n t. In the end they made their confessions as a
diem that atl .°P to tofa ^ situation inasmuch as it appeared to
lease, some “nd of confession really was a prerequisite for re-
ffWphtt S™? “ e . hard to assess since in the
i ends to include many of the older missionaries who
^ccDent examok )?r e ^ uan ^ did not enforce the regulation in this case is an
^ >0rtant - A that the satiations in prison routine were £m-
compliant i ““ of climate in tiie same prison might have elicited
P and possibly attitude change in a man hke Boanichon.
1G0
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
to feel strongly about nearby emotional events (one subject re-
ported being almost unmoved when told of the death of his brother);
and so on. Of course, the psychological effects attendant upon the
tremendous physical incapacitation which resulted in some subjects
cannot be discounted cither. Some subjects returned with TB, some
had the after-effects of vitamin deficiencies, some suffered con-
siderably from the after-effects of having worn manacles and chains,
and so on; but they all felt the psychological tension and other
psychological concomitants to be the more salient post-repatriation
problem.® 1 L
Behavioral Compliance Without Attitude
Change
Minimal Behavioral Compliance. Willingness to make and
sign confession provided it was seen by prisoner not to be technically
rue (even if slightly exaggerated) and not to be compromising to
nmse or his important reference groups; no subjective sense of
v ...?° r c 8 rce sympathy for Communist position; increased
| \ ° w * n g repatriation, toward the Communist regime but
not toward the individual influence agents who were likely to be
seen merely as having fulfilled their job
nrm? >atr ' atCS falling into this category are distinguished from the
wpathp S ° n ^ they appeared upon repatriation to have
. f C . e experience somewhat better. They gave the appear-
imnricnn™ t 5\ anc * objectivity and clearly did not appear as if
havintr me | n an y wa y broken’* them. They usually admitted
first nf confessions under duress but pointed out that,
confp«?n« avoided seriously compromising anyone by their
' serami% tha t thob trial had beeo a^ochery of legal
had i 111 f 3Ct were not criminals the Communists
reform^ ♦ wn to be. They did not seem to experience any guilt in
thev vinlnf 0 t iu* 1 - confession, largely because they did not feel tliat
. j t * ieir se lf*image by the kind of confession they made.
debilitating to thVm , ^ a . P reva ‘ ent complaint which see
fa em was tension, nervousness, jumpmess, etc.
Effects of Coercive Persuasion JP3
tlon to launch lecture tours, organize special programs or drives,
write books and pamphlets, and so on, to expose Communism.
Behavioral Compliance * Accompanied btj
Attitude Change
Unintecrated Attitude Chance. New pro-Communist attitudes
grafted onto old attitude structure but not integrated into it; no real
identity crisis stimulated.
Repatriates fitting into this category appeared at repatriation to
be sick, somewhat confused, and somewhat distant; they immedi-
ately made statements to the press and to other available audiences
citing their crimes, such as espionage and sabotage, lauding their
Chinese captors for their leniency and the good treatment received
in prison, and condemning the “imperialistic warmongering" nations
of the West for their policies toward Communist China and their
failure to understand what Communism was really doing for the
people. The listener often got the impression of a broken record, a
compulsive repetition of the same points, and a heavy use of Com-
munist jargon and of such stock phrases as imperialist and war-
monger. The listener also got the feeling that die repatriate was
compulsively clinging to some kind of facade and was not showing
his real self.
After a period of time ranging from a few weeks to one year, this
kind of person began to re-evaluate his prison experience and to
recognize that he had been forced to comply against his will, that
be had accepted attitudes and information which were incompati c
with other attitudes he had and with information he could now
check. He might be overcome with guilt and with hostility tow
the Communists for having forced him into something so a ™ J
himself, and would end up having a fairly accurate view ol me lorai
experience and his role in it
Y small
The number of repatriates falling into this category is ^ ,c p f**L
but of considerable interest since they represent ns an
• Behavioral compliance here implies a sincere * n-Ibcritidmi
as well as willingness to engage in other k, ^ j_ m{lc d t0 itesn
and hmen hsi (Croup Study). The actual con 1 f t f oa ,,^i —mjnhjnr* would
about which the prisoner dually felt guilty. ‘
be more estensive than that of prisoners in the »bos r S of >
1C2
Structure , Effects, end Determinants
were ready to retire by the time they were released. On the whole
it appears that those who did not retire either continued their
careers essentially where they left off or else continued their work
in a somewhat curtailed fashion.
Extensive Behavioral Compliance. Willingness to make and
sign confession which included material reflecting the agent’s ac-
cusations but was clearly recognized by the prisoner as false, yet
was confessed to in order to case pressure and gain release from
imprisonment; subjective sense of guilt attached particularly to sclf-
perception of weakness for being unable to resist, combined with
or resulting in tremendous hostility toward the agents who thus
marred the prisoner’s self-image; this hostility toward the Com-
munists might be major long-run effect following release.
Repatriates falling into this category exhibited two types of re-
sponses after their repatriation. They either withdrew completely
from any publicity and attempted to hide themselves away as
quickly as possible, or they volubly and compulsively attempted to
explain their behavior (their confession) to as many audiences as
possible. The confessions of the subjects in this category were likely
to have included more material of the type that the Communists de-
manded, material which the prisoner recognized as false and pos-
sibly as being quite compromising to himself and to others. In some
cases more elaborate confessions resulted after a number of initial
confessions followed by retractions, and were seen primarily as
coerced responses about which the prisoner felt helpless. The pris-
oner was generally not confused about the truth or falsity of the
confessed behavior, nor did he accept the Communist's semantics or
standards of evaluation. The prisoner often erroneously believed,
. owever » a false confession would be easy to repudiate follow-
mg repatriation and that it would not do the Chinese any good to
get it
Because the coerced compliance was for most of these prisoners
so maging to their self-image, they were motivated on the one
. em phasize the coercive aspects of their imprisonment and on
tne other hand the evilness and duph'rity of the captors. One of the
major effects of imprisonment, then, was a sharp increase in hostility
ward Communism, leading in some repatriates to the determina-
164 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
popular stereotype of brainwashing— -the person who has been seem-
ingly made to believe something alien to him and against his will.
Partially on Totally Intecrated Attitude Change. New at-
titudes either continue to exacerbate an identity crisis or tend to
resolve it; in the latter ease the)' become integrated into existing
attitude structures and ongoing emotional relationships.
Tills group of repatriates, though very small in number, includes
the cases of greatest interest in that the coercive persuasion experi-
ence for them produced long-run influence at a fairly basic per-
sonality and attitude level. Subjects who fall into this general cate-
gory appeared at the time of repatriation much the same as those
just discussed, but the listener had less of a sense that the repatriate
was compulsively clinging to a facade and more of a sense that some
fundamental change had occurred in the subject about which he felt
quite secure. These subjects seemed more at peace with themselves,
seemed to have a firmer and deeper conviction about what they
were saying, relied less on cliches and jargon, and did not push
their message as compulsively.
In the period following repatriation this group did not “discover
the falsity of points the Communists had made, but continued to
use the new standards of evaluation and the new frame of reference
learned in prison. The main difference between the partially and
totally integrated groups was that in the former the new attitudes
and frame of reference did not produce a satisfactory resolution of
the identity crisis stimulated in prison, while in the latter they did.
Thus subjects in the former group vacillated between seeing their
imprisonment as a very beneficial and therapeutic experience (lead-
ing to pro-Chinese and pro-Communist points of view on many is*
sues) and as a basically destructive horrible experience (leading to
pro-American and anti-Communist points of view).
In terms of our influence model these subjects have been changed
but not refrozen. We would predict that some resolution of their
problems will come through the new social-emotional relationships
they form back home and the kind of identity and attitudes these
new significant others will support. If they can find others who
will support the kind of value emphasis which they learned in
prison (Le., being unselfish or working for greater causes), they
7
The Determinan ts of Belief and
Attitude Change
The PtmrosE of this chapter is to discuss those factors in the prisoner
and those aspects of the imprisonment experience which, in our
opinion, are related to successful influence in the sense of lasting
belief and attitude change. If we consider the extensive outline of
personal factors and experiences that was presented in the Intro-
duction to Part II, we can identify a number of them as being re-
lated to final attitude change. These arc not variables which are
necessary and/or sufficient, but rather variables which Interacted to
increase the probability of attitude change. Since the number of
cases on which our analysis is based is small, \vc cannot treat the
ensuing discussion as a set of conclusions. Rather, they should be
viewed as hypotheses to be tested against future data.
THE INITIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STATE OF THE
riUSOXER-TO-HE AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS
Tronenct* to Social Cuflt
If the prisoner-to-be was susceptible to social guilt lie was par-
ticularly mJncraWc to the pressure of J he cellmates in a group cell
and was thus particularly prone to being unfrozen In a fundamental
fashion. As we have indicated in Cliapter 5, there were many bases
on which a prisoner could feel guilty, and general guilt-pronenei*
166 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
indulgence like buying some prints or thinking about buying a
house; worry about being able to "talk to the man in the street” be-
cause of heightened awareness in prison of snobbish attitudes; fear
of “talking down”; rejection of former friends who were associated
with a period of life which now seems frivolous and in the context
of which the friends are seen as reactionary, selfish, ignorant, and
unfair; greater involvement than before in moral issues and rejection
of typical “bourgeois” values of ambition, success, money; concern
with the underdog, the underprivileged, the needy, and so on.
While members of this group have been outspoken politically and
highly critical of the United States’ economic and political system,
they have not as far as we could tell attached themselves to par-
ticular political groups and have thus far taken only an academic
interest in such groups. As far as we could tell, there has not, even
in this most influenced of groups, been any switch in basic loyalty
toward the Communists in general or the Chinese Communists in
particular, though there is clearly an increased commitment to the
Chinese people as such.
Whether from the Chinese Communist point of view these cases
would represent instances of successful thought reform is therefore
very difficult to assess. The Chinese aim is to inculcate “correct
attitudes, unquestioning obedience, loyalty, commitment, and will-
ingness to pursue Communist objectives. In a sense, none of these
t lings have been accomplished by coercive persuasion in any of its
American subjects. At most, the experience has produced some
fundamental attitude changes which have then produced a reinte-
gration in the person, leaving him perhaps somewhat to the left
po "tically by our own standards, but certainly no more so than many
e tists who have never undergone Chinese imprisonment.
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 1 69
would tend to co-operate with the Communists even m Ms own
thought reform. The sophisticated prisoner would be not only skepti-
eal about the Communist self-definition and hence initially resistant
to change, but also more able to assess just how far the influence
agents would go in accomplishing their goals. Thus he might see
that his value to them was greater alive than dead and would resist
in spite of threats of death.
Lack of Prolonged Fint-IIand Contact with
CCP Operations
As has previously been pointed out (Chapter 2), the CCP was
very careful to train its soldiers to behave in an exemplary fashion
during the take-over of a city, town, or country area. If a pris-
oner-to-be witnessed only this phase of CCP operations and was
generally unsophisticated politically, he was likely to be convinced
that the Communists were only agrarian reformers who would gen-
uinely help China and should therefore be supported or at least not
opposed. On the other hand, if the prisoner-to-be witnessed CCP
methods of consolidating their power and their program of land re-
form, he came away with strong negative feelings toward the Com-
munists because of their brutality and their basic disregard for the
welfare of the common people if this welfare clashed with broader
organizational objectives (e.g., raising food production, industriali-
zation, communization of rural areas, etc.). Typically such subjects
became uncompromisingly hostile to anything and everything the
Communists did, including all aspects of the prison regimen. The
witnessing of a single act of brutality could almost “inoculate'* the
prisoner-to-be against being coercively persuaded, because no
amount of subsequent experience could ever make the Communists
a credible source of information for him.
Quality of CCP Personnel Encountered
Tlie degree to which a prisoner was influenceable depended in
large measure on his initial attitude toward imprisonment If his
arrest and subsequent investigation were handled by obviously
competent and confident political officials, he was more likely to be
frightened and subsequently susceptible to being unfrozen than
168
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
certainly increased the likelihood of being unfrozen; however, being
specifically susceptible to social guilt fed so well into Communist
accusations and into the general theme of reform that it must be
considered to be a more specifically relevant variable.
Lack of Commitment or Lack of Inner
D irectedness °
If the prisoner-to-be had not yet found a cause or a basic set of
goals and values to which to attach himself, or had not yet found a
group into which he could integrate himself, he was more likely to
be influenced in prison. Such a person was still searching for mean-
ing and for significant emotional relationships and was therefore
likely to have a weak sense of identity and to be prone to seeking
information from the outside concerning his identity.
On the level of basic personality organization a similar variable
was a basic tendency to want to relate to and comply with others,
especially if they were in a position of prestige or authority. Such a
tendency made it harder for a prisoner to dismiss the demands made
of him by the Chinese, and, of course, if he treated them as reason-
able in any degree, he became susceptible to further appeal or
pressure.
Lack of Political Sophistication
If the prisoner was unsophisticated about the realities of Com-
munist operations (as contrasted with lack of sophistication about
Communist ideology), he was more prone to influence. In other
words, knowledge or lack of knowledge about political ideologies
W ^-. eSS /\ eVan ! outcome of coercive persuasion than the
a i ty o c prisoner quickly to “size up” the situation, to make
accurate guesses about the intentions of the captors and about the
means they would be likely to use in fulfilling such intentions. For
!^V C :. r.“ nSOptoicaled Planer might be quite prepared to
P. , ! e m munist self-definition as agrarian reformers who
_ i r t . C .P a , 3 ~' var d country like China to achieve a high stand-
? CssenlialI y acceptable means (i.e., without excessive
m ’ ,e accepted the modernization of China as a goal he
l “» directed in the .erne of Rlesmau et aL, 1933.
Determinants of Belie/ end Attitude Chmge 17 I
would lose a strong support in his own struggle with the authorities
and would lose some sense of commitment to his cause.
For many of our cases this was not a major issue insofar as they
had not been in China long enough to form close attachments to
individual Chinese or their jobs did not call for local support The
attitudes they perceived in the population of course played some
role in structuring their own, but it did not have the same signifi-
cance when this population was essentially a mass of anonymous
others” without immediate emotional relevance to the person.
Type of Facilities Available for Detention
Some prisoners were detained indefinitely in their own home; some
were herded into completely inadequate prison facilities; some were
imprisoned in modem, well-run reform prisons. The facilities avail-
able usually were highly correlated with the presence or absence of
a number of other factors pertaining to the imprisonment experience
itself, which will be taken up in the next section. For the present,
suffice it to say that only those prisoners who found themselves in a
reasonably well-managed reform prison were at all likely to be
influenced.
Knotcledgc of the Chinese Language
Knowledge of Chinese proved to be important to the extent that
lengthy and intimate interaction with cellmates or interrogators was
important as an influencing force. The better the prisoner knew
Chinese, the more susceptible he was to many kinds of subtle pres-
sures like being humiliated, reviled, accused, etc. One prisoner re-
ported that he learned Chinese while in prison and that pressures on
Jiim grew much worse after he understood the language than they
ever were before (Ford, 1957). Some prisoners "forgot" their
Chinese as a way of protecting themselves from ovcrfnvoJvcment.
It is not surprising that this factor should be important, since so
much of the unfreezing pressure lay in the interpersonal communi-
cations between agent and target It is much harder to exacerbate an
identity crisis in a situation in which the interpersonal cues emitted
by the agent fail to be understood by the target than in a situation
170 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
the authorities he encountered were obviously incompetent. To come
to believe the Communist message required the prisoner to have
some confidence that they did indeed have a message. If his initial
encounter with the Communists proved them to be stupid and gul-
lible, the prisoner would be more likely to continue to discredit
anything they told him no matter how plausible or appealing.
The best example of stiffening resistance as a result of contact
with low-level authorities occurred in a small town where a medical
missionary was arrested by soldiers and charged with espionage on
the “evidence” that some staplers he had in his house were telegraph
keys and that his transformer was a radio transmitter. This person
concluded that the Communists were hopeless, and nothing he en-
countered in prison could change his mind about them.
Of course, the contact prior to and during arrest was by no means
the only important determinant Subsequent experiences in inter-
rogation and in the cell were probably more important However, it
often seemed to be the case that certain prisons in China, usually
the ones farthest away from Peiping, had poor-quality personnel in
all phases of their operation so that initial impressions were often
reinforced by subsequent events.
Attitudes of the Local Populace Toward the
Prisoner -lo-Be and the CCP
If the prisoner-to-be was arrested at a time when the local popu-
lace was negatively disposed toward him and positively disposed
toward the CCP, he was more likely to be influenced later than if
he felt that both he and the local populace had to hold the line
against CCP domination. For example, if a doctor or priest who was
very popular in his area was arrested at a time when the local
populace was still giving him support and comfort, he would resist
strongly in order to remain loyal to this group. If at a later time the
CCP forced the local population to abandon or repudiate such a
person publicly and convincingly (by a propaganda campaign
against him or by outright threats that continued contact with and
support of a "counter-revolutionary” or “foreign imperialist” would
lead to suspicion of similar tendencies in the Chinese involved), he
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change l73
past behavior and attitudes, and made a sincere attempt to reform
himself. He did not indicate what the charges against the prisoner
were or indicate what he was to confess to; rather he created an
atmosphere which was somewhat therapeutic in suggesting that the
prisoner examine his own conscience and leam to sec his crimes for
himself. At the same time he would indicate that the evidence
against the prisoner was quite clear-cut and that there was ab-
solutely no doubt of his guilt. Hence the opportunity of reform was
really leniency on the government’s part
If the prison was not well run, the judge or interrogator was likely
to accuse the prisoner harshly, make dire tlireats concerning the
consequences of not confessing, and generally underplay the leni-
ency and reform aspects of imprisonment. In the accusation he was
likely to demand that the prisoner confess to being a spy or saboteur
without, however, giving any dues as to what he had in mind by
way of the alleged behavior engaged in by the prisoner.
The lenient approach, emphasizing self-analysis and reform, had
its biggest impact when the prisoner later became aware tliat other
prisoners really accepted this premise, worked hard at reforming
themselves (confessing and dianging their attitudes), and were
indeed rewarded by the authorities and given shorter sentences. One
of our subjects stated that it was quite a shock to him to discover
that this lenient policy really meant what it said, that the govern-
ment really was serious about rehabilitating and reforming people.
He had not believed the judge upon initial contact, but once he
saw' the system in operation he remembered very' vividly the atti-
tude that the judge had taken toward him. Of course, if the prison
was not well run there was likely to be among the prisoners a
preponderance of sheer opportunists or autrightly hostile (toward
the CPP) types, in which case the whole concept of leniency' be-
came merely an academic matter.
One other aspect of the initial contact with prison authorities
which was important was the type of threat they employed and the
degree to which they were convincing in employing it. In particular,
if the threat of permanent imprisonment was presented in a con-
vincing maimer, e.g, if the subject came to believe that there really
was no way out of prison except through confession and reform, and
172 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
in which the target is highly sensitive to all aspects of the behavior
of others around him. The insertion of a translator destroys much of
the immediate potency of the interpersonal situation because of the
untranslatability of the feelings which are generated in the inter-
action among cellmates and the awkwardness and loss of time
involved.
Youth
Age seemed to become a factor in several ways. On the one hand,
it was the younger person who was more likely to lack commitment
and political sophistication. On the other hand, the very old person
was likely to command respect from his Chinese jailers in spite of
Communist efforts to subvert this cultural tradition, and hence have
less pressure put upon him to confess or change his attitudes. It is
also probably true as a general principle that, other things being
equal, the younger the person the more inlluenceable he is. With
as small a sample of cases as we have, we certainly cannot make
any sweeping statements about age, but we can note our impression
that the very old prisoners seemed least likely to confess or to
change their attitudes, prisoners of middle age (40-55) sometimes
made confessions but seldom exhibited attitude change, while
younger prisoners (25-35) showed the most of both confession and
attitude change. It should, of course, be underlined that age by
itself means nothing. We need to be able to identify what psycho-
logical or experiential factors contributed to the fact that the
younger prisoner was more likely to change his attitudes.
VARIABLES PERTAINING TO THE PRISON
EXPERIENCE ITSELF
Initial Contact with Judge or Interrogator
Though it was not always apparent to the prisoner at the time,
the nature of the initial contact with a judge or interrogator played a
key role in determining certain of his attitudes later. In particular,
U ?? T*® P rcsenlation of the Chinese Government’s “lenient policy”
which had this impact. If the prison was well run, the judge was
e y to indicate to the prisoner that the government was very
lenient with anyone who confessed sincerely, saw the error of his
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 175
management, the degree to which a particular prison routine be-
came a source of stress to the individual varied markedly with his
past history, his attitudes toward his body, and so on. For one
prisoner the lack of opportunity to clean up properly was a major
torture; for another it was a minor annoyance. For some prisoners
the toilet restrictions which sometimes Jed to incontinence were a
tremendous humiliation; others barely cared about having to urinate
or defecate into their own clothes when not permitted to go to tho
toilet. For almost every one of the factors mentioned in Chapter 4,
we could cite some prisoners who minded very much and others who
barely minded at all
The question then arises: Was the rather stressful prison regimen
irrelevant to the occurrence o£ influence, or were there ovcr-all
effects that can be identified? It is our hypolhes.s that the oocr-ol
effect of the prison regimen svas to weaken many o the nmris
upon which a prisoner might ordinarily rely tn his Wy»(“
Table 3 in Chapter A). To the extent that this regunen wa .physi-
cally stressful, it weakened the prisoner phys.ealiy and generally
lowered his ability to cope with whatever new s ier, y,
duccd. To the extent that the regimen deprived the ‘ P*°
normal dally routine and, in fact, forced him rnto beta™* winch
ho might have thought very untypical of himself (such *8
himself, or being unclean, or eating unpalatable . >• ^ ,
mined his self-Fmage or sense of identity. Tc .the AaMhe
prison regunen forbade contacts with persorn outode
accustomed-to information sources, it undermined rognlu Pl£
lor the prisoner’s beliefs and attitudes To ^ crieatthatjhe prB ^
regimen enforced certam patterns 0 e prisoner’s sense of
ing him dependent f« r c« was to make the
pr^
, q ot° tSMingUmeTlrion ,o his problems. The recognition
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
that the Chinese really were prepared to bold on to him for twenty,
thirty, or more years, be became more prone to being influenced. To
achieve such a belief in the prisoner it seemed that a soft approach
which stimulated fear was far more effective than a harsh accusing
approach which stimulated hostility. Perhaps the crucial variable
was whether the prisoner perceived his judge or interrogator to be
an essentially rational person who was rationally pursuing certain
goals (to obtain a confession, for example) or a highly emotional,
capricious person whose very capriciousness might raise doubts in
t e prisoners mind concerning the seriousness nnd permanence of
hrs condition. In the former case it was probably much more dif-
ficult for the prisoner to tolerate physical stresses (such as being
res aine y handcuffs and chains) than in the latter case, because
in the latter case the prisoner could convince himself that it was the
capr, Clous sadism of the interrogator that resulted in his pain,
, , l , he former case it was somehow his own failure to pro-
min Tl „ interrogator wanted which resulted in the physical
nnor'ati ,,. 6 - ™ a lnterro gator would point out that only unco-
tint tlJv pns “j ers wcre ever given chains and cuffs to wear, and
that it,,/ W ° U COmc soon as any evidence was forthcoming
bltr^T" W “ reaU y in "settling his ease.”
rotator nc ii 00 / * n ® uence model, the initial contact with the inter-
toward conf ^ • 6 l ° * ee * in S s which could operate as forces either
pothesis is thaTtf ° r a ® ainst !t in tllc unfreezing stage. Our hy-
effective in in.l • 6 S eneraP y rational, soft, lenient approach was
desire to nl U(an g f ear of permanent imprisonment and perhaps
forces tmL!T e h r a “ lh ° ritie b both of which can he thought of as
hostile annm CSSai ®’ on die other hand, the harsh emotional,
operated^ , f WaS c ^ ective in inducing counter-hostility which
operated as a force against confessing.
rac DeMftelfag Frls0 „ Regimen
effects rc S im 1 on needs to be mentioned only briefly because its
Pihouers oietd f 1 y ^ *° P*oner, and different
'he ones thiol, as P e . cts of this regimen as
Deinc the on« ,„i.. t — , v aspects or tins regur
influenced. For exam ,° r . ( them hei ghtened the probability of being
example, if we consider the problems of bodily need
Determinants 0 f Belief and Attitude Change 177
Grange, (Ih: actual facilitation of change, and the reward of cWes
accomplished were all carried out primarily in tie contest of die
personal relationships existing between cellmates.
Most prisoners experienced both solitary confinement and con-
T « r in groups raging in size from two to twenty or more.
ns often been assumed that the explanation of a prisoner’s
weakening was to be found in the periods of isolation and solitary
confinement he suffered.* Our data support the opposite conclu-
sion that the major stress for prisoners was to survive psycho-
logically in a group cell in which the prisoners were committed
to reforming themselves and particularly their most backward
member.
Not all group cells functioned as explicit influence agents. Prisons
varied in the degree to which they utilized group cells for this pur-
pose and in the sophistication with which they employed them.
At one extreme we found the case exemplified by one of the
Shanghai prisons in which the prisoner was put into a cell contain-
ing one other prisoner according to the criterion of whether the two
men knew each other or not. If they did not, they were allowed to
share a cell. The prison regulations explicitly forbade any com-
munication between the prisoners and enforced these by clandestine
spying on the prisoners followed by severe punishment if any cell-
mates were caught talking with each other. The authorities used
this strategy to make each prisoner feel like a nonentity, a number,
a case which was to be settled solely between him and his in-
terrogator. This system failed in that prisoners, in spite of regula-
tions, would start to talk to each other and in many cases discover
that they shared strong feelings of hostility toward the authorities
which gave them a common bond that markedly strengthened their
capacity to resist. In this same prison Western prisoners were moved
* The impact of long periods of solitary confinement varied markedly with the
personality of the prisoner and the location of this experience in the broader set
of experiences. For example, priests who were used to leadme a solitary ate
seemed to prefer solitary confinement to other forms of cell life. Similarly, in-
dividuals who had been subjected to very severe and Wunude : rpxwpKcea
pressure were much relieved to be placed in sohtaiy confinement (* !, otign, , oi
course, if the authorities antidpated this reaction they did not provide uie op-
portunity for this kind of relief).
176 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
of needing to make a certain kind of confession as the solution might
have come much later; but once the recognition came there were
strong motives available to make the prisoner go through with it
The retrospective perception of the prison environment and its
regimen of course varied with the degree to which the prisoner
was influenced. We have pointed out previously that influence could
be thought of primarily as a shift in the frame of reference for
evaluation. The perceptions of the prison experience illustrate this
shift. Generally speaking, those prisoners who were most influenced
were most likely to state later that prison life was really quite
comfortable, and, in particular, to underline how much better life
was in prison under the Communists than it would have been under
the KMT. Where we would tend to compare the prison regimen
with life outside of prison or with American prisons, the influenced
subject, operating from the premise that he was guilty and there-
fore had to be imprisoned in China, judged the imprisonment in
terms of the Chinese standard. He considered what might have
happened to him if the Communists had not introduced the concept
of reform and had not provided adequate food, clothing, and heat
in their prisons. In other words, in terms of an old Chinese standard,
the prison was in fact well run and well equipped.
The subjects found to have been influenced to a greater degree
were for the most part incarcerated in prisons in or near Peiping.
It was apparently true that these prisons were better equipped and
better run than those in other cities or rural areas. The physically
more comfortable regimen in these prisons supports our conclu-
sion that physical stresses alone were not a crucial variable in
determining the amount of influence. Many of the prisoners who
resisted most were also in the most physically grueling situations.
Many prisoners who were influenced most were physically pressed
very little.
“Struggle’ Meetings in Group Cells
One of the most provocative hypotheses which our study sug-
gests is that a period of being “struggled” by cellmates in a group
cell was a necessary condition of being influenced to confess and
change attitudes. In other words, the induction of a motive to
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 179
twenty-four-hour day, and “struggle” sometimes lasted for months.®
The effect of these experiences on the prisoner can be inferred
from two kinds of data: the influenced prisoners themselves at-
tribute much of the cause of their change to their group cell ex-
periences; the uninfluenced prisoners usually report that of all the
stresses they ever had to bear the group cell was the worst, or they
report that they were never subjected to any struggle meetings in a
group cell of more reformed prisoners.
It is difficult to determine whether the group cell and its ac-
tivities were a unique kind of influence, or whether such group cell
activities always accompanied a prison regimen which was in toto
dedicated to reform. We found that those prisons which did not
seem to be either very qualified for or interested in reform tended
not to utilize this type of group cell; whereas those prisons, par-
ticularly the one in Peiping, which were heavily committed to
successfully reforming their inmates and seemed to be staite w
more skilled personnel, always utilized group cells and struggle
meetings. We do not know whether the use of such a group
in a setting less committed to reform would still have a Sl ™'
effects, or whether it was necessary that allot the aspects oft he
prison milieu and daily regimen reinforce each other to be suae
ful in influencing inmates. Our guess is that a proper / . (q
group is sufficient to produce influence but it may ® , ot
organize such a group if the rest of the prison legmen does not
support it.
We have previously mentioned the "f, ^ton The
tact between the prisoner and the ju g a j] y the con-
nature of the continuing contact between > ^ sometimes
text of repeated and prolonged interroga 2 further
went on for the entire period of impnsonme ^ ways:
variable of importance. Such contact was ; t reaffirmed
I. II the interrogator was skilled and convincing.
e. *nd ^freezing
eroup cell in unfreezing, c
® The role of the
178 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
several times, often into cells containing other “reactionary’' or
resistive prisoners; and each successive experience with cellmates
reinforced their will to resist the Communists because of the in-
creasing sympathy which learning of each other’s cases seemed to
generate.
At the other extreme, in the Peiping prisons the Western prisoner
was usually put deliberately in a cell with several Chinese prisoners
who were on the way to reforming themselves (who had already
1 made confessions or were working on them). In these cells the
regulations sanctioned and, in fact, demanded communication be-
tween cellmates. Specifically, they were to "help” their one re-
calcitrant member see the error of his ways, get him to admit his
guilt, and help him to construct his confession. Usually the cell had
a leader and it was made known through his contact with the au-
thorities that the progress of the entire cell was contingent on the
performance of their least-reformed members.
It is not unlikely that the prisoner’s cellmates believed in his
guilt, in that they believed that the government did not arrest or
manacle (if he was manacled) innocent people. From their point
of view, therefore, the prisoner’s refusal to acknowledge his guilt
must have been seen as genuine perversity and have represented
not only a great threat (that they would all be held back), but also
a challenge to their own skill in reforming others.® The Peiping
prisoners accounts detail vividly the accusation, browbeating, hu-
miliation, rcvilcmcnt, etc., which characterized the frequent "strug-
gle meetings as well as the daily routine in the cell. Apparently
it was the intensity and continuity of these pressures that was par-
ticularly difficult to handle. There was no escape during the entire
I* imprisonment, one of our Shanghai cases was pat into
n “ d ? the ^rience very different: one, tfie other
fwn intellectually and professionally far inferior to the priest; and.
L^to * uch a . after a year or more of successfully resisting and
Ues Wlth ^ hcT Prison who were also resisting made the
^emotional impart. What happened in cases like this *as
which” thr a, P rf j on er began actively to try to undo the effects
M 1 S° riU 7 *I«w the other cellmate, that they WOT
tb™ ”c^ltL"d <h' government had iwf
iohtary wm remlting In their being relumed to
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change jgi
of a Jong and detailed autobiography often led to a genuine soul-
scarchmg, particularly if the inteirogator guided the prisoner’s
IMntang along the lines most likely to reveal the inadequacies of
. or °f the soda) system in which he had spent his life. Such
inquiries into the past were engage d in with equal force by the
members of the group cell; but the interrogator could follow a
thread through carefully and sympathetically, as would a therapist,
whereas the group was more likely to aim at a quick destruction of
resistance. If the prisoner formed a close attachment to a cellmate,
as often happened as a result of “struggle,” such an individual
would become even closer to the prisoner than the interrogator
had, and would help him to see his past in a new perspective toward
the aim of getting him to make his confession.
In summary, interrogation along with cellmate pressure was an
important variable insofar as it could operate to convince the pris-
oner of the hopelessness of his situation and could provide the
basis of an emotional relationship between prisoner and inter-
rogator. The development of such a relationship might be facilitated
because of the prisoner's total dependence on the interrogator, and
could then be used as a lever for influence. It was not possible
to determine very accurately what skills on the part of an inter-
rogator worked toward this aim, except that calm, rational, non-
hostile approaches always seemed to work better than excited,
emotional, hostile ones.
The Vse of Rewards and Punishments
The use of rewards and punishments cuts across all the other
conditions which have been discussed. In a well-run reform prison,
the authorities made adequate diagnoses of what would constitute
significant rewards and punishments for a prisoner (or used trial
and error to determine it), and, insofar as possible, organized the
prison in such a manner as to maximize the punishment for not
confessing or changing attitudes while maximizing the rewards for
confession and change. If the whole prison regimen was organized
in this fashion, if the prisoner could get no reward except by co-
operation, this total inflexibility constituted a great P ress ^ on Ill f x
The effectiveness of reward or punishment depended on tho
180
Structure, Effects, and Determinants
the prisoners belief that the only way to get out of prison or to
reduce discomfort or pain was to make some kind of confession.
2. If the prisoner’s cellmates were culturally and intellectually
very different from the prisoner himself, it was the interrogator
who often became a model for the prisoner to identify with and
hence the agent of influence. We heard this from our subjects most
often in the following form. They had an increasing need to talk to
someone without feeling that they were merely playing a role; this
someone had to be similar to themselves and share some common
interests with them; and in the prison group, it was the interrogator
who was most likely to fulfill the qualifications for a subject who
was fairly highly educated. If the interrogator encouraged such a
relationship by being matter-of-fact, sincere, logical, and calm, he
could gain the confidence of the prisoner and build a relation-
ship which then could become a lever for exerting influence. 0
3. The interrogator was one of the direct agents of pain and
pressure, a person who threatened, exhorted, questioned, tortured,
pleaded, rewarded, punished, and did all the other things usually
described in accounts of sophisticated interrogation. One major
difference between him and the classical interrogator in military
affairs was that he was not interested in getting the prisoner to
divulge specific military information, but rather was interested in
getting the prisoner to confess, which led to long discussions of the
past history of the subject and a detailed analysis of all his ac-
tivities. Because of the interrogator’s role as the controller of the
prisoner s ultimate as well as daily fate, strong feelings toward and
about him were generated and such feelings could sometimes be
used by him to exert influence.
Interrogation facilitated unfreezing in that it focused the prison-
ers attention on his own past activities and attitudes, and maximized
the likelihood of his finding something in his past which provoked
guilt and hence induced a motive to change. The repeated writing
Actually such relationships developed only in the few Instances In which
2nH| *e Pnsoner and the personality of the interrogator comply
^,^ lhCT -i An in * ereslin R question about which we can only conjecture
with the interrogator was more likely to be
fn rehtionship, while a relationship with a cellmate was more Ukcly
to be a sibling or a peer-group relationship.
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 181
of a long and detailed autobiography often led to a genuine soul-
searching, particularly if the interrogator guided the prisoner’s
thinking along the lines most likely to reveal the inadequacies of
his past or of the social system in which he had spent his life. Such
inquiries into the past were engaged in with equal force by the
members of the group cell; but the interrogator could follow a
tliread through carefully and sympathetically, as would a therapist,
whereas the group was more likely to aim at a quick destruction of
resistance. If the prisoner formed a close attachment to a cellmate,
as often happened as a result of “struggle," such an individual
would become even closer to the prisoner than the interrogator
had, and would help him to see his past in a new perspective toward
the aim of getting him to make his confession.
In summary, interrogation along with cellmate pressure was an
important variable insofar as it could operate to convince e pris-
oner of the hopelessness of his situation and could provi e
basis of an emotional relationship between prisoner and inter-
rogator. The development of such a relationship might
because of the prisoner’s total dependence on the in err*V »
could then be used as a lever for influence. It MS not pori b
to detemrine very accurately what skills on the part of an mter
rogator worked toward this aim MW than excited,
hostile approaches always seemed to v
emotional, hostile ones.
The Use of Regards and Punishments
The use of rewards and punishments
conditions which have been discuss - would constitute
the authorities made adequate diagnos . ^ ^ med trial
significant rewards and pums jn® n , possible, organized the
and error to determine it), and, ^ punishment for not
prison in such a manner as to the reward s for
confessing or changing attitudes sv regimen was organized
confession and change. If the ? reward except by co-
in this fashion, if the prisoner couM pressurc on W n,
operation, this total or punis hment depended on the
The effectiveness of rewara o F
180
Structure, Efiects, and Determinants
the prisoner’s belief that the only way to get out of prison or o
reduce discomfort or pain was to make some kind of confession.
2. If the prisoner’s cellmates were culturally and intellectually
very different from the prisoner himself, it was the interrogator
who often became a model for the prisoner to identify with an
hence the agent of influence. We heard this from our subjects most
often in the following form. They had an increasing need to talk to
someone without feeling that they were merely playing a role; t is
someone had to be similar to themselves and share some common
interests with them; and in the prison group, it was the interrogator
who was most likely to fulfill the qualifications for a subject who
was fairly highly educated. If the interrogator encouraged such a
relationship by being matter-of-fact, sincere, logical, and calm, e
could gain the confidence of the prisoner and build a relation-
ship which then could become a lever for exerting influence.
3. The interrogator was one of the direct agents of pain an
pressure, a person who threatened, exhorted, questioned, torture ,
pleaded, rewarded, punished, and did all the other things usually
described in accounts of sophisticated interrogation. One major
difference between him and the classical interrogator in military
affairs was that he was not interested in getting the prisoner to
divulge specific military information, but rather was interested m
getting the prisoner to confess, which led to long discussions of the
past history of the subject and a detailed analysis of all his ac-
tivities. Because of the interrogator’s role as the controller of ®
prisoners ultimate as well as daily fate, strong feelings toward an
about him were generated and such feelings could sometimes be
used by him to exert influence.
Interrogation facilitated unfreezing in that it focused the prison-
er s attention on his own past activities and attitudes, and maximized
the likelihood of his finding something in his past which provoke
guilt and hence induced a motive to change. The repeated writing
Iho Telation,hi P s developed only in the few instances in"*"*
inSnSF* prisoncr 31,(1 die personality of the interrogator
h^*rtK h »? h * r i An in l terestin ? question about which we can only conjertor
LhiSfu ?. rek u 0nshI ? interrogator was more likely to be »
tott h ,w re 0mhip ' 3 relationship With a cellmate was more likely
to be a «blmg or a peer-group relationship.
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 1S3
that he was strongly reactionary after all, since he failed to ap-
preciate what the Chinese people were doing for him (a brand new
crime to be added to the list of old ones), and therefore deserved
to be treated more harshly than ever.
l - "j num ^ er of subjects have stated that the authorities also used
Kindness and specific rewards as a manipulative device to induce
motivation to change, tvhether an initially co-operative response
had been made by the prisoner or not. It is a general principle of
learning that you cannot teach a person to mate a new response by
the method of reward unless that response occurs for the first time
spontaneously. It is a question, therefore, whether such alleged
manipulation, or "calculated leniency” as Lifton (lQ56h) calls it,
actually operated to show the prisoner what life could be lilce if
he made certain hinds of responses; whether the authorities were
using such a manipulation without an adequate understanding of
what they were doing; or whether co-operative responses were in
fact sensed by the authorities prior to their giving the rewards, but
the prisoners themselves do not remember it or report the sequence
inaccurately. It is quite possible that the first alternative, to show
the prisoner a way out, is the rationale underlying this use of re-
ward, but it should he remembered that such a stratagem does not
show the prisoner what he is to do. To be told that a bright future
awaits you if you do the right thing, but not to be given further
clues os to what constitutes the right thing, can only lead to further
frustration. And we must not underestimate die degree to which
authorities and cellmates alike insisted on sincere and honest con-
fessions, something which the prisoner at first failed completely to
comprehend. Most prisoners knew that a false confession would
lead to more punishment than reward, hence were motivated toward
somehow finding out what was really wanted of them. Calculated
leniency could not help them to find the answer. But reward which
followed swiftly some cognitive step in the right direction (some
beginning of understanding of what the "people's standpoint" was)
would strongly help to keep the person on the path that would lead
to the ultimate answer.
As a final point, it should be mentioned that the Indiscriminate
use of reward and punishment is certainly a powerful way to dis-
jg2 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
rapidity with which it was administered following some response
by a prisoner that could be diagnosed as either an attempt to co-
operate or an attempt to resist. It is a well-known principle of learn-
ing that the efficacy of reward and punishment decreases as the
time lag between the response and the administration of reward .or
punishment increases. The use by the authorities of effective in-
formation-gathering channels, and the use of cellmates as surrogates
for the authorities, insured a minimum time lag in this sense. For
example, a prisoner living in the midst of several others who were
“struggling” him was subjected to constant evaluation and the other
prisoners were highly sensitized to detect any changes in attitude
in him. If he began to see a solution, e.g., to see what he was to con-
fess to and how to do it, this usually manifested itself in a slight
change of behavior, and such a slight change was immediately re-
warded by the cellmates by a lightening of pressure on him and
was followed by strong encouragement and guidance as to how
he should proceed.
The moment such a change in attitude was communicated to the
interrogator (usually through the cell leader), a variety of physical
pressures on the prisoner were lifted (e.g., chains and manacles
might have been removed). The moment there was a change in the
other direction, from a co-operative attitude to one of stiffening
resistance, such physical pressures were intensified and the cell*
mates intensified their efforts to get the prisoner to change once
again.
It is unlikely that the whole system operated with as much
effectiveness as has been depicted, but one senses that the au-
thorities were attempting to use rewards and punishments in the
manner described above, and when they succeeded they were build-
ing into the prison regimen strong forces toward producing changes
in the prisoner. Failure of adequate diagnosis by given prisoners o
what were significant rewards and punishments provided some o
the tragi-comic incidents of imprisonment. This could happen when
the prisoner was offered some privilege as a reward, yet failed com-
pletely to understand it as a reward (e.g., some Chinese delicacy
which he still found unpalatable); his failure to react favorably
then often led to the interpretation on the part of the authorities
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change JS5
to accept the Communist point of view at anything more than a
superficial level, depended on the manner in which it was integrated
into the rest of the prison routine and on the individual prisoners
self-image and level of sophistication.
A prisoner who had already committed himself to co-operating
with the authorities (by working on his confession or by genuinely
trying to appreciate the CCP position) was likely to seek, in the
written material handed out for study, justifications for the course
of action upon which he had embarked. On the other hand, those
prisoners who had resisted confession extraction or who had been
exposed to somewhat crude and ineffective procedures treated the
study ns simply another regulation to wluch only lip service had to
be given. Thus the timing of study was important in terms of the
psychological state of the prisoner.
Where the timing was poor, it seemed primarily to be an artifact
of generally unsophisticated methods of influencing the prisoners.
The same personnel who were insensitive to the problems of how
best to get confessions out of resistant prisoners were the ones who
introduced study materials at arbitrarily chosen times, with a crude
set of instructions, and without any clear notion of how they should
really be used in aiding the reform process. An excellent example
Is given in the account of his imprisonment by a Clunese bishop
(Huang, 1951). He describes how study materials were passed out
by prison personnel who themselves did not understand them fully.
When ideological questions arose in discussion which were not
covered in the distributed materials. Bishop Huang would be asked
to give his opinions on them because he could understand the
ideology better in spite of his rejection of it. Thus he ended up in
the incongruous position of “helping" his cellmates with their study
though no one really took it seriously. In other words, if the prison
was not W’cll equipped for reform and the authorities did not
basically care about reform, they Introduced tire study materials in
much the same way as they might any set of routine instructions
from higher authorities.
The relationship between the success of the study program and
the prisoner's self-image and level of sophistication can he stated
in the following manner. If the prisoner had an image of hunselt
184 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
org anize an individual If one wanted to “break’ an individual in the
sense of the popular concept of brainwashing, this could ca-
tainly be an effective way to do it But we cannot underline strong >
enough that this was not the Communists’ aim in a reform prison-
The}' had a clear conception of what constituted a crime, a c
image of how the criminal should behave in making his coa es-
sion and reforming himself, and a clear goal of a reformed in ivi “
who had adopted the people’s standpoint At no^point in ^
process would there be room for simply “breaking the person.
Rather, the unfreezing phase, the weakening or destruction o SU P^
ports to certain attitudes and responses, operated (in e a
least) to produce changes in a fully intact individual, and t e ne\
behavior and attitudes had to be built squarely on the foundation o
old attitudes and behavior (but seen from a different perspective J.
Our conclusion is, therefore, that the Communists did not u z®
the administration of rewards and punishments simply as a mampu
lative device to break people, but had a rational program P urU ~L-
ing those responses which they felt signaled a lack of willingness
on the part of the prisoner to reform himself and rewarding t ose
responses which they felt signaled an attitude of willingness 0
reform himself.
Indoctrination: Study of the Communist Foint
of View
In the well-organized reform prison the prisoners were expecte
to spend a considerable amount of time on the study ( hsueh
of materials which were distributed by the authorities. The cor
reel manner of conducting study was for each of the group n5e ®
hers to read the material and then, in group discussion, to
snd rationalize the major conclusions of the material, as we
to indicate how the ideas in the material applied to his own cas
(see Table 5 in Chapter 4 and Appendix 2). .
’The success of such study, in the sense of influencing the prison
„ were exceedingly proud of their civilized and
problem of prison management and it would only be the ^
Li... bad not assimilated the new Communist concepts who viouM_ X „
“ raethods of torture and attempt to extract a confession at
a3 Y Pnce. r
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 187
shift in attitudes, \ve can isolate a number of variables that seemed
to be related to the maintenance of such attitude shifts. Our in-
fluence model indicated that for attitude shifts to maintain them-
selves the new equilibrium had to be re-frozen; that is, the new at-
titudes had to become integrated into other aspects of the per-
sonality and into ongoing social relationships in which they would
receive support. If the repatriates attitude shifts could be char-
acterized as having been refrozen while he was still in prison,
he could maintain such shifts so long as no new unfreezing or chang-
ing process was initiated. If they were not refrozen, the post-im-
prisonment experiences could operate to refreeze them or to undo
them quickly by not supporting them. In isolating variables, then,
we must seek those experiences following repatriation that would
operate either as further supports for the new attitudes or as under-
miners of such attitudes.
Initial Contact with Ileprescntatices of the
Non-Communist World
It is difficult to determine what were the crucial aspects of the
initial contact between the repatriate and representatives of the
government, mission, or other agency who met him and cared for
him during the first few days of freedom; but almost all of our
cases indicated that this initial contact was somehow very important
One key aspect seemed to be the degree to which predictions
made by the Communists in prison were confirmed or disco nfirmed
in these early contacts. If the Communists told a prisoner that the
press would sensationalize his new attitudes, that he would be
treated as a sick “brainwashed” person, that people would reject
him, and that the American Government would treat him as a
security risk and put him under surveillance, and any or all of these
things actually happened, it would, of course, tend to lend further
support to the new attitudes and fix them more firmly. Particular y
crucial in this connection were the contacts with members of e
United States Government. A number of the repatriates indicated
to us their resentment of what they believed to be “planted agents
of the FBI or some other government agency whose job, they telf,
was surreptitiously to spy on them. Since one of the key ensions
18G Structure, Effects, and Determinants
which allowed him to participate freely in the study program (either
because he felt he would not be influenced, or because he ielt mat
he could genuinely learn something about the Communist pom o
view), and if the prisoner was unsophisticated about the relation-
ship between political realities and political theories, he was )
to be influenced. If his self-image would not allow him to ecome
involved, even at the level of superficial compliance, or he was
sophisticated enough to know that any level of involvement was
dangerous, he was likely not to be influenced.
Many prisoners felt that they could not possibly participate in
study activities because it would be sacrilege or blasphemy even
to repeat certain Communist principles in a public situation U- e **
in front of other cellmates); others felt that the material P rese P*
was obvious nonsense in terms of what they knew to be the rea lties
of Communist politics. If a prisoner could be appealed to to
ticipate, (e.g., by being asked at least to consider the other side o
the story, or because non-participation might brand him as stup*
or uneducated, or because such participation was a much-nee
relief from the boredom of the daily prison routine, etc.), he cou
often be convinced of the validity of the Communist standard 0
evaluation, at least in some areas, and thereby have his attitu cs
changed indirectly.
The use of a small discussion group for study tended to heighten
involvement, encouraged the acceptance of membership roles, fa ”
tated understanding by heightening mutual identification, nn
facilitated the overcoming of resistance because the resister coul e
unanimously condemned and criticized. Specific study techm<j ueS
such as self-analysis, criticism (mutual and self), airing of grievances,
etc., all tended to involve the person and heightened his sense o
participation.
VARIABLES PERTAINING TO POST-IMPRISONMENT
EXPERIENCES
This group of variables is somewhat more difficult to discuss be
cause the action of any given variable depended very much on
the^ degree to which the repatriate had been influenced. If
limit the discussion to those prisoners who showed a significan
IBS
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change
Ongoing Relationships with Significant Others
As has previously been argued, a persons key support of at-
titudes pertaining to self or the sense of identity comes from his
emotional relationships with “significant others.” It is the informa-
tional cues that these significant others provide which serve to re-
inforce or destroy identity, and which therefore are the crucial
determinants of attitude and identity change (Schein, 1960). A
repatriate could only maintain his new attitudes if he could embed
them successfully in a significant emotional relationship, f.e., find
some person with whom he was very close and who would support
the new attitudes in the sense of accepting them and agreeing with
them. If the repatriate could find no one who would fulfill this role,
and if, in fact, the significant people in his life all failed to confirm
the new identity and did not accept and agree with the new at-
titudes, he would again be influenced toward some new integration
of beliefs and attitudes.
In our follow-up studies we have found instances of both types.
Some repatriates found very secure emotional relationships which
supported the attitudes learned in prison— these cases have main-
tained most of their new attitudes and have integrated them into
their daily existence in this country. Other repatriates found them-
selves in emotional relationships which did not support the attitudes
learned in prison — these cases have abandoned their new attitudes
and have again found new integrations, or are still seeking them.
Finally, a few cases have found themselves in the situation of hav-
ing available both kinds of such relationships and have vacillated
between commitment to some who would support the attitudes
learned in prison and commitment to others who would demand the
abandonment of such attitudes.
Situational Factor*
A number of additional variables should be mentioned which
derive their main importance from the fact that they seem to haw
further confirmed what the Communists had predicted, and that
they determined the kinds of new emotional relationships that
would be facilitated and made probable.
188 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
of their new attitude was increased sympathy for the 9™“®
Government and decreased sympathy for the United States Govern-
ment (not the American people), such experiences seemed
strengthen anti-government attitudes.
Contacts with people who knew something about Connnums
China, even if they did not really understand the nature of thoug
reform, seemed to elicit less hostility from the repatriates tnan
encounters with uninformed members of the press or interes e o
lookers who seemingly did not understand anything 0 " a ,
prisoners had experienced. One of the strongest componen
the repatriate’s new attitudes was the feeling that he had acquir
a genuine understanding of what were China’s basic problems an
what the CCP was trying to do about them. He felt that he new
perfectly well that the CCP operations were not perfect, u
was evaluating their efforts in terms of the KMT’s ineffectivenes
and in terms of the degree of need for reform which he perceive
With this understanding went the feeling that the West had con
spicuously failed in its attempts to understand what the CCP was
trying to do and had created a genuine information vacuum a u
Communist China. Given this feeling on the part of the repatna c,
it is not difficult to sec how a reporter trying to learn more or a
bystander asking innocent questions could confirm precisely "
the repatriate bad come to believe — namely that there ' vas
understanding on the part of Westerners of what was going. on
China, especially of events such as those which he had experien
himself. And it became very easy for him to attribute this ignorance
to the policies of the American government and thereby confirm or
liimself his attitudes toward it.
Determinants of Belief and Attitude Change 191
relatives who lived in a certain kind of surroundings, or being asked
to participate in political activities, etc.
Becoming involved in activities that have political significance
was particularly important in that it elicited behavioral commit-
ment which would require further justification and further align-
ment of attitudes with behavior. The pro-Communist repatriate
who was asked to speak to leftist groups about his experiences had
his attitudes reinforced just as much by this activity as did the
strongly anti-Communist repatriate who was asked to speak to antl-
Communist groups. In turn, such activities made available ranges
of people with whom the repatriate could form relationships and
who would support whatever attitudes he brought from prison.
The main point is that we cannot assume that mere re-entry into
our society will guarantee a discarding of anti-American and pro-
Communist attitudes, nor can we assume that individuals who do
not drop such attitudes now constitute a hard corps of Communists
ready to destroy democratic society. Rather the evidence from
the very small number of cases for whom such attitude changes
were significant points clearly to a complex embedding of the new
attitudes in the ongoing personality and social relationships of the
person concerned, and the new integration seems to liave as many
different basic features as there were different personalities and
different sets of experiences involved.
290 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
For example, the ongoing foreign policy of the United States vis-
i-vis China was watched closely by most of the repatriates tor
evidence of the truth or falsity of Communist claims concerning our
imperialistic and aggressive intentions and our policy of remain-
ing ignorant of Chinese mainland affairs. To the extent that they
perceived in this policy a confirmation of CCP claims, it of course
confirmed and strengthened their new attitudes. Similarly, the
repatriates might infer from their direct contact with our economic
system (via their own efforts to find suitable jobs and places to
live) whether Communist claims about this economic system are
supportable or not. Obviously the conclusion drawn by any given
repatriate would here be a function of an immense number of es-
sentially fortuitous factors.
The nature of the contact which the repatriate had with differ-
ent strata of American society was also a significant situational
factor. There is some evidence to support the conclusion that con-
tact with working-class members of this society operated to discon*
firm the repatriate’s new attitudes while contact with upper middle-
class members or members of underprivileged groups served to
confirm them. To the extent that members of the working class
(who “earn” their position by their direct contribution, rather than
by family origin, according to Communist doctrine) became a sig-
nificant reference group for the repatriate, the discovery by him ot
their strong support of American traditions and their lack of support
for Chinese Communist methods of control and organization b®"
came a strong disconfirming force for the new attitudes. On the
other hand, seeing social injustice at first hand by having primary
contact with members of society whose contribution was seen to
be questionable by the repatriate (the rich businessman) or who
were the failures and rejects of society (the slum-dwellers) would,
of course, reinforce Communist attitudes concerning social class
and the social ills which capitalistic economic organization allegedly
breeds. To a large extent the kind of contact the repatriate had was
a function of his decisions as to where to go and what to do, bu
for some of them, fortuitous factors entered, such as having to go
to a hospital for prolonged treatment of TB, having friends an
ig 2 Structure, Effects, and Determinants
1. The prisoner is prone to social guilt or guilt regarding the
Chinese “people.”
2. The prisoner lacks a sense of commitment to some cause or
group and is not strongly inner directed.
3. The prisoner is not sophisticated about politics (Communist
politics in particular).
4. The prisoner has not had first-hand contact with CCP opera-
tions during the phase of consolidating their power and initiating
their programs such as Land Reform.
5. The prisoner has contact with high caliber CCP personnel dur-
ing all phases of his imprisonment.
6. The prisoner (if he has attachments among the Chinese) loses
the support of Chinese to whom he feels committed.
7. The prisoner finds liimself in a well-organized, physically ade-
quate prison.
8. The prisoner knows the Chinese language.
9. The prisoner is relatively young.
10. Initial contacts with the judge or interrogator lead the pris-
oner to believe in the sincerity of the Chinese Government concern-
ing their leniency to those who are wiling to reform themselves.
11. The prison regimen operates to weaken the prisoner and re-
move his usual social and psychological supports.
12. Struggle meetings are held in cells in which the cellmates are
well on the way to becoming reformed and are highly motivated
to reform their new member.
13. A relationship forms between the interrogator and the pris-
oner which can be exploited by the interrogator.
14. Rewards and punishments are used consistently to reinforce
co-operation with the authorities.
15. Study of Communist materials by group discussion is cor-
rectly timed and worked into the prison regimen.
16. Contacts following repatriation tend to confirm predictions
made by the Communists.
17. Emotional relationships support whatever changes have oc-
curred in prison.
18. Events in this society and types of groups encountered rein-
PART THREE Theories of
Coercive Persuasion
A number or specific theories have been proposed to explain how
and why changes occurred in the beliefs, attitudes, values, and be-
havior patterns of prisoners. Most of these theories postulate a
particular mechanism as the explanation for the outcomes observed
(e.g., Pavlovian conditioning, hypnosis, dissonance reduction, trans-
fer of guilt-anxiety, identity change, social conformity pressure,
etc,). As Chapter 4 has attempted to explain, we view the influence
process as a fairly complex sequence of events involving the three
major phases of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing ; we feel
further that each of the psychological mechanisms which are sug-
gested in the various one-factor explanations is important for
understanding some part of the total change sequence. We do not
feel that any one of them alone can explain the outcomes observed
in the different phases, nor do we feel that any one can be dispensed
with as irrelevant. Our job in the next hvo chapters, then, is to
show where various psychological mechanisms are relevant an
where we feel the limits of their utility lie.
For the most part we have considered only theories which have
explicitly attempted to explain ‘'brainwashing." We have not, ex-
cept in the sections of Chapter 9 on the social psychology of in-
fluence, treated works which could explain some of the ou comes
of coercive persuasion unless their authors themselves nw ® ®
attempt. Our purpose is not to show how one could relate differen
theories to coercive persuasion, but rather, to e\ ua e ens g
explanatory attempts and to develop a conceptual scheme w
^ 105
Theories of Coercive Persuasion 297
be discussed which deal specifically with the psychology of social in-
fluence (Festinger, 1957; Kelman, I95S; Asch, 1951, 1952; Ho viand
ct al., 1953). Logically one should also include in this section those
authors who feel that hypnosis or pseudo-hypnosis offers an ex-
planation (Hunter, 1951; Meerloo, 1956; Iluxley, 195S). However,
these authors tend to see hypnosis as an esoteric technique of the
hind referred to in our first category, rather than as a complex inter-
personal influence process, and hence will be treated only in the
former context.
Because most of the theories to be discussed are technical and
rely in varying degrees on terminology, Part III will be generally
more technical in nature. We shall examine each of the theories
from the point of view of the psychology of influence; a reading of
this part therefore presumes some familiarity with the technical
vocabulary of psychology.
196
Theories of Coercive Persuasion
encompass coercive persuasion as well as other types of influence
processes. ,
The major criterion for the utility of such a scheme (and the
major criterion by which we shall evaluate the theories to be pre-
sented below) is its capacity to organize a wide range of observed
data into meaningful categories (variables) and to state causal
relationships between these variables. The degree to which the
variables developed are also conceptually pure, operationally de-
finable, and easily measurable will only be considered secondarily
in our evaluation.
Theoretical mechanisms which have been suggested as explana-
tions for coercive persuasion fall into a number of general cate-
gories. First, we have a number of explanations based largely on
psycho-physiological stress mechanisms. We include here Sargants
(1957) use of Pavlovian conditioning (he emphasizes the physio-
logical aspects of conditioning particularly) and Hunter (1953);
Hinkle and Wolffs (1956) analysis of the debilitating effects of
various psychological and physiological stresses; and theories about
the effects of drugs, implanted electrodes, and other esoteric
methods of allegedly producing specific involuntary behaviors ( Mil-
ler, 1957; Huxley, 1953). Second, we have a series of explana-
tions deriving bom traditional learning theory, using either a
Pavlovian or an instrumental conditioning model (Farber et aU
1957; Winokur, 1955; Santucci & Winokur, 1955; Meerloo, 1954).
Third, we have a series of explanations based on psycho-analytic
formulations which emphasize in particular the vicissitudes of gufl*
and guilt-anxiety in the coercive persuasion process (Meerloo, 1956;
Moloney, 1955; Lifton, 1956). These three theoretical positions will
be treated in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 9 we shall consider explanations which are more
socio-psychologicaL Thus a fourth type of explanation combines
psychoanalytic theory with sociological formulations around the
problem of identity (Lifton, 1956; Bidennan, 1957; Schein,
I960; Coffman, 1957, 1959; Strauss, 1959). A fifth type of explana-
tion puts emphasis on cognitive processes such as shifts in frame o
reference and learning new semantic rules (Lifton, 1956b; Schein,
1956, I960; Biderman, 1956). Finally, a number of formulations will
8
Theories of Coercive Persuasion I:
Stress, Learning, and
Psychoanalytic Theories
PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL STRESS
One of the most comprehensive and, we feel, most adequate de-
scriptive accounts of the total coercive persuasion process is pro-
vided by Hinkle and Wolff (1956). They attribute the changes ob-
served in the prisoner primarily to a state of mental and physical
exhaustion resulting both from the combination of fatigue, pain,
and physiological stress due to disease and malnutrition and rom
the psychological strain due to isolation, total dependency, and
humiliation. According to Hinkle and Wolff, the prisoner then com-
plies to his captors’ bidding and accepts their beliefs as his own,
even if his own are in contradiction to them, because is is e o
exhaustion results in his being confused, uncritical, an g y
suggestible. Once the pressures are lifted and the prisoner
lowed to regain his physical and emotional energy e '
recognize how he had been deceived, to revert to
patterns and beliefs, and to repudiate his prison expen
ing been basically a horrible ordeaL The stimulation of mrnri) aod
g4, the various social pressures, and the interpersonal contacts
199
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 201
The feature which these theories have in common is evident—
that the change in the victim of coercive persuasion is to he ex-
plained by a systematically created state of psycho-physiological
exhaustion, in which state the victim cannot think clearly enough
and does not have will enough to avoid accepting beliefs and en-
gaging in behavior which he would ordinarily resist strongly. A
key assumption upon which such a formulation rests is that a state
of lu'gh suggestibility and uncriticalness results from such exhaus-
tion. The assumption is crucial because only in such a psycho-
logical state might one expect a person to accept beliefs that are in
flat contradiction to other beliefs he holds. In this argument lies a
second assumption, however, which must be made explicit. All
these formulations accept as given that coercive persuasion in-
volves the acceptance of beliefs which are in contradiction to other
beliefs or values the person holds, that these new beliefs are some-
how added to the personality rather than being integrated into it,
and that these new beliefs will be given up as soon as psycho-
physiological equilibrium has once again been reached (i.c., when
the captor’s pressure is lifted). The implication is that the victim
and captor are always in a situation of total conflict with each other.
Miller (1957), in conjecturing about possible future develop-
ments, extends this line of thought by noting the potentialities of
sensory deprivation, new kinds of tranquilizing pharmaceuticals,
electrodes implanted in the brain, etc., for eliciting behavior which
the prisoner would not ordinarily engage in. Again, the key as-
sumption is that the new behavior is totally unthmkablefor e
prisoner, hence some means must be found to get him to p uC0 1
involuntarily, whether this be by PavJovian conditioned rc exes or
some other esoteric means.
Critique
1. Our study of those cases in whom any attitude djange«|ai
accomplished by the Chinese suggests that the P / ,j lC
logical stress explanation applies only to limit p° .j
total imprisonment experience, and that very .
physiological stress-producing devices were ewcon^J^
ployed by the captor. In other words, even in those cases whom
2 0 o Theories of Coercive Persuasion
with cellmates and interrogators are seen primarily as contributing
to the ultimate state of psycho-physiological exhaustion.
Hinkle and Wolff explicitly deny the relevance of Pavlovian
mechanisms to an understanding of coercive persuasion (primarily
because the Pavlovian formulations as used by Hunter, Meerloo,
Sargant, and Huxley are such oversimplifications), but their own
theory closely resembles the Pavlovian formulations in the emphasis
they put upon psycho-physiological collapse. Sargant (1957) has
made a vigorous, if somewhat loosely reasoned, argument for the
analogy between the collapse which Pavlov saw in his experi-
mentally induced neuroses in dogs and the collapse seen in van o us
lands of human conversion processes, of which he feels “brain-
washing” is a good case in point Specifically, he alleges that the
brain (whether human or animal) will go into a state of severe
“inhibition” if stimulated by unusually powerful stresses and emo-
tional stimuli (“unusually powerful” stimuli being defined as stimuli
well beyond the capacity of the organism to cope with by normal
habitual means), and in this state will become highly suggestible
and capable of a complete reversal of values. According to Sargant,
such a state of inhibition is evidenced in the human by emotional
collapse such as that seen in revival meetings, under the effects of
barbiturates, under shock treatments of various sorts, in very severe
and traumatic initiation rites, and so on. The fact that sharp changes
in belief and value occur in all of these situations leads Sargant to
the hypothesis that it is the emotional collapse and subsequent
brain inhibition which, via the state of increased suggestibility,
explains the change.
Hunter (1951, 1956) is less explicit in postulating specific theo-
retical mechanisms, but the burden of his argument is similar to
the above two. By systematic pressure at the physical and psycho-
logical level a person is reduced to a state of confusion * in which
he can no longer clearly distinguish what he believes and how he
should act
•» tlie following definition of brainwashing: Brainwashing • • ■
for^b!??. ? Dt 3 n ? an ' s * fog so that he will mistake what is true
did tv# i W £ at 15 n ’?ht for what is wrong, and come to believe w
5? rvLr^ p? T n actuaC y ^ happened, until he nltanatdy becomes a robot for
the Communist manipulator. <lfSnte^l956, p. 67)
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories
203
perceptions or conceptions, but these new perceptions or concep-
tions are not necessarily completely alien ones to him; rather they
are likely to draw on portions of his personality which have hitherto
remained unconscious or which he could not consider before.
3. 'pie postulation of increased suggestibility or decreased capacity
to think critically as the key change mechanism evades the basic
issue of how change is actually produced. This evasion is reminis-
cent of the conflict within social psychology concerning the ex-
planation of certain experiments in which people’s judgments were
influenced by knowledge of others’ judgments (Asch, 1948). The
issue was whether a behavioral change represented a new evalua-
tion of the same stimulus object (the suggestibility theory), or
whether the stimulus object was perceived differently as a result of
learning how someone else judged it, and hence evaluated differ-
ently. Asch argued very persuasively for the latter position and his
cognitive formulation certainly fits the facts of coercive persuasion
better than a straightforward reliance on the suggestibility ex-
planation. This argument, as applied to coercive persuasion, would
be similar to the one we have previously stated. The prisoner learns
new evaluations of self and others by first identifying with another
prisoner, then by seeing various objects in his social world from
this perspective, then by shifting his frame of reference and his
standards of evaluation, and finally by applying these new standar
to the social objects including his self. One can certainly assert at
all of these cognitive processes involve a state of suggestibility, ur
main argument against such an assertion is that basically it oes
not explain anything. . .
4. The above arguments apply primarily to the theore co p ‘
«i°n of Hinkle and Wolff. The Saigant, Hunter, and MJo
emphasize more heavily than do those of Hinkle and o
voluntary changes produced by psycho-physiologica “ c ty.
like drugs, conditioning, etc. The main argument agarns '
Hon is that there is little evidence that any prisoner ac y
experiences of the kind described by these ^ h fact
symptoms which implied such experiences, tb ey
due to them. To produce involuntary changes / j, ave
the Communists appeared to be interested in; 3
202
Theories of Coercive Persuasion
physical and physiological stress was fairly extreme, both the
prisoner’s and captor’s attention was on the psychological tacts
about the prisoner which were implied by his debilitated con lbon,
and it is these psychological facts which constituted the g? eate ^
pressure in our opinion. For example, the wearing of handcuffs an
ankle chains was intensely painful and debilitating, but worse, 1
was perceived by the prisoner’s cellmates as the symbol o s
recalcitrance and unwillingness to reform himself and thus serve
as the justification for further humiliation, revilemcnt, and bruta
zation.
The psycho-physiological stresses entered into the unfreezing
process in generally lowering the prisoner’s resistance, but the as-
sumption is not tenable, in our opinion, that such lowering o
resistance is equivalent to the production of a state of uncriticalness
and high suggestibility. The most that could be said is that these
stresses facilitated unfreezing and the induction of a motive to
change. But the prisoner could not be said at this time to have
been mentally incapable of exercising critical judgment (though
it might have seemed that way to him retrospectively). On the con-
trary, in some cases the prisoner gained in such a crisis situation
some very clear notions and insights concerning himself and his
total situation.
2. The assumption that coercive persuasion is fundamentally a
process of an omnipotent captor finding a way to convince an
impotent prisoner of something that the prisoner would not or-
dinarily accept, i.e., the assumption that the captor-induced beliefs
arc completely in conflict with the prisoner’s, may be applies c
to a few cases but certainly is not an accurate description of the
situation of those cases who were influenced by the process. The
psycho-physiological exhaustion explanation is basically irrclcvan
to those cases in which influence resulted from a gradual shifting
of the cognitive frame of reference, the adoption of new standar
of evaluation, and the discovery of new perceptions of self and
others (none of which were necessarily in fundamental con ic
with the person’s own value system). As in other influence processes
like psychotherapy, very drastic measures may be utilized to create
a state in which the patient or prisoner is “ready” to have new
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 205
the nature of the crimes and the feelings of guilt were tilings he Bad
to locate for himself out of a reanalysis of his own experiences.
In summary, the psycho-physiological exhaustion explanation may
be quite applicable to those parts of the process which we have
called unfreezing, i.e., in creating a desire on the part of the pris-
oner to find some solution to his problems. But this explanation does
not provide a plausible mechanism for the subsequent process of
changing, of learning how to comply and to what to comply.
THEORIES EMPHASIZING TRADITIONAL LEARNING MODELS
We find in tills group of formulations some which emphasize
Pavlovian conditioning as an explanation (e.g., Meerloo, 1954),
some which emphasize Pavlov's work on experimental neurosis and
the production and consequences of conflict (Sargant, I9o7), and
some which combine Pavlovian learning principles with those of
drive reduction or instrumental conditioning (Santucci & Winokur,
1955; Farber et al, 1957). The only one of these that we shaU
examine in detail is the theory which combines both Pavlovian and
drive reduction formulations. In the context of this examination it
will become evident, we hope, why a purely Pavlovian conditioning
model could not possibly be adequate. In fairness to Meerloo and
others who argue strongly for the Pavlovian explanation (e.g.,
Hunter, 1951), we should state that these authors themselves do no
slide to a purely Pavlovian model. They present a variety o ex
planations for “brainwashing” which go well beyon a '’’
label these as Pavlovian. We shall not include them in this section
because we feel they have mislabeled their own theory. _
Basically the learning theory analysis states that t ..j,
initially coerced to engage in behavior which strong > .
beliefs and values he holds. This conflict arouses anxI
which act as drive states and lead to a search f°^ rcs P°.
would reduce such guilt and anxiety. However, e { j ic
which can reduce the anxiety and guilt is a ‘ , fch .-^ify
prisoner, namely, the adoption of beliefs an J uesin the direction
the elicited behavior. Changes in beliefs an ^ ucc anxiety
of those of the captor arc reinforced because <•> f orro of
and guilt, and because they lead to extrinsic reivards to u
204 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
repeatedly stated, they leaned over backward to produce changes
which were self-initiated. They wanted the prisoner to see and feel
his guilt, not just be willing to sign a piece of paper. False confes-
sions were usually rejected by the interrogator, not as a diabolical
strategy, but because the interrogator was interested in proving the
prisoner’s guilt by at least a locally acceptable legal process.
The question remains whether during straight military interroga-
tion for key information the captor might be willing to use devices
like truth serums and whether he would have success if he did so.
From the little definite evidence available on the point,® one would
infer that most good interrogators do not need to rely on such
devices and, in fact, would prefer not to because the data pro-
duced by them tend to be highly unreliable anyway (Kubis, 1957;
Ome, 1960). With respect to Pavlovian conditioning as a technique,
it has been pointed out (Bauer, 1957, Schein, 1959) that no evi-
dence exists of the use of Pavlovian methods in thought reform
operations and that, in any case, coercive persuasion as a process
of influence could not possibly be explained by such a simple basic
mechanism. In fact, the whole applicability of Pavlovian condition-
ing formulations to adult human behavior has not yet been con-
vincingly demonstrated.!
5. Perhaps the most serious deficiency of the debilitation-sug-
gestibility explanation is that it fails to take note of the fact that
the judge or interrogator did not define for the prisoner what he was
to do (or what he was to believe) in any manner which the pris-
oner initially could understand. Hence, even if he wanted to com-
ply or was suggestible to the point of complying, there would not
have been available a ready model of what he was to do. A number
of prisoners, as we have mentioned, tried to evade the issue by
making false confessions wlilch involved guesses as to what the
captors wanted, only to find themselves being punished further for
insincerity and unctMjperativcncss. The only thing the prisoner could
l)o sure of was that he was in some manner guilty of some crimes, but
BSdmru* *19^ COtnpTe *‘«ulve evalnatJon of the problem of interrogation. tec
li'kinT* lLC Deit W ~ ctk,n {ur • more detailed analysis of learning theory formu-
Sfrm, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 207
that certain lands of verba! and other behaviors are reinforced
selectively by the alleviation of the DDD syndrome. The fact that the
alleviation is intermittent and unpredictable leads to particularly
ugh rates of emission of the conditioned behavior and makes it
particularly difficult to extinguish (Skinner, 1933). How it is that the
correct verbal and other behavior is elicited in the first place is not
dealt with by Farber, except to note that most humans have already
earned to emit various kinds of verbal behavior when in a motiva-
tional state like DDD.
Critique
1. The basic virtue of a learning theory analysis is that it brings
tile phenomenon of coercive persuasion into a realm of psychology
"which is reasonably well understood and which allows, therefore,
the formulation of specific predictions about the outcome of the
process. A second virtue is that it provides an actual mechanism of
change; i.e., it offers an explanation of how a new response comes
to be learned and states principles which govern the strength or sta-
bility of that new response. As stated in the preceding section, it is
the failure to provide such a mechanism which is the main weak-
ness of the psycho-physiological stress analyses. Thus, if learning
theory applies to coercive persuasion this is a tremendous theoretical
gain. The question is, to what extent and how fruitfully does it apply?
2. The basic problem with the application of learning theory to
the phenomena of coercive persuasion is that it explains too little
and at the same time too much. There is little doubt that both
avlovian and instrumental conditioning enter into the process at
some points, but such a statement would be true for virtually any
situation that one might conceive of. It is in tliis sense that learning
oory explains too much. It is of such a level of generality that its
applicability can almost always be demonstrated.
At die same time, this level of generality results in analyses which
ate somewhat sterile in that they do not explain the phenomenon at
a level at which it “makes sense" or at a level at which differential
predictions about outcomes can be reliably made. For example. It is
undeniably valid, as far as all available experimental evidence is con-
206
Theories oj Coercive Persuasion
praise and improved material conditions from the captor.
Pavlovian conditioning enters into this learning process at two
points: (1) The anxiety and guilt come to be conditioned (by the
avoidance conditioning paradigm) to the threats and punishments
which initially produced the complying behavior, and thus come
to be elicited by fewer and fewer cues on the part of the captor;
such a mechanism would be important in explaining the continued
co-operation of the prisoner with his captor in the seeming absence
of severe threat or punishment; (2) Once verbal behavior consistent
with the captors’ ideology has been elicited and learned by being
reinforced, it could then be transferred to other cues or stimuli by a
Pavlovian conditioning mechanism; thus behavior initially elicited
by a complex shaping process (i.e., the prisoner having to learn what
was wanted of him at the level of belief and value) could become
conditioned to a variety of simple cues with which it has been paired
(e.g., the mere presence of an interrogator or a verbal signal like
“imperialism”); the extensive repetition of slogans, singing of songs,
and reciting of dogma could be paired with appropriate emotional
responses elicited by some other means leading to the conditioning
of these emotions to the slogans, songs, etc.
Another formulation which is similar to the one presented above
is stated by Farbcr and others. They feel that the Communist con-
trol techniques as manifested in their handling of PO\V*s in Korea
can be thought to produce a motivational state — which they call
DDD for its three basic components: debility, dependency, and
dread. The reader should have no difficulty in seeing how the kinds
of circumstances previously described can be categorized into a
DDD classification. Farbcr et al. feel that occasional indulgences
and unprcdictably administered rewards have the effect of condition-
ing (Pavlovian) the prisoner’s “expectancy” of relief. It is the inter-
mittent reinforcement which tends to maintain expectancy at a high
level and renders it less susceptible to extinction. “. . . this process
serves to keep hope alive, permitting some degree of adaptive be-
havior, and inhibiting self-destructive tendencies, which would
frustrate the enemy's purpose.” (Farbcr et al., 1957, p. 276)
At the same time, instrumental conditioning enters the picture in
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 209
fusion). Yet there is a legitimate area for theoretical analysis in these
phenomena which is left largely unexplored.
It is only recently, for example, that physical and social isolation
as motivation-inducing conditions have become the objects of sys-
tematic study. The need for such study is signaled not only by the
diversity of definitions which have been given for a state such as
isolation (ranging from "solitary confinement with guards present
and available for some human contact” to experimental conditions
such as described by Bexton et al., 1954, or Lilly, 1956a, in which
the subject is cut off from as much sensory input as is physically
possible), but also by the diversity of initial findings of the effects
of isolation (ranging from dramatic reports of psychotic-like states
produced in a few hours to reports of subjects being able to perform
in a manner indistinguishable from normal after severa ays o
isolation). Recently, as a result of the study of data from Chinese
Communist prisons, more attention has been given to social isolation,
a state in which the subject may be in the midst of others but feel
himself completely isolated from them. Hie effects of secli e condi-
tion me at present only reportable anecdotally, there bc^ Mo
theory and less experimental data available to throw hght on diem.
Studies of sleep deprivation (Fisher 4 Iiubmstcin, 10 m) arc quite
equrvoS ISinghhe degree to which
can be demonstrated. Similarly, there rs amp c c ( - „ jt
cal torture may stiffen resistance in some people while " calamg
in others. TlJi. is
suffered from a state of DDD, nrr „rrcd The same argil-
learning theory- alone just w iy s motivational conditions
^‘l! r< Lcaming form'ilations^rLro^ns^yct ^how
new behavior is initially c> emphasize a process called
forcement. Skinnerian fo . f rc in/orring any partial
"shaping” the of^c final
response which is in the d,u * pn lv only to situations in which
is wanted. Pavlonan forn ™| j-Jfc exists. Tborochkean instm-
a stimulus-response connection already exu
208 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
concerned, to state that the prisoner learns to make certain kinds of
verbal and cognitive responses because: (a) he is in a motivational
state in which learning is likely to take place; and (b) he is selec-
tively reinforced. If we cannot go beyond this, however, and describe
the nature of the motivation and the nature of the reinforcement wc
have contributed relatively little to the understanding of the out-
come.
At this point, most learning theorists are willing to become circular
in their definitions and rely on an empirical criterion of what sorts or
stimuli constitute reinforcements for a given individual, and what
kinds of motivational states are of particular importance to him.
There is nothing in the theory itself, however, which would offer to
predict what would be motivating and what would be reinforcing.
The limit of the theory would be the suggestion to examine evnpiri-
cally the subject’s previous history for clues as to what kinds of
motives had been learned and by what kinds of reinforccrs.
The utility of various other theories such as those based on psycho-
analytic and those based on sociological considerations lies precisely
in their attempt to make refinements in the concepts that learning
theory has left unrefined. These theories offer concrete hypotheses
about the kinds of motivations that will be important in an adult
human under given conditions of stimulation, and about the kinds
of reinforcing states of affairs for which the adult human typically
strives. As Farbcr el al. (1957) themselves note in paraphrasing
Spence: . . . the view that principles derived from conditioning
might apply to more complex behavior does not at all imply that
complex behavior can be explained solely in terms of the variables
affecting conditioning.” (p. 274)
3, Learning formulations such as those described above tend to
leave unexplained the induction of motivational states which p re "
T?° S V lie sub i cct to Ieam something new. By "leaving unex-
p amc . I mean that the theorist is not able to use the learning
leory itself to explain why or how, for example, a state of DDD is
V. * ^* or * b is explanation he relics on general stress theory
similar to that used by Hinkle and Wolff, or simply describes the
°ff S ^nditions which arc assumed to have a certain predictable
c e ( e .g.» withholding sleep is assumed to produce mental con-
Stress, learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 209
fusion). Yet there is a legitimate area for theoretical analysis in these
p enomena which is left largely unexplored.
is only recently, for example, that physical and social isolation
motivation-inducing conditions have become the objects of sys-
ttnatic study. The need for such study is signaled not only by the
nersity of definitions which have been given for a state such as
(ranging from “sohtary confinement with guards present
ar > available for some human contact” to experimental conditions
as described by Bexton el al., 1954, or Lilly, 1956a, in which
5 S u lGCt ** °ff from as much sensory input as is physically
possible), but also by the diversity of initial findings of the effects
0 isolation (ranging from dramatic reports of psychotic-like states
P r uced in a few hours to reports of subjects being able to perform
. n a manner indistinguishable from normal after several days of
tion). Recently, as a result of the study of data from Chinese
mmunist prisons, more attention has been given to social isolation,
® state in which the subject may be in the midst of others but feel
umself completely isolated from them. The effects of such a condi-
arc at present only reportable anecdotally, there being little
mcory and less experimental data available to throw light on them.
Studies of sleep deprivation (Fisher & Rubinstein, 1955) are quite
equivocal concerning the degree to which heightened suggestibility
030 he demonstrated. Similarly, there is ample evidence that physi-
ol torture may stiffen resistance in some people while weakening it
n others. Thus it is descriptively correct to state that Korean POWs
suffered from n state of DDD, but \vc certainly cannot derive from
'Cuming theory nlono just why this state occurred. The same argu-
ments apply, of course, to the explanation of motivational conditions
"hich were present in the prisons in which coercive persuasion took
place.
208 Theories of Coercive Persuasion-
concerned, to state that the prisoner learns to make certain kinds of
verbal and cognitive responses because: (a) he is in a motivational
state in which learning is likely to take place; and (b) he is selec-
tively reinforced. If we cannot go beyond this, however, and describe
the nature of the motivation and the nature of the reinforcement we
have contributed relatively little to the understanding of the out-
come.
At this point, most learning theorists are willing to become circular
in their definitions and rely on an empirical criterion of what sorts of
stimuli constitute reinforcements for a given individual, and what
kinds of motivational states are of particular importance to him.
There is nothing in the theory itself, however, which would offer to
predict what would be motivating and what would be reinforcing.
The limit of the theory would be the suggestion to examine empiri-
cally the subjects previous history for clues as to what kinds of
motives had been learned and by what kinds of reinforcers.
The utility of various other theories such as those based on psycho-
analytic and those based on sociological considerations lies precisely
in their attempt to make refinements in the concepts that learning
theory has left unrefined. These theories offer concrete hypotheses
about the kinds of motivations that will be important in an adult
human under given conditions of stimulation, and about the kinds
of reinforcing states of affairs for which the adult human typically
strives. As Farber ct al. (1957) themselves note in paraphrasing
Spence: . . the view that principles derived from conditioning
might apply to more complex behavior does not at all imply that
complex behavior can be explained solely in terms of the variables
affecting conditioning.” (p. 274)
3. Learning formulations such as those described above tend to
leave unexplained the induction of motivational states which pre-
dispose the subject to leam something new. By “leaving unex-
plained" I mean that the theorist is not able to use the learning
theory itself to explain why or how, for example, a state of DDD is
induced. For this explanation he relies on general stress theory
similar to that used by Hinkle and Wolff, or simply describes the
observed conditions which are assumed to have a certain predictable
effect (c.g., withholding sleep is assumed to produce mental con-
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 209
fusion). Yet there is a legitimate area for theoretical analysis in these
phenomena which is left largely unexplored.
It is only recently, for example, that physical and social isolation
as motivation-inducing conditions have become the objects of sys-
tematic study. The need for such study is signaled not only by the
diversity of definitions which have been given for a state such as
isolation (ranging from solitary confinement with guards present
and available for some human contact” to experimental conditions
such as described by Bexton et al, 1954, or Lilly, 1956a, in which
the subject is cut off from as much sensory input as is physically
possible), but also by the diversity of initial findings of the effects
of isolation (ranging from dramatic reports of psychotic-like states
produced in a few hours to reports of subjects being able to perform
in a manner indistinguishable from normal after several days of
isolation). Recently, as a result of the study of data from Chinese
Communist prisons, more attention has been given to social isolation,
a state in which the subject may be in the midst of others but feel
himself completely isolated from them. The effects of such a condi-
tion are at present only reportable anecdotally, there being little
theory and less experimental data available to throw light on them.
Studies of sleep deprivation (Fisher & Rubinstein, 1955) are quite
equivocal concerning the degree to which heightened suggestibility
can be demonstrated. Similarly, there is ample evidence that physi-
cal torture may stiffen resistance in some people while weakening it
in others. Thus it is descriptively correct to state that Korean ROW’S
suffered from a state of D DD, but we certainly cannot derive from
learning theory alone just why this state occurred. The same argu-
ments apply, of course, to the explanation of motivational conditions
which were present in the prisons in which coercive persuasion took
place.
4. Learning formulations are as yet weak on the problem of how
now behavior is initially elicited and thus made available for rein-
forcement. Skinnerian formulations emphasize a process called
"shaping” the behavior, which consists of reinforcing any partial
response which is in the direction of or part of the final response that
is wanted. Pavlovian formulations apply only to situations in which
a stimulus-response connection already exists. Thomdikcan fnstni-
210 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
mental conditioning formulations rely on the occurrence of “trial
and error” behavior, by which is meant that in a suitable state of
motivation the organism will emit various kinds of behavior until
some is found which leads to reinforcement Response hierarchies
are postulated in terms of the probability of occurrence of given
responses, but no good theoretical explanation is offered for the
actual placement of given responses on the hierarchy.
Critics of "trial and error” learning have noted that the animal
certainly does not respond at random, but that there seems to be
some cognitive component to its behavior which makes for some
degree of "calculated guessing” or “hypothesis testing” even in a
low-level organism. We feel that this kind of cognitive component is
crucial in the adult human and needs detailed analysis if human
learning situations are to be understood. For example, in Chapter 4
we noted the complex manner in which prisoners seemed to find
ways of orienting themselves to their social and informational en-
vironment which permitted them to determine what kinds of re-
sponses were wanted of them. A key point in this connection was the
failure of the interrogator or judge to reveal to the prisoner specifi-
cally what was wanted except in very generalized terms such as “You
must confesj, you must admit your crimes.” The crux of the matter
was that the prisoner had to learn how to find out what he was to
learn.
The general prison routine favored high response productivity in
some areas by enforcing active participation in all kinds of activities,
ranging from the trivial (c.g., singing Communist songs at certain
specified times) to the psychologically highly significant (e.g., taking
part in criticism and self-criticism in the cell). However, the pro-
duction of ideologically correct responses, ones that would be re-
inforced, depended, we feel, upon a certain amount of insight on the
part of the prisoner concerning what was wanted. Hence, enforced
participation could not automatically guarantee that reinforcible
responses would occur.
5 . With regard to the specific formulations presented, for example,
by Santucci and Winokur, the main flaw in the analysis lies in the
assumption that the captor can routinely elicit certain kinds of col-
laborative behavior which then produce conflict and subsequent
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 211
learning of new beliefs. There is ample evidence that the captor
cannot routinely coerce certain lands of behavior; i.e., that many
prisoners resist such coercion to the hilt, or that the captor’s de-
mands are too unclear to allow the prisoner to determine what be-
havior is wanted. It is probably true that for POWs, upon which
the Santuccf and Winokur analysis is based, there were fairly clear
demands such as to sign petitions, inform on fellow POW*s, etc. But
it would be quite erroneous to identify what these authors label as
"brainwashing" as being equivalent to what we have tried to describe
as coercive persuasion. Learning theory analysis may have limited
practical applicability to the POW situation, and can be applied in
principle to the coercive persuasion situation, but we should not
mistakenly overgeneralize from one of these situations to the other.
PSYCHOANALYTIC FORMULATIONS
One of the most interesting formulations using psychoanalytic
theory is the one proposed by Moloney (1955). He argues that in
certain individuals there exists a particularly authoritarian, demand-
ing superego which requires continual neutralization by the ego
lest the individual be swamped by his superego and become a
“carbon copy” of what the superego wants. If such an individual is
put through a physically and emotionally exhausting experience he
may be unable to sustain his war against the superego, or its sur-
rogate in a present relationship, and may experience a “psychic
emptying” of himself which actually reflects a process of abandoning
the self to the authority of the superego. Moloney notes that such a
process can be seen in religious conversion and training (particularly
in Zen Buddhism), in creative or inspirational experiences of prob-
lem solving, in the origin of schizophrenic processes, and in reactions
to Communist interrogation methods. If the individual does not
have a powerful authoritarian superego opposing an insecure ego
he will hold out much longer before confessing or will attempt to
escape the situation physically by avoiding capture initially, by try-
ing to escape at any cost if captured, or by committing suicide.
The key elements in the formulation then are: (1) a personality
predisposition; (2) a process of becoming physically and emotionally
exhausted (here Moloney agrees with Sargant); (3) an authority
2 i 2 Theories of Coercive Fcrsuaslon
figure like an interrogator or judge wlio comes to be the surrogate
or representative of the superego in the prison situation; (<i) an
eventual abandonment by the prisoner of his self-strivings and a
total "giving in" to the superego surrogate, which in this ease means
the interrogator.®
A second psychoanalytic formulation is Mcerloo’s analysis of the
transfer of guilt. f Mccrloo asserts that there arc both external and
internal motivating factors involved in confessing and becoming
converted. The external factors are the various prison experiences
which weaken the ego's resistance by exhausting it physically and
emotionally. The internal forces arc the conscious desire to remove
pain and threat and the unconscious dependency needs and child-
hood hostilities, both of which produce great quantities of guilt. The
childhood feelings and needs arc stimulated by tbc actual depend-
ency of the prisoner on his captor and the accusing environment
which treats the prisoner like a child who has done something bad.
Submission to the authority and identification with him then
solves a number of the prisoner's problems; (1) it removes the
external threat and pain; (2) it permits the unconscious guilt to be
attached to some concrete behavior (e.g., making a confession) and
thus releases the individual from having to face his own unconscious
unacceptable impulses which stimulated the guilt in the first place;
(3) it permits a giving in to dependency longings (this latter ap-
pears to be similar to Moloney’s “self-abandonment"); and (4) it
• An Interesting additional point is that the prisoner then lias available to
him the resistance patterns which were originally used against the inroads of
the compulsive authoritarian parents, e.g., slavish following of orders while
sabotaging the spirit of the venture, various kinds of passive resistance, refusal
to take any responsibility, etc. The degree to which such resistance patterns
were used might be a reflection of the degree of self-striving which had to be
abandoned; i.e„ the person with a stronger ego being forced to abandon self
because of unusual stresses might be expected to fall back on more resistance
devices of the kind died.
f Meerloo in giving his analysis has unfortunately muddled his own theory by
stating that these processes are also explainable by Pavlovian conditioning and
that they involved essentially hypnotic techniques. We do not see how these
three models can be made readily consistent with each other; perhaps Meerloo
can. In his writings on the subject of “mentiride” he has not stated a clear
position, however, hence we have taken the liberty of stating his separate
theories in the separate parts of this chapter {see Meerloo, 1951, 1954, 1956).
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 213
permits some gratification by magical means in that the prisoner’s
submission “annihilates” the interrogator by removing the reason for
his existence. Since the environment fails to fulfill all of the de-
pendency needs of the prisoner even if he submits (e.g., he is still
asked to be “responsible” for his own re-education), a further
psychological defense, that of identification with the aggressor, is
necessary. Presumably much of the motivation for learning the
captors ideology comes from such defensive identification.
The formulation given hy Lifton (1956a) is considerably broader
than the previous two, not only in relying on a wider range of
psychoanalytic thcoiy, but also in adding some sociological formula-
tions. Basically, however, Liftons explanation of why change occurs
is psychoanalytic; hence we shall treat Iiis theoiy primarily in the
present section.
Lifton divides the experience of coercive persuasion into four
basic stages:
1. The emotional assaults which have the effect of (a) destroy-
ing the prisoner’s feelings of individual identity; (b) mobilizing
within the prisoner powerful guilt anxiety; and (c) making him feel
in total conflict with an inflexible environment
2. Leniency: A sudden shift on the part of the authorities to
seemingly kind treatment,* which has the effect of showing the
prisoner the possibility of an adaptational solution and enlists his aid
in reforming himself,
3. Confession: “The constant accusations and demands for
atonement and conformity with the prison group create both a uni-
versal and a personal confession compulsion. Guilt anxiety is chan-
neled into specific areas which the Communists make use of in
guiding the prisoner towards his final confession or coercive con-
fabulation.” (Liiton, 1956a, pp. 2-3)
4. Re-education: “Through a unique and thorough group ther-
apy’ — utilizing mutual study, criticism, self-criticism, exposure of
• In Chapter 7 we questioned whether there was adequate evidence of
manipulation of the sort which this stage Implies The point is emcid because
according to Lifton it is the authorities’ leniency which starts the chmge proc«s
in motion. According to our formulation, some clunge must already have oc-
curred In the prisoner if die authorities suddenly became kind, even if only
subtle change in attitude or motivation.
212 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
figure like an Interrogator or judge who comes to be the surrogate
or representative of the superego in the prison situation; (4) an
eventual abandonment by the prisoner of Ills self-strivings and a
total "giving in" to the superego surrogate, which in this ease means
the interrogator. -
A second psychoanalytic formulation is Meerloo’s analysis of the
transfer of guilt. { Mccrloo asserts that there are both external and
internal motivating {actors involved in confessing and becoming
converted. The external factors arc the various prison experiences
which weaken the egos resistance by exhausting it physically and
emotionally. The internal forces are the conscious desire to remove
pain and tlircat and the unconscious dependency needs and child-
hood hostilities, both of wluch produce great quantities of guilt. The
childhood feelings and needs are stimulated by the actual depend-
ency of the prisoner on his captor and the accusing environment
which treats the prisoner like a child who has done something bad.
Submission to the authority and identification with him then
solves a number of the prisoner's problems: (1) it removes the
external tlircat and pain; (2) it permits the unconscious guilt to be
attached to some concrete behavior (c.g., making a confession) and
thus releases the individual from having to face his own unconscious
unacceptable impulses which stimulated the guilt in the first place;
(3) it permits a giving in to dependency longings (this latter ap-
pears to be similar to Moloney’s "self-abandonment"); and (4) it
• An Interesting additional point Is that the prisoner then lias available to
him the resistance patterns which were originally used against the inroads of
the compulsive authoritarian parents, e.g., slavish following of orders while
sabotaging the spirit of the venture, various kinds of passive resistance, refusal
to take any responsibility, etc. The degree to which such resistance patterns
were used might be a reflection of the degree of self-striving which had to be
abandoned; i.e., the person with a stronger ego being forced to abandon self
because of unusual stresses might be expected to fall back on more resistance
devices of the kind cited.
f Meerloo In giving his analysis has unfortunately muddled his own theory by
stating that these processes are also explainable by Pavlovian conditioning and
that they involved essentially hvpnotic techniques. We do not see how these
three models can be made readily consistent with each other; perhaps Meerloo
can. In his writings on the subject of “menticide” he has not stated a clear
position, however, brace we have taken the liberty of stating his separate
theories in the separate parts of this chapter (see Meerloo, 1951, 1934, 1930).
Stress > Naming, and Psychoanalytic Theories 213
permits some gratification by magical means in that the prisoner’s
submission annihilates" the interrogator by removing the reason for
ins existence. Since the environment fails to fulfill all 0 f the de-
pendency needs of the prisoner even if he submits { e.g., he is still
asked to be responsible" for his own re-education), a further
psychological defense, that of identification with the aggressor, is
necessary. Presumably much of the motivation for learning the
captors ideology comes from such defensive identification.
The formulation given by Lifton (1956a) is considerably broader
than tile previous two, not only in relying on a wider range of
psychoanalytic theory, but also in adding some sociological formula-
tions. Basically, however, Lifton s explanation of why change occurs
is psychoanalytic; hence we shall treat his theory primarily in the
present section.
Lifton divides the experience of coercive persuasion into four
basic stages:
1. The emotional assaults which have the effect of (a) destroy*
ing the prisoner's feelings of individual identity; (b) mobilizing
within the prisoner powerful guilt anxiety; and (c) making him feel
in total conflict with an inflexible environment.
2. Leniency: A sudden shift on the part of the authorities to
seemingly kind treatment, 0 which has the effect of showing the
prisoner the possibility of an adaptntional solution and enlists his aid
in reforming himself.
3. Confession: “The constant accusations and demands for
atonement and conformity with the prison group create both a uni-
versal and a personal confession compulsion. Guilt anxiety is chan-
neled into specific areas which the Communists make use of in
guiding the prisoner towards his final confession or coercive con-
fabulation." (Lifton, 1956a, pp. 2-3)
4. Re-education: “Through a unique and thorough group ther-
apy’ — utilizing mutual study, criticism, self-criticism, exposure of
•Jo Chapter 7 we questioned whether there was adequate evidence of
manipulation of the sort which this stage implies. The point is crucial because
according to Lifton it is the authorities' leniency which starts the change process
in motion. According to oar formulation, some change must already have oc-
curred in the prisoner if the authorities suddenly became land, even if only a
subtle change m attitude or motivation.
214 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
'wrong thoughts,* and 'depth interpretations’— -the Communists seek
to change the prisoners political and ethical beliefs, and alter Ills
personal and group loyalties.” He goes on to say:
There is a broadening of guilt to his entire previous pattern of existence;
there are adaptational rewards or emotional appeals such as group par-
ticipation, self-surrender, catharsis, problem-solving, and super-morality;
there is a “working through” by means of repetition and continuous ap-
plication of oneself to the doctrine; and there is finally a recoding of
reality, an acquisition of a new world view, and a new personal relation-
ship to the world.
We can see that the process represents a symbolic “death and rebirth”
— and that it uses in powerful combination, tecluiiqucs which resemble
hypnosis, induced religious conversion, and a coercive form of psycho-
therapy. [Lifton, 1956a, p. 31
As can be seen from the above quotes, Lifton sees the process as
consisting of a number of separable stages and implies that different
mechanisms may be operating at different stages. The core of Lifton’s
formulation is his analysis of guilt anxiety. lie feels tliat the total
environmental control “quickly and inevitably” produces guilt anx-
iety (which is guilt which the prisoner feels, though its true basis
may remain unconscious, and which produces generalized feelings of
being sinful and deserving of punishment). Because the basis of the
guilt remains unconscious, the prisoner experiences the guilt as free-
floating until he is able, in his confession, to attach it to concrete
pieces of behavior he may have committed or fantasied committing.
In this stage is involved the cognitive operation of adopting the
“people’s standpoint.” “Channeling of guilt" is, as far as we can tell,
the same process which Meerloo describes as a transfer of guilt, and
serves a similar function: to save the prisoner from further pressure
and to save him, at the same time, from his own unconscious.
In the next stage the guilt is broadened to include not only the
specific acts cited in the confession, but basic elements of the pris-
oner s identity. He leams that “his entire past life has been in the
service of evil.” In the stage of emotional assaults the prisoner had
already found it impossible to sustain his normal social and occupa-
Stress, Learning, end Psychoanalytic Theories 215
tional roles, thus destroying or at least undermining major portions
of his identity. Now he learns that this identity was actually an evil
one to be gotten rid of, and embarks upon the process of finding a
new one. In this process a variety of group forces and further cog-
nitive reorganization play the major role in completing the “rebirth”
of the prisoner. These are steps eight to eleven in Lifton’s (1956b)
“steps” of reform:
Re-education — the rebirth
8. The broadening of guilt. The prisoners guilt, which has earlier
been channeled into specific categories, is now expanded to include the
major elements of his basic identity. He “learns” that — as a “messenger
of imperialist conquerors’* — his entire life has been in the service of evil.
He feels in need of thorough personal "reform.”
9. Adaptational rewards. His "progress” brings meaningful psycho-
logical rewards. Following the unbearable pain of the early period,
these can assume immense meaning to him. During the latter months
of imprisonment, when he has adjusted to the “academic routine” of
"re-education,” he experiences the "togetherness” of intimate group liv-
ing, suffering, and "reform"; the rewards of self-surrender— of merging
with an all-powerful force and sharing its strength; the satisfaction of
problem-solving, in which nothing remains unanswered; the rewards of
uncovering — the catharsis of personal confession and the satisfactions of
"frankness”; the increased prestige and improved treatment that go with
being a “progressive”; and Bnally, the moral satisfaction of participating
in a great crusade of redeeming oneself and others — and, on a mass
mystical level, of joining the “struggle for peace," the "human brother-
hood,” the "fight for equality,” and the “great Communist future.'
10. The " working-through " The prisoner must express, act upon,
and live the principles of "thought reform” — that is, in Communist
terminology, he must "combine theory with practice.” He may at first do
this only outwardly, and then ritualisticaUy — as if reciting a catechism;
but through his interminable “group therapy” he eventually finds himself
thinking and feeling in terms of these "truths.” He must constantly
"analyze” bis alleged deficiencies, bis "thought problems," and his re-
sistances." "Depth interpretations" are available for all. varieties of non-
conformity. Everything is reducible to the "insights” of the Marxist
2 X 6 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
doctrine: he “works through*’ every barrier to “reform.”
11- The recoding of reality. Finally, he approaches the ultimate at-
tainment of “thought reform"— the acquisition of a new view of the world,
and of a new personal relationship to the world- He reconstructs his
communication techniques, shifts his role behavior, and alters his values
and his identity. He has accomplished this vast recoding chiefly through
a two-step reinterpretation of his own past and present status: from kind
missionary, or teacher, to evil spy, and from evil spy to repentant sinner.
And he applies a similar reinterpretation to all spheres of thought and
behavior: the Communist world, formerly considered aggressive and
totalitarian, is now seen to be peace-loving and democratic- He identifies
himself fully with his captors. He is happy in his faith. He has been re-
born. [Li/ton, 1956b, pp. 190-91]
Lifton’s analysis is deliberately descriptive, because he mistrusts
the process of Western observers imposing their own theoretical
formulations on processes which derive from different cultural ori-
gins.
Criffgue
1. As can be seen, the theoretical sections described thus far tend
to build on and supplement each other rather than to offer competing
hypotheses. The main thing to be said for learning theory is that it
provides a change mechanism where general stress theory only says
“something” will happen. The main thing to be said for the psycho-
analytic formulations is that they fill in some of the places where
learning theory has little to say, without being in any major way in-
consistent with learning theory. Thus, as we build up our theoretical
discussion, the total picture becomes more and more complete, and
the individual theoretical positions become less and less vulnerable
so long as they admit of the need for supplementation by others.
The psychoanalytic formulation supplements a learning theory and
stress theory analysis at the following crucial points:
a. It provides a concrete set of hypotheses about guilt-anxiety as
a motivating force demanding of the individual some change or
new learning.
b. It brings in unconscious factors and offers hypotheses concern-
ing their relationship to the prison experience and its outcome.
Stress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 217
c. In the concept of identification it offers a mechanism to explain
how the prisoner learns what sorts of responses are wanted of him,
i.e., what to do to get reward and alleviate punishment
d. In the concept of transfer of guilt there is offered a hypothesis
which could explain the basis for the different lengths of time which
expire before a given prisoner makes a confession; i.e., the implicit
hypothesis is that the prisoner becomes ready to change — to make
a confession — when his ego’s capacity to defend itself against the
unacceptable wishes or feelings (which are the basis of the guilt)
begins to weaken dangerously. Coercive persuasion involves self-
analysis at many points and one might expect that such self-analy'sis
in a punitive environment would be especially guilt-provoking;
handling this guilt would be one of the prisoner’s main problems
(see Chapter 5 for an analysis of the lands of guilt which became
relevant in coercive persuasion).
e. The psychoanalytic formulation, particularly as espoused by
Moloney, offers a clear-cut and testable hypothesis concerning prone-
ness to being coercively persuaded— -that the individual with a
powerful and authoritarian superego opposing a relatively less
powerful ego will be the most likely to give in to his interrogator or
judge and attempt to become precisely what the authorities want
him to become.
f. Meerloo’s formulation, in particular, puts considerable emphasis
on the role of dependency wishes which make the prisoner want to
comply; most theories too glibly assume that any' sane prisoner would
resist and only resist. It is particularly important in analyzing in-
dividual predisposition to seek out those factors which not only
weaken the prisoner’s capacity to resist, but also those which
strengthen his desires to comply, e.g., desire to identify with a
powerful authority or social movement, desire to help the Chinese
people, desire to be taken care of completely, etc.
g. Finally, the psychoanalytic formulations partially fill in the
large gap left by stress and learning theory where these fail to
analyze the interpersonal process which is involved in coercive per-
suasion. Much of what is crucial about this process occurs between
people, and the psychoanalyse formulations give much needed at-
tention to the authority and dependency relationship between
prisoner and captor.
218 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
2. The social relationship which is analyzed by psychoanalytic
formulations is that between the prisoner and his interrogator — a
relationship which simulates in many respects the parent-child rela-
tionship. A number of analyses of extreme situations (e.g., concen-
tration camps, POW camps, and prisons) have noted the importance
of the relationship between prisoner and authorities. The applica-
bility of psychoanalytic theory to such situations is, of course, not
accidental inasmuch as child-parent relationships as prototypes of
authority relationships are the main object of analysis in the theory.
The shortcoming of the theory lies in its failure to give adequate
attention to other lands of social relationships which develop as the
adult becomes integrated into society. In our opinion, peer-group
relationships (i.e., the relationship of prisoner to prisoner) were
particularly crucial in coercive persuasion, yet little attention is given
to such relationships in the psychoanalytic formulations discussed.
Part of the reason seems to be that the theory itself is not well de-
veloped for handling peer-group relationships and group phenom-
ena. 0 Another reason is that psychoanalytically oriented individuals
who have attempted to analyze Communist techniques of imprison-
ment (with the exception of Lifton) have taken as their model the
Russian case, and it happens that in Russian prisoner-handling the
relationship between prisoner and interrogator is indeed made para-
mount. Typically the prisoner saw no one except his guard and/or
interrogator for his entire imprisonment. The Chinese, by placing
prisoners in group cells with others who more “reformed” than they,
have introduced a new and crucial circumstance which demands
theoretical analysis. Lifton describes well the kinds of situations
which arise in such groups but offers little theoretical clarification of
their origins or outcomes.
3. A final point, which applies to most psychoanalytic explana-
tions, is that the theory often offers explanations at too complex or
too deep a level Where a simple explanation in terms of contem-
porary events would suffice, the psychoanalytic theory offers an ex-
* Some the writings of Freud ( 1022) and Redl ( 1942 ) are relevant to any
attempt to formulate psychoanalytic hypotheses about peer-group relationships
i t <?» * t° wcvcr * die only explicit attempt to mate such an analysis
" Litton* (1037b) account of emerging leadership patterns in one particular
group of European prisoners.
Sfress, Learning, and Psychoanalytic Theories 219
planation which involves the person’s entire psycho-social history
and a host of unconscious factors. One argument against such
theorizing is its basic untestability at this stage of our knowledge of
experimentation. If no other theory will fit, then it is appropriate to
try one that will fit even if it is untestable, and find ways to test it.
But if another and more testable theory fits, it should certainly have
priority. A good example is the guilt analysis offered by Afeerfoo
and Lifton. Both of them make the assumption that the guilt is
founded on some unconscious basis and that change takes place in
the prisoner in order to prevent this unconscious factor from becom-
ing conscious. The evidence for tliis position derives from subsequent
"insights” which prisoners have had concerning personal flaws winch
they had hidden from themselves, and the motivating force of which
they could subsequently recognize.® Perhaps this was true, but is it
not equally possible that the prison situation stimulated or elicited
behavior (as the learning theorists suggest) which directly conflicted
with certain values the individual held (and which he consciously
recognized) and thus produced guilt directly (guilt being the feeling
which signaled the conflict which the learning theorist pins his
analysis on)? We feel that the prison environment, particularly the
necessity of living in close quarters with a number of other human
beings, stimulated a great many feelings which became the moti-
vators for change. A number of these could quite correctly be de-
scribed as guilt (see Chapter 5), but some of them did not depend
on unconscious factors for their potency . At most they were pre-
conscious insofar as the individual did not recognize them until they
were pointed out to him; but once pointed out they were readily
perceived.
If our argument is correct that there are many bases for guilt, some
of which lie in the person’s peer-group relations, it is necessary to
broaden the hypothesis about the sources of individual vulnerability
to coercive persuasion. It may be true tliat the strong-superego,
weak-ego” type of character is vulnerable; but there will be other
• An intriguing hypothesis is that the generalized sense of guOt whidi seems
to reflect unconscious historical factors occurs after the prisoner has been in-
fluenced and repatriated as a response to his recognition of having complied
rather than being a cause of the compliance.
220 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
types who are vulnerable as well, e.g., the individual with multiple
reference groups, the person in transition from one commitment to
another, the as yet uncommitted person, etc. In terms of the content
of Communist coercive persuasion, the person bom into a well-to-do
middle-class family who found himself in China because of a “tour-
ist’s curiosity” might be vulnerable because of the ease of eliciting in
him “social guilt” about his class status, i.e., his failure to have earned
by his own labors the social position he then occupied. Of course
any hypothesis about vulnerability is on shaky ground because of the
fact that the Communists exercised their own selection criteria of
whom to put special pressure on, and there is little question that
amount of pressure is at least as important a variable as personal
vulnerability in determining the amount of influence accomplished.
In summary, the psychoanalytic formulations contribute to the
theoretical analysis some hypotheses about the nature of the mo-
tives which are stimulated in the unfreezing process and about the
lands of individuals who might be prone to influence. They also
suggest some mechanisms like self-abandonment, identification, and
transfer of guilt which can explain change, and help to clarify the
role of interpersonal processes between the prisoner and the au-
thorities.
9
Theories of Coercive Persuasion II:
Socio-psychological Theories
IDENTITY THEORY
It is difficult to find a single proponent of all the elements which
go into this theoretical conception. Much of it comes from Li/tons
analysis of ego-identity change; much of it comes from the sociologi-
cal analyses and observations of Goffman (1956, 1957a, 1959); a
number of the points come from the detailed account of interroga-
tion by Biderman (1957, 1960). Others who have discussed coercive
persuasion from this point of view are Strauss (1959), Erihson
(1958), and Leites and Bernaut (1954). Our own formulation would
fall primarily into this section, though, as we have pointed out, we
feel a number of mechanisms are necessary to clarify all the events
of coercive persuasion.
We may take as a starting point Liftons analysis of the Com-
munists' “assault on the prisoners ego-identity" and supplement it
with some of our own conceptions. Basically what is involved for
the prisoner is that his professional and personal roles are denied ex-
plicitly by the cellmates and the interrogator, while the role of ‘spy/*
“saboteur,” or "criminal" is the only one which is accepted. If we
define a person's self or his identity to be largely his conscious and
unconscious perceptions of himself in his various roles, it becomes
clear that a denial of certain roles by others constitutes an under-
221
222 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
mining of the individual’s self or sense of identity. Another way to
put it is to say that we know ourselves largely through what we do;
when we are prevented from doing what we are accustomed to, our
self-knowledge begins to be undermined. For example, it may be
difficult for a doctor to continue to see himself as a doctor if he is
prevented from practicing. The denial of role, then, is one way in
which the prison environment operated to undermine sense of
identity.
A second and perhaps more fundamental threat resided in the fact
that the prisoner’s cellmates typically refused to confirm any of his
self-perceptions which were in any way predicated on assumptions
of innocence or blamelessness. We are assuming that any sense of
self depends upon constant confirmation by others (Goffman, 1955;
Schein, 1960). If we see ourselves as "intelligent” or “handsome,” yet
significant others fail to confirm the perception by withholding defer-
ence or compliments, it becomes more difficult to continue to hold
on to the self-perception. As we have detailed in our previous de-
scriptive material, it was the humiliation, revilement, harassment,
etc., by the cellmates which served primarily to deny to the prisoner
any role or sense of self other than that of the “guilty criminal.” This
statement means that the prisoner could not get any positive response
(i.c., approval or even sustained attention) from another prisoner
unless he was wiling to assume the "guilty criminal” role.
To further the self-destruction process, various supports of self
were undermined. We have assumed that the sense of self depends
to a large extent on emotional relationships with significant others,
on membership in and identification with certain groups or profes-
sions, on information about others who have some relationship to
self, and so on (Schein, 1960). The cutting and manipulation of
information channels undermined each of these supports with a
resulting loss of sense of self or identity in the case of many prison-
ers. One interesting hypothesis in this connection would be that the
mental confusion noted by those analysts who arc most concerned
about psycho-physiological stresses (e.g., Hinkle & Wolff) does not
include all cognitive functioning, but only those areas of cognitive
functioning wliich pertain to the prisoner’s identity. A further hy-
pothesis which we favor would hold that the psycho-physiological
Sotio-psychological Theories 223
stresses have their greatest impact on the prisoner via their destruc-
tion of even his bodily self-image and his physical sense of selfhood.
We would assume that for the prisoner to see himself as unable to
function normally, forced to live like an animal, and in danger of
permanent injury and impairment represents fundamentally a greater
stress than the physiological concomitants of the actual debilitation
and physical trauma.
The denial of role and identity operates, in our terminology, to un-
freeze resistances and induce a motive to change, i.e., to find an
acceptable role and identity. A basic theoretical assumption which
is implicit in this formulation is that any adult human must have
some sort of viable role and identity which permits him to organize
his own behavior and make meaningful contact with others in his
social environment. One may conjecture that this assumption is but
an extension of a general principle in psychology which is receiving
increasing support — namely, that the nervous system functions in
such a manner as to organize the perceptual world; i.e., that random
stimulation is intolerable (produces basic anxiety) and either must
he organized by the nervous system itself or avoided by the organ-
ism. Recent studies of sensory deprivation have shown that minimum
levels of stimulation are also a requirement of healthy functioning. If
such minimum levels are not maintained the organism generates its
own stimuli in the form of hallucinations, though such a process is
obviously only a temporary expedient, and continued deprivation
produces irreparable damage (Bexton et al, 1954).
We would hypothesize that the need for an optimal level of stimu-
lation and for organized consistent input is just as important in the
area of social cues, e.g., those cues emitted by other people in refer-
ence to oneself, as it is in the area of physical cues. In fact, it is pos-
sible that personality damage can occur in the same sense in which
nervous system damage can occur, if levels of social stimulation or
confirmation are inadequate.
Most of the studies of sensory deprivation have dealt with under-
stimulation, though it is quite likely that overstimulation might have
comparably disorganizing results. In the case of social cues, we can
identify in the Russian interrogation methods a tendency to rely on
understimulation (keeping the prisoner in solitary confinement).
224 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
while the Chinese rely on overstimulation (preventing the individual
from having any privacy whatsover). The disorganizing effects of
the latter condition, quite apart from the content of the specific at-
tacks made by the cellmates, have been described by Goffman ( 1957,
1959). He argues that our social self is a “constructed object” which
requires for its successful maintenance that the individual can peri-
odically “step out of role” to “compose himself,” etc., which, of
course, requires privacy or what Goffman calls an available “back-
stage" area. For most individuals the maintenance of a “constructed
self* is impossible if no privacy whatsoever is permitted them (e.g.,
if the input of social cues is higher than the person can handle and
still remain organized). This line of reasoning leads to the conclusion
that the disorganization and destruction of identity can be more
effectively accomplished by social ooerstimulation than by under-
stimulation.*
The amount of social stimulation which the individual is receiving
and its degree of randomness docs not depend on the specific number
of people who are present. We should hypothesize, instead, that:
1. A given social self or identity requires reinforcement and sup-
port from only one significant other.
2. If the individual has the support of one significant other, this
is a sufficient level for him to tolerate large quantities of disconfirm-
ing information which may come from others (in the realm of per-
ceptual judgment this effect has been demonstrated conclusively by
Asch, 1952).
3. If the individual docs not have the support of anyone in the
immediate facc-to-facc situation, he can rely to a certain extent on
self-administered symbolic reinforcement; but in this condition he
* * interesting hypothesis might be that the emotional collapse which Is
described by as characterizing war neuroses, religious conversions.
Initiations, etc.. Is in fact an Identity collapse produced by sod at ovcntimulaUon.
it Is true that such a collapse Is often Induced by physiological meant, e.g.,
drugs, but it Is equally true trial It can be produced by continual unabated social
pressure, c g , the liaranguing arguments of a revivalist preacher or Interrogator.
Tbr advantage of the Identity collapse theory is that it can male differentia!
predictions Inset! on different Initial roles and identities which individuals have,
i gant ' "tvtfional collapse tlieory cannot deal ssell with individual differences
In susceptibility, eserpt to fall back on a crude typology of temperaments which
are <L!Lcult to deEnc operationally. *
Soda-psychological . Theories • ,,,,-
does become vulnerable to disconfirroing information, and the dis-
con firming information gains potency as a function of the number of
others who are unanimous in the cues they provide (though there is
evidence from perceptual studies that the impact of a unanimous
majority which stands in disagreement with a lone individual reaches
its maximum effect when it is three against one; e.g. Asch found
that even 15 against I produced little more effect than 3 against 1).
4. The problem of over- and under-stimulation refers not to the
number of people who confirm or diseonfirm a given self, but to the
degree to which the person can regulate the amount of information
winch others can get about him to react to. If he is in complete soli-
tary confinement, nothing he does by way of presenting himself as
any given kind of person makes any difference ( unless the person has
the capacity to administer significant reactions to himself— herein
may lie the answer to the riddle of why prisoners who compulsively
maintain certain rituals of shaving, going to the toilet, etc., seem to
survive better than those who abandon these rituals), If he is con-
fined with others twenty-four hours a day of every day, the others
get too much information about the person to react to, which makes
it impossible for him to present himself in any given pattern, and to
deal with all the incoming reactions.
5. The degree of stress which over- or under-stimulation repre-
sents may be related to the individual’s personality and to the type
of identity he has. At the level of his personality, one may expect
a person whose ego is highly autonomous from the id and superego
to be able to stand understimulation better, while one whose ego is
highly autonomous from external reality may be able to stand over-
stimulation better (Rapaport, 1951). At the level of identity, one
might expect persons with identities which require relatively less
routine confirmation (e.g., religious persons, intellectuals, etc.) to
be able to stand overstimulation of a disconBrming nature better
than those persons whose identities do require routine confirmation
(e.g,, salesmen, politicians, etc.).*
* Of course, ail identities require some Jand of confirmation. Identities can
be drstingulshed, however, In terms of the .mount of
from whom it is reguirei in what lords of forms (symbolic vs. direct) nnU m
what kinds of time intervals it is required.
Socl o -psychological 7 he cries 225
does become vulnerable to dis confirming information, and the dis-
confirming information gains potency as a function of the number of
others who are unanimous in the cues they provide (though there is
evidence from perceptual studies that the impact of a unanimous
majority which stands in disagreement with a lone individual reaches
its maximum effect when it is three against one; e.g. Asch found
that even 15 against 1 produced little more effect than 3 against 1).
4. The problem of over- and under-stimulation refers not to the
number of people who confirm or disconfirm a given self, but to the
degree to which the person can regulate the amount of information
which others can get about him to react to. If he is in complete soli-
tary confinement, nothing he does by way of presenting himself as
any given kind of person makes any difference (unless the person has
the capacity to administer significant reactions to himself— herein
may lie the answer to the riddle of why prisoners who compulsively
maintain certain rituals of shaving, going to the toilet, etc., seem to
survive better than those who abandon these rituals). If he is con-
fined with others twenty-four hours a day of every day, the others
get too much information about the person to react to, which makes
it impossible for him to present himself in any given pattern, and to
deal with all the incoming reactions.
5. The degree of stress which over- or under-stimulation repre-
sents may be related to the individuals personality and to the type
of identity he has. At the level of his personality, one may expect
a person whose ego is highly autonomous from the id and superego
to be able to stand understimulation better, while one whose ego is
highly autonomous from external reality may be able to stand over-
stimulation better (Rapaport, 1951). At the level of identity, one
might expect persons with identities which require relatively less
routine confirmation (e.g., religious persons, intellectuals, etc.) to
be able to stand overstimulation of a disconfirming nature better
than those persons whose identities do require routine confirmation
(e.g., salesmen, politicians, etc.). 0
• Of course all Identities require some kind of confirmation, identities can
be distinguished, however, in terms of the amount of con&maUon they r^ 1 re,
from whom it is required, in what kinds of forms (symbolic vs. direct) ana tn
what kinds of time intervals it is required.
229 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
Thus far we have confined our analysis to the destruction of
identity. We have stated our conclusion that the intense social en-
vironment in the prison was capable of destroying the prisoners
sense of identity and thus could induce a motive to find a new
identity. Before discussing this finding of a new identity we must
briefly consider, however, how one can best characterize the psy-
chological state in which the prisoner finds himself when his old role
and sense of identity has been destroyed. There are basically two
alternative conceptions: (1) the prisoner is in a state of complete
confusion, strongly motivated to find something with which he can
identify himself in order to regain some sense of self, and to find a
role which will be an acceptable adjustment to the prison; or (2)
the prisoner drops the unacceptable role but falls back on other role
patterns and self-images which still allow survival; e.g., if he is
forced into a state of complete dependency he can still take the role
of the dependent person or child and use this role-conception as a
way of saving a sense of self.
Much of the resistance behavior of POWs fits the latter concep-
tion (Biderman, personal communication). Biderm an argues that
the POW found himself in a situation in which the most adaptive
role was that of “schoolboy’' — this was the role which the Chinese
demanded and were willing to reward. However, within the context
of this role there were still extensive measures that the prisoner
could use to undermine the indoctrination program, measures de-
riving from his own schoolboy history — not paying attention, need-
ing to go to the bathroom frequently, pretending not to understand,
forming gangs or coalitions to mock the teacher (e.g., the “Crazy
Week" affair in which numbers of prisoners pretended to be crazy),
etc. We have previously referred to this kind of role behavior in
reference to Moloney’s analysis of the ego abandoning itself entirely
to superego authority (Chapter 8). This abandonment produces
compliance, but only of a very passive sort which might be quite
unsatisfactory to a captor.
Assigning our own cases to these categories is complicated by
several problems. First, only some cases could be described as
genuine cases of identity destruction. Second, in a number of these
cases we do not know through what psychological stages the pris-
Socio-psychologtcal Theories 22 7
oner went. Third, some cases seem clearly to illustrate a desperate
switching from role to role (with mounting guilt for the role-playing
itself). Others illustrate what would seem to be a temporary state
of complete identity diffusion. Lifton (1956) implies in his analysis
that most of his cases reached such a point of diffusion.
This issue is crucial in terms of any conception of resistance to
coercive persuasion. If the prisoner can find a role which is accept-
able to his cellmates and interrogators without complying or being
strongly influenced, he has found a powerful way to resist coercive
persuasion. Perhaps the crucial variable is the sophistication of the
Cellmates in identifying and rejecting roles which are not consistent
with the reform aims of the prison; i.e., their skill in identifying the
individual who is managing to withhold personal involvement or is
successfully playing the role of the penitent criminal without really
believing in his guilt. We have said in another context that a cell
should be more effective in locating such “role deception” than an
isolated interrogator might be, because there will be a greater likeli-
hood that among a number of individuals there will be at least one
whose own personal style gives him the capacity to see through what-
ever the prisoner is trying to do, to expose him, and thus to force
him into more “honest" change.
Turning now to the problem of finding and accepting a new role
and identity, there seems to be agreement that tliis occurs through
the prisoner’s finding a model in a cellmate or in the interrogator and
identifying with him. Here again the group cell heightens the proba-
bility of successful relearning because of the increased likelihood
that the prisoner can find someone among his cellmates with whom
to identify, and because the intimate cell life permits the administra-
tion of immediate reward once a step in the right direction is taken
by the prisoner. According to Litton the sequence then consists of
moving from the role of "guilty criminal” ( during which the confes-
sion is constructed) to the role of “repentant sinner,” the latter shift
involving extensive self-re-evaluation and the formulation of a con-
ception of self based on premises more acceptable to Communism.
Such a shift is largely accomplished through the identification with
someone who has already accepted such premises about himself. The
prisoner thus acquires a new frame of reference and new reference
228 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
groups in terms of which to make judgments.
The depth and permanence of identity changes will depend, as wc
have detailed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7, on the experiences of the
repatriate following his release. If his new identity finds support, it
will be sustained; if it fails to be supported, the person will be
forced into still another influence process. Support need not be
limited to reinforcement by significant others. If elements of the
new identity come to be integrated into and play important func-
tions in the individual’s total personality, they will be more or less
permanent and the experience may retrospectively be viewed by the
subject as having been a therapeutic one.
Critique
1. The most important thing to be said about the kind of theory
presented above is that it applies especially to those prisoners who
were influenced at the level of their beliefs and attitudes. The theory
is important, then, to the extent that our aim is to explain those
cases which involved belief and attitude change, not to explain all
possible reactions to imprisonment.
2. This kind of theory is complex in that it involves many complex
variables, the precise or reliable measurement of which is far from
easy. It is therefore difficult to test, just as the psychoanalytic
formulations axe difficult to test. On the other hand, the theory’s
complexity also gives it greater explanatory power in that it makes
possible the explanation of many separate cases of coercive per-
suasion in which the outcome in terms of influence was very differ-
ent.
3. One of the chief virtues of this kind of theoretical conception,
we feel, lies in its making the self or identity a central concept and
point of reference. Insofar as coercive persuasion involves attempts
to change central beliefs and attitudes, and insofar as such beliefs
and attitudes tend to be organized around the self-conception, it
stands to reason that this self-concepion must become a central target
of influence. The Communists, of course, use the language of self,
identity, and role as the idiom in which to communicate their politi-
cal conceptions and to describe what the prisoner is expected to
accomplish in his "thought reform.”
229
Socto -psych ohgical Theories
If one takes the self as a point of reference, a great many other
theoretical positions can be fitted comfortably into a broad model of
change. For example, the theorizing about self-conception tends to
refine and supplement the learning theory formulations at several
points:
a. A concrete motive is suggested, need for sense of self, which
drives forward the learning process, and conditions are stated in
terms of environmental manipulations which allow for the estimation
of the strength of the motive in a given prisoner at a given time.
b. A concrete definition of reinforcement is suggested, i.e., that
the significant reinforcers for the prisoner are self-confirming cues
from cellmates and interrogator, reductions of personal and physical
threat, and material rewards like medicine and food if specific
deprivations exist (though it should be emphasized again that for
many prisoners the latter reinforcer was not very signicant because
they were not sick or underfed).
c. A concrete mechanism is suggested by which new behavioral
and cognitive responses are initially learned, i.e., identification with
cellmates or interrogator.
d. The suggestion is made that learning via cellmates can be very
effective because reinforcement follows very closely the emission
of a response. . . , .
The identity change conception is, of course, also quite consistent
with previously cited psychoanalytic formulations, but goes beyond
them at a number of points: .
a. While unconsciously-based guilt may be a ley motive in some
individuals, identity theory provides other possible ™bveS'rfJc
would produce change in the individual! even with > respec< to gn . .
the evidence suggests that many kinds of gu.lt cat. be _aroused 1 in
ercive persuasion of which some of die most ™
feelings pertaining to failure to bve up to ones self-image eg
ideal) or failure to remain loyal to groups with
Bed (these lands of guilt may be stimulable ™ .
individuals than guilt based upon unresolved childhood oolitic )
• A simpler chaape mechante, ^
230 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
b. Identity change conceptions refine the crucial area of prisoner
relations with other prisoners, an area which we felt is insufficiently
analyzed by psychoanalytic formulations. The same point can be
made with respect to the prisoners integration into various kinds of
groups, his current emotional commitments, and his reference
groups.
c. By noting that identification can occur with a cellmate, the
suggestion is made that there may be two basic types of influence
which can occur through identification: "rcsocialization” occurring
primarily through identification with a parent figure like the inter-
rogator; and "reinitiation” or forced integration into a group, which
occurs primarily through identification with other incumbents for
the status and role of group member.*
The relationship between psycho-physiological stress theory and
identity-change theory is somewhat more difficult to unravel. In
some sense these theories stand in opposition in that the former states
the sufficiency of psycho-physiological stresses to explain prisoner
compliance, while the latter argues that only certain kinds of psy-
chological stresses can explain prisoner compliance, specifically,
those directed at the prisoner s sense of identity. Part of the problem
lies in the different aims of the theories. Hinkle & Wolff, for example,
set out to explain the reactions of all types of prisoners to all types of
stresses under both Russion and Chinese handling. This aim would,
of necessity, lead to a broader and less refined kind of theory. Our
aim is to explain the small number of cases of belief and attitude
change, and what we are asserting is that in those cases the psycho-
physiological factors, as broadly outlined by Hinkle & Wolff, offer
insufficient explanation and overemphasize the role of pain and
WCTe not sparing in their utilization of accusations that the person was not even
living up to his own stated ideals, but such pressure seemed to act more as an
unfreezing force than a force toward change.
The whole psychology of adolescent and adult Initiation has, in our opin-
ion, been insufficiently analyzed. It is quite possible that one would End in the
passage ot an adult from one key position to another coercive persuasion
processes which are not too dissimilar to ones we have described here. In a
sense coercive persuasion can be best understood if one regards it as a par-
Ucularly intensive initiation rite geared to prepare prisoners to become pro-
ductive members of Chinese Communist society, as this concept is defined by
them (see Chapter 2).
Socio-psychological Theories 231
debilitation.
The crux of the issue lies in the concept of “the breaking point.”
There has been much discussion of this concept; whether every man
has onej how one should determine its location, whether its location
can be altered by suitable training and indoctrination, etc. In all of
the conceptions the assumption is implicit, however, that the break-
ing point has something to do with the individuals ability to tolerate
physical pain in some absolute sense. Lip service is usually paid to
the fact that fear of pain is more painful than the actual physical
sensation, and that psychological factors can influence the percep-
tion of pain in many ways; but the final implication is seldom drawn
that “breaking point” may not have anything to do with physical
pain whatsover, but may be primarily a psychological process in
which self-conception plays a central role.
We have to distinguish two points: (a) a point of physiological
breakdown where the pain has produced diffident trauma of one
sort or another that the prisoner faints or in some other way defends
himself at a basic physiological level; and (b) a point of psycho-
logical giving-in which may be thought of as die pom w “
prisoner sees himself as having reached a level o pain
where his physical self is about to be destroyed or where
fundamental damage is about to be done to his seU-eoooepb homay
be far from the potat of physiological breakdown whenhe hat the
perception of having reached his limit (a response ttefainttag may.
of cornse, also occur here but for psychology be ^
It is our contention that very few, if any, p . ^ point>
pected to behave in terms of the first concephon of a
Such behavior would require that the iod.v.dual had r^cl,' P
of ceasing to care about his body as a ^If
ceasing to care how much pam an a “ , physical sensations
tolerating, and being quite unamuous about phys.e^ ^ ^
involved. Without specific traming to assu i itwou ldnotbe
means ofyoga or some prisoner.
232 „ Theories of Coercive Persuasion
with the individual’s self-conception in order to make any reliable
prediction concerning the effects of psycho-physiological stresses.^
Our argument has an important implication for resistance training.
If it is true that the breaking point comes for most people far short
of their physiological limit of endurance, it is possible by suitable
training to increase their capacity to resist physical pressure by
teaching them to tolerate greater levels of physical pain. Such train-
ing would have to be aimed at showing the potential prisoner that
the amount of damage to body and self which is actually done by
certain kinds of traumas is perhaps less than he believes in terms of
his self-conception. For example, one wonders how many prisoners
were aware that even if fingernails were pulled out that they would
grow back normally. The prisoner also needs the information that
certain physiological stresses may produce permanent damage yet
be avoidable. The best example concerned the dietary problems of
rOWs in Korea. One wonders how many POW*s were aware of the
fact that by not eating everything which was in any way edible they
were risking permanent damage to their eyes and other organs and
in many cases their life. If preservation of psychological and bodily
self is to be maximized, information about the effects of different
kinds of psycho-physiological stresses must be maximized.
Given this psychological concept of “breaking point,” what are the
psychological consequences of “giving in”? A prisoner may give in
at a point where he believes he can no longer tolerate pain, only to
discover that he has not really suffered much damage. Then he may
feel guilty for not resisting more strongly and must cope with the
guilt in addition to the captor’s pressures. If he can be made aware
that such giving-in short of the physiological limit is the normal re-
sponse, that it does not constitute personal failure, and that physio-
logically he still has many resources, his capacity to resist should be
sharply increased.
4 . The chief shortcoming of the “Identity Theory,” as well as of
the theoretical conceptions discussed in the earlier sections, is its
failure to deal explicitly with the problem of how change in belief
or self-conception actually comes about. What actually happens at
the level of the person’s cognitions which can account for some of
the dramatic changes in verbal behavior which repatriates have ex-
233
Socio-psychological Theories
hibited?
In summary, what we have somewhat loosely labeled "Identity
theory contributes some further refinements to tie theoretical
analysis: -
1. The placement of the “self-image” or “identity” at the center of
the conceptual scheme.
2. A depiction of the unfreezing, changing, and refreezing proc-
esses as being primarily socio-psychological and concerned with
interpersonal forces.
3. Emphasis on interpersonal communication and peer-group rela-
tions.
4. A specification of the role of social cues and a consideration of
the possible impact of over- as well as under-stimulation.
5. A definition of the breaking point as essentially a function of
the subject s self-image.
6. The suggestion that identification with peers represents a dif-
ferent kind of influence process from identification with authority
figures.
7. The hypothesis that guilt-anxiety is only one of several possible
motives for changing.
COGNITIVE THEORY
The cognitive formulation below is a combination of our own ideas
and those of Lifton, and was developed to explain the events which
occur during the phase of coercive persuasion which we have
previously labeled “changing." Given a prisoner with some readiness
to change, how does the change actually occur at a cognitive level
and how does it lead to new behavior and beliefs?
The primary effect of unfreezing is that it makes the prisoner seek
information which will guide him in finding an adaptational solution
to his problems. Such information can be gotten to some extent from
the propaganda input to him via the mass media, lectures, loud-
speakers, etc., but more likely is obtained from cellmates or inter-
rogators who begin to be models of how to adapt successfully. The
prisoner who has been unfrozen begins to treat the interpersonal
cues he obtains from them as credible and valid, and begins to take
their point of view seriously, where previously he may have paid
234 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
no attention to it or even discounted it The unfreezing stage, then,
can be thought of as making available to the prisoner some channels
of information input, or rather, making the prisoner open himself
to certain kinds of information input
The information to which the prisoner begins to pay attention con-
tains the following lands of data: (1) Data about himself; i.e., the
prisoner begins to see how his cellmates actually perceive him, and
to become aware of the fact that they actually believe him to be
guilty of crimes which he is “obstinately” refusing to admit. (2) Data
about his cellmates; i.e., the prisoner begins to see how some of his
cellmates (the more reformed ones) view the world, the lands of
assumptions they make, the way they reason and draw conclusions,
what they believe in, and by what standards of evaluation they oper-
ate; he also learns something of their past history and the experiences
they have had which clarify for him some of their current percep-
tions, feelings, and beliefs. (3) Data about China, its history and
political development, the rise of Communism and its role in the
China of today, the manner in which Communism defines its rela-
tionship to the rest of the world (e.g., its unceasing struggle against
real or imagined enemies or reactionary attitudes, etc.; see Chapter
3 for further elaborations of this point), the position of the foreigner
in Communist China during the Korean hostilities, etc.*
The key process of reorganization which then occuned involved
the recognition on the part of the prisoner that certain of the
premises held by his cellmates, certain of their standards of evalu-
ation, and certain of their feelings deriving from their acceptance of
Communist premises did indeed make him guilty in their eyes. For
example, he might recognize that if his Chinese cellmates believed
themselves to be in an economic and psychological struggle with
America, and if they perceived America’s intervention in the Korean
War to have been an act of hostility as a prelude to invading China,
then indeed they would be justified in regarding with great suspicion
Of course, when we spent of data here, we mean data only in the sense of
what was accepted by the interrogators and the cellmates as factual. When we
say that the prisoner began to pay attention to such data, we do not mean that
he began to believe what his cellmates believed, but only that he began to
attempt to understand their position by trying intellectually to see the world
through their eyes.
Socio-psychofogical Theories 235
any Westerner who remained in China after the outbreak of hostili-
ties and continued to communicate various kinds of information to
the outside. Furthermore, the Western prisoner could see that his
Chinese cellmates were justified in holding the opinion that the new
government was fair and lenient if they had had concrete experience
with KMT police methods, and if they felt that the standard of living
in the prison was much higher than ever before, and if they wanted
a chance for a decent future life. The fact that he had no adequate
trial might not mean anything to him since he might not have had
any under the KMT either. Perhaps the greatest shock to the pris-
oner was the recognition that, from the standpoint of certain premises
which his cellmates accepted, the conclusions they drew and the
evaluations they made were quite rational and defensible. If he had
built, as so many prisoners had, defenses around the notion that the
system was irrational and merely devoted to getting him to ore*
it could be a great shock to be confronted by a point of view which
was different but quite reasonable and quite sincerely held.
The disagreement between the point of view of the prisoner and
that of his cellmates was then discovered 10 be primarily a matter of
how certain key concepts were defined and how certain facts o
human behavior were theorized about. The pnsoncr began to see
that guilt and crime had an entirely different meaning in the Com-
munist frame of reference (see Chapter 5) and that £ °
crime were defined quite differently in ftis frame o f
tag this process was the discovery by the prisoner that : some i of to
strongly held co^ctionsi^<m^h^captis^ w^^behke^sero
not valid— the prisoner found that ius expe ~ icncv “ an( j
Communist malevolence were erroneous, cellmates' view
willingness to reform the prisoner wer t j c treatment ho
of theta experience being the ejodeoce). ^oogh the ^
received was bad from an absolute point ol view,
as bad as he had expected^ ^ nc w semantics.
The acceptance of the new neW theory of human bo-
thenewstand^of^J^^ Uiree forces: (1) theneed tobc
of imprisonment; (2J tiie
which would make further adap-
havdor'dien probably resulted from Uuee f
able to explain
need to find a cognitive mechanism v
230 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
tab'on to the prison situation possible; e.g., once the prisoner had dis-
covered how crime was defined and evaluated, he could locate those
behaviors in his own past which constituted crime from this point of
view and construct the confession which was wanted; (3) the need
to get social reinforcement from his cellmates-, i.c., any degree of
understanding on the prisoner’s part of his cellmates' point of view
would presumably be perceived by the cellmates as a change of
altitude which they would strongly reward as being a fundamental
step toward reform/
It is important that this process not be confused with a process of
merely granting to someone with whom one is in conflict his defini-
tion of terms. The process we have described above involves much
more — the genuine understanding of how the other person thinks
about his world, the recognition that such a way of thinking has
validity for him, the recognition that it is fair under the circum-
stances for the other to expect the prisoner to think the same way
he docs, and finally the application of this way of thinking by the
prisoner to his own behavior. The degree to which genuine re-
organization was involved could be surmised from the ease with
which the prisoner began to be able to remember pieces of behavior
which now fitted together into a pattern of crime. Having adopted
the peoples standpoint" he could construct his confession and rec-
ognize his guilt.
Having recognized the criminality of certain of his past beliaviors,
the next step was for the prisoner to apply the general theory of
crime to himself, the step which Lifton calls “die broadening of
guflL Tlsc prisoner must recognize that his crimes were an inevi-
table result of his class origins and that lie is in fact guilty simply
because of tliese origins and the attitudes which go with them. His
own guilt, he., the wrongness" of his attitudes, is demonstrated to
liim over and over again in the crowded life of die cell through the
criticism of his cellmates — the prisoner is told he is selfish, he does
not have appropriate concern for the working classes, he does not
appreciate die excellent food diat the prison dispenses or the high
finality of the accommodations, and so on. Again, these criticisms
Ime a real impact only after die prisoner begins to understand that
Uw cellmates really feel this way, and tint for them die prison really
Sodo-psy dialogical Theories ' 237
is “a good deal” that the food really is good, that they are Iuciy to
have heat in their cells, and so on.
The constant exhortation to examine himself and criticize himself
focuses the prisoner on his own identity in a manner calculated to
reveal whatever faults he might believe himself to have, in addition
to the ones pointed out by the cellmates. If he has adopted an orien-
tation of trying genuinely to understand himself from his new per-
spective, he will likely find many things to feci guilty about in his
relations to others. That is, the conception of political crime now
may generalize as a concept of crime being “any relationship to the
Chinese people which he exploited for personal gain. Failure to
understand the “real feelings" of the Chinese people would, of
course, be one of the biggest crimes he would perceive, especially if
Ids life in China had consisted of contacts with the diplomatic set
and a small number of middle- and upper-class Chinese. TTie pris-
oner could readily generalize this perception further to include his
relationships with people as a whole, and if this process occurrct ic
might attempt to make changes in himself which would have long-
run consequences in areas quite separated from politics. It was tills
land of experience which, wo believe, led some repatriates to report
some years after the repatriation that imprisonment was genuinely
therapeutic for them and made them “better poop c.
An excellent example of lids process can be given from one ot the
coses quoted by Litton, that of a European pnest:
“And now, like a monster from out or the abyss, the M-' "f;
ration dawns: You, the missionary, the herald of the grope . ( rf
messenger of the imperialist conquerors, their P • j flcr
your ethnological and industrial reports on
the occupation ol your missionland you g J a „ Wc .
many different services- L ’ jin? question whether
it not now prove as a big, long 7 coo j , 0 jJ* people
Yes, the scope of pur conuptmg eeUsaty is
enlarged: what you do.
038 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
colleagues do. Thus you cannot escape the fact that your society and your
mission are to be regarded as spy centers, sending out reports to both
headquarters, and that Rome becomes the world center, from where
impe rialis t governments draw their perverting information.
“As proof that you now condemn this process you must at once give
full information about the spy activities of your society, of your mission,
and of Rome. By doing this you acquire the mentality of the new regime,
which alone will make you realize the sins of your past life and those of
your comrades. Only this mentality will give you true guidance for your
future work. With that, the chances for your pardon are greatly en-
hanced.” [Lift on, 1956b, p. 188]
A crucial question is, of course, how much of what we have called
cognitive reorganization is built on false logic and cognitive dis-
tortion. The logic of Communism is beyond the scope of this analysis,
but some comments can be made which may clarify the issue.
Cognitive distortion probably plays a larger role in that phase of
coercive persuasion which we have called unfreezing than it does in
the change process which has just been described. It is in his initial
dealings with the interrogator and cellmates that the prisoner finds
himself being trapped into conclusions which he cannot accept or
into making confessions which he later repudiates. He recognizes the
logic as false and sees the attempt of the captor to distort facts be-
came he does not as yet see all the steps and all the premises from
which the captor is operating. From the interrogator’s point of view
this process is one of probing for the weaknesses in the criminal’s
defense. He is pretty sure in terms of his dossier that the prisoner is
guilty, ut e is not completely sure about the specific crimes, hence
test out various possibilities by trying to get the prisoner to
ess to many different things. The prisoner who does not go be-
y° n . , °* conflict with his captors is not influenced at the
suaded of n ° l ^ **** coercive, J r P er '
inr ^.| k C | 0 ^ er ^ ie prisoner who identifies with cellmates or
° r f 5 . 3 Wa y a dapting to the situation, one who has been
r 30 “ read y to change, finds in the logic of his models a
co £ ni ve steps which are reasonable and plausible. The
Sodo-psychohgtCal Theories
question still remains: Are these steps of thinking really logical or
only seemingly so? We believe that they are as logical as any set of
reasons ever are for holding certain attitudes, which means that they
probably would not stand up under detailed formal analysis but
that they are entirely plausible given the premises and experiences
of the person who holds them. Thus, if one is influenced through the
process of identification, that is, through the process of adopting new
attitudes by seeing the world through one's models eyes, one accepts
the psycho-logic” of the model and treats it as entirely rational.*
Probably the initial question is somewhat beside the point. There
is always a certain amount of distortion, sharpening, leveling, and
false logic in the beliefs and attitudes which other people acquire.
Because people are ambivalent on many issues it is easy to play up
some “facts” and play down others when our value position or feel-
ing changes. Coercive persuasion involves no more or less of such
distortion than other kinds of influence, but our popular image of
"brainwashing” suggests that somehow the process consists of ex-
tensive self-delusion and excessive distortion. We feel that tills
image is a false one; it is based on our lack of familiarity with or
knowledge about the process and the fact that so much publicity
was given to the political influence which resulted in a few cases.
In summary, the change process viewed as a series of cognitive
steps can be described as follows;
1. Learning to pay attention to a certain class of information
wlii cJi is available in the environment
2. Learning a new frame of reference for organizing and evalu-
ation behavior and the self, which involves: (a) new basic premises
to reason from; (b) new semantics, i.e., new denotative and con-
notative definitions of certain key concepts like “crime’' and “guilt";
(c) new standards of evaluation or judgment, i.e., new anchors or
neutral points for the dimensions on which evaluations arc to bo
made which shift the ranges of stimuli judged to be, for example,
• In a recent unpublished paper CarfinW (1053) hat ahnmhtJOmdy the
many conceptions which sociologically define the term rationality When we
salYha? someone has acted rationally this can mean any of a great variety of
♦hL!™ 3 sneh thln« as “taking into account alternatives, considerin';
<**»•»
personal Ik Bop « «“» » f rtc -
240
Theories of Coercive Persuasion
"good” or "bad," " O.K .” or “not O.K.,” "fair” or "not fair.”
3. Applying this frame of reference to one’s own behavior and
discovering why one was “guilty” in the Communists’ eyes.
4. Applying basic premises about the causes of guilt to one's basic
self and recognizing aspects of this self which deserved condemna-
tion and required change.
5. Using the new frame of reference,' or portions of it, after repa-
triation to evaluate behavior, both own and others, producing judg-
ments and evaluations which appear to others to represent dramatic
shifts in belief and attitude which cannot be understood.
Critique
1. The biggest problem with the cognitive type of explanation is
its complexity and the difficulty of specifying exactly what is meant
operationally. Whether this is inherent in the terminology or repre-
sents a lack of theoretical clarity on our part is difficult to judge. On
the positive side, we feel it to be essential to refine the area which
is usually covered by such loose terms as “changing your mind,”
"becoming converted,” “having insight,” “changing your beliefs and
attitudes, etc. The problem lies in spelling out the relationships
between overt non-verbal behavior, overt verbal behavior, covert
symbolic behavior (thinking), and various processes such as those
described above— learning new definitions for old concepts, broad-
ening the range of perceptions which are classified into a given con-
cept, shifting ones scales of judgment, shifting the anchors in new
and old scales of judgment, and so on.
2. Cognitive formulations like the present one cannot, of course,
be divorced from motivational analyses like those presented in the
our prece g sections. These formulations supplement each other
an eac is necessary. In fact the relationship between motivation
" ° ne ° f the ™ st interesting areas of psy-
gy o unravel. It seems quite clear from the study of coercive
-fu ■°f e cann °i equate information available in the cn-
Thp mnf'vT' \ 0 . r P iat i° n w ^i c h will be perceived by the prisoner.
_ _ 1 «‘*° n SI ^ e experience concerns the problem of
., £ ? t ^ e i > . Ua ^ rea diness” for certain kinds of information,
par y y s oying or undermining certain perceptual defenses.
Socio-psychologlcal Theories 241
3. The cognitive formulation puts heavy emphasis on the assump-
tion that the prisoner is at all times engaged in organizing and
evaluating his information input, that he is at no point in his experi-
ence simply an empty organism into which the captor can pour con-
ceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.
In conclusion, we feel that only with a cognitive conception such
-as the one presented above is it possible to understand fully how
some prisoners could undergo what would be described by most
observers as a “conversion" to Communism. That phase of the in-
fluence process which wc have called changing cannot be under-
stood without a cognitive sequence being specified.
SOCIAL-INFLUENCE AND ATTITUDE-CHANGE
THEORIES AND EXPERIMENTS
It would stand to reason that the fields of psychology which have
devoted themselves to studying the problems of social influence and
attitude change would have the most to contribute to an
ing of coercive persuasion. There is, however, an impor an
why they probably cannot claim such a position— name y,
been in to Odd a tradition of doing basic «pcmna.bl work *
humans, and such work has typically precluded: (1)
beliefs and values which are fundamental to the person, ,
ing at motivational levels which could produce severe traum ^.n tl
(3) creating experimental conditions which cou pr eencra |Jy
and irreversible changes in the subject. E»pe ^cultural
been limited by what the espcnmcnlal subjects m «
norms would tolerate. It is possible O tout attitude
lions wo have missed not only we .lull
relevance of many of the studies.
Dissonance Reduction a theory of
^ito^ng^thS^aiUkin'd — ~
242 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
duced by coercive persuasion." Festingers basic assumption is that
when two or more cognitions (thoughts, perceptions, implications or
behavior engaged in, etc.) are inconsistent with each other, U
inconsistency creates a state of “dissonance and such a state mo-
tivates the individual to do something which will reduce the dis-
sonance; i.e., dissonance acts as a powerful motive. Fcstingcr feels
that one of the most common causes of a state of dissonance is the
performance by a person of an action that is inconsistent with
some value or belief he holds. The acUon may take place on impube
without having been thought through, it may have been elicited by
a trick or goad of another person, it may have occurred under the
influence of alcohol, or have been coerced, etc., but the fact re-
mains that its commission implies certain things about the person
which he now must bring into h'ne with his values, beliefs, and seu-
unagu. ^ ,
The dissonance between the implications of the behavior and the
person’s values, beliefs, and/or self-image can be reduced either by
“undoing” the behavior, i.e., changing its implications, or by chang-
ing the beliefs, values, or self-image. Fcstinger asserts that the un-
doing of the implications of behavior is by far the more difficult
thing to do, hence belief, value, or self-image change will more
likely occur. That is, the overt behavior usually constitutes a more
final commitment in that it involves others, is very salient, may
have set into motion consequences for the originator and others, and
so on. The privately held belief may have less of such commitment
attached to it, hence may be more changeable.
The implication of this point of view for the analysis of coercive
persuasion is clear — if the prisoner commits acts, for whatever
reason, which have certain kinds of consequences or implications
be produces dissonance which then must be dealt with. Such be-
havior might be a confession which the prisoner is aware will hurt
some group or his country, a denunciation of a loved one, an act
of informing on a fellow prisoner, or any behavior which violates
important values held (e.g., a priest acting ungenerously to a fel-
• These Ideas were communicated to E. Schein by Fcstingcr in a scries of
conversations and do not appear in his book. Our apologies if we have mis-
quoted him.
Socio-psychohgical Theories 243
low prisoner). Its committing aspect may be that it is witnessed by
others, becomes public through the mass media, or simply is
witnessed by the person himself.
Once the behavior has occurred and the dissonance been created,
the prisoner has the following alternatives: (1) to tolerate the dis-
sonance; (2) to reduce the dissonance by rationalizing that his
behavior was coerced (by “rationalizing” we mean here simply
choosing a certain reason from among several as the dominant
one; for example, some behavior may or may not in fact have been
coerced from the point of view of an outside observer, but this is
irrelevant to the choosing of coercion as a reason for the behavior);
(3) to try to undo the committing aspects of the behavior (c.g.,
repudiate the confession, though this may produce urt ler is-
sonance in that the prisoner now must see himself as t e so o
person who would make and then repudiate a confession); : (4 )
to find reasons why the behavior was justifiable on pounds : other
than that it was coerced. It is the last of these altcrna ves ™
cognitively produces a change of belief (e.g., e
made because, so the prisoner believes, the acts nlletred
fession actually occurred, or actually had the imp 1C
- .he confession). Of course,. 5
greatly aided by the presence in
ample justifications for the behavior which was ""
whole set of ideological premises wldch jus y danger
The only check on tins kind of belief would ^
of creating even greater * sso "“ c ® S to rationalize a con-
the total belief system. It might be temp g j( be
fession in terms of some Communist P rci ™ ’ . another which
discovered by the prisoner .hot ihrs prejn.se leadsjo nno _ ^ ^
Is in even greater conflict with rTnm nIe might be a priest
oner is not prepared to change- A - g ! f^o/was justifiable
confessing and coming to be ie\e i . discover that
because it ns helping the Chmcsc * tf )C role of the
Loirs a “ i,ud,! cta3C
244 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
least as far as one could surmise from prisoner accounts); i.e.,
that the typical coercive persuasion sequence was to get a be-
havioral commitment which then produced dissonance, the reduc-
tion of which then produced the belief change.
Critique
1. Festinger s theory of dissonance reduction is very similar to
those learning formulations which state that coerced behavior pro-
duces conflict, the reduction of which acts as a reinforcer for any
cognitive response which reduces it. Its main value lies in the ex-
plicit analysis which is made of belief changes in a variety of
situations and in the careful spelling out of the relationships which
obtain between overt behavioral commitment and covert private
beliefs. In his book, Festinger gives considerable experimental evi-
dence to show that beliefs are indeed quite responsive to overt com-
mitments which have been made, and that the adult human will
change his cognitions drastically to preserve a sense of inner har-
mony, i.e., to avoid dissonance. This is not to say that beliefs are
more malleable than behavior. Rather, because behavior is more
malleable, it must, in a sense, be changed before beliefs can be ex-
pected to change. In general, he asserts, that if one wants to change
beliefs or attitudes one should change the overt behavior first be-
cause this is generally easier to do than to attack the beliefs and
values directly. This point would be especially true in those situa-
tions in which the consequences of a given behavior are not im-
mediately obvious, e.g., making a concession in an argument on an
early premise which seems trivial, signing an innocuous-sounding
peace petition in POW camp, etc.
2. The problems of applying Festinger's formulation are, how-
ever, serious ones. First of all, as we have previously stated, the
captor did not have an easy time at all in eliciting behavior which
would produce dissonance. Especially with regard to the matter of
making a confession, it seemed as if a prolonged unfreezing bad to
occur before behavioral commitments were made by the prisoner.
Festinger would probably argue that the unfreezing process itself
consisted of a series of minor behavioral commitments which could
only be justified by going farther along the path of confession and
Socio-psijchological Theories 245
attitude change, but such a formulation would leave out of the
picture the effects which have been observed to result from psycho-
physiological stresses which debilitate the person (i.e., great sug-
gestibility which, in turn, should make the subject more tolerant of
dissonance — Orwell’s “double-think” would be a good example), the
problems of dealing with guilt, and the problems of trying to main-
tain a viable self-image. Each of these problems could probably be
translated into dissonance terms as they can be into learning theory
terms, but then our criticism would be the same for both they
are both too general and too unrefined to be fruitful analytical tools.
3. The dissonance formulation seems to oversimplify cognitive
operations. For example, a prisoner who committed himself be-
haviorally by confessing and who then accepted the justifying be-
liefs which the environment offered liim found himself under pres-
sure immediately to prove the "sincerity” of his acceptance of the
beliefs and attitudes by showing willingness to engage in mm© ex-
treme behaviors such as denouncing loved ones or highly va ue
groups. To prevent himself from getting into such a vicious cycle
the prisoner often simply tolerated the dissonance. e w o e
question of specifying the conditions under which dissonance can
be tolerated must be explored before the theory becomes fruitfully
if* often true that any of a number of belief andatU.ude
changes could reduce dissonance by adequate yra o o ,jj
behavior engaged in. The particular raUonatouon chosen "ill
depend, of course, on its acceptability and tiie degree *]
leads to reinforcement from significant oU.« m theaftuatta. ft
however, the reference group of significant o ther, ahfaj ™
new f onp does no. atstept the first groups dis-
laborated might
accepting certain Communist d ‘ a. percon mold
• F» dir/o ”' it tl which lie, «. a
stop being iniiuenced is if b “JJ* ^ h c ha, been consented
dimension qusI.MUvely occo, -ben Chun sUtmgly held
Such qualitative change
values are suddenly encountered.
; ; after repatriation such
245 Theories oj Coercive Persuasion
rationalizations would make the individual a deviant, but other
rationalizations would be available— namely that the collaborative
behavior had been coerced or that the individual had been “brain-
washed” Such Hexibility poses the problem of being able to state
some conditions under which belief change will be stable, even
if the reference group shifts. The postulation of identification as a
mechanism of change overcomes this difficulty in that the emotional
relationhip can survive even if the parties to it are physically sep-
arated, or if reference groups shift.
5. Experimental evidence is widely available pertaining to belief
and attitude changes which follow forced compliance or behavioral
commitment Such evidence goes all the way back to the observa-
tions of World War I that in literacy training for illiterate troops
the writing out of certain statements (as part of the process of
learning how to write) led to the acceptance of attitudes which
were reflected in the statements themselves. In his book Festinger
cites data from a variety of carefully controlled experiments which
demonstrate, for example, that: (1) following a decision there will
be an active seeking out of information which produces cognitions
consonant with the action taken; (2) following a choice between
alternatives there will be an increase in the attractiveness of the
chosen alternative and a decrease of the unchosen one; (3) follow-
ing a forced public statement of opinion (if different from subjects
own) there is a significant shift in the subject’s private opinion; (4)
if subjects are exposed to information which would produce dis-
sonance they are able to misperceive, fail to pay attention, or distort
it in a manner calculated to minimize dissonance, etc.
Strong support for the conception that active participation and
behavioral commitment is a key device for producing attitude
change also comes from several experiments carried out at Yale by
Janis and King (Janis & King, 1954; King & Janis, 1956), from
studies in which attitude change resulting from role shifts was
measured (Licbennan, 1956), etc. In the Janis and King studies it
was shown that subjects would shift toward an opinion different
from their own original one if the)' were put into the position of
having to deliver a speech which argued for the new opinion.
Lieberman showed that workers promoted to foreman would change
Soda-psychological Theories ‘ ' m
their attitudes In the direction of prevailing foreman attitudes within
ma er of months, and 11 demoted (as happened in sufficient num-
bers to observe the same subjects through two role shifts) re-
adopted the prevailing attitudes of the worker group.
In ail these experimental situations the position to be accepted
was highly visible. The problem of how the prisoner finds what be-
liefs and values to acquire, how he comes to leam to pay attention
to his cellmates, is not illuminated by this line of research.
Compliance, Identification, and Internalization
Experiments on influence and attitude change have traditionally
paid little attention to the mechanisms which underlie the change,
concentrating instead on isolating the variables in the communica-
tion source, in the communication content, and in the nature of the
receiver of the communication which predict actually observed
change. Recently, however, a number of formulations have ap-
peared which imply that the change process may occur by any of
several mechanisms, and that the degree, depth, and permanence
of change are crucially affected by which mechanism is operating.
We shall not discuss all of these models in the present chapter, con-
centrating instead on Kelman’s (1958), because it is an excellent
synthesis of several of the others, and has been experimentally
supported.
Kebnan argues that overt change of behavior can reflect any one
of three underlying processes:
1. Compliance: In which the S changes his behavior in order to
obtain some reward or avoid some punishment; i.e., he is trying
to control the social effects of his behavior.
2. Identification: In which the S changes because he wants to
maintain or establish a satisfying self-defining relationship to an-
other person or group; S believes in the induced behavior but its
actual content is irrelevant to him; it is the act of conforming (of
maintaining the relationship) which is satisfying.
3. Internalization: In which the S changes because he recog-
nizes the content of the new behavior to be intrinsically awarding;
i.e., it serves to provide a solution to a perceived problem or fulfills a
personal need.
248 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
The kind of influence process which is likely to occur will de-
pend, according to Kelman, on the kind of power the influence agent
possesses. If he can control the S’s basic fate and the means of ac-
complishing his goals, the influence is likely to be compliance and
to be in evidence only when the agent is present If the agent s basis
of power is his attractiveness for the S, the influence will take the
form of identification and will be in evidence so long as the relation-
ship persists or is salient. If the agent’s basis of power is his ex-
pertness with respect to solving problems of a type which S has
and perceives, the influence will take the form of internalization
and will be in evidence whenever conditions are relevant regard-
less of the amount of surveillance or attractiveness of the agent
In an experiment dealing with different influence sources to which
different kinds of power were attributed it was demonstrated by
Kelman that the theory could predict the extent and permanence of
attitude changes.
Critique
1. Kelmans typology of influence processes is highly relevant to
our analysis in that it sharpens the distinctions between the various
lands of outcomes which we have attributed to coercive persuasion.
Clearly some of the prisoners only complied with their captors, show-
ing the effects of influence only during the time that they were
under surveillance. Some prisoners, as we have indicated, came to
identify with their interrogrator or cellmate and were influenced
in the more fundamental fashion which identification implies.
Finally, some prisoners found in the Communist attitudes some
solutions to personal problems and internalized these solutions.
2. The main problem with the applicability of the Kelman for-
mulation is that the interaction among the processes of compliance,
identification, and internalization has not as yet been spelled out.
To what extent will compliance lead to identification, or identifica-
tion lead to internalization? Can and do these processes overlap?
We have previously argued against the glib explanation of influence
as a process of rationalizing behavior elicited by compliance, on the
grounds that compliance could not readily be predicted for any
given prisoner. Therefore, it is not of major concern to us whether
Socio-psychological Theories 249
compliance leads to identification or internalization (though this
is an interesting theoretical problem in its own right). We are more
concerned about the relationship of identification to internalization
insofar as it is our contention that the crucial influence step is the
one where the prisoner begins to identify with cellmate or in-
terrogator. Two kinds of connection between identification and
internalization can be spelled out:
a. Through identifying with a cellmate or interrogator the pris-
oner may discover a way of viewing the world which exposes to
him some personal problems he has and which he can solve by
being influenced; that is, the influence agent may, in effect, provide
both the problem and the solution, which implies that internaliza-
tion can logically follow identification. A good example would be
the case of the prisoner who discovers by seeing the world through
his reformed cellmate’s eyes that his own relationships to people fail
to satisfy deeper values he accepts and that the Communist values
pertaining to interpersonal relationships are likely to so ve m
terpersonal need which now has become salient.
b. For many prisoners the problem of psycho-social survival was
how to find out what was wanted by the authorities. As we have
pointed out, identification with a cellmate often P'ovcd to be tt*
mechanism by which information became available that cnabW the
prisoner to satisfy his captors. If we conceptualize the coera
persuasion process in this fashion, it becomes ev.de», tot the
process of identifying with another in the cell h *■£•“£> ! °" r
L to a problem^hence is en insbince^of ^es
iTc^Srclbonwillpersis, ^usetheid— n
itself will persist even when the ® ona , Motions by
prisoner, having discovered some p animates as models
identifying with cellmates, in „oup after release from
and continues to use the obse rved ,f^ me repatriates (con-
prison. Such a process , . Uon of [i ie Chinese people as a gen-
tinued admiration an * 0 b serv ed in a given set of
eralization frora t0 , v diich this process will operate dc-
fellow prisoners). Th d o(Lcr feting models begin to
pends on tlie aegrcc
250 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
create conflict requiring further influence to take place. Such com-
peting models will gain salience (as we have stated in Chapter 7)
as a function of the emotional relationships in which the repatriate
finds himself after his return home (which in turn will partly, but
only partly, be under his own control — see pp. 187-193).
In a complete description of coercive persuasion, then, it be-
comes necessary to consider the relevance of each of Kelmans
processes of influence, and in particular to discover the interaction
of identification and internalization. Kelmans model, as we have
said, derives its virtue from the clear statement of the separate
processes and their separate experimental validation, making pos-
sible a more precise fitting of a complex social phenomenon like
coercive persuasion into social psychological theory.®
Studies of Croup Pressure
A series of experiments carried out by Asch (1951, 1952), brings
out the group-pressure aspect of the influence problem in bold relief.
Asch had a group of "confederates” of the experimenter give
unanimously incorrect responses to a simple perceptual problem
preceding the public judgment of an experimental subject When
the subject arrived in the experimental situation he would find
anywhere from 1 to 15 other Ss (all of whom were in collusion with
the experimenter) and would be jockeyed into a position in the
room in which he would have to give his oral answer following all
the others. The problem was to match a given line with one of
three others on an adjacent card (a task which control Ss did with-
out error). On a senes of 18 problems the confederates would then
give unanimously incorrect answers to 12. The experimental ques-
tion was, to what extent would the experimental subjects repeat
their inconect answer? Many groups were run using different types
i Urt ^fu c ° m Pj icat * n K P r °hlem is the fact that the experimental under-
pinnings ot theories like Kelmans tend either to be weak or to involve situations
ottow applicability to real life situations. Only recently, for example, has there
ematic attempt to study the influence process in a senal interaction
1°: t0 de,crmine ^ terminal effects from several successive inter-
«Perimenta!ly controlled (e.g., Fisher & Lubin, 1958). Yet
the £n , J! lty 11131 ^ ^deriving mechanisms shift as the different phases of
rtan i; process occur may be the most important feature for the under-
loading of interpersonal influence. 1
Socio -psych ohgical Theories 251
of Ss, and it was generally found that roughly one-third of the Ss
tended to go along with the unanimous majority on most of the 12
"test” trials.
All Ss were interviewed following the experiment, and evidence
was obtained that the yielding represented in different Ss a different
psychological process. In some Ss it was a simple adaptation to the
group involving a change in behavior (Kelman’s compliance) with
the subjective recognition by the S that he was giving the wrong
answer in order not to "seem different” from the others. In other Ss
there was an awareness of giving an answer that seemed wrong
subjectively but accompanied by lack of confidence in own ju g-
ment resulting in the decision to trust the groups ju gmen .
third group of yielders denied that they had given wrong answers,
leading to the conclusion by Asch that they had undergone genurne
change In perception (their need to be in toe with *e group war
so strong that they had to deny even to themselves that they had
bC Z£;A* by Ascii were that the unanimous major!*
reached its potency when it reached 3 against 1; ™
to 15 against 1 led to no significant toease in
demonstrable. Even more significant, if a second ejenmentai St*
ject was inserted in the group to a as P > t |, w -p e d
“minority 1 * subject, the yielding effect was .1 mo t , ™pWe.y
out. No matter how many members ° Lfsubiect “ rrect
answer they gave was incorrect the test subject g
""Lb's findings are obvious*
coercive persuasion problem e g of be jj e f s and at-
single perceptual response rati ^ t j |( . f act t J ia t a unanimous
titudes. Most relevant would potential but that a single
majority has tremendous m ® uen TW f consistent with our
supporter can break its s eng^ ■ ns wtere the targe t individual
observation that only in ^ worc unan iniously amayed
was placed in a cell s s likely to be set io motion. If
against liim was an ^ who „ er e resisting influence, tins
^ own
050 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
create conflict requiring further influence to take place. Such com-
peting models will gain salience (as we have stated in Chapter 7)
as a function of the emotional relationships in which the repatriate
finds himself after his return home (which in turn will partly, but
only partly, be under his own control — see pp. 187-193).
In a complete description of coercive persuasion, then, it be-
comes necessary to consider the relevance of each of Kelmans
processes of influence, and in particular to discover the interaction
of identification and internalization. Kelmans model, as we have
said, derives its virtue from the clear statement of the separate
processes and their separate experimental validation, making pos-
sible a more precise fitting of a complex social phenomenon like
coercive persuasion into social psychological theory.*
Studies of Group Pressure
A series of experiments carried out by Asch (1931, 1952), brings
out the group-pressure aspect of the influence problem in bold relief.
Asch had a group of “confederates” of the experimenter give
unanimously incorrect responses to a simple perceptual problem
preceding the public judgment of an experimental subject. When
the subject arrived in the experimental situation he would find
anywhere from 1 to 15 other Ss (all of whom were in collusion with
the experimenter) and would be jockeyed into a position in the
room in which he would have to give his oral answer following all
the others. The problem was to match a given line with one of
three others on an adjacent card (a task which control Ss did with-
out error). On a series of 18 problems the confederates would then
give unanimously incorrect answers to 12. The experimental ques-
tion was, to what extent would the experimental subjects repeat
their incorrect answer? Many groups were run using different types
. ^ further complicating problem is the fact that the experimental under-
pinnings ot theories like Kelman's tend either to be weak or to involve situations
ot low applicability to real life situations. Only recently, for example, has there
been a systematic attempt to study the influence process in a serial interaction
situation to try to determine the terminal effects from several successive inter-
actions which are experimentally controlled (e.g., Fisher & Lubin, 1938). Yet
the possibility that the underlying mechanisms shift as the different phases of
the influence process occur may be the most important feature for the under-
standing of interpersonal influence.
Socio-psychoJogical Theories 251
of Ss, and it was generally found that roughly one-third of the Ss
tended to go along with tire unanimous majority on most of the 12
“test” trials.
All Ss were interviewed following the experiment, and evidence
was obtained that the yielding represented in dilferent Ss a different
psychological process. In some Ss it was a simple adaptation to the
group involving a change in behavior (Kelman s compliance) with
the subjective recognition by the S that he was giving the wrong
answer in order not to “seem different’ from the others. In other Ss
there was an awareness of giving an answer that seemed wrong
subjectively but accompanied by lack of confidence in own ju g-
ment resulting in the decision to trust the groups judgment,
third group of welders denied that they had given wrong answers,
leading to the conclusion by Asch that they had undergone genuine
changes in perception (tlicir need to be in tunc with fte group was
so strong that they had to deny even to themselves Hurt they had
b Adiw C fodings by Asch were that the unanimous majority
reached its potency when it reached 3 agrunst 1;
to 15 againsi X led to no significant increase m amount of mfiuenee
deTonslable. Even more significant, if a second esperirne m!
ject was inserted in the group to act as a pad mer to the one
“minority” subject, the yielding effect mil™' /a,
out. No matter how many f f ° U S *fthe ' correct
answer they gave was mcorrect the test subject go
“Itch's findings are obviously relevma . **
coercive persuasion problem eve g of beIiefs ^d at-
single perceptual response ra unanimous
titudesjdost relevant .would fta, a single
majority has tremei adous wB < » S consistent without
supporter can break rts s eng ■ j r] ie target individual
observation that only in ftose PT* “animLly arrayed
was placed in a cell wtl * Bk^ to^ set in motion. If
against him was an P h resisting influence, this
252 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
The fact that yielding subjects showed different underlying
psychological processes is consistent with our findings and supports
a theory like Kelman’s, but points in addition to the importance of
individual predisposition for predicting the outcome of influence. A
host of recent studies has attempted to define precisely those per-
sonality characteristics which correlate consistently with "independ-
ence of judgment” or with “tendency to yield to group influence.”
Unfortunately there has been relatively little agreement among such
studies either in finding that yielding can be consistently demon-
strated in a given individual across different kinds of tasks, or that
specific personality measures relate to such yielding when it is
found. Those studies which claim positive results have isolated
factors like the following as being predictive of yielding: low
intelligence, weak ego, high authoritarianism (Crutchfield, 1935);
social inadequacy, inhibition of aggression, depressive tendencies,
low self-esteem (Hovland ct al., 1953) submissiveness (Mouton et
al, 1950); high activity proneness (Schein et al, 1957), etc. (See
also: Adomo et al, 1950; Linton, 1955; Schroder & Hunt, 1958;
Berkowitz & Lundy, 1957; Fisher et al, 1957; Hoffman, 1953, 1957;
Hovland et al, 1959; Singer & Schein, 1958). Until a higher degree
of agreement is obtained on experimental studies there seems to be
little value in speculating on the relevance of the specific kinds of
findings that have been exemplified. (Our own tentative conclu-
sions based on our subjects are summarized in Chapter 7, pp. 167—
169.) The most that can be said is that there seems to be no simple
pattern of personality which relates to the amount of influence evi-
denced either in laboratory studies of influence or in our own studies
of coercive persuasion.
Communication Studies
A number of studies have concentrated on the systematic analysis
o the determinants of opinion change when the medium of com-
munication is an oral or written presentation to an audience (Hov-
n et al, 1953, 1957, 1959). In these studies variables such as the
na e o the communication source, the communication content,
e au lencc predisposition, the nature of the response to be made
y e audience, the order of presentation of positive and negative
Sodo-psychologlcal Theories 253
arguments, etc., have been investigated. A detailed analysis of the
points at which these studies relate to the coercive persuasion
process will not be undertaken here because the basic content of
the attitudes under investigation in them is fundamentally differ-
ent from the kind of attitude content which is central in coercive
persuasion. Specifically, the Hovland studies deal with opinions
and attitudes wliich do not centrally involve the self-concept or
basic values the individual holds (c.g., they deal with attitudes
toward broad social issues, product preferences, international affairs,
etc.). If Communist methods of prison indoctrination were limited
to the manipulation of verbal communication inputs, such studies
would be highly relevant. Our exclusion of them hinges on our con-
viction that coercive persuasion involved much more intensive inter-
personal influence processes, in the context of which die mampu a-
tion of mass media inputs, for example, played only a limited role.
These studies have limited applicability to coercive persuasion in
the same sense in which they have limited applicability to psycho-
therapy or resocialization in prisons, for example.
Extensive experimental work has also been earned out on the
problem of opWon change in the small group denvtag ; from .ewms
classical studies <e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 19S3). T °
and evaluate the relevance of these studies and other classics in
ft c ij chprif 1936) would require far more space than is
the field (e.g„ Shenf, 1936) ' 9^ ^ ^ of , ow ^
available here. Many of to r£ , evant for U)e same reason
portanee to the subjee t tance twin's classical studies
that the Hovland studies are not c w™ do deal with
on involved, and the model which
central rssues J Uie one we have found most use-
the basis of our influence model (Chapter 4).
CONCLUSIONS
, a orecedine chapter we have attempted to Ksess
In this and the P £ hologica l theories to the problem
the relevance of a num tj coercive persuasion. The
of ^l^S.^^ebrevimvea may be classed in the follow-
stress mode.s, learning Uieones,
254 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
psychoanalytic formulations, psychoanalytic formulations combined
with sociological formulations, cognitive formulations, and social-
influence models. One conclusion stands out above all others when
one examines the relevance of these models to coercive persuasion
— the models tend to supplement each other rather than to compete
with each other. Taken singly, no one of the models gives an
adequate account of the varied results of coercive persuasion; taken
together, they provide a picture which makes the process and the
outcome understandable without the need to resort to esoteric
theories or demonology.
We can summarize best by attempting now to combine the model
which we presented in Chapter 4 with the theoretical mechanisms
spelled out in this and the previous chapter. We stated that no in-
fluence could occur in a prisoner unless the prison milieu tended to
unfreeze him or unless he was already unfrozen (ready to change
and motivated to do so). In Table 3 we indicated that unfreezing
involved the undermining and weakening of the prisoner’s initial
attitude of resistance, physical stamina, social-emotional and cogni-
tive supports, self-image, sense of identity, sense of integrity and
inviolability, and basic personality integration.
Psycho-physiological stress theory contributes some degree of
understanding of how this weakening occurs, particularly at the
physical level, but requires extensive supplementation from the
psychoanalytic and sociological formulations before it becomes clear
why some of the environmental events observed in prison had the
effects they did, in the sense of inducing or arousing motives in
the prisoner which led him to change. Of particular importance are
theories dealing with the role of self-image and identity, insofar as
the loss of a viable identity seemed to be one of the key elements in
the influence process. The extension of psycho-physiological con-
cepts of sensory deprivation to under- and over-stimulation at the
level of social cues (confirming or disco nfirming interpersonal in-
formation) is also necessary, though here we enter a realm in which
no good theory as yet exists. Notions of the breaking point also
have to be conceived, in our opinion, in both physical and sodo-
terms, insofar as the person’s concept of himself is
probably closely related to what he thinks he can stand physically.
Soclo-psychological Theories 255
and is the psychological reality to him, regardless of what his body
is capable of. Of course a key theoretical concept, coming both from
psychoanalytic and sotio-psychological contexts, is guilt in its
various forms. The special role which guilt comes to play in un-
freezing has been discussed in Chapter 5 .
The process of changing was described in Chapter 4 as involving
first of all a need to change, then the discovery of an information
source which provides the direction of change, and a cognitive
mechanism which describes or accounts for the altered psycho-
logical functioning at the level of belief, attitude, value, and be-
havior. The formulations which derive from learning theory and
the cognitive analysis given in this chapter offer fruitful direc-
tions toward the discovery of a change mechanism at the cognitive
level. The concept of identification coming both from psycho-
analytic and sociological theory is a crucial supplement, however,
in providing a dynamic and motivational element as well as an ex-
planation of why the prisoner uses certain sources of information
more readily than others. It also focuses on the interpersonal nature
of influence or change and draws attention to the fact that such
influence is not limited to the socialization process or childhood. It
would, in fact, be interesting to test the hypothesis that identity
change can only occur through identification, i.e., coming to see
yourself through the eyes of some important others and accepting
some of what he (they) sees (see). The chief competitor to the
identification "theory” of influence would be the transfer of guilt-
anxiety “theory* which argues that cognitive change occurs in order
to avoid unconscious material, that is, as a defense against inner
forces of destruction. We feel that both mechanisms probably
operate, but that the transfer of guilt mechanism applies more to
those cases who showed only temporary influence, while identifica-
tion applies more to those whose influence was more or less stable.
The process of refreezing implies that any change will not re-
main stable unless there are forces continuing to operate to make
it stable. Put in this form we have merely reiterated a well-known
principle of learning, and what learning theory has to offer at the
level of instrumental responses should certainly be applied and
tested at the level of cognitive responses of the sort which coercive
250 Theories of Coercive Persuasion
persuasion involves. Thus learning theory provides us with variables
and causal relationships between them but does not specify the
' content of these variables. The psychoanalytic and socio-psycho-
logical formulations provide the content in the form of notions about
self-image, identity, interpersonal cues of a confirming or discon-
firming (reinforcing or not reinforcing) sort. It should at some point
in the development of the field be possible to put the two formula-
tions closer together and determine whether the traditional learn-
ing laws can provide useful insights into the processes occurring
between people. Some of the immediate complications which one
can imagine would be our hypothesis that confirmation need come
from only one significant other; that the same interpersonal cue will
have very different meanings depending on whom it came from
(i.e., how the recipient perceives and defines the sender); that the
relationship between the target of influence and the model through
whom the influence occurred can sustain itself symbolically or
through surrogates; and that the person can to a degree control the
amount of confirmatory (reinforcing) cues he will get by seeking
out others who will or will not provide it. Clearly, refreezing can
occur intrapsychically through cognitive and affective internal
processes producing a reintegration which may have considerable
internal stability.
^ If one could engage in coercive persuasion in an experimental
situation, it would be tempting to derive and test a more parsi-
monious model than that which is suggested by the complex com-
bination of all the theories mentioned above. Without having access
to such experimental verification, however, it would seem the more
appropriate course to put into the theoretical model a sufficient rich-
ness to encompass the extremely rich data. We do not have sym-
pathy for the attempt to squeeze the many types of experiences
which the victims of coercive persuasion report into simple, one-
actor, theoretical models. Such squeezing serves neither to in-
crease our understanding of the process nor to advance our knowl-
c g® o eory. We feel that the change or influence model pre-
sente in Chapter 4, supplemented by the specific mechanisms men-
one m this chapter, is as close as we can come at this stage to
giving a eoretical model of the coercive persuasion process.
PART FOUR Implications for a
Theory of Influence
One of mi: most significant trends in current social psychology is
the gradual broadening of theory to encompass seemingly widely
divergent kinds of phenomena. Particularly with respect to the study
of social influence one finds increasing attempts to bridge the gaps
which bare traditionally separated studies of socialization and
initiation in antliropology, of the learning process in the field of
education, of the process of psychotherapy in psychiatry and clinical
psychology, of reform and rehabilitation in penology and criminol-
ogy, and of confession extraction and indoctrination in studies of
Communist practices as well as in police practices in other societies.
The search for common practices in the art of influence and for
common theoretical mechanisms promises not only to improve our
understanding of the influence process in general but also to shed
light on the many separate kinds of activities which thus far have
produced only separate bodies of “wisdom" that get passed from one
generation of practitioners to another.
The next two chapters are a deliberate attempt to contribute to
this trend by examining those elements which coercive persuasion
has in common with other kinds of influence situations. We have
deliberately focused on common themes and have ignored some
glaring differences between situations or processes. We have at
times taken great liberties in making assumptions about influence
processes with which the practitioner or specialist in that area might
rightfully wish to quarrel. Our only justification for such stretching
of the limits of the areas discussed is to stretch all of our imagination
a little in the hope that this stretching will lead to some new ap-
proaches to the analysis of situations in which influence occurs.
r 257
10
The Ritualizatum of Belief
Oun theoretical discussion thus far has only peripherally dealt
with the problem of how beliefs, attitudes, and values are integrated
into the total personality and what functions, if any, they perform
for their holder. The question not only is important for any theory
of influence but also, as will be seen, brings us back full circle to
the problem of the impact of coercive persuasion on those who
continue to live within totalitarian society. There has been a good
deal of speculation concerning the relationship between publicly
expressed and privately held beliefs, attitudes, and values in the
citizen of such society. In Chapter 3 we examined some of the as-
sumptions which can be held concerning this relationship and tried
to indicate that the simple dichotomy of overt public behavior versus
covert private behavior is insufficient for an understanding of what
can happen to cognitive-affective responses under the impact of
coercive persuasion. It is from this starting point that we should like
to resume our analysis.
Smith et at (1956) have distinguished three functions wlucli
opinions * can serve for the person. They can serve to appraise
reality — tlirough his opinions the individual can test reality, cate-
gorize incoming information, and reach rational conclusions about
his environment. They can serve to facilitate and reinforce social
adjustment — through his opinions the individual can relate him-
• The terra “opinion" is used by Smith et aL to represent in general what wc
have been referring to as beliefs, attitudes, and values.
259
2C0 Implications for a Theory of Influence
self to others, express his membership in certain groups, and Bs
sense of identity. And they can serve to external.® mner problems
tlirough his opinions the individual can express lus personal con-
flicts, his conscious and unconscious feelings and motives.
If opinions are to be changed, the strategy of change will have to
depend upon the function they serve: opinions 'yhich serve object
appraisal functions will be most responsive to facts; opinions which
serve social adjustment functions will be most responsive to in-
formation concerning what significant others thinh; opinions which
UU 0 • . , .
serve to externalize inner conflict probably become more rigid wun
increased external pressure and can only be changed in a permis-
sive and reassuring environment by some kind of personal reor-
ganization. ,
If a change strategy is employed which is incongruent with the
basis on which the opinion is held, it may lead to less expression
of the opinion (making it less public) but not necessarily to opinion
change. If the environment, however, has the means of checking
private opinions (as the group cell did), the individual will find
himself in difficulty if his opinions are either expressive of personal
conflicts or serve to appraise reality.* He can then change in some
deep personality sense so that expressed opinions are now con-
gruent with what the environment demands, or redefine the criteria
by which reality is to be judged, or suppress the use of opinions to
fulfill the expressive or object appraisal functions and try to fulfill
these functions through some other means.
We have seen that some prisoners found it possible to redefine
the criteria of reality by adopting the “people’ s standpoint,” and that
some prisoners underwent significant personal reorganizations. The
category of individual whom we have not treated in detail is the
one who did not change in either of these ways, but who found it
possible to separate the realm of opinion expression from the realms
of object appraisal and personality expression, i.e., who initially or
terminally used opinions solely to facilitate social adjustment. This
kind of response, which we have labeled ritualization of belief,
• If his opinion* serve primarily social adjustment functions he will readily
change them to adjust to the demands of the cellmate, as will be indicated
below.
The Ritualization of Belief ogl
! S f ountl no1 onl y in of climate which is created by a
totalitarian regime, but also in the climate of any "total institution ”
, e ' an ^stitution which has the responsibility of caring for all
aspects of its inmates’ lives {Coffman, 3957b),
The ritualization of belief is the psychological process which re-
sults when a group's formal doctrine and its manner of expression
is completely controlled by the leaders of that group. Such control is
present in totalitarian societies and in total institutions such as
monasteries, nunneries, fraternal orders; certain kinds of academies
and schools, certain kinds of reformatories, mental hospitals, prisons,
etc. The degree to which the ideology of the organization or society
is explicit may vary independently of the degree of control which
is exerted by the authorities aver the inmates’ expression of ideology.
However, the more committed the organization is to an explicit
ideology, the tighter the controls on the inmates with regard to
learning it, assimilating it, and expressing it appropriately. By con-
trast, the individual who is not controlled by a group in this sense
can maintain belief systems which grow and change, wliich are re-
sponsive to external information and internal forces in the in-
dividual, which he may use to fulfill object appraisal and expressive
functions, which he may test against the beliefs of others, and the
expression of which is curtailed only by the patterns of social forces
to which he exposes himself.
From tlie point of view of the individual, the psychological
essence of tile ritualization of belief is his ability to gain control over
both his overt expression of belief and his private expression (even
his expression of it to himself in his own thoughts), which means
that beliefs serve only the social adjustment function for him).
Learning to control overt expression is, of course, not difficult, but
learning not to have thoughts other than the ideologically correct
ones is difficult indeed and is probably only attempted by in-
dividuals who are highly motivated to do so.
In the training of a nun, for example, this goal is sought^by
two methods — the novices attempt to leam to maintain an in-
terior silence,” i.e., to think of nothing if they are not thinking about
their faith, or to fill mentally unoccupied periods with prayer and
other routine activities (Hulme, 1956). The function of both of
Implications far a Theory of Influence
3r££=3=S2
rssr-Jsr-'!^:
fantasies The threat in these fantasies lies, of course, in that they
could readily lead the individual to engage in impulsive =“*° ns
belief expression which would bring strong sanctions from the
^“le^s to control his overt ^ covert ^
expression he comes, in a sense, to be emptied of belief and 81 cd
will, ritual. That is, he gives up that which *V*° rd ^chefi
plies in common usage-a dynamic, changing, viable and
kind of cognitive response. The more the individual adapts to tne
group’s ideology, the less able he will be to think productively and
creatively because he will have lost some of the cognitive tools
with which to do such thinking. We have informally observed that
an individual who has accepted ideology in this sense is quite unable
to discuss it in terms other than cliches; he is likely to repeat com-
pulsively certain stock arguments and premises, or else to refuse to
discuss the ideology altogether. In any case he is likely to give ie
impression either of being quite devoid of fantasy and creative
thought or Glled with certain lands of routine and stock thoughts
which he is unwilling to examine critically.!
At the same time, his beliefs and their overt expression will be-
• Whether such fantasies also produce anxiety nr Guilt in the clinical sense
unclear. Since they are in conflict with external authority rather than n e
values, one may expect more fear and less anxiety and/or guilt.
1 The frequent allegation that defectors from Communist secret police ope
tions appear, upon being interviewed, to be "inhuman” is apparently in pa u
to the defectors' appearing to be cognitively “empty” of anything other than
ideology. They cannot respond to interviewing except in stock ideolrn, c
cliches. Interestingly enough one of the subjects in the Smith et al. study °
whom beliefs served primarily to facilitate social adjustment had similar -
Acuities in being interviewed. He cither answered in a cliche or went blame.
263
The initialization of Belief
come more labile in that they lose their anchorage in the total per-
sonality. Their prime source of stability is the authority of the group
which has defined them and their prime function is to facilitate the
individuals adjustment. When the group no longer provides au-
thority, i.e., no longer tells the individual how to adjust, the in-
dividual is lost and has only the alternative of finding another group
which will provide an ideology comparably well organized (pos-
sibly this accounts for some of the conversions from Communism to
Catholicism); on the other hand, if the group or its leaders change
aspects of the formal ideology, the individual can readily accept
the new formulation even if it disagrees with the one held previously.
A number of observers of the citizen in totalitarian society have
described a process which we feel is essentially what we have called
the ritualization of belief. For example, Guillain describes the situa-
tion in Communist China as follows:
The socialization of heads proceeds therefore from a sort of abandon-
ment on the part of the individual of the faculty of thought. He delegates
it to a group, he externalizes it. He yields it to the party, the representative
and guide of the people, and to the leaders, considered as the wise men
of the regime, who cannot err. One could truly speak of “mental aliena-
tion,” in its medical sense, meaning “insanity” a renunciation of the
mind. One is ever tempted to use the word "alienation” here in its
Marxist sense. Man finds himself deprived of that little superfluous prod-
uct, of that surplus — thought (Guillain, 1957, p. 13-1 j
Hotter sees the ritualizing aspects in noting about mass move-
ments that:
Where unity and self-sacrifice are indispensable for the normal func-
tioning of a society, everyday life is likely to be either religiofied (common
tasks turned into holy causes) or militarized. (Hoffer, 1951, p. 15 J
The best statement of the functions of beliefs and the lability
which results from ritualization is found in the excellent anaysis
by Katkov:
264 Implications for a Theory of Influence
People refrain from spitting on the floor and bother to put on ties, not
because they believe that spittle spreads infection or that ties add to their
personal beauty, but because otherwise they would not get on with their
fellow creatures. And the Soviet citizen who does not want to be con-
sidered a leper professes the official ideology for a similar reason . . .
It stands to reason that beliefs which are held and professed for these
pragmatic reasons will persist and function in quite a different way from
beliefs which are held because of their recognized or alleged truth value.
To begin with they cannot easily be modified by argument. At the same
time they will be relatively easily discarded as soon as those who hold
them discover that in changed circumstances they become useless for
pragmatic purposes and indeed might be dangerous. This explains the
astonishing number of "conversions” or "changes of heart” which Soviet
citizens undergo as soon as they are withdrawn by force of circumstances
from the control of Soviet State authority. In fact, in the majority of
cases, these are by no means "conversions” . . . The beliefs were not
held because their truth was demonstrated, but were instilled by those
means of persuasion against the background of coercion . . . [Katkov,
p. 8]
It is futile to treat political opinions instilled by the persuasion-ciun-
cocrcion method by mere argument, as if they were held for their truth
value and not For their pragmatic and life preserving reasons. But they
also should not bo approached as if they were merely insincere, make-
believe attitudes, concealing elaborate alternative views on the same sub-
jects. [Katkov, p. 12]
The fact that belief systems can and do become ritualized seems
amply demonstrated in analyses like the above and in more detailed
clinical studies of individuals who adapt to a coercive organizational
context. We do not know, however, to what extent such xitualiza-
tion actually leads to an atrophy of a private cognitive world. Does
the individual preserve a sense of self which is independent of the
self which the organization defines for him, or is it impossible to
preserve such a sense of self without interaction with others? If it is
true that a viable private cognitive world depends on some inter-
action with others, or at least one significant other, it becomes
crucial to analyze in detail the extent to wliich a totalitarian society
265
The Ritualization of Belief
or any group actually manages to sever all emotional links which
are not politically or ideologically defined. In Chapter 3 we have
indicated that there are forces in totalitarian society which operate
to destroy any vestiges of private relationships. One wonders
whether in the process they also destroy the capacity of the citizen
for creative effort or whether the citizen always manages to find
outlets in non-political areas for functions which beliefs and their
expression can no longer fulfilL
In order to indicate the relevance of the ritualization of belief
for our study we have to distinguish certain features of the ex-
periences of our American subjects from the experiences of Chinese
or others whom thought reform was intended to make useful mem-
bers of Communist society. The most important difference is that
our subjects were expelled from Communist China following their
imprisonment, whereas the others went to work within Chinese
society. ,
The long-run changes in our American subjects have to be as-
sessed in terms of the impact which the return to Western society
would have on someone who had been 'reformed in prison. It
he had accepted new criteria for appraising reafity, such entena
would either be dropped upon his return or integrated with West-
ern criteria (thus producing someone who ought appear mo
liberal, more to the left, possibly more confused and labile in lus
thinking, or someone who seemed to have a number of log 0 -t.ght
compartments). If he had undergone some persona^
Bon and adopted some of the broad ethical pnndples of C 0 „
monism he could no doubt make a very successful ^ap py^d
justment in Western sodety inasmuch as
not conflict with our own. If he had lea ™, l ivirI)nmen , i e J had
their expression) solely to adjust to a : soma on scs in his
begun to ritualize them, he would have foundjes^ons« { ^
friends and relatives which encourage emressive
ritual and the readoption of * e ° b ) ec * J P su ,,portive and cn-
200 Implications for a Theory of Influence
generally for a continued ritualization of belief unless the in-
dividual entered a total institution which supported those same
beliefs.
The situation is entirely different for the native prisoner. All the
institutions in Communist society support the continued use of ex-
pressed beliefs and opinions purely in terms of their social adjust-
ment functions. Even private expression becomes subject to govern-
ment scrutiny and the entire social control apparatus operates to
insure a continued expression of only those beliefs, opinions, and
attitudes which are currently sanctioned by the party. The con-
sequences of this for the reformed native prisoner are probably the
following.
If his thought reform has led primarily to the adoption of new
criteria for appraising reality (if he has internalized the Communist
point of view thoroughly, understands it, and can reason from it),
he can enter society with some hope of acceptance as a dedicated
and useful member (useful in that he could, through his own
understanding of the theory, help others to understand it). He
would probably be perceived as the type of Communist who has
been described as the idealist or the true convert and would adjust
successfully until such time as party policy and actual operations
would lead to disillusionment and disaffection. Once disaffected he
would, like others, find himself in the position of having to ritualize
his beliefs in order to survive physically in the system.
If his thought reform had led to personality reorganization, the
adoption of the broad Communist ethic, and the intention to lead a
good life, he would quickly discover that such a life was impos-
sible and that the ethic was not in evidence in the daily operation
of the Communist state. He too would then become disillusioned
and either commit acts leading to rearrest, attempt to defect, com-
mit suicide, or undergo a further influence process leading to the
ritualization of his beliefs.*
One of the chief points of conflict between the actual operation of the sys-
t«n and 1 the personality reorganization encouraged by reform lies in the concept
ot individual responsibility. The method of reform and much of its theoretical
emphasis places the individual in a situation of talcing personal responsibility for
meeting the organizational goals of the system; the more he learns to take re-
sponsibility, however, the more likely he will find it impossible to adjust to the
The Ritualization of Belief 2G7
If his thought reform has led to a ritualization of his beliefs and
a corresponding submersion of other functions for belief expres-
sion, the system would support a continued reliance on this type
of psychological adjustment, in fact would reinforce and further the
process of ritualization.
The observations of our subjects concerning the type of adjust-
ment which their Chinese cellmates were making to thought reform
suggest that most of the Chinese were sufficiently aware of the
realities of Communist operations not to allow themselvess to bo
too deeply touched by the reform process (in the sense of opening
themselves up to personality reorganization). Rather, one gets t le
impression that they were attempting to ritualize their beliefs and to
learn the role of the reformed person without completely giving
themselves to it. Whether this would be equally true of the young
people being reformed in Revolutionary Colleges we o not mow.
Our statement applies only to those Chinese cellmates who were
observed by our American subjects. ,
In conclusion, it con bo scon .ha. .ho loose <hs.,nct,on boh^
overt behavior and private belief does not pnwA enough efine-
ment to make possible an understanding of whal happens to
liefs under the impact of coercive persuasion and
institutional social control. Only if we condone the
concept with hypotheses about the funchons of belt eft ta the FJ
sonality is it possible to spell out some of he results. * we ease
argued here is that the main result of totairbwia n conUoi i s * F
sphere of private activity become reacted or ^
belief systems become ritualized and come fcav ' fa .
justment function, and that such ntuahzalian yj c |fc
dividual without the cognitive tools to lead a P mc
i. 0 „ in *c end both his public and pm® ^
dominated by ritual. The concept : ofl Y dttlcm to
adjustment function captains two i po inability or un-
totalitarian states: their cognitive emptiness and }
, i. u litrlv find repeatedly
deological E»<“ of ' ho "S 1 ’'
268 Implications for a Theory of Influence
willingness to examine their own cognitions or fantasies; and their
ability to change their belief systems frequently as the regimes
official dicta change the ideology.
The importance of the concept of ritualization for a theory of in-
fluence lies in the fact that some of the most important influence
processes within our own society occur in institutions which may
quite properly be called total institutions. If ritualization is one kind
of outcome of a certain strategy of influence (quite apart from the
content of the material involved), it is important to ask whether
such an outcome was intended or not, and what side effects, wanted
or unwanted, accompany ritualization. This question is especially
relevant to those institutions which wc sanction morally— our mental
hospitals, reformatories, academies, etc. Most theories of influence
limit themselves to a consideration of the conditions under which
opinion change will or will not occur. Our argument is that if we
are going to consider influence processes which go deeper than ad-
vertising or the mass media, processes which might properly be
called rcsocialization, acculturation, or re-education, we must con-
sider not only the conditions of change but also the nature of the
new integration which the change produces in the target individual.
11
Coercive Persuasion in
Mon-Communist Settings:
Some Parallels
The model of coercive persuasion we have proposed is not limited
in its applicability to what the Chinese Communists did to their
Western political prisoners. Bather, it is applicable to all instances
of persuasion or influence in which the person is constrained by
physical, social, or psychological forces from leaving the influenc-
ing situation. The model is also morally neutral in that it explicitly
ignores the content of the beliefs, attitudes, values, or behavior pat-
terns which are involved in the influence process. If we preserve
this moral neutrality we can raise the question whether the events
in Chinese Communist prisons provide any clues to the understand-
ing of other influence processes, even those which we condone and
consider to be valuable, e.g., psychotherapy, reform in prison, eta
It is important in considering such parallel phenomena not to fall
into the trap of thinking that because we use methods similar to the
Communists our methods are bad and should therefore be aban-
doned on moral grounds. It could just as well be argued that the
Communists are using some of our own best methods of influence,
and therefore coercive persuasion really has some good features to
269
27 0 Implications for a Theory of Influence
it We feel that neither approach helps us to understand the nature
of the influence process, hence prejudgment must be avoided m so
far as is possible. , T t
In spelling out the parallel phenomena it will be useful to in-
sider them in terms of the basic categories of unfreezing, changing,
and refreezing. Particular attention must go to unfreezing because
too often this process is overlooked as an integral part of the in-
fluencing situation.* Yet it seems dear that the unfreezing of a belie*
or attitude is a necessary condition for any influence to occur.
UNFREEZING
If we look at institutional influence of the kind which goes on
in prisons, reformatories, hospitals, educational institutions, religious
orders, etc., we find a great concern with unfreezing which may, in
fact, be the reason for the success of such institutions in produc-
ing influence. Possibly the most interesting aspect of such un-
freezing is that its basic components are similar regardless of the
content which is to be taught in the influence process, ranging all
the way from Communist ideology to a specific set of religious
doctrines. The similarity in unfreezing procedures is probably most
closely related to the fact that total institutions of the kind we have
mentioned all are in the business of influencing the person’s self-
image or identity and that a certain amount of folk wisdom has
accumulated concerning the best way of doing this.
For example, most influencing institutions separate the target in-
dividual from his normal social contacts and daily living routines,
thus reducing sharply the amount of interpersonal confirmation he
can obtain. In prisons, mental hospitals, convents, and monasteries
this is obvious; in educational institutions it is somewhat less so.
In the latter the reduced contact results from a combination of
* The experimental study of social influence ha« failed to draw attention to
unfreezing became it generally lies outside of the experimental design itself.
Subjects are usually allowed to volunteer; if they do not pay attention to the
experiment they are either thrown out of the analysis or treated as part of the
uncontrolled error variance; if they or others object too strenuously to parts of
the experiment on moral grounds it often has to be discontinued, etc. Most ex-
periments on influence do not directly concern themselves with unfreezing at
all, exceot at the cognitive level, by presenting material which it is presumed
or hoped will create readiness for accepting the influencing message.
Coercive Persuasion fn Nan-Communist Settings 271
factors: a very heavy work routine; social norms that too much
attaclimcnt to home is somehow bad or unmanly; and the physical
isolation of the academics, schools, and workshops that makes con-
tact with significant others from home difficult. Christie (1954) re-
ports the interesting finding that Army basic trainee adjustment
tends to be better the farther away the trainee is from home and the
less frequent his contact is with home folks.
Most total institutions have as part of their routine of inducting
a new member what may best be described as "mortifications of
the self," which serve symbolically to destroy the old self by destroy-
ing its external trappings. Thus entry into religious orders ; involves
giving up one’s usual doll, cs, one’s usual physical comforts, ones
normal physical routine, even certain basic physical characteristic
as in the rase of the shaving of tiro novices head. There is usua y
a deliberate degradation of the individual when he enters the m-
stltutlon. His clothes are taken aw ay, his ^sessrons aro logg d hv
nondescript institutional garb is issued to turn, and th «P«»don
is stated that he is to assume a routine of life
tinguishable from the routine of countless others. llc j ec0mcs
number, a nonentity; iris former seif <*“« l ) relj gi0 m or ders,
Again, tire process is perhaps most obvrous in religious ,
hospitals, reformatories, or prisons, buU' h^id coun^rp^ ^ ^
educational practices as issuing uniforms to stude h .
tioning of severe and degrading ta| * « he b l
ratifying the perception that the new . . rpgptinrs a similar
comes a full-fledged member. In oHhe eongre-
process occurs in the practice of m S j sinful that only a
gallon feel as if their old S^anTrelf-esteem. In
conversion could reinstate a 8 _ u berty or upon entrance into
Initiation rites, whether to rctaUon to puberty or, P ^ rf
an organization like a fratcrin y, practice of scari-
degrading the incumbent, ct cn p i> ^ ; n our own adolescent
Ecation In non-literate societies ( j ® rtion 0 f destroying the
culture), which seem to have ^ ^ and ^ of
old self and at the same tone test g be officially
die incumbent for die -w of M au Mau or of
bestowed upon him. in uie »
272 Implications for a Theory of Influence
cults of witchcraft (Carothers, 1954) the destruction of the old self
is accomplished in part by forcing the individual as part of his oath
or as a test of his worth deliberately to desecrate or profane im-
portant symbols or relationships (e.g., spitting on the crucifix, swear-
ing to lall father or brother if ordered to do so, committing sexual
acts which are revolting to the initiate, etc.). Even the relatively
non-coercive sales relationship involves a measure of unfreezing in
this sense in that the good salesman will prepare his customer either
by showing him that his old self-concept needs revision or that by
buying the product he can better achieve some idealized self-concept
he may have.
Certain organizations like Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) do not
deliberately unfreeze an individual but refuse to take anyone under
their care who is not already unfrozen. Thus a person does not be-
come eligible for care by AA unless he has really become desperate,
is dissatisfied with himself, and is prepared to turn his fate over to
some greater power. A comparable criterion exists to a degree in
private psychoanalytic practice, in that an individual who claims to
have a problem will generally not be accepted for treatment by the
psychoanalyst unless he demonstrates real motivation to get well
(i.e., unless he is already to a degree unfrozen and prepared to
change). Of course, the person may have motivation to enter analysis
for reasons other than a dissatisfaction with his present sense of
self. In fact one suspects that those patients who get turned down by
analysts arc precisely the ones who say they want analysis but who
are in fact not unfrozen and are not willing to allow themselves to
enter a situation in which they may be unfrozen ( e.g., by accepting
the basic rule of psychoanalysis and genuinely attempting to co-
operate with the analyst in an exploration of their unconscious). A
similar point applies to the voluntariness of entry into religious
orders. While it may be true that the individual initially is strongly
motivated to become a nun or priest, this is not equivalent to being
psychologically prepared for giving up one’s old self. The degree of
effort which religious orders put into the training of their incumbents
suggests that a good deal of unfreezing has to occur after the in-
cumbent has entered the institution and exposed himself to the full
force of the new environment. Of course, where the new self is
Coercive Persuasion in Non-Communist Settings 273
particularly different from the old self, an additional strain on the
subject is imposed and greater institutional support has to be given
him to make the transition possible. _
Beside the physical and soda! isolation, and the mortification of
self, other parallels can be found between the unfreezing in coercive
persuasion and that in other infiuencing institutions For example
the monopolization of the attention of the individual by controlling
the communication flowing into and out of the institution is an
obvious parallel. In some institutions like academies, limitations are
placed on the number of letters which can be received or sent; m
prisons or mental hospitals the inmate may actually be
censorship of Ins mail and certainly is limited “ len “ ' °‘
media to which he is permitted to expose himself. A
of total isolation from all communitation often
initiation rites or is co-ordinated with those tones when reaffinna
tion of faith is ofi5dally sanctioned or demanded. j(.
A closely connected parallel is the emphasis 0 X,ed ildth
examination in many influencing msbtu ons,o inmate or
a deUberate attempt to destroy the b y to sfflu-
studen, group. In pris m; there H^^^t^Cressey
tional rewards and punishments, 7 is so me tendency to
& Krassowski, 1957), in mental hospdabtoere is mme ^ ^
move patients who fmn^cb^ewi* ^ ^ H( .
In the opinion of the statt, wo , . self-examination
goals; in religious orders there is full circumscribed and
and contemplation combined w . j ; ^j a i ce lls as sleeping
supervised social life and the givmg ° f ^ US ed as a
quarters. In prisons solitary non i, in school
punishment for behavior coun er stan( ] i rl the comer; in the
the pupil is punished by being being isolated; in
menial hospital getting ’ sicker by b5„g 'sen. to
SSfcSZZ-Z * — by “ ow
'TZ Cresting sidehgh.
— TbC
274 Implications for a Theory of Influence
group can usually generate a powerful field of forces for the indi-
vidual and, in effect, induce conformity to its norms whatever they
be. If those norms support the institutional norms and goals, as in
the case of group cells in thought reform, they are not only tolerated
by the institution but encouraged and organized for that purpose.
If the group norms run counter to the institutional norms or goals,
as was the case in POW camp (Schein, 1956), they have to be
undermined and destroyed so that the commitment to the group as
a source of resistance to influence ca n be made inoperative.
The interesting question arises, then, in what way are groups in
fact used in the unfreezing of individuals in the parallel types of
institutions which we have discussed? We have already mentioned
several instances of the breakup of groups by institutional authori-
ties; are there examples of the use of groups? In AA the small dis-
cussion group plays a key therapeutic role; in mental hospitals
there has been an increasing reliance on therapy groups, work
groups of various sorts, and/or patient self-government groups,
where in each case the assumption is made explicitly or implicitly
that for the new group member the membership experience will pro-
duce influence of a kind desired by the institution; in educational
workshops, like those concentrating on human relations training, the
group experience is considered the key educational experience; in
the “hell week” hazing engaged in by fraternities one of the key ex-
periences is “the ride” in which a small group of pledges without
money is taken somewhere far away from the chapter house to
return by its wits; and so on. One of the more interesting strategic
problems for the influence agent would seem to be how to make the
small groups in his target population work toward his own goals
rather than at cross purposes with him. Once he has allowed or en-
couraged the formation of small groups, he must be prepared for
the severe resistance which may be generated if such groups turn
against him.
As a final parallel concerned with unfreezing, we shall examine
tiie coercive element of the coercive persuasion process. Have we
been engaging, in the above paragraphs, in a flight of fancy in so far
as there is a fundamental difference between our own institutional
persuasion and that which occurs in Communist prisons because the
Coercive Fersuasion in Non-Communist Settings 275
target individual in our institutions can generally escape before he
is too severely unfrozen?
Clearly the parallel is applicable to those institutions which are
entered involuntarily and/or which confine their inmates by force
for varying lengtlis of time. Prisoners and mental patients can be
forced to attend meetings, lectures, and therapy groups; they can
be forced to visit psychiatrists, social workers, teachers, and others
who are concerned with resocializing them; they can even be forced
to share cells with others more “reformed" than they or put into
solitary confinement; they are subject to the institutional system of
rewards and punishments in the same final way as the political pns-
oner in that any degree of privilege can be withrhawn and any de-
grec of punishment exacted by tie authorities without anyone n eed-
£g to be any wiser (at least it may be perceived m tins fashron by
SS-asasaarssg
generally defined as failure, but the act of enbynw ^ ^ ^
may constitute a more or Ie ” ^ eV0C ? t aIe pat hs when he makes
individual often cuts himself off f'™ alternate ^ ^ peth aps
his decision. In addrtron to these by fellow group
an even more powerful o ^ . thers 0 f the emerging
members and by ome who has entered a religious
institutional identity. The yo g a difficult time
order and wishes after half a year to lea™ be t
276 Implications for a Theory of Influence
termination is defined by all concerned as an act of moral weakness.
Obviously these pressures are not always as strong as we have im-
plied, and obviously people do leave institutions like religious orders,
but equally obviously it generally requires an act of great courage
to do so. Such courage is not too dissimilar to the courage required
to resist the pressures of thought reform.
In the case of therapeutic institutions the pressures to remain
until the therapist terminates the relationship or until the patient
feels well enough to do so himself, i.e., when he has been successfully
influenced, are somewhat different but equally potent First of all,
the situation is defined as one where cure will not come quickly or
painlessly, thus predisposing the patient to tolerate some of the
painful aspects of unfreezing. Second, the patient is put into a posi-
tion of being less expert about his condition than the therapist and
therefore less able to judge when termination is appropriate. Third,
the patient feels the tremendous threat that if he does anything to
displease the therapist he may lose the help which is being offered as
well as incur the displeasure or wrath of a person whom he has
invested with considerable authority.
In the face-to-face kind of influence situation such as in a buyer-
seller relationship there are also strong forces operating to keep the
buyer in the situation once it has been established (hence the well-
known “principle” that the important thing for the salesman is to
get his foot in the door”). These forces are primarily the moral
norms which govern facc-to-face relationships (Goffman, 1955;
Biderman, 1960). It is generally not possible in terms of these
norms openly to ignore another with whom one is talking, or to cut
him off abruptly, or to allow him to embarrass himself too severely,
because each of these offenses would produce considerable guilt in
their perpetrator. When we allow someone else to lose face or to
embarrass himself, we are thereby threatening our own status in the
situation because of having failed to exercise the necessary counter-
measures to prevent the incident from occurring in the first place.
In the case of situations like revival meetings, lectures, etc., the
group forces generated in the .situation ran have similar coercive
components. How many of us would find it easy to leave in the mid-
dle of a church service even if the minister’s words were beginning
Coercive Persuasion in Non-Communist Settings 277
to generate acute discomfort, anxiety, and guilt in us? Pluralistic
ignorance is of obvious importance in these kinds of situations
insofar as everyone may be equally uncomfortable and equally
desirous of leaving, yet be ignorant of the fact that anyone else feels
this way, a situation strikingly reminiscent of the plight of die
deviant in a totalitarian society. For the agent to maintain this
coercive atmosphere obviously requires careful management; if e
permits open communication to occur between members of his audi-
ence they may discover their shared discomfort and thereby break
the coercive tic holding them. ...
We do not need to belabor the point, but it should be clear that
the term coercion is applicable to the entire continuum o
ranging from small constraints imposed by die very na e
moral order governing interpersonal relationships to very siza e
straints which deriv£ from a combination of physicrf and social
forces such as those found in Chinese Communist gro«p ceUs. In
other words, many more influence situations are «aUy fastances
coercive persuasion than might at first blush seem o found ^
In highlighting the unfreezing pressures which ca
such varieef institutions as education,
salesmanship, and diought reform we are s gg S engaging
understood better if analyzed from the standpoint ofte eng g*g
in coercive persuasion. We are not sugg & ^ such
suasion is the only important activity '*5. . denying the rele-
tions; on the other hand, little is o e g demonstrable,
vance of a process the occurrence of which * cleiuty ^
Ultimately what distinguishes P r ^ f material which
from each other is their goab and standing, eta),
defines the outcome (know! !ed S.' H have borrowed heavily
But at the level of means these a p „ sua de and have
from cultural traditions of how to mfluenoc a P
incorporated similar techniques for drherem
changing
The most potent source of wTroore re-
““ a model 0
278 Implications for a Theory of Influence
behave, think, and feel in an acceptable manner. In terms of a status
or rank liierarchy the cellmate occupied a peculiar position relative
to the subject; he was a person in transition from the status of guilty
criminal to the status of redeemed citizen, but he still possessed
elements of both statuses. The hypothesis suggests itself that where
the degree of change expected of the person is very drastic the
change agent most likely to be successful as a model will be the per-
son in transition who still has a foot in each camp. He is sufficiently
like the target person to make possible an identification, but his loy-
alties have shifted partially or totally toward the institution desiring
the change. He is still in a category similar to the target and hence is
more likely to be trusted than the authorities, yet he is willing to use
the target’s trust to exert pressure on him to change. He is in closest
touch with the target, hence is often in the best position to know
the target’s state of readiness for influence, the points of strategic
leverage for inducing change in terms of the target’s strengths and
weaknesses, and the kind of idiom in which best to communicate
with the target.
On the other hand, this change agent must not be perceived as
being merely a conscious agent of the authorities, a plant or a stooge,
or one who has "sold out” or become a “company man.” His shift in
loyalty must be perceived as spontaneous and sincere if he is to
continue to have the power to influence others. All the conditions
listed above are essentially true of the cellmates as described by our
repatriates. But does a model like this apply to any of our own
institutions?
We cannot provide extensive evidence, but some dramatic paral-
lels can be cited. In the treatment of juvenile delinquents it has been
frequently observed tliat the psychiatrist or social worker cannot get
anywhere with an individual if that individual is still loyal to (is
sewn up by ) a gang which itself mistrusts treatment. In this kind
of an impasse the only chance the therapist has is to get through to
one o the influential members of the gang, win his confidence, and
use him to get the co-operation of the others. The crucial change
agent is not the therapist, but the gang member in transition from
oya t) to the gang’s mores to loyalty to the therapist’s mores, what-
ever they may be.
280 Implications for a Theory of Influence
paired with someone who is of the same rank but greater seniority
than he, or of only slightly higher rank. One industrial concern has
reported that it has abandoned the apprenticing of newly hired
college students to high-ranking members of the company in favor
of low-ranking ones. Because of lack of time and inability to com-
municate, the higher-ranking manager fails to imbue the young man
with enough of the company ideology to get him to remain with the
company. The person of equal rank or only slightly higher rank can,
in the process of teaching “the ropes” to the newcomer, teach him the
company ideology. However, as in the case of the prison or mental
hospital, the influencing agent can, if he wishes, also create pockets
of resistance by poisoning the attitudes of the new employee.
The person in transition or the person close in rank to the target
of influence may be in the best position strategically to exert in-
fluence, but obviously is only one link in a chain. He himself must
be influenced by someone in authority to be loyal to the institution
and to want to achieve its goals. The person in authority (the of-
ficially defined teacher, doctor, interrogator, judge, coach, or parent)
may be directly influential, but often his very position of authority
leads the target to mistrust his motives. Also the gulf between him
and the target may make it difficult for the target to identify with
or understand the authority figure.
We indicated earlier that there may be two basic types of influence
process involved, depending on whether the target individual identi-
fies with a person in authority or with someone who is essentially a
peer-group member. One task for future research would be the de-
termination of the conditions under which each of these is most
likely to be effective and an assessment of whether “authority in-
fluence produces different results from “peer influence” in terms of
type and degree of influence accomplished.
REFREEZING
The importance of refreezing is implicitly or explicitly acknowl-
edged by all institutions of influence. In the case of prison rehabili-
tation or rcsocialization in the mental hospital, elaborate systems of
transition and follow-up are usually considered to be an integral part
of the total therapy program. Of course, where the person is being
281
Coercive Persuasion in Non-Communisf Selling*
influenced in the direction of the acceptable norms of society, he
will normally obtain support and reinforcement for a |
from a wide variety of otliers. One of the difficulties wi ie. p ^
“ that they return to a subculture to which h ™™*ng to .Jddhto
arc in fact not supported and reinforced, thus leading K
A comparable problem exists for the mental patient 'rh o is , rehmnng
to a family station which stimulated his breakdown “
place. His more -normal" behavior might no p ^ myn jjj over
him either to seek support elsewhere or
Religious orders the - -ft— &T
rdTen“al^tt ***
die joint performance constant sup-
282
Implications for a Theory of Influence
sustaining new attitudes has been widely documented. In those cases
where entire organizations have gone through a training program, it
has been possible to initiate far-reaching organizational changes.
The importance of specifically social support was illustrated in the
recent Billy Graham crusade in New York City. An informal survey
of individuals who came forward and converted when Graham called
for converts indicated that only those individuals who were sub-
sequently integrated into local churches maintained their faith. For
the others the conversion was merely a temporary response which
was neither integrated into the rest of their personality nor received
support from significant others.
The purpose of presenting these parallels was to show that one
could view a whole variety of influence phenomena within the gen-
eral model of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing; and that, from
the standpoint of such a model, Chinese Communist coercive per-
suasion is not too different a process in its basic structure from co-
ercive persuasion in institutions in our own society which are in the
business of changing fundamental beliefs and values. By showing the
parallels, we hope to illuminate both our version and the Communist
version of coercive persuasion, and lay the groundwork for a more
general theory of influence.
The virtue of the particular model we have chosen derives from
the fact that it draws our attention to the time dimension in influence
and reminds us that successful influence must start long before the
actual change is brought about and must be followed up by support-
ing and reinforcing kinds of experiences. Too often we forget this
point, particularly in the field of social psychology, when we insti-
tute training programs in human relations or offer advice on how
to change attitudes in various areas of life.
CONCLUSIONS
We stated at the outset that our aim was b '
coercive persuasion from a Q °f ch ? a or abo ut Com-
major conclusions therefore are not nrocess Perhaps
iminism, but about coercive persuasion as can be
our most important conclusion is th knowledge about man
understood within the framework o exi 2 aonroach to prison-
and groups. There is in the Chinese Cmnmunlst . 'SSr^Vhat
ers little that is theoretically nerv or difficult ^ ^ ^ ^
novelty there is lies in the willingness o ^ create m environ-
their experience and interpersonal <Y of even initially
ment conducive to influencing the pohdcalatb“ Wo
hostile individuals, and io put untold quantrtres
enterprise. . , , ^ Chinese efforts have been
A second broad conclusion of American civilian pns-
successiul In a very small number ^ how ever, because
oners. Tlris conclusion must be quah£ i ^ DOt completely in
die effects produced by co ^ c ''' e P b| „ benefited personally from
line with Communist n ms. Somc su ^ better peop fe, but
tire experience in that no. risen shandy and
SS S£^-.5SS=» —
individuals varied so outc ome and undel j! te ° , £ a an d whose
form. We *«*£?£**. ^55**. -any
persuasion pro®® ... v Ve cannot say muc , h coercive
interest throughout has been ^
282 Implications for a Theory of Influence
sustaining new attitudes has been widely documented. In those cases
where entire organizations have gone through a training program, it
lias been possible to initiate far-reaching organizational changes.
The importance of specifically social support was illustrated in the
recent Billy Graham crusade in New York City. An informal survey
of individuals who came forward and converted when Graham called
for converts indicated that only those individuals who were sub-
sequently integrated into local churches maintained their faith. For
the others the conversion was merely a temporary response which
was neither integrated into the rest of their personality nor received
support from significant others.
The purpose of presenting these parallels was to show that one
could view a whole variety of influence phenomena within the gen-
eral model of unfreezing, changing, and refreezing; and that, from
the standpoint of such a model, Chinese Communist coercive per-
suasion is not too different a process in its basic structure from co-
ercive persuasion in institutions in our own society which are in the
business of changing fundamental beliefs and values. By showing the
parallels, we hope to illuminate both our version and the Communist
version of coercive persuasion, and lay the groundwork for a more
general theory of influence.
The virtue of the particular model we have chosen derives from
the fact that it draws our attention to the time dimension in influence
and reminds us that successful influence must start long before the
actual change is brought about and must be followed up by support-
ing and reinforcing kinds of experiences. Too often we forget this
point, particularly in the field of social psychology, when we insti-
tute training programs in human relations or offer advice on bow
to change attitudes in various areas of life.
CONCLUSIONS
We stated at the outset that our aim was to analyze the process ot
coercive persuasion from a socio-psychological pomt of " e ' v -°'" r
major conclusions therefore are not about China or atxtutCom-
munism, but about coercive persuasion as a social process. P
our most important conclusion is that coercive P^f°”Tmm
understood vrithin the framework of existing
and groups. There is in the Chinese Communis approach d >
era litde that is theoretically new or difficult to unders.and^ What
“nSu quantities of effort into this
“S broad conclusion is
successful in a very small number “ * however, because
oners. This conclusion must be qual ffiedsome what,^ in
the effects produced by coercive p benefited personally from
line with Communist aims. Some su J econle tetter people, but
the experience in that they fee ey nQt riscn sharply and
their dedication or loyalty to 1 abs olute authority
their willingness to subordmate themselves
has apparently decreased of Chinese Communist
A third conclusion is dial the toto f (hat tbo program
thought reform is extreme y experiences of the targe
itself operated so uneven to closure to tl, ought re-
individuals varied so '"^ 0 Xme and Jrstand the coercive
form. We can evaluate the wcre influenced and whose
persuasion process in those few Macs h oboul ,hc many
[nilucnce made headlines Wc^no s y^ ^ ,, coerdvc
interest throughout lias been ^
284
Coercive Persuasion
cases where influence was demonstrable.
A fourth conclusion is that the influence process as exemplified in
coercive persuasion is best thought of as a complex series of events
occurring over a considerable period of time. These events can best
be understood in terms of a model of change which includes three
phases — unfreezing, changing, and refreezing. For influence to oc-
cur there must be induced a motive to change, there must be avail-
able some model or other information source which provides a di-
rection of change, and there must be reward for and support of
whatever change occurs. Furthermore, the changes associated with
coercive persuasion are basically changes in perceptions of, beh'efs
about, and attitudes toward the self and interpersonal relations, and
the political changes observed derive from the connection in Com-
munism between political ideology and the class attitudes toward
self and others.
In other words, the basic political premises promulgated in prison
were essentially moral doctrines about interpersonal attitudes from
which could be derived the concept of crime which established the
guilt of the prisoner. Because of the close connection between politi-
cal and interpersonal values in the coercive persuasion process, those
theories of influence which deal with ego, self, or identity change
appear to be most applicable to an understanding of the changes
observed in the prisoners. However, it was found that most of the
theories which have been offered to explain brainwashing tend to be
relevant and to supplement each other. This supplementation be-
comes clear if one secs influence as consisting of different phases in
tliat the different theories tend to account for different phases of the
total process.
A fifth conclusion is that it is exceedingly difficult to predict
whether a given prisoner will be successfully influenced or not be-
cause o t . e large number of variables which appear to be involved
as e crminants of influence or resistance. In terms of predicting in-
uencc, c only feature which stands out consistently is that the
n ucn prisoner underwent intensive “struggle” at the hands of
♦T r ° m ? re re ^ orme d cellmates; the crucial influence step was
1 . S row di of an identification with one or more of these ccll-
n enns of predicting resistance, a number of variables can
APPENDIX 1
The Lenient Policy °
The keynote of the Chinese Communists’ attitude to their pris-
oners-of-war is the celebrated “Lenient Policy.” On several occasions
Commander Ding gave long lectures on this theme. We were some-
times faced with questionnaires about it. The subject was always
cropping up.
It was a freezing afternoon in January, 1952, when for several
hours “Snahe-eyes” first expounded it in my hearing. We squatted
before him on the floor, chilled and hungry, to leam once again the
lesson of Chinese leniency. Big Wong interpreted. This is the gist of
his discourse, many phrases of which ring as clearly in my ears today
as when I first heard them.
From the very Erst days of our People's Liberation Army we have car-
ried out the Lenient Policy towards war prisoners. It is not something
first invented in the Korean War, but a policy rooted in our People’s
Army from the beginning.
We know you believe in the Geneva Convention and the Red Cross.
These are instruments of bourgeois idealism which it is impracticable to
cany out, as we believe you will eventually realize. Moreover, they are
used by the imperialists and capitalists to cover their evil plans. Our
Lenient Policy is perfectly sufficient for all your reasonable needs. It is a
sincere policy, based on principles of humanitnrianism, equality and in-
ternational law. When you really understand it, you will no longer be
critical of it
You have come here as dupes of the imperialists, the warmongers, and
"P 1 * 5 Appendix Is a quotation from a British chaplain's account of his
Imprisonment in Korea (Davies, 1954).
288
Appendix 1 .
tile Wall Street big-shots, who have forced you to come from your homes,
and your loved ones to fight their dirty war for blood-soaked profits against
the Korean people. We could justly hill you as war criminals, and enemies
of the peace-loving people of the world. But we know you are only dupes
and tools of the warmongers. You have been liberated now. We shall not
harm you. No, true to our Lenient Policy we shall deliberately preserve
your lives and help you to learn the truth. Later on you wffl selfumn-
sciously realize this and thank us. We extend leniency towards you and
iTof you accuse us of no. taking ear. of you, mi : of Mg «
prisoners d£ We teU you " “ES
they could not cat our type of food. Also, they 7 ^ t00>
brought on by vice, which arc hard to cur through. Some of
caused great damage, and food supp ies co ij. e an j, ole l in the
you think you should bo living in to slaughter and rape
Pentagon. We did not invite you to come to Korea
the innocent, peaceful Korean people. this op-
New you are here we do our best grateful
portunity to open your eyes and see dollars and
Shis is our Lenient Policy. But many of you VVe «
girls’ legs, and do not ivish to study hard and lean, w
there are four types of men among you. ^ selfconsciously
First, there are the righteous, pmgr f , international friends, who
learning the truth, These men are and gaining solidarity
are struggling free from the to ^ We s bake ^ hands,
with the peace-loving people o mEn who are uncertain. They
Secondly, there are 5C ™' ® -ftey incline this way and that way-
are swayed by every wind that u^onsdous decision. They
They listen to ho* ^ wan. to be friends with them,
are basically good men, u tQ acce nt the truth,
but they cannot make up eiI _ e3S ily influenced by the ba m •
who are basically hostile mm
anfwtfd^Slcedldreo^prisonemagamstns.
2gg Coercive Persuasion
are the real enemies of the people, the hired tools of the Wall Street war-
mongers, the absolute reactionaries, members of the capitalist, ruling
clique.
Most of you are basically righteous men, and we hope you will learn
the truth, but there are a few of you who are the real enemies of the
peace-loving people, and who wish to organize subversive activities
against the camp authority, and disrupt the study programme. These men
think they are clever — little Carnes," little Brownes * — but they will find
they cannot outwit the powerful and intelligent C.P.V. Our Lenient Policy
is not limitless. It cannot be extended forever to those who are deliberate
reactionaries with a hostile attitude towards us.
So we remind you again of the Lenient Policy of the Chinese Peoples
Volunteers. We give you warm clothes for the Korean winter; we feed
you; we give medical attention and regular inoculations; we look after
you; we have even been known to return sick prisoners to your lines; we
give you full religious freedom. If you have a conscience at all you must
see how lenient we are to you.
1 am not a Christian, and I do not know all your religious beliefs, but
I do know it says in the Bible you should have a good conscience. Ask
your chaplain, he will tell you. So if you really are Christians, you should
have a good conscience towards us, and honestly and conscientiously
appreciate our Lenient Policy. Your religion says men with a bad con-
science go to Hell. You should self-consciously examine yourselves and
consider our leniency to you, and adopt a good attitude to us and drop a
hostile attitude.
At Panmunjon the American imperialists and their running dogs and
lackeys, the British capitalist ruling clique, are holding up the peace talks.
In the imperialists* prison camps they are torturing, starving and killing
the Korean and Chinese prisoners, but we will remain calm and will never
torture or Ml you. You are safe with us. We shall always self-consciously
cany out the Lenient Policy and thus shall continue to give you the chance
to study and Icam the truth, and see how your leaders are catching the
T V" a”? ° ! !f and Paring to eitend the Korean conflict, and
unleash a third world war.
Regiment. ^ Brow °e were the senior POW officers from the Gloucester
Appendix 1 289
The basis of it all was the preservation of the prisoner’s life so that
he might 'learn the truth,” as his captors saw it, be converted, and
join the ranks of "the people.” It seemed to me a land of political
system of salvation, parallel with the Christian one. [Dawes, 1954,
pp. 71-75]
APPENDIX 2
The Group Discussion in
Thought Reform
CURTIS H. BARKER
The following is on attempt to describe the role f f
on as a technique in the Chinese
Ush a common frame of reference m Chmese society, £
a “m°oup y iscussions tahe many forms, but they are here to-
scribed 6 interms of basic function and content,
situations and tire conditions in which they are held. T1
Ta^'^-Mllllncs. Often called
mgs, they are referred to as “self-education m
The number attending these meetings may vary from U
or more, and they are organized in every nmghborhood, vdlage,^^
farm cooperative throughout China. Everyone is as ' -orefuRy
liis life, family, and work. Meanwhile the propagandist 7
notes the highlights of each ones grudges or pievances.^ ^
cusation or complaint meeting, carefully briefed activists
"pouf out their bitterness." The propagandist begins to chg
root of bitterness" of the people in his group. Their suffering
because of fate, but because of Kuomintang reactionaries, lan
feudalism, and most of all, American imperialism. . . .
When given an outlet, suppressed feelings resulting from soci i » *
justice, economic misery, and outworn tradition can generate
290
Appendix 2 291
mendous power. Even if there were a normal distribution of attitudes
toward these “enemy" classes ranging from “for” to "against, the
propagandist would skillfully stifle any positive comments so that
any succeeding comment about these classes would be more negative
than the preceding one. The trend can only move in one direction—
against. The fervor and emotional pitch of these meetings is re-
qucntly such that it leads directly to the open trial of landlords, the
punishment of undesirable officials, or demonstrations and parades.
2. Study (Hsueh Hsi •) Mortises. To study is to correspond
one’s subjective thoughts to objective facts. Objective ac in
case are: (a) Marxist-Leninist theory of social development; b)
the study of history; (c) part)' policies and directives; mid (d) study
of work or one's o^upattm. These W are presented to gronps oj
ten to fifteen people orally and through sueh reference
pamphlets, posters, cartoons, wall newspapers, magre lantern shores,
e,C Tho next step Is “thought revealing.’ The Chhtese — s for
tills term actually mean to draw out, with a sense of enheem^t or
seduction. Everyone must talk. This exposes rc _
and aids self-imloctrination, psychologically spe^&“ *
mains for tire leader or propagandist to prov.de the correct rnter
Pr Beita large city or -m me wTlage.^ £$
literate groups, the emphasis shift number of char-
the Communist term for ’““t^^j^^reduced drastically
acters required for minimum h cy wT j tten language. The
as a result of extensive simplification mwt s0 „tj s ticated of
success 'of this campaign “earning to read and
educators. Needless to say, the phrases u d^ iut emphasize
write do not say, "The pen of my aunt is on tn
propaganda slogans, and so on. ., 1NCS As with all other
3 CamasM atm umal]y Evolve
types of meetings, no one escapes > * ^ of this group
about sir to > Ite - ‘gggj ^detailed autobiography beginnmg
is concerned with the g rf W M , .»
• For » except tecipto and ->ysts o£ »
Barnett, 1934.
Coercive Persuasion
292
at the age of seven. The illiterate can always find a scribe in desfr
nated places in rural areas, or in a booth in the city streets where they
may go to dictate their life story. This serves as a basis for pmpomt-
ine sources of “backward elements in ones past, and Kalso helps
to prepare one psychologically for the revealing of his innermost
* A^hderesting technique is evident in these groups. On the surface
to the researcher, there seem to be two main areas of content: (aj
political ideology, regarding feudal, reactionary, imperialist thinking,
etc.; and (b) moralistic principles, regarding selfishness, arrogance,
one-sidedness, responsibility-shirking, thoughtlessness, etc. But, m
practice, the cadre or activist who leads these groups very cleverly
blends these two areas together, so that they become indistinguish-
able. This facilitates identifying the ideology with everyday life and
with moral values that anyone would accept. . .
The most outstanding characteristic of these meetings is that it is
virtually impossible to hide your true feelings under the efforts of all
the group members to see through your rationalizations or other
defenses. Intimacy must result where this experience, which does not
allow withdrawn behavior, is repeated daily. One must also remem-
ber that hostility does not motivate this relentless effort to break
down a fellow’s defenses — it is a sincere desire to “help” him in his
“struggle” to be honest with himself. It is this, more than anything
else, that inspires gratitude for this experience.
4. Discussion Meetings in Support op Nationwide Campaigns
or Movements. A substantial portion of discussion groups operate
in direct support of the current campaign or movement When one
of these is launched, every effort of the regime is geared to its con-
tent This is tantamount to saying that the thought of virtually every-
one in Chinese society is concerned with the current movement at
least once a day. The implications of this fact alone could not be
exaggerated.
Immediately after the Comm unis t take-over came the “Study
movement, where the importance and function of study, per se, was
developed. Next came the “Land Reform” campaign, followed by
“Resist America — Aid Korea," "World Peace,” “Suppression of Coun-
ter-revolutionaries” “Increase Production and Austerity,” “Donation
Appendix 2 293
for Buying Airplanes and Artillery,” etc. The principle of involving
the masses in one central task at a time seems worthy of note.
The content of these discussion meetings involves a very rational
analysis of the merits of the movement. Participants are encourage
to be skeptical and even to bring up negative aspects, whereupon
the fallacies of this type of thinking are clearly demonstrated by a
skillful cadre, largely on moralistic grounds.
One of these campaigns may last from three to six months. One
month may be devoted to the development of slogans. Not only does
every slogan presented have to be learned and recite rom mem ry,
but every single participant has to invent or compose a ® °S
own. ItThould be noted that the use of slogans is a major
Chinese mass media, and when coupled with meetings su _ sur f acP ’
the slogans, plastered on almost every aval a e 0 b serV ed
throughout China, are anything but empty. It h the
(Millin, 1953) that this emphasis has much to dc ' ^ * -.^d^vith
type of mentality one finds in the new C una. ^ 0 f chris-
tlie memorization of Bible verses by an ear er 8 ^ Js .
tians — by the possession of these slogans, mieht be asked,
vided with a ready answer for all questions which might
by others or himself. . .. narra tion of an
Another effective device in lhes f §,e Rroup leader, which
endless number of stories, or para . y ^ sihiati0 ns to the
cite myriads of everyday situatio ^ themselves volun-
movement under discussion. Soo P .[ testimony for the
teer illustrations from their own experrence-vocal tes
effectiveness of this device. r meetings by content
We have now discussed four baste W ^ quest ionsi How
and function. It would be appropna attend tliese meet-
does the CCP manage to get 630 might be
tags? Under what conditions does th s o nmnbe r of propa-
better understood if one wh®**** aver
gandists (group leaders and orgam*cm in the urnL
production nnit is about 10 per " aIs0 important to i reahre
Bus may range from 6 to 13 per cent » ^ “ Ilo ‘,Yrs are the only
2S “l L fn S .he united States '^China the time one
rigidly scheduled segment of every y
Coercive Persuasion
294
spends in these group meetings is just as rigidly prescribed. This
may vary from one to four hours daily, including Sunday.
In answer to the question, why do people show up at these i meet-
ings, it should be pointed out that while all party cadres, agitators,
propagandists, etc., are commanded to use persuasion rather than
coercion, a subtle form of terrorism is always at work The vast
number of persons in thought-reform prisons, and the unknown
number of those executed, provide mute testimony of the P n “ °" e
pays for not trying, sincerely and enthusiastically, to rehabilitate
oneself into the new China. The intrinsic value of being sincere and
enthusiastic is also an important appeal to many.
It happens every day at 11:00 A.M.; in the hotel all seven of Hie
porters on the third floor meet on a stair landing around a low table.
From his breast pocket each one pulls a small pad of paper and &
pen — tire badge of the new citizen. One says, “Comrades, Room 312
had to ring three times before I answered.” This is discussed at
length until someone else mentions a petty failure in hopes of im-
pressing others with his willingness to admit his shortcomings. There
is always someone in the group who quickly perceives it as just that,
and the motive for such an act becomes the subject for discus-
sion.
A train pulls into the station for a fifteen-minute layover, and the
entire crew meets on the station platform to help the brakeman arrive
at the conclusion that “I have freedom. I am free to play basketball.
I used to play before, but when I tore my shoes, I was too poor to
buy more — I could no longer play. Today, I have two pairs of shoes.
I am now free to play basketball.” This could be a group of bank
employees, peddlers, sales clerks, teachers, or village co-operative
members.
One factory schedules a “Criticism and Self-Criticism” meeting
from 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. Following supper at the factory cafeteria (the
wife joins him; the children arc fed at the nursery) they meet again
at 6:00 p.m. for the group reading of the Peoples Journal, where the
“correct” interpretation of the government’s policies and directives is
arrived at through an "open-minded” discussion of the issues, during
which everyone speaks. At 7:00 p.m. begins ninety minutes of
"study” which consists of a political instruction lecture followed by
Appendix 2 295
an educational discussion. This might be replaced with a scheduled
ninety minutes at home listening to a broadcast of a speech explain-
ing a new directive or describing the latest nationwide movement
(These examples are drawn from an article entitled “China Behind
the Red Mask,” in Rdalitfs, August 1956, No. 69.)
According to one official report for a two-week period in the city
of Peng Chi, in the Northwest, high-ranking cadres in factories and
mines made 625 reports to a total audience of 70,000; there were 270
group discussions in which 25,000 people participated; 30 accusation
meetings and 15 oral contests were held. In addition there were
storytelling evening meetings, memory meetings, and farewell meet-
ings for those joining the armed forces. Then cadres w< j^ r S amz
to conduct interviews in every family in the city (Yu, 195oa;.
One of the most significant factors is the mere
on* experience s in these groups ere being shored
one else in Chine. One obvious implication here is tba ■ “ S'
required to put yourself in someone elses place u gre»Uy
A^d this someone else can be anyone in Mao ton-
self practices daily self-criticism! This population of oti ® b=®mes
a Jry dominant reference group for an y
to evaluate not only the content, but the leg.hn.acy of the program,
also seems to be a familiar
ing. A good salesman will tell 1 you eto produc{ ^ someone
someone who really thinks he do P words, a man isn't
who doesn't care whether he has it or not othe^ ^ ^ ^
vulnerable to as many techniques un facilitates planned
The two-way, face-to-face nature of this medium ^
involvement, allowing for the °P nerceD tion — one’s receptors are
(1) involvement implies se ec v p ^ ^ involvement in-
tuned toreJevant data, ^^^ ^ rationa l aspects of
creases, emotional facto
evaluating the data. « succee d in locating the source
The accusation m Mlu, 8 s (|[ an dlorJ5, moneylenders, etc.) in
of condemnation of enemy da^( , he partys Propaganda
the hands of the people- >- b
Chief in the Northeast, writes.
Coercive Persuasion
296
The reason the accusation meeting is an effective method of educating
the masses is because it educates and mobilizes the masses y eir
experiences, sufferings and interests. . . . Through the accusation ^
ing, the masses are able to concentrate their old and new hatre , o
their today with tomorrow, to connect their individual interests wi
interests of their country, and to understand the greatness of peo? ®
China, and the preciousness of the new life. [Horn to Be A Propagan >
1951, pp. 69-70]
In the study meetings, while social theory and ideology are s
fully brought to the people’s level, and related to daily life, it mus
be remembered that not only are these issues new to the particip an ,
but so is the intellectual exercise of debate. And while the citizen is
encouraged to indulge in this new-found exercise, he is no mate or
the propagandist. Again, through the leader’s skillful manipulation,
the participant's experience usually results in a very reverent respe
for the knowledge, skill, and sincerity of the leader, who himse
becomes an image for potential identification.
The activities of criticism and self-criticism have several imphea
tions: (I) Individualism, a characteristic of Chinese people, is mini-
mized first by the content — self-centeredness is condemned, etc.—-
and second by the technique — the very process of exposing ones
mistakes or defects in public implies submission to the social group
as well as subjection to the group norms. (2) In a society where be-
ing two-faced” was included in socially accepted behavior, it mig t
be difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the sentiments of the
people. These meetings make an issue of sincerity, which is semanti-
cally equated with truth, regardless of content. (3) The cathartic
effects of such a meeting cannot be overemphasized. Very few of us
live up to the ideals that have been set for us, either by others or by
ourselves. It is not difficult to exploit the resulting guilt toward the
end of justifying the use of this technique. (4) It becomes a simple
matter to shift the blame for shortcomings in the regime's programs
from the party^or government to “reactionary thinking” or “back-
ward elements who must reform their thoughts, or to “enemies
who will ultimately be eliminated.
When an individual suddenly “realizes” that the underlying moti-
Appendix 2
~ - 297
vation for his “reactionary” behavior of the past has been concern
for himself, it is a blow to his ego. But lo and behold, right before
him is a way of life that not only thrives on unselfishness, but can
provide an infinite source of referents to support its ideology.
This latter feature is dramatically communicated through the
nationwide movements. To know that the little bit you are domg to
“increase production and austerity is being multip e y
of millions gives not only legitimacy but importance to your ecision
‘“llow'do all these stimuli figure in the development of fa new
identity for the Chinese citizen? Through the techmques deserted
above, each citizen gets a dear image, in his own e , ^ an
of thinking and behavior encouraged by e
even more clearly defined image of that
the regime. The individual then, throug m rp , . comes to
tion of the external world-past, present ‘
accept these images as valid, even if u^pp P these {mages
And finally, through reinterpretation o b;mse if playing in the
become integrated into the role > be * q{ such a P plan * highly
In evaluating the success ^^“^^’a^shift tal not neces-
noted: (1) The nature of the desarbed ^ ^ ^ a stage ta per .
sarily involve the individual identity t0 the role one
sonality development; rather it gtace the revolution had
plays hr finding his fVsodCnewJ« had to be found any-
rejected so much of the old T' sustain itself only if the
Uy. (3) This new image or.dent.ty can^
environment continues its ™P p „f permanence of effect “
suasion and coercion. (4) The q . £ a[ iB success fa m°s
almost academic, if not '“TtonOT period- Bcgardless of wtat
crucial in the early P 05 accomplishments of
7 It may be safely communicated a dear nnage of
her entire population; (-1
298
Coercive Persuasion
what she stands for; and (3) she has succeeded in involving her
population in the problems of perpetuating that image. These ac-
complishments axe clearly due to this newcomer to the field of mass
media — the group discussion.
APPENDIX 3
The Agents Involved in
Coercive Persuasion
CURTIS H. BARKER
One of toe questions raised in our basic Offline concern ^
Icm of who is actually instrumental in pro* “Te Zrgel
prisoner (target). During his imprisonmen JP with many
deals with many representatives °* * e J°^ ese re lated to co-
fellow prisoners. In what wayo > b wl J& on does each
ercive persuasion, or, to put it anotn / ect to the pro-
seem £ play in «he *°
duction of a confession and a of fheir soc ial origin, edu-
determine who these agents are in Q n jjus j a tter question
cation, occupaflon, specific e JP e "'' ’ 1,35 not already been
we have not found much of S! § n “^ . 0 f the conclusions of
reported, thong we
other studies ( Hinkle ct W »
Types of Agents Administrator
6 . Interpreter
3 Se” ogator 7. Cellmate
4. Indoctrinator 8. Judge
. tnne of treatment and com-
1. t^grf^the attitudo^ the captors through the Initial
municate to the targ 299
30Q Coercive Persuasion
contact with the target The atmosphere, thus set, can range from
leniency to terror, as desired. In this context the interaction usually
takes the form of an official act between the target and the regime,
and it has the effect of creating an image of the regime in the eyes of
the target, as well as his psychological set These agents are usually
attached to the military and are accompanied by militia.
2. Guard. Primary' function is to see that the prescribed prison
regimen is carried out to the letter. Since the context is institutional,
with complete isolation from the outside world, it is important that
this enforcement be carried out in a most impersonal manner, leaving
only the prescribed agents to develop social relationships with the
inmates. (In some cases, targets withstood the social isolation only
because a guard, with as little as a gesture, indicated that a relation-
ship might exist.) This impersonality also has the function of pre-
venting the target from feeling that “these efforts are personally di-
rected at me” and, rather, encouraging the feeling that he (target) is
in the hands of an impersonal institution. The guards are almost al-
ways identified with the military.
3. Interrogator. It is his job, primarily, to do the tearing down
of the old ways of thinking. In the atmosphere of omnipotence, and
with the accompanying unlimited array of techniques, he tries to
show how target’s thinking was faulty, how his behavior was crimi-
nal, and how he can repent. In this authoritarian context, the inter-
action is highly personal, permitting an intensive relationship to
develop. Ensuing emotions in the interrogator may range from pa-
ternal friendliness to contemptuous hate — the only sure thing being
its fluctuation. If things take a turn for the worse, or for other reasons,
tliis relationship may be abruptly terminated or interrupted for as
much as six months. It is hard to pinpoint the institution from which
this agent comes, but I would guess he has had experience as an
intelligence interrogator since his techniques are so similar. The ex-
tension of these techniques is made possible by the fact that the
target s perceptions and interpretations are the content of discussion
as opposed to objective data. This agent is usually perceived as
distinct and separate from the military and has been described as
being from the intellectual” class, many of them having been
students in the United States. This agent is also perceived by the
Appendix 3 ^
target as the one who can 'clear tip his case" or the power figure.
4. iKoocmrNATOn. This man partially fills the vacuum which is
created by the weakening of social and perceptual supports, ego,
self image, etc., by giving lectures or in some other way «™"™-
cating the Communist point of view. He also P™ n “ ° r j
the referents by which vague generalities can be « down to real
personal meanings. This is done in a non-lies e a p
at all. In other words, the target must be 'ready ior tins phrue ^
fore it begins. It is not too important that an tatense mcial relaHon^
ship develops between target and tbs * (he taIgel - s
ever happening), since it is more imp Really and “logically."
fused thoughts can anchor *ots*wsot J ta
MiSar— -
° ( ; S Z? Fm "o" this^role was fulfilled by an inter-
rogator or cellmate. nf the Korean War where
1. ADMLNismATon. 'Vit .-hc «^"l-cal commissars,
some prison camps were set up , solely with administra-
the institution administration is ™ X JracHon of regulations,
tive duties including <hs "Pbf^ egective esecution oi insttt“ hon '
Tlicy are also concerned w ith cr tibody thinks of all the bad
wide campaigns, (i.e., forsixmon a u think of the goo
tilings they have done; f e to _f aC e contact with this agen
things they’ve done, etc.). Th corridor warden as the a bo '
is usually restricted to the floor or com ^ ^ * mo ved from
ssSrSgsafessSK:
6. iNnron®®!. ™ d J ne d as just poW situation,
and sometimes may vas utilized mainly m , ors could
knowledge, the intreprej«j,« ^ because mi my were
aud is -idence
sometimes r^ed^ven P*** ^ * h ”
sonicuni'— — , .
English, indicating ««'
Coercive Persuasion
302
as a device. This is substantiated by the fact that some totepretm
played various roles, usually in contrast to that of the ■ntenogator
ee sometimes feigning direct solicitude toward the target offering
to help him to settle his case. While his efforts are usually in support
of die interrogator’s function, some sources have identified the in-
terpreter with the political corps. He also played an important role
in the courtroom interrogation. ,
7. Cellmate. While no single change agent could accompli^
the phenomenon of coercive persuasion by himself, the cellmate is
the primary agent who gives this phenomenon its identity. His pn-
marv function involves the destruction of the targets ego an tie
rebuilding of his self-image. To begin with, the cellmate is identified
with the target population by virtue of his own incarceration. Simul-
taneously, however, the cellmate identifies behaviorally with t o
other change agents (e.g., interrogators) in his relations with the
target. If he has accepted the Communist interpretation of his past
behavior, he sincerely (if not vindictively) tries to help the target to
do the same. The context in which this agent operates is that of
strict physical and social confinement The cell, which is always too
small, becomes the target’s universe and is shared by from X to 18
cellmates — the majority of known cases having from 5 to 8. One of
these cellmates is selected by the authorities as the cell leader, but
there always seems to be at least one or two others bucking for the
job. The characteristics of this agent seem to he: (1) a fairly ad-
vanced state of reform (but far from the security of knowing how
advanced he is!); (2) leadership qualities of an interpersonal nature;
(3) extreme enthusiasm, vehemence, sincerity, aggression, etc., in
carrying out liis perceived task. He is aware that his position as cell
leader, as well as his state of advancement, is dependent on his per-
formance in flits role.
The interaction involved is highly complex, mainly because of a
conflict of emotions: the intense social relationships resulting from
tire enforced and prolonged intimacy versus the hostility and aggres-
sion which characterize these relationships; confusion of cellmates
dual role as member of target group as well as a change agcnL The
effect usually is for the target to Identify with these cellmates re-
gardless of the role they play, even to the adoption of their behavior.
Appaulix 3
303
8. Tlii* agent usually supported the functions of the in-
terrogntor, However, Die conlcxt was connecter! to the legal Issue
with the courtroom being the stage. The techniques and foie™'*''™
are similar to those of the Interrogator, but the effects on the target
with the courtroom being the stage The techniques and ini'™ 1 * 0 "
are similar to those of the Interrogator, but the effects on the target
have no added dimenslon-lhe underlying hope or fear that a de-
cision regarding his fate may fx? forthcoming re ore te '
room. Some sources reported hating as many as Italy !“te T °gaHons
in this courtroom setting. Tl,o judge was usually IdcnuBed wath the
political commissars.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
It should he noted that while the above ttaataU« »« .typical,
thet- arc ncitliec rigid nor exhaustive m indoclr inalor-
combining of roles. (Tlicrc is one hv0 yearS |) Nor
type Using along with the targe! * ^ ^ md onotb( . r begins,
is the line always clear where on ofthc total process,
Aside from their relationship to Uic we P j. e Jn ^ context in
tile main differences between these g The degree of
which they operate and the tech q y ^ roo dificd by
Importance of any PJ*‘™1}5 £ 0 f dial particular agent,
the necessity for. nod the effect |0 speculate about such
There do not seem to be enough ,dat JV ^ ^vaUon,
points os the das, haclgrouod ef hese a^^^ ^ ^ ,
cynidsm. training, or even Pf”. 0 " ’ 2 ,|* target's guilt, this would
matter of whether or not they ^ j ‘ ibon in the hierarchy. Those
seem to bo n function of them J ° mU . the cellmates ap-
person, who were dm most cm ' * S l had ., lr eady made a
peered to believe in cadi other s pu I ^ „( view), and
Session and to some «• W ‘“d.S
were tl.ereforo quite si neere b. the 1 ft ^ apparently
ward mates. The in wanting to «fonn ottert
sincerity in reforming ; thime i i , JentiBra tien and grosvang
witnesses to succcssiui
Coercive Persuasion
304
one may guess, in so far as a belief in the guilt of the target facili-
tated the comfortable performance of their own job, and, in so far as
they often managed to produce the confession they sought, they
reinforced their own beliefs. With increasing rank and administra-
tive responsibility in the party, one may expect the broadening of
their perspective and an increasing tendency to operate according
to political expediency rather than abstract reform ideals. The same
trend would undoubtedly be true of the indoctrinator. The arrestor
was probably sincere to the extent that he himself had been through
thought reform and had thoroughly assimilated its philosophy. One
of the reasons why the CCP has won so much sympathy, it may he
recalled, is precisely its ability to make its soldiers and policemen
somewhat zealous converts. The target individual often sensed from
the moment of arrest that he was dealing with something more than
a routine police or military operation. On the other hand, we have
cited above how damaging it could be from the CPP point of view
to have inexperienced, crude arrestors who firmly fixed the target’s
disgust and hostility for the CCP and its operations.
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INDEX
Accusation meetings, 290
Adjustment, social, 259
Adorno, T. \V., 105, 252
Agents in coercive persuasion, 299-
304
administrator, 301
arrestor, 299
cellmate, 302
guard, 300
indoctrinator, 301
interpreter, 301
interrogator, 300
judge, 303
Agrarian reform, see Land reform
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), 272
Alienation, Marxist, 263
Altered psychological functioning, 159
Antisemitism, 95
Anxiety, 145, 156. 214, 215
conditioning, 206
Arrestor, 299
Asch, S. E., 133, 197, 203, 224, 250
Attitude change
and behavioral compliance 160-163
and commitment, 165
conclusions, 191
determinants, 167-193
experiments, 241-253
Integrated, 164
and interrogation, 179
post-prison experiences, 180-191
vs. “refreezing," 101
In repatriates, 101
rewards and punishments, 181
and role shift, 246
“significant others," 189
situational factors, 189
in “struggle" meetings, 176
theories, 211-253
urdntegrated. 163
Barier, C. I!., 290, 299
Barnett, A. D.. 45, 57, 291
Bauer, T. 44, 204
Beclcer, K-, 154, 159
Behavioral compliance 160^163
BerVman, P. L., 109
Berlcowitz, L., 252
Berle, A. A., 41, 79, 86
Eemaut, Elsa, 79, 100, 221
Bersohn, M., 53
Bexton, W. H., 209, 223
Biderman, A. D., 196, 204, 221, 220,
275
Bonnichon, A., 88, 150, 161
Brainwashing, 60, 151, 184, 19o, 20 ,
211, 239, 246
defined, 9, 200
see also Coercive persuasion;
Thought reform
Brandt, C., 27, 32, 34
Brinton, C-, 92
Brzezinsld, Z. K-, 70, 77, 84, 98
Buddhism, 40
see also Zen Buddhism
Bureaucratism, 54, 55, 91
Cadres
creation of, 54
and group discussion, 49
nationwide influence, 29o
training of, 49
Caro then, J. C., 272
Cartwright, D. P., 253
Castro, Fidel, 88
Cellmates, 302
“Changing," 129—130, 25o, 277
big-brother system, 279
cognition, 129, 239
cognitive theory, 233
“company man," 278
In juvenile gangs, 278
loyalty shifts, 278
in mental hospitals, 279
nm^Vimmunlst settings, 277--50
314
Index
315
“stool pigeon." 270
vs. “unfreezing," 129
Clicn, T. H, 80
Chen, W. H. C, 45
CbVn Yun. 31
Cheng fmg (party reform) move-
ment, 33-39, 75
Intra-Party morale, 35 , ,
Leninist concent, 3-4
masons for, 34
tendencies, 34 ,
pre-prison experiences, 112
Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
42. 84
combat state, 81-91
Constitution (1945), 85
development, 25
and local populace, 170
personnel, 109
prisoner contact, 109
Qiinese People’* Volunteer* (Lfv;,
2S7
Chiu, S. M., 80
Christie, R., 271
Chu Teh, 31 013
Coercive persuasion, 11— -193,
205, 269
agents involved In, 299-304
analysis (outline), 11— -193
basic stages, 213
cognitive process, 196
conclusions, 283-235
determinants, 111-193
effects, 111-193
and guilt, 140-156
hypnosis, 197
Identity problems. 190
initiation rites, 230
learning theories, 205-211
mechanisms, 190 ,
in non-Communist settings, -
perception of tal^ver. 112
SMSTSi— 1
198
social psychology, 117-139, 197,
221-250
stress theories, 199-205
structure, 111-193
theories, 195-250
Cognitive theory, 233-241
and distortion, 233
formulations, 240
Collectivization, 53
Communications
breakdown in, 102
of cellmates, 131
by Interrogator, 135
mass media, 134
pubh'c vs. private, 76
studies, 252
and totalitarianism, 76
Communism
Chinese vs. Soviet, 37
logic of, 238
>s. nationalism, 39
Communist Ideology. 61-74
flll-induslveness of, 70
basic goals, 65
dynamics, 68
leaders, 74-84
materialism vs. idcalxnn. 67
“people’s standpoint, 59
SiiK^TthSn' and 8ctio "- 69
Compliance, de^oitmn of, 247
Confessions, 50, 114, 148,243
false, 14S, 183 joi
forces acting on prisoner, 121
pubhc, 41, 100
religious, 41
CnitcbMi, Ii ' s ' 25 -
gJSfSK’S—
39 - 42 , 103
Davies, S. J-. 289
Defectors, 56, 109
Defectors (continued)
motivations, 109
see also Prisoner of war (POW)
Dej'aegher, R. J., 44
Dissonance reduction, 241
“Double- drink,” 245
Drugs
sensory deprivation, 201
truth serums, 204
Ego guilt, 148
Ego identity, 221
Ego neutralization, 211
Erihson, E. H., 63, 131, 221
Escape From Freedom, 105
Fainsod, M., 78
Fairbank, J. K., 27, 32, 34
Fantasy, control ovct, 282
Farber, I. E., 196, 205, 208
Ferreus, 66
Fcstinger, l*., 98, 197, 241
Fisher, S-, 209, 250, 252
Followers, 78, 104-110
cscane from self, 105
psychological factors, 104-110
self-sacrifice, 100
in totalitarian society, 106
“true believers," 109
Ford, R., 90, 171
Formalism, 36, 54
Freud, S., 218
Fried, M. H., 26
Friedrich, C. J., 70, 77, 84, 98
Fromm, E., 101
Fu Cheng-shcng, 295
C admit! e, H., 239
Geneva Convention, 286
Coffman, E., 198, 221, 224, 281, 276
Courlay, W. E., 49
Government, Chinese, coalition, 33
Criffith, \V., 91
Croup
cells, 176
discussions, 40, 290, 296
indoctrination, 48
pressures, 250, 252
Coercive Persuasion
“straggle’’ meetings, 176-179, 291,
296
Guard, 300
Guerrilla warfare, 27, 91
Guillain, R., 49, 50, 70, 108, 263
Guilt, 87, 141
anxiety-guilt, 145, 156, 213
by association, 141
broadening of, 214, 236
captor’s view, 140-144
channeling, 214
conditioning, 206
vs. crime, 235
ego or identity, 14o, 148-15-
failure to act, 142
generalized, 219
for harmful action, 142
for having knowledge, 142
incorrect attitudes, 141
loyalty, 145, 164
“objective," 156
of “others,” 141 152
persona (face-to-face), 1 »
for personal faults, 142
fjMew. 144-153
proneness, 147
reAgniztog, If
situational, 145, loo
social, 67, 146-1*8, W
special role of, 140-156
transfer of, 212
types, 141, 145 ^
and "unfreezing, 156
299
Hitler, 94
Hoffer, E., 79, 104,263
Hoffman, M. I~.
Hol land, C. I., 1^, 252
Huang, Q-, 99.
Huxley, A., 190
Hypnosis, 197
Index
Idealism, 67
Identification, 247, 255
with authority, 212
with cellmates, 131, 151, 230, 238,
249
defensive mechanism, 213
and internalization, 249
with interrogators, 249
Identity
change, 189, 229, 230
collapse, 224
confirmation, 225
crisis, 131, 164
denial, 223
destruction, 224
diffusion, 227
guilt, 148
levels, 225
problems, 190
resolution, 165
shifts, 297
stresses, 225
of students, 49
theory, 221-233
Ideological unanimity, 55
Imprisonment, 58-61
for espionage, 58
for propaganda proposes, 58
and property seizure, 59
revenge on West, 59
Indoctrination, 184, 301
Stored psychological functioning,
159
not discernible, 158
types and degrees. 15S-166, 248
theory, 257-282
Informers, 45 -
Initiation, psychology of, 23U
Inieles, A., 77, 03, 1 _
Internalization of behavior, 247
Interpreter, 301
military, 204, 275
prison, 51
Russian, 223 _ R -
and "unfreezing,
Interrogator, 300
communications, 135
establishes guilt, 88
initial contact, 172
Machiavellian, 144
sadistic, 174
superego surrogate, 212
Interviews, propose of, 10
Jacobinism, 66
juverole gangs and loyalty slufts, 278
KnSX.'li. cflOT.
2S.*&SJ*W1 47,234,286
Kracauer, S., 109
Kubis, J. F.,204
£S^a.T),27,225
Krisas.*
L X£l71
ideological, 91
of masses, 73
study, 73 „
and "unfreezing, 171
Lea, C. H., 87
Leaders, 98.
basic traits, 92
cell, 182
psydobgtcal factors,
foie in movement, a-
sense of omnipotence, 100
success of, 92
^Stcd. ■»
£££?«
Levin, K-. I 17 -
Coercive Persuasion
318
Liberation movements, 30, 85
Liebcrman, S., 240
Iifton, R. J., 32, 40, 49, 80, 107, 133,
145, 183, 190, 213, 210, 221, 233,
299
Lilly, J., 209
Lindsay, M., 28
Linton, Harriet B., 252
Literacy training, 246
Liu Shao-chi, 51, 35
Liu Shaw-tong, 49
Loyalty guilt, 154, 155
Lubin, A., 250
Lundy, R. M., 252
Mao Tse-tung, 25, 35, 47, 68, 75, 8o
Marxism, 69
sinification of, 35
Mass persuasion, 46
Materialism, 67
“Mechanism of escape,’* 105
Meerloo, J., 79, 104, 150, 190. 205,
212, 217
"Menticide," 212
Messianism, 64
Methodology, 7, 20
Miller, J. C., 190, 201
Millin, L., 293
Missionary movement, 59
after take-over, 44
Moloney, J. C., 190, 211, 217, 220
Morale, intra-Party, 35
Mouton, J. S., 252
Mutual surveillance, 103
pao chla, 45
Mysticism of leaders, 93, 100
Nationalism, Chinese, 39
Neuroses of war, 224
“New man,” 79, 103
creation of, 52
Nineteen Eighty-Four, 78, 98
Omc, M-, 204
Orwell, C-, 78, f
3, 245
Ohlin, Ruth, 62
Ongoing relationships with "significant
others," 189
Opinion change
in small group, 253
terminology, 259
Papal Inquisition, 86, 87
Pavlovian formulations, 20o
in coercive persuasion, 200
mechanisms, 204
Peer influence, 280
Persona (face-to-face) guilt, 152
Physical “liquidation," 44
Post-prison experiences, 115, 138, lbO-
191
Initial contact, 187
with “significant others, 189
situational factors, 189
Post-Yenan period (1945-49), 43
Power struggle of leaders, 74, 7U
Pre-prison experiences, 112
Prison
administration, 301
cell, 113, 150, 152, 167
cellmates, 153, 302
“changing," 134
debilitation, 174. 204
diet, 175, 232, 230
^fc U l 4 13,134,.37, 103 ,
172-186
facilities, 171
goals of, 114
groups, 182, 227
guard, 300
identity' crisis, 133,164
indoctrination, 184, 253, 291,
information sources, 234
interpreter, 301
interrogations, 179, 300
interrogator, 51, 303
isolation, 177, 209, 300
management, 184
180
V t ,oAm 51, 80, 88
pimtshment, 150, 174, 181
“refreezing," 137
regimen, 113, 159, 1
Index
319
rewards, 181
role-playing, 152
songs, 210
stress, 175
"struggle" meetings, 176-179, 182,
193, 284, 291
Prisoner
age factor, 172
American, 283
British, 289
CCP approach to, 283
vs. cellmates, 235
contact with CCP, 169
as hostage, 59
and local populace, 170
motivational state, 208
not inner-directcd, 168
not politically sophisticated, 168
psychological state, 167-172, 226
situational factors, 167
uncommitted, 163
Western, 58. 235
Prisoner of war (POW)
American, 53, 56, 160, 200, 209
British, 280
resistance of, 226
Propaganda
anti-American, 47
materials, 293
in mass media, 46
oral, 47, 49
in prison. 114, 169. 233, 299
Psychotic defenses, 122, 133
Public Security Committees, 45
Punishment, uses of, 181
see Also Prison, punishment
Pye, L. W, 33, 85
Race discrimination, 95
gSE&S A °> *
239
Reality testing, 259 ne 27
Recruits, Chinese Conunonist. 25-7.
31
Red Cross, 286
Red!, F., 218
Re-education
recoding of reality,
rewards, 215
steps in, 215
working- through, 215
see also Coercive persuasion;
Thought reform ' '
“Refreezing,” 136-139, 255
in non-Communist settings, 2S0
Repatriates, 15S * 4
altered psychological functioning,
159
American, 1S7, 190, 265
attitude changes, 163
internalized beliefs, 249
paranoid, 139
pro- Communist, 191
psychotic, 139
types of, 189
Resistance, 123, 252
to confession, 123
to influence, 161
patterns, 212, 226
in prison, 161
training, 231 .
Revolutionary colleges In Communist
China, 49. 267
Rewards, uses of, 181, 215
Riclett. A., 165
Riesman, D., 16S_
Ritual of liquidation, 100
Ritualism, 75. 51 „
RitualiznUon of belief, -59 — 08
Role-playing. 152
denial of role, —J
and deception. 227
in prison, 152
Rousseau, J. J-. 66
Sadism, 174
Snntucci. l\. 196, 205, -10
204, £22. 252
Schneier. Inge 165
Schroder. If. M-. ^
Schwartz. B , -5, 3^, 34
Secret police. 45
Sino-Japanese W ar (1937). 34
Sherif, M-. 253
Singer, M- T.» -5-
320
Situational guilt, 150
Skinner, B. F., 207, 209
Skinnerian formulation*. 209
Sleep deprivation, 208, 209
Smith, M. B., 100, 259, 202
Social guilt, 140
pronencss to, 167
Social influence, 24 1-253
Social psychology of cocrdve persua-
sion. 221-250
Socio-economic change, motivation
for, 82
Soviet purges, 100
Stalin, 85
Stealing in prison, 155
Strauss, A., 100, 221
Stress, 199-205
Talmon, J, L., 64, 70
Taoism, 40
Tennien, M., 44
Thomdikean formulations, 209
Thought reform, 9, 43-01, 210, 228,
267
after take-over, 43-61
avowed aims, 52
CCP viewpoint, 53
conclusions, 60
evaluating, 283
in group, 290-298
implicit aims, 54
important movements, 48
leniency phase, 107
passion for unanimity, 62-110
visible effects, 55-58
see alio Coercive persuasion
Totalitarianism, 75, 70
Transcendentalism, 86
Coercive Persuasion
functions of, 109
Image of, 03
passion for, 02-110
"uUcrfng," 120-129, 233, 2M
Alcoholics Anonymous, 272
in Army basic training, 271
aspects of prison, 125-128
attitudes, 123
of basic personality, 127
vs. “changing,*' 129
cognitive distortion, 238
forces acting on prisoner, 121
and guilt, 156
identity crisis, 131
in interrogation, 180
in mental hospitals, 273
in non-Communlst settings, 270-27/
and physical strength, 125
and prison confession, 121
in religious orders, 271
and resistance, 125
self-image, 120
social -emotional support, UU
VS. foreign policy, 190
Wales, N., 31
Walker, R. L-, 49
Wang T 5 un-ming. 32
War neuroses. 224
Wei. II., 45, 87
», A 6.fi9T20S,2.0
;S, C S:'fcf60,ml99, 203 , 222 ,
299
Wright, Mary C., 27
Yen, Maria, 49
Youth movements, 57
Unanimity
coercing of, 102
forces to consider, 63
Zander, A., 253
Zen Buddhism, 211
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